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Among the many traumas inflicted by the nightmare of Vietnam has been the realization-for many Americans the shock of recognition-that foreign and domestic policy have merged into a seamless web of interlocking concerns. It is now almost impossible to identify any issue, condition or interest of national significance which is not affected by international trends and circumstances, and which does not in turn affect some aspect of the foreign policy of the United States. For students of public affairs long concerned with both elements of our national posture this may be a truism which hardly bears repeating. However, I regret to observe that most citizens, including most specialists in foreign or domestic affairs, have not yet adapted their insights and prognostications to this integrated view of the world; nor have those of us in public service been effective in foreseeing and planning to deal with the domestic implications of foreign policies, some of them already now in effect.
After a period of studied withdrawal from the world scene from 1966 to 1969, the People's Republic of China has returned to the international diplomatic and trading arenas with vigor and imagination. President Nixon's projected visit to Peking symbolizes the rapid turnabout. Three years ago U.S. bombs were falling within miles of the Chinese border and fears of a Sino-American war were rampant in the two countries. Indeed, in 1967-68, when China had only one ambassador abroad, its trade had dropped and its relations with its neighbors had reached all-time lows, many students of Chinese foreign policy (this author included) thought it entirely possible that Chinese leaders had become overwhelmed by domestic problems of an enduring nature. As a result, it was thought that China was turning inward and was unlikely to play an active role on the world scene in the early 1970s.
President Nixon's dramatic revelation that he will soon visit Peking ended two decades of public debate about the wisdom of establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The joint communiqué announcing this watershed in American foreign policy stated that "The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries. . . ." Thus the question is no longer whether to establish diplomatic relations with China, but how to do so. Heaven may be wonderful-the problem is to get there.
The defense of Taiwan remains at the heart of the issue of China. The recent initiatives of Peking and Washington, and the impending presidential visit, have inspired hopeful speculation. Discussion has centered on formulas for recognition and entry into the United Nations. Our alliance with the Republic of China on Taiwan has been given less consideration, and its implications are optimistically avoided. But our security relationship with Taiwan-in particular the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954-dictates certain diplomatic solutions and precludes others. Definitive choices will have to be made, and illusions of entertaining contradictory positions will have to be abandoned. If the consequences of our defense arrangement are not grasped, and the problems not deliberately resolved, the expectations that have been aroused may be unfulfilled, and the United States may proceed to underwrite a new order in East Asia that offers at best a tense military equilibrium and perpetual American involvement in the political evolution of the region.
There are many different ways of conducting a government. In the United States the executive authority is both more formally centralized in the President and more sharply separated from the legislature than in most democracies. This is particularly true of the conduct of foreign affairs, where the authority of the President has been seriously challenged only in those rare instances, such as the Versailles Treaty or the Vietnam war, when he seems to be grossly ignoring or overriding the opinions both of the Congress and of the public.
At the moment when East Asia is emerging as the new center of great-power confrontation, the old one, Europe, is showing signs of settling down. Eighteen years of almost glacially imperceptible movement have elapsed between the post-Stalin "thaw" of 1953 and the wary "era of negotiations" of 1971. But now the whole constellation of talks between the Soviet Union and its major Western adversaries, around the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the Ostpolitik, Berlin, force reductions and the convocation of a security conference, look like ratifying the stalemate between the two blocs painfully reached in Europe over the years. Since this recognizes in particular the frontiers between the contestants, it amounts not only to a virtual settlement of the cold war but to the nearest approximation one can expect of a peace treaty ending the Second World War. Moreover, this development coincides with another of great importance. The likely enlargement of the European Community from six to ten member countries, including Britain, is bound to open a new phase in the integration of Western Europe. With two such changes, European security in the middle and later 1970s will necessarily be very different from the patterns that have grown familiar during 20 years.
Latin America embraces a number of different realities within a common course. At least four of them can be easily identified, even though their lines of demarcation are not clearly defined. Thus, the four major units appear to be (1) Brazil, a world in itself; (2) Mexico and Central America, which to a man from the deep South seem, at times, more remote than Europe; (3) the Andean world; and (4) Argentina. Moreover, within this broad division there are subtle questions, such as whether Venezuela does not in fact have closer ties to the Caribbean than to the Andean world. Chile's Pacific location must be measured against its visceral union with Argentina at the southern tip of the continent. The remnants of ancient civilizations and the existence of large Indian populations profoundly alter the personalities of Peru, Bolivia and Mexico. Yet, despite these differences, Latin America shares common phenomena that go beyond its origins, geography and self-expression, and reach its innermost structure.
After more than a quarter-century of formally close contact, the real relationship of the American and the Japanese peoples is like that of two men observing each other through the flawed glass and distorting mirrors of a fun-house. Their perspectives are strikingly, sometimes absurdly different Our dealings of the last 25 years-one war, a successful occupation, unnumbered seminars, government conferences, student exchanges and an $11 billion yearly trade relationship-seem not to have clarified the view.
SEVERAL factors are creating a new phenomenon in the developing world. It is what Robert McNamara of the World Bank has called the rising number of "marginal men"-people who have reached adulthood with no useful role to play in their societies. Largely the product of an unprecedented "baby survival" boom the world over, these individuals now find a dearth of jobs, of the means to provide for themselves and take part in life around them. Quite simply, there is a serious and growing unemployment problem in countries from one end of the developing world to the other and it is likely to dominate international development in the 1970s much as the food issue did in the 1960s.
History geopolitical forces, power balances and election results all helped shape the crisis in East Pakistan; but only in terms of "the pathology of the subcontinent," as one diplomat described it, can this bloody upheaval be adequately explained. From the night of March 25, when the Pakistani army launched its surprise offensive in East Pakistan in an attempt to crush the Bengali autonomy movement, normal standards of logic and reason stopped applying. The mindless brutality of the West Pakistani troops demonstrates the military régime's irrational determination to hold on to East Pakistan at whatever cost and by whatever tactics are necessary. In turn, this brutality has fired and fed an increasingly effective and popularly supported guerrilla counteroffensive that keeps East Pakistan in chaos. Every army reprisal against the civilian population produces new Bengali freedom-fighters. The Bengalis-now sullen, bitter, hating-seem ready for a long fight for full independence. Talk of anything less, such as the old goal of East Pakistani autonomy within Pakistan, is considered heresy.
As far as government is concerned, less is often held better. Still, total absence of government gives a draughty feeling and it is just this sense of vacuum which pervades all today's discussions of the sea and seabed, areas into which, for good or evil, technology is fast hauling us. There is no government, no general system of law or of law enforcement, no obvious way even of setting about instituting government for these seven-tenths of the globe.
Certain moments in the lives of peoples represent milestones in their centuries-long journeys. There were several such moments in the process of establishing the principles of self-managed socialist democracy in the multinational federal state of Jugoslavia.
With the tentative accord on the status of Berlin achieved by the envoys of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France in August it appears that this cause of contention may finally be put to rest. Agreement has been a long time in coming.