A Tale of Two Wars
Richard Haass’ perceptive insider’s account of the policymaking leading up to both Iraq wars -- one a "war of choice," the other a "war of necessity" -- holds key lessons for future U.S. leadership in the Middle East and beyond.
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Two postmortems on the Iraq occupation lambaste Washington for handling the job poorly. But doing much better would be so difficult that perhaps the bar should be raised for going to war in the first place.
The best strategy for the United States now in Iraq is disengagement. In a reversal of the usual sequence, the U.S. hand will be strengthened by withdrawal, and Washington might actually be able to lay the groundwork for a reasonably stable Iraq. Why? Because geography ensures that all other parties are far more exposed to the dangers of an anarchical Iraq than is the United States itself.
By losing the trust of the Iraqi people, the Bush administration has already lost the war. Moderate Iraqis can still win it, but only if they wean themselves from Washington and get support from elsewhere. To help them, the United States should reduce and ultimately eliminate its military presence, train Iraqis to beat the insurgency on their own, and rally Iran and European allies to the cause.

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Another View of "War of Choice" in Iraq
It seems to be popular to condemn the "War of Choice" in Iraq without addressing the question of what could or would Saddam have done by 2009 if he had been left undisturbed. Well, of course, no one can say for certain what he would have done, but looking at what North Korea accomplished should be a consideration for what he could have done. Today, North Korea has two nuclear tests under its belt, and Saddam has none. Yet, he had smarter scientists, a better covert supply chain and more money than the North Koreans. Saddam could have two nuke tests under his belt as well. Am I arguing that every time the US is confronted with a "War of Choice" (e.g., Kosovo) that we should attack? No. The better choice is tough negotiations as the US/UK used with Khadafy to get Libya to renounce WMD in 2003. However, I would note that these tough negotiations were the direct result of Khadafy realizing that if it was 21 days to Baghdad, it might only be 5 days to the Shores of Tripoli (another positive result from that "War of Choice" in Iraq). In the 1930s, the West had "War of Choice" decisions in 1936 in the Re-militarization of the Rhineland, in 1938 during the Anschluss and 1939 during the takeover of Czechoslovakia. The question is never a simplistic "Do we go to war or not?". It is the tougher question of "If we don't go to war, then what happens?"