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In the crisis precipitated by the discovery of Russian strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems in Cuba, many Americans came to a new understanding of the great accretion of strength which membership in our alliances in this hemisphere and in Europe brings to a confrontation of power. They got a new understanding, too, of the vast importance of having choices of means, other than nuclear means, of meeting a hostile threat. These truths, seen in the sharp light of experience, bring into clearer relief the central problem of our European alliance.
In a major address on July 4, 1962, the President called for a partnership between the United States and Europe. With the passage of the Trade Bill this "great design" seems to have come a step closer. To many, the Atlantic Community beckons as the great hope of the 1960s. The possibility of establishing a vital Atlantic system is indeed one of the great opportunities of our time. It may well be that to future historians it will appear the distinctive feature of our decade, far transcending in importance the crises which form the headlines of the day.
Our refusal to aid France in developing her nuclear strike force has never lacked American critics. Should we not seek an accommodation with General de Gaulle, trading missile technology and components for coöperation in another military or political field? Increasingly, it is said that we should. Proponents argue that France is well on the road toward acquiring her force de frappe, despite our opposition which has embittered French officials and made their program slower and more expensive. The bitterness and higher cost leave France both less willing and less able to support common enterprises, including the provision of modern French divisions to NATO and toleration of American-controlled nuclear weapons on her territory. It is said that these are unpleasant consequences of American policy, especially as they are felt by one honored major ally and not another. If we should supply Skybolt missiles to the United Kingdom for its Bomber Command, should we not assist France in some comparable way? Especially if France pays for it and eases our troubled balance of payments?
It is interesting that, with very few exceptions, even the most enthusiastic supporters of the idea of an Atlantic Community have not clearly defined what nations are embraced within it; nor have they been willing to commit themselves to what they believe might be its best form of political organization. As of this moment, it seems to me both natural and prudent to avoid a dogmatic approach to both questions. However, I believe agreement on certain principles is now possible; and I am convinced that in a comparatively short period of time specifics may be possible as well. A discussion now of both principles and possible alternative solutions is therefore desirable. Whether the eventual answers will evolve from the quiet type of leadership shown by Jean Monnet in his highly successful sponsorship of the European Economic Community, or through a wider discussion, with public pressures forcing decisions, it is impossible to foretell.
Europe and America are like a married couple who cannot live happily together yet cannot live apart. Their marriage, so far as it derives from mutual interest rather than a romantic attachment, might, in the old days, have been described as a marriage of convenience. A marriage of inconvenience would, however, be a more apt description of a union in which partners who are incompatible in many respects yet are welded indissolubly together. It is comforting that wedded bliss is not conspicuous in the Sino- Soviet household. There is solace in the fact, too, that when the West is challenged from without, domestic friction diminishes. But it is not only against a chronic threat from the East that it has had to close ranks. There are new developments within the West, and as it tries to adjust itself to these it may be thrown into a vexatious disarray.
Never before have we seen such an extraordinary display of disunity in the Communist world. Moscow's policy of rapprochement with Tito is regarded by Peking and its supporters as further proof of the fundamentally revisionist, anti-Marxian character of "the Khrushchev group." Peking views the indecisive Soviet policy regarding the Sino-Indian conflict-Moscow's precarious attempt to carry water on both shoulders-as a typical failure of Khrushchev to give full support to a "fraternal socialist ally." It brands the Soviet decision to withdraw missiles from Cuba as appeasement of American imperialism, a clear manifestation of the pacifism and fear that it now regularly describes as the trademarks of Russian diplomacy.
ON September 25 of last year, President Kennedy laid before the 16th General Assembly a four-point program of space coöperation under United Nations auspices. The program called for a régime of law and order in outer space; the promotion of scientific coöperation and the exchange of information; a world-wide undertaking in weather forecasting and weather research; and international coöperation in the establishment of a global system of communication satellites. As a result of this initiative, an effort in outer space coöperation is now under way. The President's program was incorporated in a resolution adopted unanimously by the 16th General Assembly on December 20, 1961. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has finally begun its work-with the Soviet Union on board.
The thoughts that I record here began to take shape three years ago in a small mountain town in Nepal where my trip was interrupted by a three-day festival to Laksmi. I had been walking for eight days and was to walk nearly twenty more without once meeting a wheeled vehicle or any other evidence of mechanized civilization. Through dense tropical forests of sal a hundred feet above sea level, up steep slopes thick with rhododendron trees, along great cedared ridges cool even in the sun at 12,000 feet, I had been traveling in the only way one can in Nepal, on foot trails that are sometimes deserted, sometimes thronged with heavily burdened men and women moving in unison, their baskets weighted with new potatoes or ghee. Occasionally the trail would thread a village animated with the play of naked brown-skinned children, with cheerful old men in woolen shawls and shy dark-eyed girls carrying jars of water from the well-an irregular patch of mud-colored houses on the gold of ripening rice paddies surrounding it. With all its beauty and poverty and its growing desire for new ways, in the familiar jargon of our time, this was the underdeveloped country.
How important international trade is for the less developed nations is indicated by the fact that it frequently accounts for 20 percent or more of their total economy as against 8 percent for the economy of the United States. Indeed, trade is much more important to them than aid. Total exports of the less developed areas amounted to $31 billion in 1960, while the total flow of financial assistance from the industrial nations (including private foreign investment) amounted to $8 billion.
The crisis over Cuba and the Chinese invasion of India have had their salutary lessons for many nations and many political leaders-for none perhaps more than the neutralists. They have spoken up positively, as before, for peace and negotiation, against blocs and power politics. But what they have seen has attested to their relative inability to influence the course of events, or even to maintain solidarity in their own ranks, when the big powers are taking crucial decisions and the global strategic balance is at stake. A more pertinent question is whether, and how, the neutrals can safeguard their own vital interests.
The newly independent countries of Africa are now providing a somewhat bizarre setting for a continuation of the four-decade struggle between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, embodied in their respective states, the Republic of China (Nationalist), and the People's Republic of China (Communist) . The match between the two in this sector of the larger struggle is by no means as uneven as it looks at first glance. Certainly Communist China, with its 700,000,000 people and huge land area, looms far above any individual African country-indeed, it has over three times the population of the entire African continent. Rump Nationalist China, however, while minuscule when compared to its Chinese rival, is a large state by African standards. Its population of 11,000,000 would rank it seventh were it in Africa, ahead of 27 other independent African countries, as well as the few remaining colonial possessions. Moreover, its per capita income of nearly $120, second highest in the Far East, would place it tenth in Africa.
The importance of public revenue to the underdeveloped countries can hardly be exaggerated if they are to achieve their hopes of accelerated economic progress. Whatever the prevailing ideology or political color of a particular government, it must steadily expand a whole host of non-revenue- yielding services-education, health, communication systems and so on-as a prerequisite for the country's economic and cultural development. These services must be financed out of government revenue. Besides meeting these needs, taxes and other compulsory levies provide the most appropriate instruments for increasing savings for capital formation out of domestic sources. By providing a surplus over recurrent expenditure, they make it possible to devote a higher proportion of resources to building up capital assets.
During the past quarter-century, enlightened public opinion throughout the world has become keenly sensitive to the treatment of minorities as a barometer of moral decency and social sanity. The awesome experiences of this period have drawn particular attention to the symbolic and actual position of the Jewish minority. In this light, the status of the Jews in the Soviet Union warrants special concern.