During its first few months in office, the Obama administration has essentially ignored India. This could be a serious strategic blunder, given India and the United States' shared interests.
This is a fascinating collection of case studies of instances in which regular forces have found themselves trying to cope with armed groups that have occupied holy places, mainly mosques (in Iraq, Islamabad, Kashmir, Mecca, and Thailand) but also one church (in Bethlehem) and a temple (in Amritsar, India).
India's growing economic and diplomatic prominence is unlikely to be derailed by its territorial dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. But given the risk that the Kashmir issue could spark a nuclear war, it is in India's best interest that it be resolved. Washington should use its influence with Islamabad to broker an agreement and thereby cement its growing strategic partnership with New Delhi.
Last month the Bush administration announced plans to sell India civilian nuclear technology, prompting a firestorm of criticism from nonproliferation advocates charging that the move would reward irresponsible behavior and spur proliferation elsewhere. Indiana University's Sumit Ganguly argued in Foreign Affairs back in 2001 that Washington's approach to nuclear issues on the subcontinent was outdated. In this postscript, he explains why the Bush administration's new policy makes eminent sense and why the criticisms of it are specious.
Three new books detail 50 years of misrule in a country ill served by its overweening military. Now Pervez Musharraf seems bound to repeat these mistakes.
With its two nuclear tests in 1998, India provoked bitter international criticism and retaliatory tests from Pakistan. But in India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, Ashley Tellis argues that fears about nuclear instability in South Asia may be unfounded-and that the time has come for Washington to rethink its unyielding policy on nonproliferation.
Pakistan needs across-the-board reforms, but the record of military regimes in this hapless country offers scant hope that General Pervez Musharraf will get the job done.
Explains how (1) neither India nor Pakistan could expect to benefit from a war over Kashmir (2) nevertheless their pre-emptive defence postures create the risk of war breaking out through inadvertence, miscalculation or misperception.
