Robert Legvold

Clunan does something unusual in this book: she both intervenes in an academic debate over international relations theory and produces fresh insight into the wellsprings of contemporary Russian foreign policy.

No one knows the story that the Soviet archives tell of Stalin's rise better than Khlevniuk. He has toiled over these materials longer and more extensively than anyone else.

Never, Cohen stresses, was the Soviet Union the historically predetermined tragedy that so many in the West have come to assume.

Verhoeven argues that the real forerunner was the psychologically unbalanced, self-imagined revolutionary Dmitry Karakozov, who in 1866 committed the until-then-unthinkable public act of attempting to shoot the tsar.

Cheterian argues that nationalism did not destroy the Soviet Union; the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed national grievances and anxieties to flourish.

Brent has overseen Yale University Press' exceedingly ambitious project to expose the hidden details of the Stalin period contained in the Soviet archives.

This book details the Iranian-Russian relationship in all its complexity and is utterly timely, given the deep U.S. concern over the prospect of a nuclear Iran and the grief this generates in U.S.-Russian relations at a time when Moscow seems more a part of the problem than a part of any solution.

Gregory here argues that Joseph Stalin, as other tyrants before him, rationally calculated both the utility and the limits of terror as a means of buttressing his and his regime's power and furthering its agenda.

There cannot be a better measure of the lavish and murky wheeling and dealing that characterized Russia's coarse path from public to private property than what happened in the oil sector.