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The Obama administration relies on drones for one simple reason: they work. Drone strikes have devastated al Qaeda at little financial cost, at no risk to U.S. forces, and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused.
Drones are not helping to defeat al Qaeda and may be creating sworn enemies out of a sea of local insurgents. Embracing them as the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism would be a mistake.
For the second time in less than six months, polio vaccine workers in Pakistan have come under fire. For the gunmen, killing health care workers has been seen as a legitimate response to a nefarious extension of Western power. And, for the CIA, faux vaccine campaigns have sometimes been justified as part of the war on terror. Both sides are wrong: denying or providing health care should never be an instrument of statecraft.
The narcotics trade is ruining Afghanistan and spreading death and addiction around the world. Kabul needs a new approach to the problem -- and neighboring Iran happens to offer a great model.
The United States' approach to counterinsurgency, championed by General David Petraeus, helped produce stunning results in parts of Iraq and Afghanistan. In retrospect, however, the fuss over the doctrine seems overblown. It achieved mere tactical successes and only in combination with other, non-military factors.
With the rise of endless irregular wars playing out in the shadows, special operations have never been more important to U.S. national security. But policymakers and commanders focus too much on dramatic raids and high-tech drone strikes. They need to pay more attention to an even more important task these forces take on: training foreign troops.
Stephen Hadley and John Podesta overemphasize the speed of the transition about to take place in Afghanistan as the United States departs, argues a former U.S. ambassador. Hadley and Podesta respond, insisting that time is running out for a legitimate Afghan government to emerge.
Two new books address exactly what happened during the raid that killed Osama bin Laden. Squabbling over the details, though, misses the point. What survives in historical memory depends as much on patterns of human understanding as on the arguments churning through the news cycle.
Adding the Haqqani network to the State Department's terrorist list is big on symbolism but slim on substance -- a domestic political gambit that may end up complicating life when the next administration tries to bring the Afghan war to a close.
Far from being a needless waste, as other authors have argued, mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles are worth the price tag. They are essential tools for protecting U.S. troops in irregular warfare and on uncertain terrain abroad.
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