Letter From Bishkek
Over the years, both Russia and the United States have tried to court Kyrgyzstan. Did their strategic competition help push President Kurmanbek Bakiyev from office?
DAVID TRILLING is Central Asia News Editor for EurasiaNet.org. The images in this article are his own.
The downfall of Kurmanbek Bakiyev began with a betrayal. In February 2009, Bakiyev, the president of Kyrgyzstan, met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Moscow, where he received a promise of $2.15 billion in Russian loans and aid. That same day, he ordered the U.S. military out of its airbase at the Manas airport near Bishkek. The United States set up the base in 2001 to support the NATO mission in Afghanistan; since then, the base had become particularly essential, especially after Uzbekistan ordered the closure of a U.S. base on its territory in 2005.
To nearly all Central Asia analysts, the deal was clear: Moscow had long wanted the U.S. military out of its backyard -- or at least a greater say in how U.S. forces operated -- and Bakiyev, in exchange for promises of cash, was happy to oblige.
Yet just four months later, in June, the United States agreed to increase its yearly rent for the Manas base from $17 million to $60 million. A further aid package promised $177 million to the Kyrgyz government. It was announced that the base would stay after all.
Although Bakiyev ostensibly added to his government’s coffers, he unwittingly set in motion the events that would eventually lead to his fall from power. Last week, a surge in nationwide public demonstrations in the Kyrgyz capital resulted in violent clashes that drove Bakiyev to abandon his office, effectively handing power over to a disparate and disorganized group of weak opposition parties. Five years ago, Bakiyev became president after his predecessor, Askar Akayev, was deposed in a popular revolt. Now, it was his turn to flee.

Alexander Knyazev, director of the CIS Institute, in Bishkek, told me that Bakiyev’s reneging on the deal with Moscow was a “key moment” -- not only in relations with Moscow but also in terms of his own political survival. Knyazev, who is close to the Kremlin, called the breach “prostitution.” He went on: “Many countries do that. . . . But Bakiyev did it in a very irresponsible and untalented way. He lied to Russia and got the money from the U.S.” For Moscow, this was “unforgivable.”
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The United States may have reset its Russia policy, but the U.S. approach to the other states in the region is in dire need of a conceptual revolution.
Few peoples of the world have ever been forced to become independent nations. Yet that is precisely what happened to the five Central Asian republics after Russia, Belarus and Ukraine—the three original signatories of the U.S.S.R.’s founding 1922 constitution—met in Minsk on December 8, 1991, and created a new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Central Asia is central to Eurasian security despite its seeming remoteness. Blessed with natural riches, it nevertheless has two wars in progress, ethnic and religious tensions, a limited amount of democracy, and far to go in development. Whether Central Asia consolidates its independence or slides into chaos will help determine whether Russia develops as a normal nation free from regional insecurities and imperial longings. Uzbekistan may be an island of stability and a potential anchor.
