Post-Conflict Reconstruction
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Iraq is not suffering sectarian strife as much as what could be called intra-sectarian conflict, in which rivals from both the country’s Shiite- and Sunni-dominated parties reposition themselves amid the political fray.
In Afghanistan, the United States faces a choice: either establish a permanent administrative and security presence, or stand back and risk the country becoming a haven for organized criminals and terrorists. Staying forever won’t work, so Washington must accept the risks of withdrawal.
Judged by any yardstick, Afghanistan has made little progress since 2001. The United States and its allies have bred an overly centralized and ineffective government in Kabul that is hooked on foreign aid and struggles against a resurgent Taliban. Without serious reforms, the next ten years could be worse.
To transform Afghanistan into a regional economic hub, the United States must emphasize that the idea originated not in Washington, but in Kabul. Going forward, Afghanistan and its neighbors will have to take the lead in determining what projects are built and when.
Americans should not have been surprised by Obama's recent announcement that he would send a small number of troops to Uganda. This is only the latest chapter in a feeble, decades-long U.S. attempt to take out Joseph Kony and his militia.
Arriving in Tripoli just after it fell to the rebels, the author witnessed several similarities between the Libyan capital in 2011 and revolutionary Afghanistan in 1992. They offer valuable lessons on how to avoid catastrophe.
The Afghans will indeed be ready to take over their own security by 2014, writes the former commander of the ISAF Joint Command. The size and quality of Afghanistan’s armed services have increased drastically over the last few years, and the United States’ decision to focus on good local governance, especially in key areas, has pacified the most important parts of the country.
Every invasion of Afghanistan has eventually come to naught, either because the invaders paid insufficient attention to local culture or because they sought to impose centralized control. If the United States is interested in leaving behind a better Afghanistan than the one it found, it needs to take those experiences to heart.
The looming U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan need not lead to instability. If it proceeds smartly, Washington can ensure that fewer U.S. soldiers will leave the country more secure, not less.
The fall of Laurent Gbagbo was the result of a civil war many years in the making. Now, as Côte d'Ivoire eyes its political future, it is up to the international community to make sure that it helps more than it hurts.
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