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The dominant element in American foreign policy since 1946 has been opposition to communism and to the communist powers. As far as Africa was concerned, responsibility for pursuing these objectives was delegated to America's trusted allies - Britain, France, Belgium, and even Portugal - whose policies in the area were therefore broadly supported despite minor disagreements which arose as American business became interested in Africa's potential. Inevitably this placed America in opposition to an Africa which was trying to win its independence from those same powers; but when political freedom could be achieved peacefully, America was able to appear to Africa like a bystander. It was therefore able to adjust its policies and accept the new status quo of African sovereign states without any difficulty. Notwithstanding these adjustments, however, America has continued to look at African affairs largely through anti-communist spectacles and to disregard Africa's different concerns and priorities.
When Jimmy Carter toasted José López Portillo on the occasion of the Mexican President's mid-February visit to Washington, he drew a laugh from those assembled in the White House State Dining Room by saying, "The Mexican people know what Yankee imperialism means, and being from Georgia, I have also heard the same phrase used."
The place of Jerusalem in the process of seeking peace in the Middle East is unique. Its historical, emotional and international complexities set it apart from other issues which may be solved on the basis of mutually agreed boundaries. The questions that the Arabs raise about Jerusalem cannot be decided by drawing a line. The future of Jerusalem cannot be resolved by division.
During the past year a great deal of attention has been devoted to the accumulation of debt by the less-developed countries (LDCs). One recent publication estimated that the long-term public debt of 86 LDCs (including undisbursed amounts) exceeded $200 billion at the end of 1976; and that short-term and private debt amounted to another $50 billion for a total of $250 billion.1 Another publication estimated that the combined long-term, short-term, public and private debt of the non-OPEC LDCs (not including amounts undisbursed) would total $180 billion at the end of 1976, of which $75 billion was owed to commercial banks.2 About $45 billion of this is said to be held by the U.S. banks. These figures are generally 20 to 25 percent higher than comparable figures for 1975; indeed, they have been growing at such rates or higher ones since 1973.
Since 1974 - when the oil crisis hit and the world recession began - a number of developing countries that do not export oil (non-oil LDCs) have been borrowing heavily in the international credit markets. Surprisingly, private banks, not international agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, have underwritten most of this massive debt buildup, as the table on page 734 shows. And this shift from traditional to non-traditional sources of financing, along with the sheer magnitude of the borrowing, has led to criticism of private banks for their handling of the situation.
We have come a long way from the excesses of "Western economic warfare" against Eastern Europe. The past five years have seen an explosion of East-West trade and Western lending to Eastern Europe, including the U.S.S.R., with Western governments, banks, and exporters competing strenuously for East European business. In the atmosphere of détente, a wide range of political and economic forces generated opportunities for profits, which competitive capitalism exploited with characteristic alacrity and flexibility. The sum total of these diverse initiatives has been large-scale Western export of capital, both financial and real, to Eastern Europe. This new East-West economic interdependence now clearly demands the policy analysis which ideally should have preceded it.
The need to respect human rights has lately become the focus of public attention and debate. Such a development is clearly a reflection of rising popular expectations which in some cases have led to a growing tension between governments and the governed. We can discern a worldwide trend to assert individual and collective aspirations and to bring about changes in governmental processes at all levels in order to make them more responsive to these aspirations. This trend shows up in many forms-from movements of national independence to devolution and demands for worker codetermination. In the United States and Western Europe a growing interest in "the human dimension" of world politics is seen by many as a natural and healthy reaction to an overemphasis on great power diplomacy, elitist cynicism, and to excessive secretiveness during the recent past.
One of the more surprising things about the meeting of the "Eurocommunists" in Madrid last March was that they came away calling themselves Eurocommunists. The quotation marks came off in Spain, and the French, Italian and Spanish Communist Parties now willingly talk of Eurocommunism. Spanish Party leader Santiago Carrillo has even published a book bearing the title. The main reason for the change, as French Party leader Georges Marchais explained in Madrid, was the discovery that to be known as Eurocommunists was somehow helping. "I was struck," said Marchais, "by the headline in a reactionary French newspaper yesterday that said, 'Eurocommunism is a farce.' I say no, it is not a farce. It is something serious."
A popular melody has joined the reggae rhythms in Jamaican nightclubs; it is a song called, "The Foreign Press." In rich island dialect, the song accuses correspondents of besmirching Jamaica's good name with false reports throughout the world. It says that, between dispatches, reporters manage to frolic on the beach and in the nightspots, adding: "Why don't they write about that in the foreign press?"
Rarely has a country experienced so curious and kaleidoscopic a set of political changes as India since 1975. No one is very surprised when a developing nation turns authoritarian. The complexity of modernization itself seems sufficient explanation, if not justification. But a developing country whose authoritarian ruler reveals herself to be genuinely ambivalent about liberal and authoritarian strategies - who chooses to legitimize her position through an honest election and accepts her ensuing defeat with grace - deserves our attention.
After more than a year and a half in office, the Australian conservative coalition government led by Malcolm Fraser has established foreign policy in a pattern different from that of his Labor Party predecessor, Gough Whitlam, but different also from that of the Liberal and Country Parties governments of which Mr. Fraser was himself for some years a member and which were in power for a record 23 years from 1949 to 1972. He has inherited from both, and has adapted both to his own changing philosophy as well as to Australia's changing circumstances.
"I felt like one who has inadvertently loosened a large boulder from the top of a cliff and now helplessly witnesses its path of destruction in the valley below, shuddering and wincing at each successive glimpse of disaster." So George F. Kennan described the consequences of having published in this journal, 30 years ago this month, the article which introduced the term "containment" to the world. Attributed only to a "Mr. X" in order to protect the author's position as Director of the State Department's new Policy Planning Staff, the article, entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," was nonetheless quickly revealed by Arthur Krock as having come from Kennan's pen. Ironically, its very anonymity assured it a conspicuousness Kennan's subsequent efforts to clarify his views never attained.