As Washington was fretting about ballistic missiles, 19 hijackers used commercial airliners to kill more Americans than had died in any previous attack in the country's history. And there could be worse to come. The United States is the target of a few hostile nations and well-organized terrorist groups, some of them state-sponsored. They understand that nuclear or biological weapons could do the job even better. To meet these new threats, Washington must pursue three simultaneous strategies: prevention, deterrence, and defense. Missile defense is not the whole answer -- and it could even become part of the problem.
Twice before, America had the opportunity to make the prevention of conflict its first line of defense. It must not lose this moment after the Cold War to foment a revolution in security strategy. Preventing proliferation is key, and U.S. programs help turn Soviet missile sites into sunflower fields. The American armed services, the world's most emulated, show other militaries how to function in a civil society and conduct exchanges that head off misunderstandings. In Europe, George Marshall's fondest hopes are being realized through the Partnership for Peace, which reverberates well beyond the security realm. Meanwhile, the United States leverages forces for maximum deterrence and invests in smart technology. But its best investment is in openness and trust, the essential tools of the art of peace.
The military technology which played such an important role in the US-led victory over Iraq was built and deployed during the 1980s, but "was largely conceived and developed during the 1970s". Explains and discusses the defence policy objectives and procurement priorities which launched this resurgence of US military technology -- the 'offset strategy', whose central concept was that of compensation for numerical inferiority through 'force multiplier' effects, chiefly in regard to C3I ('situational awareness'), defence suppression (EW) and precision guidance. The USA should take care not to nullify the offset strategy by wanton arms transfers.
The Weinberger five-year plan was based on unrealistic assumptions of budget growth. As a result "there is a ticking time bomb of programs... which cannot be completed even under a flat budget". Sets out an alternative plan which preserves operating and maintenance budgets, while reducing R&D and manpower budgets.
