IT IS an especial privilege to appear before the members of the Council on Foreign Relations because of their notable endeavor to facilitate an intelligent appreciation by our people of policies and action in the field of foreign affairs. Not only have you provided a forum, but in establishing a quarterly review under highly competent direction you have made one of the most helpful contributions to a better understanding of our foreign relations that has ever been made by private enterprise. The need is obvious.

I see among you those who have won eminence by sound judgment and exceptional facility in mastering facts, yet you constantly realize, I am sure, what slight opportunity you have for any but the hastiest consideration of the more difficult problems of the day so far as they lie outside your professional activities, and how impossible it is to reach any satisfactory independent conclusion unless you are aided by earlier special studies or by some experience which gives you background and perspective. Even then the old experience may be merely a trap to hold the mind in the clutch of preconceptions when it should be free for new excursions and impressions. If those in our community who are highly favored by training and variety of contacts are encountering such difficulties, what shall be said of the great host of our people--shrewd, fair-minded, but busy, preoccupied with the exigencies of the competitive struggle and living in the midst of strident appeals and multiplying allurements. With countless organizations we especially prize the few, such as yours, that seek the careful opinion, the sober matured judgment--an effort prosecuted, as your editors have said, with "a broad hospitality to divergent views" but none the less controlled by a sense of values and of responsibility.

It seems to me that I can make no better use of this occasion than to speak on certain recent questions and negotiations with which I have not been able to deal in other addresses. I shall not confine myself to a single topic and, although the various subjects of my remarks tonight are not directly connected with each other, I trust that taken with what I have previously said they will aid you in obtaining a conspectus of the present state of our foreign relations. The point of view of the responsible officer is not that of the debater or the reviewer; others may discuss, he must act on his best judgment. In most instances, when all the circumstances have been carefully considered, he is likely to feel that there is a certain inevitableness in that action. But I am here simply to report, not to claim agreement or challenge criticism.

QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE SMUGGLING OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS

Foreign nations are naturally tenacious of their rights upon the high seas, and, on the other hand, our Government can not look with indifference upon the attempts of hovering vessels, claiming the protection of foreign flags, illicitly to introduce their cargoes of liquors into the commerce of the United States. This Government must use every proper means to put a stop to this illegal traffic. It should be remembered, however, that authority with respect to the high seas can not be effectively conferred by acts of Congress if these are in contravention of international law, even though such legislative acts as municipal law would govern the decisions of our own courts.

Where international rights and obligations are involved, controversies not otherwise adjusted would naturally come before an international arbitral tribunal whose decisions would be governed by international law and would not be controlled by municipal law. This principle was explicitly recognized in the recent decision by Chief Justice Taft, as arbitrator in the controversy between Great Britain and Costa Rica, where the Chief Justice illustrated the point that, while in our system an act of Congress might for municipal purposes repeal a treaty, the United States could not thus get rid of an international obligation which would continue and would be enforced by an international arbitral tribunal. The Chief Justice said:

"This is not an exceptional instance of an essential difference between the scope and effect of a decision by the highest tribunal of a country and of an international tribunal. The Constitution of the United States makes the Constitution, laws passed in pursuance thereof, and treaties of the United States the supreme law of the land. Under that provision, a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. The Supreme Court can not under the Constitution recognize and enforce rights accruing to aliens under a treaty which Congress has repealed by statute. In an international tribunal, however, the unilateral repeal of a treaty by a statute would not affect the rights arising under it and its judgment would necessarily give effect to the treaty and hold the statute repealing it of no effect."

The Government of the United States has repeatedly asserted that the limits of territorial waters extend to three marine miles outward from the coast line. This has been asserted by our Government in making claims upon other governments. With respect to Spain's claim of jurisdiction over the waters adjacent to Cuba, Secretary Seward wrote to the Spanish minister as follows:

"It can not be admitted, nor indeed is Mr. Tassara understood to claim, that the mere assertion of a sovereign, by an act of legislation, however solemn, can have the effect to establish and fix its external maritime jurisdiction. His right to a jurisdiction of three miles is derived, not from his own decrees, but from the law of nations, and exists even though he may never have proclaimed or asserted it by any decree or declaration whatsoever. He can not, by a mere decree, extend the limit and fix it at six miles, because if he could, he could in the same manner, and upon motives of interest, ambition, or even upon caprice, fix it at ten or twenty or fifty miles, without the consent or acquiescence of other powers which have a common right with himself in the freedom of all the oceans. Such a pretension could never be successfully or rightfully maintained. . . .

"In view of the considerations and facts which have been thus presented, the undersigned is obliged to state that the Government of the United States is not prepared to admit that the jurisdiction of Spain in the waters which surround the island of Cuba lawfully and rightfully extends beyond the customary limit of three miles."

Secretary Fish, writing to the British Minister in 1875, said: "We have always understood and asserted that, pursuant to public law, no nation can rightfully claim jurisdiction at sea beyond a marine league from its coast." And Secretary Evarts, in a communication to the Minister of Spain, concerning the visitation and firing upon certain American vessels near Cuba in 1880, said: "The Government must adhere to the three-mile rule as the jurisdictional limit, and the cases of visitation without that line seem not to be excused or excusable under that rule." The general principle was thus stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the recent case of the Cunard Steamship Company v. Mellon (262 U. S. 100, 122): "It now is settled in the United States and recognized elsewhere that the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes the land areas under its dominion and control, the ports, harbors, bays, and other inclosed arms of the sea along its coast, and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the coast line outward a marine league, or three geographic miles."

In the Bering Sea arbitration it was held that the United States had no jurisdiction in the Bering Sea fisheries beyond the three-mile limit and in the case of the British schooner Sayward the United States was required to compensate Great Britain for interfering with its sealing operations outside the three-mile limit. The American-British Claims Arbitration Tribunal in December, 1920, awarded damages against the United States on account of the interference by officers with the British vessel Coquitlam because of transfer of cargo off the Pacific coast outside the three-mile limit.

It is quite apparent that this Government is not in a position to maintain that its territorial waters extend beyond the three-mile limit and in order to avoid liability to other governments, it is important that in the enforcement of the laws of the United States this limit should be appropriately recognized. It does not follow, however, that this Government is entirely without power to protect itself from the abuses committed by hovering vessels. There may be such a direct connection between the operation of the vessel and the violation of the laws prescribed by the territorial sovereign as to justify seizure even outside the three-mile limit. This may be illustrated by the case of "hot pursuit" where the vessel has committed an offense against those laws within territorial waters and is caught while trying to escape. The practice which permits the following and seizure of a foreign vessel which puts to sea in order to avoid detention for violation of the laws of the State whose waters it has entered, is based on the principle of necessity for the "effective administration of justice." (Westlake, Part I, p. 177.) And this extension of the right of the territorial State was voted unanimously by the Institute of International Law in 1894.

Another case is one where the hovering vessel, although lying outside the three-mile limit, communicates with the shore by its own boats in violation of the territorial law. Thus Lord Salisbury said, with respect to the British schooner Araunah, that Her Majesty's Government were "of opinion that, even if the Araunah at the time of the seizure were herself outside the three-mile territorial limit, the fact that she was, by means of her boats, carrying on fishing within Russian waters without the prescribed license warranted her seizure and confiscation according to the principles of the municipal law regulating the use of those waters." A case similar to this was that of the Grace and Ruby (283 Fed. 476).

It will be noted that in the case of the Araunah it was the vessel herself that was deemed subject to seizure outside the three-mile limit, and not simply her small boats, and this was manifestly because of the direct connection between the conduct of the vessel and the violation of the law of the territory. It may be urged with force that this principle should not be limited to the case of the use by the vessel of her own boats, where she is none the less effectively engaged, although using other boats, in the illegal introduction of her cargo into the commerce of the territory. Such a case was that of the Henry L. Marshall, recently decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit (292 Fed. 487-488). The Marshall, a vessel sailing under British registry, in 1921 obtained clearance from the Bahama Islands laden with a cargo of intoxicating liquors. She had two clearances, both dated the same date, signed by the same collector of revenue, one of which stated that she had cleared for Halifax with the cargo in question and the other that she had cleared for Gloucester, Mass., in ballast.

The same collector furnished two bills of health, simply differing as to destination. It was abundantly proved that the real object and only business of the Marshall was to peddle liquor along the coast of the United States and particularly did she pursue her vocation while lying from nine to ten miles off Atlantic City and sent liquor on shore pursuant to previous arrangements made in the United States by motor boats. She was seized outside the three-mile limit and condemned. Circuit Judge Hough, speaking for a unanimous court, after referring to the case of the Grace and Ruby, said: "The difference between the facts there presented and those at bar is that, instead of arranging to unload and deliver the cargo of the schooner by, through, or with some assistance from the schooner's crew or equipment (as in the case cited), the whole matter was performed by a previous arrangement with those controlling the Marshall but with small boats that did not belong to the schooner and were not even partially manned by men from her crew. But it is just as true in this case as it was in the case of the Grace and Ruby, that 'the act of unloading, although beginning beyond the three-mile limit, continued until the liquor was landed.' "

The vessel was thus found to be engaged, not in the exercise of her admitted rights upon the high seas, but in unlawfully unloading her cargo into the territory of the United States, in "an actual introduction of a part thereof into the commerce of the United States" contrary to its laws. It should be added that while the British Government originally made a protest in this case, it was finally withdrawn upon the ground that the vessel was not of bona fide British registry, and it should be said that in this withdrawal the British Government did not acquiesce in the principle of the ruling. In view, however, of the historic practice of nations in the protection of their territory from the violation of their laws by hovering vessels, the United States Government can not admit that the accepted rules of international law preclude such action as that taken in the circumstances of the Marshall case.

But it is apparent that, whatever measures this Government may believe that it is free to adopt in accordance with the principles of international law, these, so far as they are practicable, are far from adequate to meet the exigency; and, further, the diplomatic history of the United States reveals the fact that maritime powers, including the United States itself, are highly sensitive to attempts by foreign authorities to seize their vessels on the high seas in time of peace. In each case of seizure there are likely to be serious questions of fact and law, and at any time there may be collisions of authority which would be embarrassing to friendly relations. It is precisely in matters of this description, where the sense of grievance and resentment are so easily aroused, that the effort should be made to reach an international agreement suited to the case. We need to put the measures that are required for the adequate enforcement of our laws on an impregnable basis and to invite and secure the friendly cooperation of the maritime powers.

Again, foreign powers have complained of what they regard as a departure from international comity through the maintenance of the present restrictions of law under which their vessels are not permitted to enter our waters or call at our ports if they have cargoes of liquors on board, although these may be kept under seal and are not to be delivered within the territory of the United States. Nations who fully appreciate our authority, and our right to enforce our own policy, can not understand such a restriction which interferes with their trade with countries other than our own. They can not understand why a ship from a foreign port with a cargo consigned to another foreign port is unable even to traverse our waters, or to visit our ports, because the cargo on board, which is destined for other countries, is of the sort we do not wish for our own. In this situation there is the plainest opportunity for a fair agreement not in derogation of our principles but to aid in their proper enforcement--not only without the slightest departure from, but with a manifest increase in, the safeguards required for our protection against the introduction of intoxicating liquors.

Accordingly, negotiations have been undertaken to reach an appropriate international agreement upon this subject and I am happy to say that such an agreement has been concluded with Great Britain today. There are other Powers which I believe are quite ready to act in a similar way. This will be a long step toward removing causes of irritation and it is precisely as we remove such causes that we shall really make progress in furthering the interests of peace.

It is hardly necessary to observe that there is no intention on the part of this Government to violate, in the negotiation of such agreements, the provisions of the Constitution. The purpose is to facilitate their enforcement. I know there are some who have expressed doubt whether such an international agreement can be made under our Constitution. This doubt I do not entertain. As the Supreme Court of the United States has said, "It is not lightly to be assumed that in matters requiring national action, a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government is not to be found." (Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 415, 433.) It would be most extraordinary if the United States were in such a situation that such causes of international friction could not be removed by an exercise of the treaty-making power which in no way impaired the efficacy of our policy, but, on the other hand, greatly aided in preventing the illicit introduction of intoxicating liquors.

But, viewing the question in its technical aspect, it is quite sufficient to point out that the eighteenth amendment has expressly confided to the discretion of Congress the determination of penalties and forfeitures, and it is manifest that this discretion can be competently and wisely exercised in maintaining the morale of enforcement and in providing that just and adequate enforcement which does not interfere with the appropriate freedom of commerce, an interference with which would serve no interest of the United States, but would be to its most serious injury. Congress in the exercise of its discretion is undoubtedly entitled to protect the substantial interests of the country. Congress has already appreciated this authority and has acted accordingly in excepting from penalties and forfeitures transit through the Panama Canal, an exception which the Supreme Court in its recent decision has fully recognized as being within the competency of Congress. What Congress has thus done can equally be accomplished through the treaty-making power, which, under adequate restrictions, may put such cargoes as those to which I have referred, not destined for our ports or to be delivered within the United States, in the same status as those passing through the Panama Canal.

MEXICAN RELATIONS

Recently, in connection with the centenary of the Monroe doctrine, I have had occasion to review our policy with respect to the Republics of this hemisphere, and I wish at this time merely to add a word as to our relations with Mexico. It is unnecessary for me to describe the difficulties of the past thirteen years. Turmoil and internecine strife produced political and economic instability and disregard of international obligations. We had the friendliest feelings for the people of Mexico and were sensible of their desire for social and political betterment, but revolutionary tendencies and chaotic conditions made it impossible to find a sound basis for intercourse. At last, under General Obregon's administration there was a restoration of stability; commerce and industry began to regain confidence; there was a hopeful endeavor to put the finances of the country on a better footing; provision was made for the payment of the foreign debt. When it appeared that there was a disposition to discharge the obligations which are incident to membership in the family of nations, this Government was glad to recognize the existing Government of Mexico and to resume diplomatic relations.

Two claims conventions were at once concluded--a special convention relating to claims arising from revolutionary disturbances, and a general convention dealing generally with the claims of the respective States and their nationals. Diplomatic relations were resumed and these conventions were concluded last September; the special convention has received the assent of the Mexican Senate and the general convention is about to be acted upon by that body. Both conventions have been submitted to the Senate of the United States.

After this happy result had been achieved, and as we were looking forward to a period of quiet and to opportunities of advantage to both peoples, suddenly there was an attempt to overthrow the established Government of Mexico by violence. It is plain that the purpose of those engaged in this enterprise of arms is simply to determine by forcible measures the succession to President Obregon. It is not a revolution instinct with the aspirations of an oppressed people; it is a matter of personal politics. It is an effort to seize the presidency; it means a subversion of all constitutional and orderly procedure. The contestants, seeking to overthrow the established government, have taken possession of certain portions of the Mexican territory and either are claiming tribute from peaceful and legitimate American commerce or are attempting to obstruct and destroy it.

In these circumstances the established Mexican Government asked the Government of the United States to sell to it a limited quantity of arms and munitions. The request was one which could not be ignored; it had to be granted or denied. This Government had the arms and munitions close at hand; it did not need them and could sell them if it wished. If the request had been denied, we should have turned a cold shoulder to the government with which we had recently established friendly relations and, whatever explanations we might make, we would in fact have given powerful encouragement to those who were attempting to seize the reins of government by force. The refusal to aid the established government would have thrown our moral influence on the side of those who were challenging the peace and order of Mexico, and we should have incurred a grave responsibility for the consequent disturbances. In granting the request, there is no question of intervention, no invasion of the sovereignty of Mexico, as we were acting at its instance and were exercising our undoubted right to sell arms to the existing government. Nor was there any departure from the principle involved in President Harding's policy as to the sale of arms.

That particular declaration was simply a feature of our well-known general policy as to the limitation of armaments. It is our fixed purpose that our surplus war equipment should not be employed in encouraging warfare by fostering militarism and the building up of the competitive armaments that threaten the peace of the world. It in no way precludes us from furnishing arms to aid in the putting down of insurrectionary attacks upon public order in a neighboring State whose peaceful development is especially important to us. Indeed, one of the grounds upon which, under President Harding's administration, this Government declined to become a party to the convention of Saint Germain relating to the traffic in arms was that the convention not only left the signatory governments free to supply each other with arms ad libitum but prevented the sale of arms to governments not signatory, and it was then pointed out that this would prevent our Government from selling arms to our neighboring republics not parties to the convention, however necessary that course might be to the maintenance of stability and peace in this hemisphere.

As the question is obviously one of expediency, each case rests on its own facts. So far as precedents are concerned, we have followed rather than departed from them. In standing for constitutional procedure and frowning upon attempts to conduct political campaigns by force of arms we create no precedent that embarrasses us. Many of our people are solicitous with respect to the contribution of the United States to the cause of peace. That duty and privilege begin at home. In aiding stability in this hemisphere, in throwing our influence in an entirely correct manner in favor of the development of constitutional government and against unwarrantable uprisings, in protecting the legitimate freedom of commerce, we are making the greatest contribution directly within our power, and in accord with our established traditions and manifest interest, to the cause of world peace. This hemisphere should be the exemplar of peace, and we look with confidence to the creation of a unity of sentiment of the American Republics against resort to the brutal arbitrament of force in political controversies. To this end the United States gladly gives its cooperation.

THE NEAR EAST

Turkey--Let me now direct your attention to affairs in the Near East. The events of the past few years have created a new situation, and the difficulty in clarifying present problems is largely due to the fact that so many of our people discuss them in terms which belong to the past. While there was some consideration of Turkish questions in 1919, and certain inquiries were prosecuted, it was not until 1920, after the Austrian and Bulgarian treaties had been disposed of, that the Allies definitely took up the Turkish treaty. This treaty, called the treaty of Sèvres, was signed in August of that year. Its terms were severer than those of the European peace treaties, not only depriving the Turks of vast territories but imposing upon them an even greater measure of foreign control than had been the case before the war. In spite, however, of the Allied occupation of Constantinople, the Greek occupation of Smyrna and its hinterland, and the French occupation of Cilicia, the Turks refused to ratify the treaty. The Allies were not in a position to compel them to do so.

As one of the results of the Great War, a new spirit of nationalism and a desire for freedom from outside control had made itself felt in the Near East. Nowhere had the evangel of self-determination found a more eager response. The nationalistic movement was particularly significant in Turkey. That this movement had often been accompanied by violence is not to be wondered at, although it is none the less to be regretted. The outcome of the movement in Turkey was the establishment of a government which claimed the right to be dealt with as sovereign and which by its military achievements made good that claim.

As early as January, 1920, the so-called Turkish National Pact had been voted by the Ottoman Parliament which was then assembled at Constantinople. This pact set forth the aspirations of the Turks and later was adopted by the National Assembly at Angora as summarizing the object of the Turkish Nationalist movement. Among its provisions was the following:

Article VI. "It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development, in order that our national and economic development should be rendered possible and that it should be possible to conduct affairs in the form of a more up-to-date regular administration.

"For this reason we are opposed to restrictions inimical to our development in political, judicial, financial, and other matters."

In March, 1921, the Allied Powers clearly appreciated that it would be impossible, short of armed allied military intervention in Turkey, to impose the treaty of Sèvres. It would seem that at no time was such armed allied intervention seriously considered, although from time to time certain of the Allied Powers gave a measure of support to the Greek forces in the hope that the latter would be able, through their victory over the Turks, to make possible the realization of the Sèvres treaty at least in part. There were unsuccessful attempts to revise the treaty. At last the total defeat of the Greek forces and the withdrawal of the Greek army from Anatolia completely changed the situation to the advantage of Turkey and effected the elimination of the treaty of Sèvres as a basis for negotiation. A victorious Turkish army being in complete control of Anatolia and threatening Constantinople, the Allied Powers intervened to bring about an armistice between Greece and Turkey which was signed at Mudania in October, 1922. The Lausanne conferences of 1922 and 1923 followed.

The Allies frankly recognized that the situation of 1918 no longer existed and that after the stubborn resistance of the Turks, culminating in their recapture of Smyrna, it was impossible to dictate the terms of peace. A treaty was therefore negotiated in which the Turks ceded very considerable territories and for the first time in their history agreed to open the Straits not only to merchant ships but to foreign warships, but in which the Allies, on the other hand, agreed to renounce their historic capitulatory rights in Turkey.

In 1919 and 1920 the question was directly presented to the Government of the United States as to the nature and extent of its participation in the political and territorial readjustments of the Near East. At that time the spokesmen for the Allied Powers at Paris suggested that the United States assume a mandate for Constantinople and Armenia. The former proposal was never presented for the consideration of the Congress, as it was clear as early as 1919 that the American people would not favor the assumption of a mandate over Constantinople, which would immediately and directly involve this Government in one of the most vexing political and territorial problems of the world--the storm center of historic rivalries and bitter contests.

When the question of an Armenian mandate was formally presented in 1920 as a result of the action of the Allied representatives meeting at San Remo, the Congress declined to sanction it. It thus again became apparent that the United States Government was not prepared to intervene in Near Eastern affairs to the extent of assuming any obligations of a territorial character. This course was in accord with our traditional policy. The United States had taken no part in the Turkish settlements which were embodied in the treaties of Paris in 1856, of Berlin in 1878, or in those which followed the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. Even during the World War we did not declare war on Turkey or take the initiative in breaking relations with that country, notwithstanding the serious provocation, from a humanitarian standpoint, of the extensive Armenian deportations. Presumably it was felt that the policy then adopted was better calculated to enable the United States to exert its influence and to protect its interests so long as this country was not to join the military operations on the Near Eastern front.

If there ever was a time when we could have successfully intervened and have backed up our intervention by armed forces, it was early in 1919 when we had a large army abroad and were in a position to prosecute such a policy if deemed advisable. But this opportunity passed. It should be added that, contrary to an impression which is somewhat widespread in this country, this government, while it has always exerted its influence in a humanitarian way, has not assumed political obligations with respect to the Armenians or other Christian minorities in the Near East. Treaties concluded by other powers undertook, however, to deal with such questions. This Government took no part in the negotiation of the treaty of Sèvres.

Such, then, was the situation prior to the year 1921. In developing our relations with the Near East subsequently, it was necessary to take into account the established policy of the Government and at the same time to serve American interests and humanitarian ends. It should also be remembered that a large part of the distress in the Near East has been caused by encouraging action which failed of adequate support. At various times the Armenians and Greeks have been encouraged to take up arms, later to be left to their own devices. This Government, however, would not be justified in promoting such a policy on the part of others which it was not prepared itself adequately to sustain. It has no mandate from the people to intervene by arms and thus to impose by force a solution of the problems of the Near East. And, for this very reason, it could not essay the role of a dictator in order to determine how others should solve these problems.

This, however, did not prevent this country from cooperating in a spirit of helpfulness and from bringing, as it has brought, its moral influence to aid in dealing with a situation of the utmost difficulty. This influence was brought to bear at the Lausanne Conference, where the efforts of the American representatives undoubtedly contributed in no small degree to the final agreement upon provisions regarding the protection of minorities, the recognition of charitable, educational, and philanthropic institutions, the appointment of judicial advisers and the maintenance of equality of opportunity. As I have said, a state of war had not existed between the United States and Turkey, and the course of events following the German War had reaffirmed the historic policy of refraining from intervention in political and territorial readjustments. Turkey had severed diplomatic relations with us in 1917, however, and these had not been resumed. But the formal conclusion of peace between the Allies and Turkey, entailing as it would the resumption of full diplomatic and consular relations, would leave the United States, unless appropriate action were taken, in a relatively disadvantageous position. Accordingly, negotiations were undertaken between American and Turkish representatives which resulted in the treaty of amity and commerce and the extradition treaty signed on August 6 last.

The treaty of amity and commerce followed very closely the Allied treaty without its territorial, political, and financial features. The United States gained the same general rights and privileges as the Allies, including the freedom of the Straits,and like the Allies consented to the abrogation of the capitulations, that is, of the exercise of the ex-territorial rights in Turkey which the Turks regarded as in derogation of their sovereignty.

In making this important decision the American representatives were obliged to take account of the following considerations. It was quite apparent that the only basis upon which negotiations could be conducted was that of most-favorednation treatment and reciprocity. Either the Turks were to be dealt with on this footing or not at all. In these circumstances three courses were open to us: (1) To compel the Turks by force to give us better terms than the Allies; (2) not to negotiate at all; or (3) to negotiate with the Turks on equal terms as with a State enjoying an unqualified sovereignty.

The first course was out of the question. However desirable the maintenance of ex-territorial rights hitherto enjoyed might be, it was obvious that the public opinion of this country would not countenance a war for the purpose of maintaining them. Neither did it appear to be practicable to forego negotiations, in an attempt to maintain the status quo. After the armistice of 1918, we sent to Constantinople a high commissioner, with a naval detachment under his command, and in spite of his unofficial status in relation to the Turkish authorities he has succeeding in affording American interests appropriate protection. But this anomalous situation could not continue indefinitely. When the treaty of peace between the Allies and Turkey comes into effect, and diplomatic and consular officials of the Allied Powers return to Turkey, we should find ourselves in an extremely difficult position if action meanwhile had not been taken to regularize our own position, and in the absence of a treaty American interests in Turkey would be without adequate safeguards. In this event, the humanitarian interests which are closest to the American heart would suffer. It was also perfectly clear that no period of waiting would avail to secure for us ex-territorial rights which on their part the Allies surrendered.

In these circumstances, the only practicable course was to negotiate a treaty as with a fully sovereign state. If such a treaty falls short of expectations, especially in that it acquiesces in the abrogation of the capitulations, it should not be forgotten that the only way to maintain the capitulations was to fight for them. It should also be borne in mind (1) that the Lausanne treaty is such a treaty as would be negotiated with any other sovereign state, (2) that it gives us the same rights as other countries will enjoy under the new regime, and (3) that by regularizing our relations with Turkey, now interrupted for nearly seven years, it will provide safeguards for American educational, philanthropic, and commercial interests in Turkey.

Let me emphasize a further point. At no stage in the negotiations was the American position determined by the so-called Chester concession. This had been granted before negotiations of our treaty with Turkey had been begun. This Government took no part in securing it; this Government made no barter of any of its rights for this or any other concession. Our position is a simple one. We maintain the policy of the open door or equality of commercial opportunity; we demand a square deal for our nationals. We objected to the alleged concession to the Turkish Petroleum Company owned by foreign interests because it had never been validly granted, and in so doing we stood for American rights generally and not for any particular interest. Opening the door for American nationals we give them impartial and appropriate diplomatic support in the assertion of what appear to be their legal rights, but without otherwise involving this Government.

During the course of our recent negotiations, the Department of State was in frequent consultation with those whose interests in Turkey it is its privilege and duty properly to protect, particularly those whose humanitarian enterprises have long been established. They have clearly indicated their accord with the position that the present situation in Turkey should be frankly faced and that the Turkish authorities should have an opportunity to show that their expressed desire for American friendship and help and their willingness to protect American interests are sincere. It is on this basis that our policy toward Turkey is being developed. Let it be understood that Turkey, while insistent upon unqualified sovereign rights, does not reject the international obligations which are correlative to such rights. Let it also be appreciated that Turkey is not endeavoring to undermine our institutions, to penetrate our labor organizations by pernicious propaganda, and to foment disorder and conspiracies against our domestic peace in the interest of a world revolution.

No one is more competent to speak on the subject of the treaty than Dr. James L. Barton, secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Permit me to quote from his recent letter (November 24, 1923):

"To say that I have followed with keen interest the making of this treaty and its fate up to the present time is to express but mildly my own feeling as well as the feeling of the American board and its friends. While the treaty does not contain all that we would like, yet I am sure I express the judgment of the officers of the American board and, so far as I know, the missionaries both on the field and here at home when I say that it is our earnest hope that the treaty will be ratified by the Senate and that without acrimonious debate. We are convinced that this is the best treaty that could be secured under the circumstances, but that it will furnish a basis for negotiations and for securing privileges not covered in the treaty.

"If the treaty should be rejected, I am convinced that the continuance of American institutions in Turkey, with their large invested interests, would be jeopardized. Under the treaty there are grounds for believing that they will be permitted to continue. I refer to educational, religious, medical, industrial, and philanthropic enterprises hitherto carried on by Americans, representing large American investments in Turkey. There are indications that the government will look with increasing favor upon the continuation of these institutions and grant them enlarging privileges. This has already taken place in Smyrna, Tarsus, and at some other points."

Let me add to this the statement of the distinguished educator, Dr. Caleb F. Gates, president of Robert College of Constantinople. After referring to the views of objectors, he says:

"Let us ask for a moment why it is that we have not made a treaty more in conformity with the wishes of so many of the American people. Is it because the American representatives were not skillful and allowed themselves to be outwitted by the Turks? The American representatives acquitted themselves exceedingly well; they gained the respect of their opponents as well as of the representatives of the Allied Powers. They came out of the conference with a reputation enhanced by the ability and fairness they had shown, and they gained for their country fully as much as the representatives of the Allied Powers gained for theirs. * * * The Turks were determined to become sovereign in their own domain, and they were willing and prepared to fight in order to obtain this sovereignty while the Allies were not. Even those Americans who now denounce this treaty as unsatisfactory were determined that their country should not go to war over these questions. * * * It is the only kind of a treaty which could have been made under the circumstances, when one party knew exactly what they wanted and were ready to fight to obtain it, and the other party was not willing to fight, but still wished to retain the former conditions. * * * As to the treaty itself, what does it give to us? It gives the good will of the Turks instead of their ill will. That is certainly worth something to all who live and work in Turkey. To them the treaty affords an opportunity to work out the problems which their life in Turkey presents and to exercise what influence they may possess in favor of the right. It still leaves an opportunity for missionaries and educators to try to make the principles of righteousness known and practiced in Turkey and it gives to business men a field for their legitimate activities. * * * The schools and colleges established by Americans are carrying on their work and many of those that had been closed are reopening."

In order to accord adequate protection to American interests in the Near East during the period following the Great War, the Department of State has maintained its representatives throughout this area and a naval force has been stationed in Near Eastern waters since 1919. Until October, 1922, this force consisted of from three to nine destroyers with various other craft from time to time. When news was received of the Smyrna disaster twelve additional destroyers were immediately dispatched, arriving in Turkish waters during October of that year. These vessels have been of inestimable service to the representatives of the Department of State and to all American interests in the Near East. Through their radio they have furnished communication when no other means were available. They have transported American missionaries, philanthropists, relief workers, and business men, saving days and weeks of time when no other adequate means of transportation were available. They have assisted in the evacuation of refugees and they have been instrumental in serving manifold humanitarian purposes. It is a pleasure to commend the admirable work that has been performed by the officers and men of these vessels.

Mandated Territories--Under the recent peace settlement between the Allied Powers and Turkey, the Arab portion of the former Turkish Empire is detached from Turkey. In Syria a mandate is being exercised by France and in Palestine by Great Britain, while in Mesopotamia a native kingdom is being developed under British guidance. These territorial changes have made it incumbent upon the United States to readjust its treaty relations which, with respect to these territories, were formerly controlled by our treaty with Turkey. In its correspondence with the British and French Governments in relation to these territories, this Government has made clear its position that the changed situation is a consequence of the common victory of the Allied and Associated Powers over Germany, and that in view of its relation to this victory the United States is entitled to insist that no measure could properly be taken which would subject the United States to discrimination, or deprive its nationals within these territories of equality of treatment with the nationals of any other power.

The rights of States which are members of the League of Nations are set forth in the terms of the French mandate for Syria and of the British mandate for Palestine, respectively. As the United States is not a member of the League of Nations, separate agreements are being negotiated with Great Britain and France under which the United States is to secure in these territories all rights and privileges enjoyed by States which are members of the League of Nations. Under these treaties American interests would be adequately safeguarded. There has been a development in Mesopotamia along slightly different lines, in view of the establishment of an Arab Government with which Great Britain has concluded a treaty, and as soon as this situation has been further clarified this Government will not fail to take proper steps to regularize its relations with the appropriate authorities of Irak with a view to the protection in Mesopotamia, as in Syria and Palestine, of American interests.

Persia--The Persian Government more than a year ago sought the aid of American experts in the reorganization of their finances. While this Government could not assume any responsibility in this matter, it was glad that the services of competent American citizens could be secured, and a financial mission accordingly proceeded to Persia and for the past year has been rendering important expert aid, as Persian officials, to the Persian ministers in reorganizing the financial administration of the country. While this is not an official mission of this country in any sense, it has helped to cement the relations between the two countries, making more firm the ties of mutual friendship and esteem.

Greece--The death of the late King Alexander of Greece was followed in December, 1920, by the return to Athens of Constantine. In accordance with the usual practice in the case of monarchical countries, the Greek representative in Washington tendered new letters of credence the acceptance of which would have constituted formal recognition of the new government. In view of the special circumstances which attended Constantine's return to Athens, it was deemed important, before according recognition, to take into account not only the part that Constantine had played in the war but also the policy of the new regime with regard to the acts and obligations of its predecessor and the attitude of the associates of the United States in the war. With respect to Constantine's attitude toward the engagements of the former government, there was for a time an uncertainty whether Constantine considered the government of King Alexander as a de jure government. This was important, for if the Government of the United States had extended recognition it might have put itself in a position of acquiescing in a possible review of the acts of King Alexander's Government which had borrowed substantial sums from the United States. It will also be recalled that none of the principal Allied Powers recognized Constantine subsequent to his return.

So far as the records indicate, these considerations controlled the policy of the United States Government during the period subsequent to Constantine's return and prior to March, 1921. Upon the change of administration the question arose whether there was a sufficient reason for changing this policy and for taking a course of action different from that followed by the Allied Powers. Other considerations had intervened making affirmative action in the matter of recognition undesirable. Constantine developed a militaristic policy in Asia Minor, in which Greece was already engaged, by which he desired to justify his hold upon the throne.

Separate action by the United States at this time could hardly have been interpreted otherwise than as an expression of sympathy and support by this Government for this policy of Constantine and as an indirect participation in the politics of the Near East which it was desired to avoid. The wisdom of refusing recognition was indicated by the overthrow of Constantine when Greek military plans in Asia Minor failed, an overthrow which was attended by a complete revolution. It will be recalled that Constantine fled the country and that his prominent supporters and cabinet ministers were arrested and after summary trials were executed. The British Government, which previously had maintained a charge d'affaires in Athens, although not recognizing Constantine, withdrew this representative, while the representatives of other powers, including that of the United States, took occasion to interpret to the Greek authorities the unfortunate impression which the execution of the Greek ministers had caused.

The régime which succeeded that of Constantine was frankly based on military power and did not regularize its position by holding elections. Meanwhile the negotiation of a treaty of peace between the allied powers, Greece and Turkey, was undertaken at Lausanne, and it seemed undesirable, pending the conclusion of these negotiations, for the United States to take separate action in the matter of recognition.

The situation has now materially changed. The Lausanne negotiations have been concluded, peace has now been ratified by Greece and Turkey, and elections were held in Greece on December 16, 1923. These elections, it is hoped, will result in the establishment of a government which will enable this Government to extend formal recognition. The fact that recognition has not been extended during the past three years does not indicate an attitude of unfriendliness toward the Greek people. What American agencies have done in assisting the refugees in Greece is clear evidence to the contrary, and this humanitarian work could not have been carried out more effectively even if formal relations had been resumed, thanks to the initiative of American agencies and the helpful cooperation of the Greek authorities.

Egypt--I should not omit the mention of the recognition of Egypt, where we have had a minister for a considerable time, and whose minister in turn we are now receiving. We have a deep interest in the most cordial relations with Egypt and it is interesting to note that the Egyptian Government has been anxious to take advantage of the facilities offered in this country for perfecting the technical education of Egyptian students, particularly along lines of trade and engineering. A group of students came to the United States a year ago and other similar student missions are now on their way.

In conclusion, I may say that the new spirit of the Near East must be met sympathetically, not by arms, not by attempts at dictatorship or by meddlesome interventions, but by candor, directness, and just appreciation of nationalistic aims and by a firm but friendly insistence upon the discharge of those international obligations, the recognition of which affords the only satisfactory basis for the intercourse of nations. In this way the Orient and the Occident may find ground for cooperation and for the maintenance of peace sustained by the reciprocal advantages of cultural relations.

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