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The West must change its grand strategy in the face of changing Soviet presence in the world order. "Passivity or -- worse -- a posture of delayed and uncoordinated reaction to Soviet initiatives would enable the Kremlin to define the East-West agenda and serve primarily Soviet interests". Soviet reformism is driven by a sense of approaching crisis, and is ready to accept fundamental changes in domestic and foreign policy. Nevertheless, the USSR will maintain the contest with the USA where it can: "certain aspects of current Soviet policy, especially in Europe, are consistent with this long-term objective". The democracies must learn to cope with the Soviet flurry of unilateral initiatives, and to sift the genuine concessions from the propaganda. Reviews the issues in (1) strategic arms control, recommending a greater attention to linkage with larger security policy goals (2) the future of Eastern Europe, recommending the devising of "a category of association with the European Community based on article 238 of the Treaty of Rome" (3) the nature, extent and timing of the economic aid which might be extended to the USSR to promote desirable reform (4) encouraging an acceptable Soviet policy towards the Asia-Pacific region (5) human rights. Predicts that "the competitive relationship between East and West will not disappear... an overall reconciliation of conflicting interests is still a long-term objective". Sets out various 'checkpoints' for assessing Western progress in achieving a more conciliatory foreign policy in these areas. This portrayal of Soviet state action and interests by three top-flight statesmen of the non-communist world, is one of organic and well-integrated policy, carefully calculated to retain maximum advantage in an adverse strategic situation. It shows no anticipation of internal instability, even as late as mid-1989. Those political scientists anguished at the 'failure' of their discipline to anticipate the Soviet collapse can draw some comfort from this equally miserable performance.
The threat of war between NATO and the WP still exists, though it is lessening. It could be further reduced by arms control and defence policies conducive "toward a structure of forces with a more defensive character, and with greater emphasis on new technologies that could reduce the role of heavy armored divisions". The basic goal is to reduce capability for sudden large-scale attack.
Site of post-WW2 tensions, Berlin now finds itself relegated to the margin of political and economic change across Europe. Even the FRG is showing less and less interest in Berlin's future. Nevertheless, NATO should not ignore it, but include it in a new vision for FRG-GDR relations and the ending of the division of Europe.
The USA continues to under-estimate the danger to world security of continuing nuclear proliferation. As it normalizes relations with the USSR, the USA should "undertake a fresh assessment of the worldwide non-proliferation effort".
Various socio-economic trends in the under-industrialized southern hemisphere reflect a sense of material and unfair disadvantage in the way the world is run, which spells long-term political trouble, possibly world war, if the wealthier nations fail to take constructive action.
The Brady plan, for reducing Third World debt through cuts in principal and/or interest, will probably fail if creditor participation remains voluntary, with each bank holding out and hoping that others will bear the losses. It needs a concerted effort to achieve a 'critical mass' of bank participation.
Analyzes the civil war in "one of the sickest societies in Latin America", and urges a review of US aid policy objectives.
Last December 22, in New York, the chambers of the United Nations were witness to a most bizarre event. As a Soviet deputy foreign minister looked on approvingly, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz presided over the signature by the foreign ministers of Angola, Cuba and South Africa of interlocking treaties accomplishing the removal of foreign forces from southwestern Africa. The three ministers made speeches. The Angolan managed a polite dig at South Africa and the United States. The Cuban was polemically sarcastic about both, and took a barely disguised swipe at the Soviets as well. The South African wound up with remarks that, inter alia, declared his country's solidarity with Third World resentment of Western domination of the global economy.
The two key issues are development aid levels and Pakistan's nuclear policy. On the first, argues that the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, plus US budget constraints, indicate that "extraordinarily high levels of aid cannot and should not be maintained". On the second, asserts that the USA should, if it proves unable to persuade Pakistan to renounce its nuclear programme, lower its sights and settle for Pakistani agreement not to test nuclear weapons.