WMD & Proliferation
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Response,
May 7, 2013
Given that there are few appealing policy options for Syria, it might be tempting to downplay Assad's alleged use of chemical weapons and brush aside earlier rhetoric about red lines. But that would be a mistake: chemical weapons can kill thousands in a single day, their use becomes a national trauma, and their debilitating effects linger for decades.
Snapshot,
April 30, 2013
Although chemical weapons are often considered weapons of mass destruction, they are not. In the case of sarin gas, many tons must be released under favorable conditions before it can inflict significantly more damage than conventional explosives. However repugnant Assad's use of chemical weapons in Syria might be, in other words, it should not change the United States' basic calculations.
Snapshot,
April 1, 2013
As North Korea issues increasingly over-the-top threats, officials in Washington have sought to reassure the public and U.S. allies. But the risk of nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula is far from remote--and the United States should adjust its military planning accordingly.
Snapshot,
March 6, 2013
After making steady progress on nuclear weapons in the first two years of his presidency, Obama stalled after Republicans waged a fierce battle against ratifying the New START treaty. Recent speeches -- and Obama's picks for secretary of state and secretary of defense -- indicate that he is ready to resume the fight.
Snapshot,
February 13, 2013
The view that nuclear weapons are merely political instruments -- suitable for sending signals, but not waging wars -- is now so common in the United States that it is hard to find anyone who disagrees. Yet that comforting assumption is not shared by leaders everywhere. North Korea, for example, does not test nuclear weapons to send messages, but to make sure that its ultimate deterrent will work. It would be tragic if the United States let misguided Kremlinology distract from the real challenges ahead.
Snapshot,
January 22, 2013
Today, it is taken for granted that using chemical weapons -- as the Assad regime has reportedly done -- is uniquely intolerable. Observers have speculated that humans simply harbor a particular fear of them or that militaries have never considered them useful. In fact, the proscription is the result of decades of international work.
Essay,
Jan/Feb
2013
Halting Iran's progress toward a bomb will require the United States to make credible promises and credible threats simultaneously -- an exceedingly difficult trick to pull off. For coercive diplomacy to work, Washington may need to put more of its cards on the table.
Snapshot,
October 25, 2012
Israel does not need its nuclear arsenal to remain the strongest power in the Middle East. It can make good use of the stockpile, however, by offering it up as a bargaining chip to end Iran's nuclear program.
Snapshot,
October 18, 2012
In the run-up to the Iraq War, diplomacy and weapons inspections became a means to an end: building a casus belli. That was a mistake then, and it is becoming one now, too.
Response,
September 4, 2012
Iranian dissidents will tell the United States what they need. But before that happens, Washington must clearly state of its commitment to their cause: regime change.
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