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For several years there has been a general feeling on both sides of the ocean that the central institutions of the Atlantic Alliance, especially NATO itself, are inadequate to the steadily widening complex of problems which confronts them. The Berlin crisis, which directly concerns only three or four of the fifteen allies, has in fact illustrated, as no doubt Mr. Khrushchev intended that it should, a number of important divisions among them in both political and military policy, and has brought to light certain weaknesses in the organization of the alliance which have been visible below the surface of events for some time past. Indeed, the Berlin crisis could be a blessing in disguise, even though only a fragile or unsatisfactory negotiated compromise emerges over the city itself, if it forces governments and public opinion in the Atlantic countries to confront some distasteful facts about their shortcomings in constructive coöperation.
During the Party Congress, which met in the new Kremlin theater from October 17 through October 31, the attention of the world was divided almost equally between the vivid and almost daily attacks on the "antiparty group" of Khrushchev's repentant and unrepentant rivals and the clear if somewhat muffled Sino-Soviet divergences over revolutionary strategy. The first of these "sensations" was obviously orchestrated in advance, and each spokesman for the central leadership was assigned a larger or smaller dose of "revelations" to pepper up the otherwise somewhat routine speeches. The second, which came to a head early on in a dispute over the future treatment of the recalcitrant Albanian Party, was clearly unplanned, and it has left a wide-open field for speculation about its implications for the future.
The trend of military evolution on which the world has been set since 1939 has seen the harnessing of the most advanced technology to the elaboration of an extensive series of new weapons and weapons systems. Through the development of a large family of ballistic and non-ballistic missiles, destructive power can now be brought to bear on unseen targets over distances ranging from tens to thousands of miles; at the same time, the capacity of a single explosion to destroy has been multiplied thousands, even millions, of times. These technological developments have been associated with the emergence of new scientific processes of management (most of which are loosely grouped under the term "operations analysis"), whose purpose is to try to help the commander control the apparatus of which he now disposes. But a question which becomes increasingly urgent in our age of nuclear deterrence, and one which grows in importance as more and more technology becomes harnessed to the demands of defense, is whether these new measures of control extend or curtail the possibilities of human, as opposed to machine, judgment.
American newspapers frequently describe the Italian Socialist Party in oversimplified terms. For instance, they say: (1) that it differs, for the worse, from the other Socialist parties of Western Europe; (2) that it is a copy of the Communist Party; (3) that it does not make much effort to exercise a democratic influence inside Italy; and (4) that in foreign policy it espouses the brand of neutralism often identified with the Soviet point of view.
On August 6, 1961, Major Gherman Stepanovitch Titov circled the earth 17 times, traveling at 18,000 miles an hour in an elliptical course which took him at maximum altitude about 160 miles into the stratosphere. For 25 hours and 18 minutes he traveled in regions until then unfathomed. In considerable discomfort he endured a prolonged state of weightlessness, hitherto known in all of human history only as a relatively fleeting experience to a handful of men. When Titov finally ejected himself from his four-and-one-half-ton vehicle and parachuted to earth he had set an all- time high mark in exploration.
Before the last war, the tasks of American foreign policy were comparatively well defined. Secretary Cordell Hull, with a Washington staff of less than 1,000, presided over our entire global diplomatic establishment from a building shared with the War and Navy Departments. The function of the 78 ambassadors and ministers stationed abroad consisted largely of reporting and analyzing the flow of events and representing the President in negotiations and ceremonial events.
THE development of the Jugoslav economic system in the 1950 has puzzled many people in the world. No wonder. The fundamental principles of Marxist socialist economy have been applied in an unconventional manner, for it was decided that a solution had to be found simultaneously both for the problem of accelerating economic growth and for attaining an open economy in which the principle of economic coexistence could be implemented through the international market.
Unconventional war is the war that is being fought today in Laos and South Viet Nam; it is the war that the French fought in Indochina and are now fighting in Algeria. It is a form of warfare the Communists have learned to employ with great effectiveness, and one which they will continue to exploit to the maximum in furthering their long-range objectives.
After several years of relative eclipse, Iran returned to the world's headlines during the summer of 1960 and since then has continued periodically to catch the world's attention. It began with the election of a new Majlis, or National Assembly, the first in four years. The Shah, who throughout this period had been personally running the government, previously had made an effort to stimulate "safe and stable" political competition by encouraging the development of a, Mardom (Peoples) Party to function as "His Majesty's loyal opposition." He named as its leader Amir Alam, a landed aristocrat of Khurasan, who was generally regarded as a staunch royalist and good friend of the British. The new party was to serve in the Majlis as government critic and to contest the elections with the incumbent Milliyun (Nationalist) Party led by Premier Manucher Eqbal. This artificial man?uvre toward two-party democracy was scorned by the intellectuals and the majority of the electorate who are politically aware; even though the heat of the hustings led Alam to criticize the régime so severely as to pain and embarrass the Shah and to frighten Eqbal, they did not consider it representative of any really genuine opposition. The National Front, suppressed since the fall of Dr. Mohammed Mosaddeq in 1953, emerged into open political activity, though it scarcely dared to compete formally-certainly not after Abdor Rahman Burumand, member of a prominent Isfahan family and admitted National Frontist, was arrested when he began drawing too large crowds,
The revolutionary transformation of the African continent from a congeries of passive, dependent territories into an association of active, sovereign states attained its climax in 1960. At the end of 1959, there were only nine independent states on the continent; a year later there were 27. Even without the additions that occurred during 1961, sovereign states became the majority on the African continent as against a minority of colonial or quasi-colonial territories. The revolution of African independence had become an objective fact.
The United States is far freer from commitments in Africa south of the Sahara than in any other region of the world. Everywhere else American policy operates in a setting of old-established friendships and understandings, supplemented in the postwar years by a network of alliances such as those creating NATO, CENTO and SEATO; and American bases are scattered about the globe. In Africa to an unprecedented degree the United States is not bound by established positions or traditions, by fixed agreements or vested interests. While in any given situation it may find itself hemmed in by extra-African considerations and by the particular circumstances of the case, it still has a unique freedom, indeed a necessity, constantly to create policies to meet the issues presented by what for American diplomacy is virtually a new continent.