Examines the nature and extent of Botha's reforms, and their failure culminating in the 1986 state of emergency. Despite his policies to defeat or co-opt all opposition groups both black and white, the confrontation between government and anti-government forces is deepening. Traces how and why South Africa reached the top of the US and Western political agenda, which led to the end of Reagan's policy of constructive engagement and the failure of the Commonwealth's EPG, and the beginning of disengagement. The effects of sanctions and South Africa's policies towards the front-line states are polarizing the country and worsening the crisis throughout Southern Africa.
Submitted by navarra444 on August 5, 2009 - 11:00am.
I have wondered since being in college in the eighties why there was so much concern about South Africa in an age of apathy and materialism. The author has a good argument that supporting black South Africans was a winning issue. We couldn't protest Reagan's support of the Contras because we didn't know about the illegal operation. Reagan also could not inform us because he said he did not know his administration was supporting the Contras. But by 1984 college students might have seen fighting Apartheid as easy morally as opposing segregation in the 1960s. Although he didn't have much white support, Jesse Jackson was a media sensation for being a black American in Democratic primaries and having a few victories. The Congressional black caucus was also gaining some notice and American people were by 1986 maybe looking for a moral issue besides anti-communism.
For a quarter-century, the goals of American policy toward South Africa have remained remarkably consistent, but that consistency has served to mask sharply contrasting perceptions of the nature and direction of change in that country's racial policies. U.S. policymakers--including those of the Reagan Administration--have deplored official South African racism, affirmed the American belief in government by the consent of the governed, predicted fundamental change, and prayed that it would come peacefully. But beyond such broad outlines, American analysts have differed sharply in their specific judgments regarding the effectiveness of white-led change in South Africa, and the importance of black opposition to white rule.
In the Security Council on August 7 the United States voted for a ban on the shipment of arms to the South African Government, and in the course of the debate the American representative announced that the United States would suspend all arms shipments at the end of the year. Since South Africa has in the past found it difficult to obtain licenses for the purchase of American arms, this decision represented only a small shift in policy. But as the vote was taken under African pressure, and as it separated the United States from Britain and France (which abstained), the shift was significant; for it showed that when faced with a choice, the United States is more prepared than before to take a stand against apartheid.
The Reagan Administration, though surefooted domestically, is now absorbing the awkward truth about international relations which continues to surprise many youthful governments--that criticizing foreign policy is easier than making it, that making it is easier than carrying it out, and that political honeymoons are of short and not always blissful duration. Nowhere has this syndrome been more pronounced than in the Administration's attempt to construct a new relationship with South Africa.
Washington's repeated attempts to bring peace to Somalia with state-building initiatives have failed, even backfired. It should renounce political intervention and encourage local development without trying to improve governance.
Comments
Why did students protest Apartheid?
I have wondered since being in college in the eighties why there was so much concern about South Africa in an age of apathy and materialism. The author has a good argument that supporting black South Africans was a winning issue. We couldn't protest Reagan's support of the Contras because we didn't know about the illegal operation. Reagan also could not inform us because he said he did not know his administration was supporting the Contras. But by 1984 college students might have seen fighting Apartheid as easy morally as opposing segregation in the 1960s. Although he didn't have much white support, Jesse Jackson was a media sensation for being a black American in Democratic primaries and having a few victories. The Congressional black caucus was also gaining some notice and American people were by 1986 maybe looking for a moral issue besides anti-communism.
John Navarra
Daytona Beach, Florida