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If the United States is to secure its vital interests in Latin America, it must better understand the nature of revolution there; it must determine more precisely its relationship and commitment to that revolution; and it must revise accordingly its Latin American policies and programs, both private and public.
It is well to check one's conclusions against the sweep of events over time. The newspapers must make their daily judgments; the columnists their biweekly syntheses; the monthlies content themselves with prediction of the future or explanation of the past. All of this misses the continuum of events. Those of each day, month and year grow out of what has gone before and will mark, shape and condition what comes after them.
"Hope," said Sir Francis Bacon, "is a good breakfast but it is a poor supper." The 1960s began with hope for the economically underdeveloped countries, but it is becoming uncertain how they will end. Unless the Development Decade, as President Kennedy christened it, receives greater sustenance, it may, in fact, recede into history as a decade of disappointment. The amount of finance moving from the developed to the underdeveloped world is not rising; and the present trend is for the growth of the low-income countries slowly to lose momentum.
"CAPITALISM is evil. The United States is the leading capitalist country. Therefore the United States is evil." It would be difficult to exaggerate the harm that this line of thinking has done. In the Soviet Union and Communist China it sustains attitudes and actions on which support for war can be based. In the non-Communist world, although the general picture of America is in many countries more favorable than some of us have supposed, our "capitalism" is often seen, like our treatment of Negroes, as a major blemish on that picture. In the minds of tens of millions it appears as a valid reason to suspect the motives of our foreign policy (e.g. in Viet Nam and in the Caribbean area) and to refuse coöperation with us in activities that, from our point of view, are designed to build a healthier, more prosperous, more democratic world.
The West faces dangers and difficulties. In varying degrees we are all conscious of them and of the confusion that tangles so much Western policy. Admittedly we would do better if we could work out our plans and purposes together, but this seems constantly further from our reach. The intention of this article is to diagnose our failings, remembering those which have afflicted other alliances in the past, and to suggest some remedies.
Let us get down to cases rather than generalize grandly. In India, food- grain output is the pivot on which economic development swings. The most urgent demand of the population is for more to eat; the most acute problem of economic stability is keeping food-grain prices from rising too sharply as money demand outpaces the supply of food; and the core of development strategy has to be either an increasing provision of food-grains to satisfy new consumer demands in the urban and industrial sectors or deliberate retardation of industrial growth to head off the new demands. What is the record and prospect on food-grains?
An American traveling in Japan is likely to feel that he has passed through the looking glass. For millions of Japanese-conceivably a majority-the United States' presence in their islands is not a protection, but a provocation. China is seen not as a menace, but as a growling giant caught in a web of problems. The aggressive speeches of Lin Piao and Chen Yi do not mean what they say, but are merely traditional Chinese exaggeration and bluster. The American effort in Viet Nam may be in the national interest of the United States, the Japanese say, but of no one else.
THE development of the West European sovereign state in the early modern period was an important innovation in the art of political organization. The most successful states of earlier times had either been large empires which were militarily strong but which failed to enlist the loyalty and active support of their subjects, or small kingdoms and city-states which secured loyalty and participation but which were militarily weak. In the great empires, only a small core of military-political leaders had any real interest in preserving the state. When their position was threatened, either by internal dissension or external pressure, the bulk of the population passively accepted the collapse of the political structure, as in the case of Rome. The little states were far more effective in using their human resources, but they seldom flourished for more than three or four generations. Sooner or later a powerful neighbor swallowed them up and their citizens sank back into apathy, as in the case of Athens. The West European sovereign state combined the strengths and avoided many of the weaknesses of its predecessors. It was large enough to generate the military strength necessary for survival; it was small enough and homogeneous enough to attract the loyalty and participation of an increasing number of its subjects.
On October 6, 1945, Konrad Adenauer, then Mayor of Cologne by grace of the British Occupation authorities, was notified by Brigadier John Barraclough, Commanding General of North Rhine Province, as follows: "I am not satisfied with the progress of your city. . . Effective today you are dismissed as Mayor of Cologne. From here on you will no longer pursue, either directly or indirectly, any political activity whatever." A remarkable document, if only because four years later Adenauer was inaugurated Chancellor of the newly created Federal Republic of Germany, a post he was to assume, incredibly, at the age of 73, and to hold longer than any Chancellor since Bismarck. Even though only 16 years have gone by since then, it almost transcends the power of the imagination to reconstruct reality as Adenauer found it when he was chosen by a majority of one vote-his own-by the new German parliament on September 15, 1949. True, Germany had made some progress since the end of the war four years earlier. Still, the country was destroyed, devastated, crushed in the most comprehensive sense of these words. Its cities were in ruins, its factories a shambles, its transportation network punctured at a thousand vital points, its agriculture in disarray-but all that was just part of it. There was no real administration, no real economy, no real education, no real courts, poor medical facilities, poor housing and few building supplies. Administrators, entrepreneurs, labor leaders and editors were trying to get their bearings under unprecedented circumstances, and all were suspect-with regard to what they had done under Hitler and what they would do after Hitler.
Washington bureaucrats will long remember John F. Kennedy as a President who stood them on their heads. Quick and impatient, he could not understand how Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon could take so long to answer his questions. Furthermore, he condoned unorthodox procedures on the grounds that order implied an absence of creativity. As Professor Neustadt has in effect pointed out, however, government officials prefer to go by the book. The result of this conflict was an encounter from which Washington has yet to recover.
Faisal, second surviving son of King Abd el-Aziz, was proclaimed King of Sa'udi Arabia on November 2, 1964, and has thus passed his first official anniversary. It is true that he governed in reality during a considerable part of the reign of his older brother, Sa'ud, whose aptitudes for government were limited, but there is a difference between power wielded in the name of another and power exercised by sovereign right.
Almost unnoticed during the postwar crises in European relationships, the English Channel Tunnel-that "hardy perennial"-has inched its way forward until now, with a consensus of political and expert opinion behind it, the project appears to be on the threshold of realization. The official decision to proceed with "Chunnel," as it is nicknamed, was announced last year in an exchange of messages between Queen Elizabeth II and General de Gaulle. There followed a final technical survey, conducted for the two governments by the Channel Tunnel Study Group. The data resulting from its extensive geological and geophysical investigations enabled the route to be determined and precise engineering plans to be drawn up. Certain administrative and financial matters remain to be dealt with before actual construction can begin, but it seems certain that within six or seven years passengers will be finding the rail journey between London and Paris no more remarkable than, for instance, a trip from New York to Boston or from Paris to Brussels.