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A pathbreaking history of the Vietnam War reveals that the Northern government was far more divided and discouraged than commonly believed. Yet the fact remains that the United States and its allies in the South always faced very long odds of success.
As Washington ponders how long to stay in Iraq, it would do well to remember the limited impact of the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam and Cambodia in the 1970s, Lebanon in the 1980s, and Somalia in the 1990s.
During Richard Nixon's first term, when I served as secretary of defense, we withdrew most U.S. forces from Vietnam while building up the South's ability to defend itself. The result was a success -- until Congress snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by cutting off funding for our ally in 1975. Washington should follow a similar strategy now, but this time finish the job properly.
Public support for the war in Iraq has followed the same course as it did for the wars in Korea and Vietnam: broad enthusiasm at the outset with erosion of support as casualties mount. The experience of those past wars suggests that there is nothing President Bush can do to reverse this deterioration -- or to stave off an "Iraq syndrome" that could inhibit U.S. foreign policy for decades to come.
Despite recently signing the long-awaited trade deal with the United States, Vietnam's communist leadership is split by uncertainty about the country's economic and political future. Without an economic overhaul soon, Vietnam risks being relegated to the global dustbin. Officials, however, remain wary of too much international engagement and know that capitalism would destroy the one-party state. Change in Vietnam is inevitable. But it will occur through an evolution, not a revolution.
In taking the war upon himself, Robert S. McNamara forgets that containment abroad and anticommunism at home virtually ensured the Vietnam tragedy.
Newly released records show that L.B.J., for all his political canniness and cunning, never managed U.S. foreign policy well-even excluding the Vietnam War.
In Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara, the former secretary of defense emerges as a man who, despite decades of public service, is unable to out the damned spot of Vietnam.
The Clinton administration inherits strained bilateral relations with the leading powers of Asia and no coherent policy for the Asia/Pacific region as a whole. Trade, security and diplomatic style are the overarching challenges--and on all three counts prominent Asians are worried. They fear a president bent on building trade walls, bringing home American troops and lecturing on human rights. Yet respect for the United States remains instinctive throughout the region, particularly given convincing progress in rejuvenating the American economy. Asia's quest for economic growth and more democratic government awaits leadership from Washington.
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