The West must change its grand strategy in the face of changing Soviet presence in the world order. "Passivity or -- worse -- a posture of delayed and uncoordinated reaction to Soviet initiatives would enable the Kremlin to define the East-West agenda and serve primarily Soviet interests". Soviet reformism is driven by a sense of approaching crisis, and is ready to accept fundamental changes in domestic and foreign policy. Nevertheless, the USSR will maintain the contest with the USA where it can: "certain aspects of current Soviet policy, especially in Europe, are consistent with this long-term objective". The democracies must learn to cope with the Soviet flurry of unilateral initiatives, and to sift the genuine concessions from the propaganda. Reviews the issues in (1) strategic arms control, recommending a greater attention to linkage with larger security policy goals (2) the future of Eastern Europe, recommending the devising of "a category of association with the European Community based on article 238 of the Treaty of Rome" (3) the nature, extent and timing of the economic aid which might be extended to the USSR to promote desirable reform (4) encouraging an acceptable Soviet policy towards the Asia-Pacific region (5) human rights. Predicts that "the competitive relationship between East and West will not disappear... an overall reconciliation of conflicting interests is still a long-term objective". Sets out various 'checkpoints' for assessing Western progress in achieving a more conciliatory foreign policy in these areas. This portrayal of Soviet state action and interests by three top-flight statesmen of the non-communist world, is one of organic and well-integrated policy, carefully calculated to retain maximum advantage in an adverse strategic situation. It shows no anticipation of internal instability, even as late as mid-1989. Those political scientists anguished at the 'failure' of their discipline to anticipate the Soviet collapse can draw some comfort from this equally miserable performance.
