Yugoslavia

Refine By:
Snapshot,
Nikolas K. Gvosdev

Two years after it declared independence, Kosovo has not progressed as many of its backers -- most especially the United States -- once hoped. To make Kosovo politically and economically viable, Washington should encourage negotiations open to the idea of territorial adjustment.

Essay, Jan/Feb 2005
Edward P. Joseph

Since Slobodan Milosevic was sent to The Hague two years ago, the former Yugoslavia has dropped off the international radar. But the Balkans are far from secure: corruption runs rampant, economies are flat, and ethnic hatred continues to simmer. Worst of all, Kosovo remains a flashpoint that could re-ignite the region.

Essay, May/Jun 2003
Gary J. Bass

Yugoslavia's former tyrant now sits in the dock facing charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. Serving as his own counsel, Slobodan Milosevic rages against NATO conspiracies and victor's justice. But these courtroom antics cannot detract from the trial's great achievements: revealing the truth about Milosevic's role in the Balkan wars and removing him from Serbian politics once and for all.

Review Essay, Jul/Aug 2001
Richard K. Betts

In Waging Modern War, General Wesley Clark describes how NATO bested Serbia -- just barely -- in the organization's first-ever shooting war. With confused priorities, a reluctant military, and overweening lawyers, the alliance was scarcely up to the task.

Review Essay, May/Jun 2000
Ivo Banac

Two new books on Kosovo and a massive history of the Balkans try to make sense of a troubled region -- with wildly mixed results.

Essay, Nov/Dec 1999
Benn Steil and Susan L. Woodward

Peace in the Balkans depends on economic stability and prosperity for all. To overcome the legacies of failed economic reforms and ethnic strife, southeastern Europe needs nothing short of a European "New Deal." Sound money and free trade can take root in the Balkans only if the EU expands the euro and its trade arrangements to the region promptly, with no strings attached. But the EU's current approach, which attaches conditions to membership in its elite clubs, falls far short.

Essay, Nov/Dec 1999
Javier Solana

The NATO war in Kosovo did not come out of the blue. The alliance fought only after Belgrade turned a deaf ear to diplomacy, and NATO knew the risks it was running. But doing nothing would have been worse; assenting to Slobodan Milosevic's mass killings would have dangerously undermined the credibility of Western institutions.

Response, Nov/Dec 1999
James B. Steinberg

If the Clinton White House is for it, Michael Mandelbaum must be against it. Hence his broadside on Kosovo ignored the inconvenient fact that NATO won.

Comment, Sep/Oct 1999
Michael Mandelbaum

In this 1999 article, Michael Mandelbaum explains why previous NATO interventions, such as that in Kosovo, had just the opposite effect of what NATO intended, leading to civilian suffering and regional instability. James B. Steinberg replies.

Essay, Jul/Aug 1999
Peter W. Rodman

NATO began its air war against Yugoslavia with high hopes that the transatlantic relationship would find new purpose through robust humanitarian intervention. Alas, Milosevic remains as entrenched as ever. A messy diplomatic compromise is increasingly likely, but anything less than total victory will have grave consequences for America and its allies. Europe will be wary of cooperating with the United States on security and balk at future engagements that lack U.N. blessing. U.S. isolationists will get plenty more grist for their mill. With its expectations set far too high, NATO will pay the price when they come crashing back to earth.

Syndicate content