The first engagement in the new war on terrorism -- with Osama bin Ladin in Afghanistan -- poses severe challenges for the United States. Rooting out bin Ladin's network will require military success in a country that the Soviet Union could not conquer in ten years of trying, as well as support from unstable surrounding nations. Washington may be tempted to try to oust the Taliban regime, but doing so could rekindle Afghanistan's brutal civil war. The United States must proceed with caution -- or end up on the ash heap of Afghan history.
As Milton Bearden predicted in “Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires,” working with the Northern Alliance was “not a wise course” and bin Laden remains at large. His Postscript says it is now “Barack Obama's war.” But Congress has an equal responsibility for this war. Congress gave the Bush Administration a blank check go after those who attacked the United States on 9/11. Congress should work with the Obama Administration to replace that blank check with a realistic authorization that redefines our mission. That authorization should spell out the United States’ political, economic, legal and military goals. Our exit strategy will flow from those goals and it should be clearly understood by the American public, our allies, and members of al Qaeda.
The Postscript argues against announcement of an exit strategy for Afghanistan, saying it “would have diminished the United States' already limited ability to influence events in Pakistan or Afghanistan,“ However, trying to keep such information from our friends in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the American public, and our allies, is highly counterproductive if we want their cooperation and support.
The Postscript argues, “those fighting the United States are prepared to hunker down and wait for when they sense a U.S. withdrawal policy is in the wind.” Those who are fighting the United States in Afghanistan will hunker down and wait it out whenever it is to their advantage, whether they sense our withdrawal is in the wind or sense the possibility of their own defeat.
The Postscript implies a military objective when it says “committed al Qaeda fighters should be shown no quarter.” This objective needs further discussion and decision, especially regarding the system of justice and laws that will apply to those members of al Qaeda who are captured, interrogated, tried and sentenced.
Bearden’s original article and Postscript do not recommend economic goals regarding Afghanistan or Pakistan. It is very difficult to imagine any goal for either country being successful without an economic goal that dovetails with it.
Submitted by bruce c. (Apr. 10, 2009) on April 16, 2009 - 6:51am.
Some thoughts for Afghanistan
It is unlikely that a military solution imposed by outside powers is workable, or even any military solution at all. I believe that this premise is now gaining wider acceptance.
Afghanistan has become a classic Mao-Style insurgency which has already defeated the Soviet forces and, historically, has achieved success against foreign invaders for, at least, 2000 years. In view of this, it is likely that a policy of containment, similar to that established by President Truman in the late 1940’s, may be the only possibility in the medium term.
The Afghan population is racially and culturally diverse and accustomed to wars of resistance. They are resistant to a central government, are theocratic, largely illiterate and led by corrupt mullahs who seriously, and dishonestly, distort islamic teaching in support of their political aims. Mostly, the illiterate rural underclass live in their isolated tribal communities and unite only in instances inter-tribal warfare or in the face of a perceived common external threat.
Such communities live in almost exact similarity with the biblical Old Testament primitive tribes.
In such a situation, a military ‘Surge’ in the style of Iraq, is not a solution. It is neither helpful nor constructive to follow the mistakes made by the (then) Soviet General Staff in committing larger forces to an Afghan war situation which has no identifiable center of effort or a point where pressure, at the Operational level of command, cannot be applied.
If the necessary support can be organized, it is likely that containment will be the only workable long-term solution. This would require immense diplomatic skill, on the part of the United States, so as to ensure that the Afghan neighboring states will contribute to and support such a policy. It will also require that Afghanistan be made permanently neutral and that its neutrality be guaranteed by the neighboring contributing powers with the United States, all of which should consider the stabilization of the country to be in their long-term interests. There are indications, from the other parties, that this is, indeed, the case. Such a consortium could consist of China, India (as always, the key to the region) Iran, Pakistan and Russia. The terms of any subsequent treaty would, of necessity, include the proviso that infringement of its provisions by a signatory would be considered as an act of war against the other parties.
Containment should be identified as the limitation of Afghan influence, in whatever form, to the bounds of its geographic frontiers.
There are other important aspects which have to be addressed. It should be accepted that external influence will have little effect, in the short or medium term, in improving the lot of the Afghan people. It should be remembered that the time-lapse between the Kennan Telegram and the demise of Soviet power was of the order of 40 years. In the case of Afghanistan, it may be considerably more. However, it will be important that the native population is made aware that modern and liberal alternatives to primitive islamic teaching are available, are relevant and are religeously correct. A useful step would be the availability of the Koran in local languages. It is also important to be aware that, unlike the Christian world, there is no central authority in Islam. Each country, region, town, community or religeous assembly has its own (and sometimes conflicting) interpretation of islamic teaching.
On the vexed question of the production of opium: this is clearly one of the main reasons for the efforts of ‘religeous interests’. For a time, in this context, pragmatism will have to overide dogma. In the medium-term it will be necessary to organize a central purchasing organization, perhaps as a United Nations Agency. The effect of this will be to take the raw opium off the market, will break the supply chain and will provide a source of funding to improve the viability and stability of local agriculture. Failure to accept this reality, would undermine future success. At a stroke, this would undermine the Taliban funding system and degrade the capabilities of the dissident elements in Pakistan which are a major source of irritation.
In conclusion, a quotation from Richard Holbrooke: ‘Yet if history teaches us one thing, it is that history is unpredictable. There will be other Bosnias in our lives, different in every detail but similar in one overriding manner: they will originate in distant and ill-understood places, explode with little warning and present the rest of the world with difficult choices between risky involvement and potentially costly neglect. There will be other Bosnias in our lives—where outside involvement can be decisive and American leadership will be required’
(To End A War: Richard Holbrooke, 1998.)
Bruce Condell
Editor/Co-Author: On the German Art of War ‘Truppenfuhrung’
Submitted by Kristen S. (Jul. 16, 2009) on July 16, 2009 - 2:43am.
Mostly, the illiterate rural underclass live in their isolated tribal communities and unite only in instances inter-tribal warfare or in the face of a perceived common external threat.
Submitted by Kristen S. (Jul. 16, 2009) on July 16, 2009 - 2:45am.
The terms of any subsequent treaty would, of necessity, include the proviso that infringement of its provisions by a signatory would be considered as an act of war against the other parties.
With its new policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Obama administration has taken ownership of an orphaned conflict. But can it achieve victory, and how?
The military campaign in Afghanistan has been, for the most part, a masterpiece of creativity and finesse. It may wind up being one of the most notable U.S. military successes since World War II. But the American strategy has also had flaws. Most important, by contracting out much of the work to undependable local proxies, it may have allowed Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders to escape -- and menace the world down the road.
The current war in Iraq will generate a ferocious blowback of its own, which -- as a recent classified CIA assessment predicts -- could be longer and more powerful than that from Afghanistan. Foreign volunteers fighting U.S. troops in Iraq today will find new targets around the world after the war ends.
Washington's repeated attempts to bring peace to Somalia with state-building initiatives have failed, even backfired. It should renounce political intervention and encourage local development without trying to improve governance
Comments
Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires, and Postscript: Obama’s War
As Milton Bearden predicted in “Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires,” working with the Northern Alliance was “not a wise course” and bin Laden remains at large. His Postscript says it is now “Barack Obama's war.” But Congress has an equal responsibility for this war. Congress gave the Bush Administration a blank check go after those who attacked the United States on 9/11. Congress should work with the Obama Administration to replace that blank check with a realistic authorization that redefines our mission. That authorization should spell out the United States’ political, economic, legal and military goals. Our exit strategy will flow from those goals and it should be clearly understood by the American public, our allies, and members of al Qaeda.
The Postscript argues against announcement of an exit strategy for Afghanistan, saying it “would have diminished the United States' already limited ability to influence events in Pakistan or Afghanistan,“ However, trying to keep such information from our friends in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the American public, and our allies, is highly counterproductive if we want their cooperation and support.
The Postscript argues, “those fighting the United States are prepared to hunker down and wait for when they sense a U.S. withdrawal policy is in the wind.” Those who are fighting the United States in Afghanistan will hunker down and wait it out whenever it is to their advantage, whether they sense our withdrawal is in the wind or sense the possibility of their own defeat.
The Postscript implies a military objective when it says “committed al Qaeda fighters should be shown no quarter.” This objective needs further discussion and decision, especially regarding the system of justice and laws that will apply to those members of al Qaeda who are captured, interrogated, tried and sentenced.
Bearden’s original article and Postscript do not recommend economic goals regarding Afghanistan or Pakistan. It is very difficult to imagine any goal for either country being successful without an economic goal that dovetails with it.
Some thoughts for Afghanistan
Some thoughts for Afghanistan
It is unlikely that a military solution imposed by outside powers is workable, or even any military solution at all. I believe that this premise is now gaining wider acceptance.
Afghanistan has become a classic Mao-Style insurgency which has already defeated the Soviet forces and, historically, has achieved success against foreign invaders for, at least, 2000 years. In view of this, it is likely that a policy of containment, similar to that established by President Truman in the late 1940’s, may be the only possibility in the medium term.
The Afghan population is racially and culturally diverse and accustomed to wars of resistance. They are resistant to a central government, are theocratic, largely illiterate and led by corrupt mullahs who seriously, and dishonestly, distort islamic teaching in support of their political aims. Mostly, the illiterate rural underclass live in their isolated tribal communities and unite only in instances inter-tribal warfare or in the face of a perceived common external threat.
Such communities live in almost exact similarity with the biblical Old Testament primitive tribes.
In such a situation, a military ‘Surge’ in the style of Iraq, is not a solution. It is neither helpful nor constructive to follow the mistakes made by the (then) Soviet General Staff in committing larger forces to an Afghan war situation which has no identifiable center of effort or a point where pressure, at the Operational level of command, cannot be applied.
If the necessary support can be organized, it is likely that containment will be the only workable long-term solution. This would require immense diplomatic skill, on the part of the United States, so as to ensure that the Afghan neighboring states will contribute to and support such a policy. It will also require that Afghanistan be made permanently neutral and that its neutrality be guaranteed by the neighboring contributing powers with the United States, all of which should consider the stabilization of the country to be in their long-term interests. There are indications, from the other parties, that this is, indeed, the case. Such a consortium could consist of China, India (as always, the key to the region) Iran, Pakistan and Russia. The terms of any subsequent treaty would, of necessity, include the proviso that infringement of its provisions by a signatory would be considered as an act of war against the other parties.
Containment should be identified as the limitation of Afghan influence, in whatever form, to the bounds of its geographic frontiers.
There are other important aspects which have to be addressed. It should be accepted that external influence will have little effect, in the short or medium term, in improving the lot of the Afghan people. It should be remembered that the time-lapse between the Kennan Telegram and the demise of Soviet power was of the order of 40 years. In the case of Afghanistan, it may be considerably more. However, it will be important that the native population is made aware that modern and liberal alternatives to primitive islamic teaching are available, are relevant and are religeously correct. A useful step would be the availability of the Koran in local languages. It is also important to be aware that, unlike the Christian world, there is no central authority in Islam. Each country, region, town, community or religeous assembly has its own (and sometimes conflicting) interpretation of islamic teaching.
On the vexed question of the production of opium: this is clearly one of the main reasons for the efforts of ‘religeous interests’. For a time, in this context, pragmatism will have to overide dogma. In the medium-term it will be necessary to organize a central purchasing organization, perhaps as a United Nations Agency. The effect of this will be to take the raw opium off the market, will break the supply chain and will provide a source of funding to improve the viability and stability of local agriculture. Failure to accept this reality, would undermine future success. At a stroke, this would undermine the Taliban funding system and degrade the capabilities of the dissident elements in Pakistan which are a major source of irritation.
In conclusion, a quotation from Richard Holbrooke: ‘Yet if history teaches us one thing, it is that history is unpredictable. There will be other Bosnias in our lives, different in every detail but similar in one overriding manner: they will originate in distant and ill-understood places, explode with little warning and present the rest of the world with difficult choices between risky involvement and potentially costly neglect. There will be other Bosnias in our lives—where outside involvement can be decisive and American leadership will be required’
(To End A War: Richard Holbrooke, 1998.)
Bruce Condell
Editor/Co-Author: On the German Art of War ‘Truppenfuhrung’
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Mostly, the illiterate rural underclass live in their isolated tribal communities and unite only in instances inter-tribal warfare or in the face of a perceived common external threat.
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The terms of any subsequent treaty would, of necessity, include the proviso that infringement of its provisions by a signatory would be considered as an act of war against the other parties.
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