Middle East

The debate about what to do in Syria has been sidetracked by discussions of credibility and reputation. But both logic and evidence prove that reputations are mostly imaginary. Obama should not let fears that others might think him irresolute drive him to disaster. Instead, he should refocus on what U.S. interests really are in Syria, and how he can best obtain them.

Given that there are few appealing policy options for Syria, it might be tempting to downplay Assad's alleged use of chemical weapons and brush aside earlier rhetoric about red lines. But that would be a mistake: chemical weapons can kill thousands in a single day, their use becomes a national trauma, and their debilitating effects linger for decades.

Although chemical weapons are often considered weapons of mass destruction, they are not. In the case of sarin gas, many tons must be released under favorable conditions before it can inflict significantly more damage than conventional explosives. However repugnant Assad's use of chemical weapons in Syria might be, in other words, it should not change the United States' basic calculations.

Whoever replaces Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad will have to commit to one of two strategies: winning domestic favor through confrontation with Israel or winning desperately needed Western support through cooperation. For years, the West Bank leadership has tried to straddle the two and, in turn, has born all the costs of both strategies while reaping none of the benefits.