The global economic crisis has revealed the folly of large U.S. budget and trade deficits, as well as of the strong dollar that makes them possible. If it is serious about recovery, the United States must balance the budget, stimulate private saving, and embrace a declining dollar.
Comments
Exaggerated Threats
For all of the author's talk regarding irregular warfare he leaves out elements just as, or more important to defending ourselves and our interests from it: Intelligence and eliminating our opponents mobilization capabilities through humanitarian concerns- something we failed to do in Vietnam and are currently failing to do in Afghanistan.
The author also perceives China as a far greater military threat than it actually is for two reasons. First, China owns an unprecedented amount of U.S. debt and thus has an interest in the value of this debt as well as our ability to pay it back, two things that could be compromised in the event of interstate war. Second, mutually assured destruction and the fear of escalation on both sides will keep conflict between the United States and China from escalating beyond the proxy-wars seen during the Cold War.
EJW
Pentagon's Wasting Assets-Wrong Prescription
Mr. Krepinevich details the erosion of U.S. military dominance in the world and concludes, “All this suggests that the United States must pursue a more modest strategy than that advanced by the Bush administration in the wake of 9/11.” However, he contradicts himself by stating that the “United States' ability to project power” must be maintained and makes some “modest” proposals that are reminiscent of the murderous Cold War tactic of proxy wars: “the United States should adopt an indirect approach to addressing instability in the developing world . . . Washington should continue its efforts to field indigenous forces . . . The U.S. military will need to maintain a capacity to ‘surge’ forces should a state of vital interest begin to fail.”
His analysis is cogent but his proposals are not consistent with an atrophying power. What’s called for is a rejection of a militarily activist foreign policy, intent on manipulation of other nations and peoples, and its replacement by diplomacy, international law, and support for nations and movements that point toward a more just society.
RE: Exaggerated Threats
Evan W.,
However much they may have invested in US debt, the mainland Chinese nonetheless consider national honor in the form of reunification with Taiwan as paramount. There's little cause for concern today but, say around 2020 - give or take two years - the Chinese economy may well force politicians to distract the people via a showdown with Taiwan as Argentina did in the 1982 Falklands War. Assuming the president of the US doesn't acquiesce in this putative hostile takeover of a democracy by a one-party state - I can hardly see how that would be politically possible - we may well see the long-range missile war which Mr. Krepinevich describes. Will the US be ready for this?
evan W
iam agree with Thomas J C. moreover, chinese has it's own system of legitimacy called mandate of heaven, a ruler is perceived to have lost the mandate, if it can't keep the unity of china.
china will use anything at his disposal to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence
Pentagon's Wasting Assets
It is pointless to attempt to regain the military supremacy that we enjoyed for the last 20 or so years. This was a unique period that is not likely to be replicated regardless of how much the United States spends on our military.
To some extent, I agree, therefore, with Joseph K. We will need to move away from the idea that the United States can intervene with impunity whenever it wants. Diplomacy will become more important and our foreign policy will need to accept the inevitable limits that accompany a more multipolar world. In fact, one could argue that such a world will ultimately be better for all, including the United States.
At the same time, it is naive, in my opinion, to "reject" the use of power and expect to replace it solely with "diplomacy, international law, and support for nations and movements that point toward a more just society." Diplomacy without power behind it is likely to be unavailaing as much as we would wish it otherwise. International law is a double-edged sword at best, as we have seen in places like Sudan. And, there are some movements that are not forces for a more just society and that must be resisted.
The Pentagon
Good argument but sobriety in the use of power is necessary. Collaboration in projecting power can prove more effective in a multi polar world, it was spectacular succesfuli "Desert Strom" ...
If China was to be invited to contribue to peace keeping efforts in the Middle east it might make it a more responsible world actor. (see Darfur).
Response
I agree with your take on this. We have to be ready to put our money where our mouth is.
Pentagon's Wasting Assets
Thank you for commenting on my post.
What I proposed was that diplomacy should not focus on intimidation but on moral persuasion. Diplomacy with power behind it is immoral; it is a perpetuation of the conventional use of so called “carrots and sticks”, really military and economic threats, to get our way. Power should be used only for legitimate self-defense, not territorial or economic aggrandizement or spread of a particular ideology. Support of resistance to tyranny is permissible if the resistance is home grown and promotes a more just society, not if it is a creation of a foreign power that wants to install a puppet regime.
This approach, which you call “naïve”, is admittedly radical, but it is the only one consistent with Judeo-Christian ethics.
Response
Dude, It is not naive or radical. We have to evolve and get over "brawny hoodlum approaches" What I mean by putting our money where our mouth is; is just that. We often forget that we are all one species and we have to survive together. So lets start working bilaterally to get this movement going.
But it's the truth if we offer to help then lets really help. If we want to really set a precedence then defense has to be built around a solid foreign policy, that says "We want peace, and we would expect human nature would instill the same feelings within you".
Puppet regimes to be quite frank are over with. Too many people are gaining access to internet, media outlets, and becoming educated. That is all good but this of course prevents plausibly to instill or lend credence to a puppet regime.
You seem to conflate two
You seem to conflate two separate arguments in your first two paragraphs. I was hoping you could clarify what you mean. For instance, you talk first about the pointlessness of regaining military supremacy and then "the idea that the United States can intervene with impunity whenever it wants."
I disagree with your first statement: it is not pointless to attempt to regain military supremacy. Indeed, it is quite vital for so many different reasons, reasons which are so numerous I feel naming only a few would do injustice to the rest. Suffice it to say, we have the essential elements to regain military supremacy in the U.S. if intelligent policies are set forth both now and in the immediate future. Albeit, this is a big "if."
We should have no illusions. U.S. power in the world will wane in the coming decades. According to the most recent NIC's Global Trends report, the projection is that the U.S. will still however remain the most powerful country in the world. We will be so in large part if our military is kept strong. Though the U.S. might not reach supremacy, at least to the extent that was once the case, the goal should be to reach such a stage of supremacy within reasonable and feasible bounds. My contention is is that this goal is reasonable. And I think it is vital, if only to sustain that sense of psychological comfort that many of us as Americans feel when we can look out into the world and truly know that no other country can overstep us militarily. As macho as that might sound, it is unfortunately the way of the political world. Diplomacy is only as good as the military enforcing it. Again, sad, but history repeats this truth many times over.
A modest response
After reading all of your comments I enjoy the "take aways". My concern as a late 20 something is how will our foreign policy be crafted in a very "domestic" driven focus? I have been so confused as to who, what, when, where and why we have developed these foreign policies. I am still confused by our Policy makers I fear they are not paying attention to the right investment areas.
The Military also needs a good "road map" and one that will define the guidelines for 10-20 years so we can acquire the right capabilities and those capabilities can have foreign policy crafted around it. A great example is developing weapon systems that are defensively focused first so we can secure what we have already, and know what we really can handle.
What concerns me in the near-term is the lack of understanding we as a body people have of the dynamics in China, India, and Latin America. Because as the author eluded too we have enjoyed the comfort of our "rear" being safe. Well that is no longer the case in dealing with irregular warfare. So what are we doing in Latin America to monitor the growing Iranian influence?
But let's be honest if we go head to head with China that is the end game. So lets develop/craft foreign policy that can provide guidance for realistic scenarios. Lets get more emphasis on diplomacy and our escalation/de-escalation strategies that we can put in play to deceive the aggressive actors?
I am just hoping for my generation who will have to deal with the 2020 scenario have studied the strategies, the history, and the early warning signs. Or at least have some of the "old guard" types around to help craft the battle plan.
not just military force
instead of only focussing on how to combat irregular forces, america should focus on how to prevent these forces from coming into existence, how to discourage locals from aiding them.
it's the kind of war that can be won with brute force. offering economic assistance and chance of better future is a must
Not taking into account all the scenarios
I think this article is not taking into account all the developments of the post-cold war era. President Clinton with the war in Kosovo, which few people have fully grasped the strategic significance paved the way for President Bush to take very bold decisions on extending the border of the western civilization all the way to Bulgaria. American diplomacy during these 20 years has been very successful in bringing Europe together and solving most of the problems in the Balkans paving the way for NATO to expand the borders making Europe safer while gaining new allies and new military bases.
The US is not standing and watching.
Stop Spinning the Wheels of Policy
One winter night as I was returning home from a day of skiing, I saw a man in a brand new, high-tech SUV stuck on the side of a country road. His right wheels were stuck in the snow at the edge of the ditch, making him dangerously close to being trapped. Instead of prudently reversing course and re-charting his path, he instead chose to forge ahead! Employing the apparent benefits of his high-tech vehicle, he gunned the engine. Instead of overcoming the base grip of primitive nature, he only worked himself deeper into the wintry mire.
Mr. Krepinevich’s article serves only to encourage foolish decisions at an unacceptably high level of policy articulation. The threats he identifies are not new; indeed, they fail to progress beyond the challenges cited in the 2001 and 2006 Quadrennial Defense Reviews. The challenge of simultaneously conducting conventional and asymmetrical conflicts is even less original. America has been conducting similar operations since the Revolutionary War: as Washington led the Continental Army, Nathaniel Greene led a partisan guerrilla campaign. It is in these formative roots that a solution will emerge, not in the blind application of new and fantastical technologies.
If US policy is to be re-evaluated, should NSC-68 not be cast aside as the embodiment of questionable practice? NSC-68 transformed George Kennan’s concept of Containment from that of idea to policy. The result at its most repugnant was the continuation of the Vietnam War for some twenty-five years. The effects of this “re-evaluation” and new approach to strategy have left an indelible mark on US strategic thinking generally, and the American military in particular. Even today the lingering effects of NSC-68 continue to be problematic in the arena of strategy and tactics.
A new Grand Strategy is absolutely required, one which acknowledges America’s status as “the world's leading consumer and debtor nation.” As a result, this strategy would present a clearly articulated outlook, which would be achieved through coldly realistic goals. Alongside this new strategy, a parallel and coordinated set of tactics must be developed to allow for the achievement of a successful and lasting foreign policy. Rather than bemoan the ever shrinking technology gap between the US and her competitors, why not change course? End the cycle of spinning tires and seek out an alternative. A potential tactical solution can be found by going no further than page two of this article; Paul Van Ripper and asymmetry.
If Van Ripper was able to cripple the world’s most powerful military employing the most diverse and advanced arsenal, why not consider adopting his tactics? Time and again the application of asymmetry has been shown to be nearly unstoppable by conventional militaries. Similarly, it has also been shown to be one of the most effective means of deterrance against similar threats. I say set aside the solid-state lasers and micro satellites. Instead, foster this overlooked and abused school of tactical thought which has been a part of American strategic thinking since the Revolutionary War.
Defense spending is known to
Defense spending is known to need major cuts, especially now, when one of a new military pet project is called brain optimization. Brain optimization would literally mean affecting brain activity in order to enhance memory capabilities to recall key information at appropriate times – in other words, mind control. This is a project of DARPA, the Pentagon's far out research arm, who aim to equip troops with devices that will synch up brain waves. Defense spending, including projects like brain optimization, is responsible for the bulk of the national debt of the US, perhaps our Congress should start cutting these sorts of programs when Americans need no fax payday loans for basic medical care, housing, or in some cases, even food.
Why the author does not
Why the author does not mention the Russion millitary power which the only can match the USA.Maybe,if war break out between the two countries,the nuclear weapon would be the only means,no need to use the projection power.If it fight against Iran and China,the normal warfare is the primary,the nuclear is not the first option, so it must depend on projection ability.
In fact,the opportunity for war breaks out between the USA and CHINA is very limited.CHINA does not have the desire and ability to lead the world.CHINA is a good behavior in world affairs,obeying the regulations which are built up by western countries very well. Before solving serious civil problem,China would never challenge the USA's leading position and millitary priority. But there is a rule for American to rember: no matter how hard it try its best to enhance its millitary power,it would never be able to get absolute advantage over China,which means if it would fight against China,the cost of war will be too heavy to endure for American,because China would never challenge the core interest of America.The American people would never risk so much.But the clash confined in very limited scale would be occur more often with the increasing of China military power.
IF CHINA could solve the inner problem successfully,CHINA will be the number one sooner or later,including millitary.But from history experience,America is still in young stage,compared with Roma and Han dynasty and other super power in history.
CHINA has a long way to go and AMEICA can enjoy its priority for a long time.
Problematic references to US Cold War 'grand strategy'
In referring to NSC-68 and the USA's Cold War strategies generated in the 1950s, the author posits that the ambition, depth and scope of those strategies and recommendations, were such a fundamental (and seemingly positive) review of US foreign policy, that the Obama administration would do well to emulate its spirit and sense of vision. These descriptions of NSC-68, the strategies of the 1950s, and the inherent worldview underlying them are problematic at best:
1. NSC-68 suggested (appropriately) that in a world with more than one nuclear power (prompted by the shattering of the USA's atomic monopoly in 1949) that the nuclear threat would diminish, but that deterrence relied on the US remaining superior in nuclear forces. The Soviet strategy of reaching for parity would be innately incompatible with this. The nuclear arms race, which America was winning at the start of the 1960s (with a 17-1 'missile gap' in her favour) would only spur on (in part) Khrushchev's bid to achieve immediate (however artificial) parity through stationing Soviet missiles in Cuba (1962), and Brezhnev's obsessive nuclear arms build up. The second consequence ushered in the Soviet achievement of nuclear parity at the close of the 1960s and early 1970s, and the terrific shadow of mutually assured destruction.
2. The doctrine of 'superiority' associated with US nuclear strategy would also prompt Eisenhower's much criticized 'massive retaliation' policy, which was meant to result in SIOP-62 - the Single-Integrated-Operation-Plan. Eisenhower's strategy also sought a severe reduction in conventional forces in favour of that threat of a single, devastating nuclear strike from the US, ie. SIOP 62 (thus deterring her opponents).
Yet the relentless 'piecemeal aggression' of the Vietminh in the 1950s (ie. the utter inability of 'massive retaliation' to deter the communist aggression against the South) put paid to a strategy which the author basically believes to have 'depth and scope'.
Naturally, there are many more problems associated with the foreign policy principles of the 1950s being held up as evidence of a grand strategy of powerful insight and intelligence. The recommendations of this period range over multiple simplifications of the global Cold War conflict, from the bid to 'homogenize' the allies of the West against the entire (presumed) monolithic communist bloc, to faulty (but perhaps unavoidable) assumptions that the USSR's resources were 'limitless' and the communist bloc could only be contained rather than 'rolled back'.
Thus, why the author would look to the 1950s foreign policy review as an inspiration for the seeming 'crisis' which the Obama administration faces is quite puzzling indeed.