AT the time the Anglo-Egyptian arrangement was made about the Sudan, Lord Salisbury, according to Lord Cromer, "joyfully agreed to the creation of a hybrid state of a nature eminently calculated to shock the susceptibilities of international jurists."

Some of the same sort of pleasure might be felt as to the mandates system.[i] It was novel in 1919; nothing of the same legal nature had ever been done before. Of course we may search around for analogies and find or try to find other things that are more or less like the mandates system; and a few of them, some protectorates, some spheres of influence, even the Sudan itself, are something like it, though rather less than more; but even the nearest of them are not very similar; and if they were, we might well recall the maxim that "nothing similar is the same."

I shall not attempt to trace the origin of the idea of mandates or of the term itself.[ii] So far as it involved the principle that the control of uncivilized peoples ought to mean a trusteeship or wardship under which the interests of the natives themselves should be paramount, it had long been advocated by various writers; and "the interests of the populations" was the phrase used in the Fifth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points:

A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

In any event, Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations is the starting point in theory of all legal argument about the mandates; it is the first international agreement about them; and, while it perhaps would be going too far to say that all other international agreements regarding mandates rest on this Article, they must at least be read in connection with it.

Perhaps it is not possible to turn one's mind back to the period after the Armistice and look at the situation then existing without being influenced by subsequent events; but there are at least some points that may be recalled. Territorial changes had already taken place in Europe on a considerable scale, not changes caused by the Peace Conference, but changes prior to the Peace Conference, some of which it would have taken force to undo. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had broken up in the latter part of October and the early part of November, 1918, before the German Armistice; the Governments at Vienna and Budapest were not only separate but bitterly hostile; Poland and Czechoslovakia were de facto in existence and functioning after a fashion; the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes, whether they were going to be one country or not, were certainly detached from their former connections; the only certainty about the situation around the Baltic was that it was uncertain. I need only mention the problem of Russia generally; and add that in that period it was quite doubtful whether there existed or would exist any Government in Germany capable of legally binding the country by any treaty of peace. Outside of Europe territorial changes were to take place in the former Ottoman Empire and in respect of the German colonies; and all of these were more or less under Allied military occupation.

Perhaps the first point that strikes one in thinking back to the early Peace Conference days is that the German colonies and Turkish territories were considered together. It is natural to suppose that this was because they were all regarded as "spoils of war," and to some extent this is true; but there were other and, I think, more pressing reasons; and nobody knew in January, 1919, whether there was going to be a global peace treaty with all the Central Powers or whether there was going to be, as it turned out, a treaty with Germany first; or even whether there was going to be some kind of document which was never properly envisaged but much discussed as a Preliminary Treaty of Peace.

Let me quote from some remarks of Mr. Lloyd George at the meeting of the Council of Ten[iii] on January 30, 1919:

Mr. Lloyd George said that they could not accept the status quo. He wanted to put the British position again. The German Colonies did not matter very much, although the maintenance of troops in German East Africa was a very considerable burden. He could not say exactly how many troops they had in that theatre, but he knew it was a very considerable number. Coming to the Turkish Empire, he had handed some figures to the President of the United States and to M. Clemenceau, and he had also told M. Orlando that they had 1,084,000 men there. It was true that only between 250,000 and 300,000 were British troops, but they had to maintain the lot, and it was an enormous expense. The difficulty was to keep all these various tribes in some sort of peace with each other. If they kept them there until they had made peace with Turkey, and until the League of Nations had been constituted and had started business, and until it was able to dispose of this question, the expense would be something enormous, and they really could not face it, especially as they had not the slightest intention of being mandatories of a considerable number of territories they now occupied, such as Syria and parts of Armenia. He thought the same thing applied to Kurdestan and the Caucasus, although they had rich oil-wells. He did not think that they had the slightest intention of being mandatories even for the oil-wells of Baku, but somebody had to be there to protect the Armenians and to keep the tribes and sects in Lebanon from cutting each other's throats and attacking the French or Turks, or whoever else might be there. Therefore, he was afraid that they must insist (he was not using that word in a military sense but from the point of view of those who had to pay taxes in the United Kingdom, and to propose it to Parliament). He was afraid, however, that Parliament would want to know why they should keep 1,084,000 men there? Did they really mean to occupy the country? Why should they do so when they had no intention of having a permanent garrison there? This question specially affected them, and unless the Conference was prepared to relieve them of that responsibility, he would really have to press very hard for a definite appointment of the mandatories, which he should have thought was the most satisfactory way of dealing with it. Then they could clear out, and leave the mandatory to undertake the job.

Of course this was put by way of argument for an assignment of the mandated areas. But wholly apart from that, the practical situation in the military sense was one for very early discussion and decision.

It may be said that at the Peace Conference only minor conflicts of self interest existed among the Great Powers regarding the distribution of these territories. Such questions had largely been settled by the secret treaties among the French, the British, the Italians and the Japanese; but I do not attribute to those treaties any very great significance here. I now refer solely to those territories that were finally detached from Turkey and to the German colonies (including the Pacific islands). It is at least arguable that even without any treaties those four Powers would have agreed that South West Africa should go to South Africa, Mesopotamia to the British, and so on, a distribution politically logical and also in accord with the military situation. What the secret treaties did was to prevent the mandates system, particularly in respect of the "C" mandates, from going any farther toward League of Nations control of those areas.

From a selfish point of view, the United States had almost no interest in the problems presented. Every American would have regarded the acquisition of any territory in Africa in any form as a burden. Our interest in Turkey was sentimental only, and even so was limited substantially to Armenia. With the possible exception of Mosul, "the open door" in Turkey meant hardly more than a phrase. In the Pacific our situation was slightly different. Of course New Guinea meant nothing to the United States and we already had a part of Samoa. The only one of the small islands having any commercial value was Nauru, where the private rights, as distinct from the sovereignty, had been owned by the British since before 1914. That the remaining islands should not become naval bases and that we should have privileges for wireless communication in the Island of Yap were about all that, from the point of view of self-interest, America could ask.

The conflict that arose in the Conference was thus a conflict regarding a principle rather than a conflict between opposing national interests. The French, or at least the French Colonial Office, wanted to annex part of the Cameroons and Togo; and the three British Dominions interested wanted to annex respectively German South West Africa, New Guinea and German Samoa.

The British Government, meaning here the Government in London, was in a rather mixed and difficult position. The Colonial Office was destined, under one form or another, to have charge of German East Africa (except the region later assigned to Belgium) and of portions of Togo and the Cameroons; but not only the form of that control, but even the fact of it, was rather small dust in the British balance. Of course London wanted to keep peace in what I may call the Commonwealth family. Aside from that desire it cared very little about annexation as distinguished from mandates either in Africa or in the Pacific; indeed, while committed to the Japanese claim for islands north of the Equator, the British probably preferred the mandate system to annexation in either locality.

Turkey was another matter; here Egypt, the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf, the Balfour declaration regarding Palestine, the rather vague commitments to the Arabs and the various agreements with the French and the Italians about Syria or Cilicia or Anatolia, all entered in as important factors.

Furthermore, there was a good deal of difference in public opinion in Great Britain on this general question. During the election campaign in December, 1918, for example, it had been bluntly asserted that Mesopotamia was a very rich country and would help to pay the cost of the war if the British took it over. It is doubtful whether any one still thinks so, after writing down in the red ink side of the ledger £100,000,000 or more spent in that region since 1919, even now that Mosul is to be credited to Iraq and even if there be included with the credit all the Mosul oil which is in newspaper headlines and which may possibly be underground and some day discovered. On the other hand there was a feeling, pretty strong even in 1919, against the extension of British colonial rule in any form whatever, anywhere. "The British Empire is big enough," is the way this sentiment was reflected among some of the most responsible British representatives at Paris.

Wilson had suggested on his voyage to Paris that

the German colonies should be declared the common property of the League of Nations and administered by small nations. The resources of each colony should be available to all members of the League, and in this and other matters involving international relations or German colonies or resources or territorial arrangements, the world would be intolerable if only arrangement ensues; this is a peace conference in which arrangements cannot be made in the old style.

This was on December 10, 1918. So Wilson did not take his ideas from Smuts, so far as the German Colonies were concerned; the Wilson idea was there the opposite of Smuts' idea. Though Smuts in his paper, "A Practical Suggestion," dated December 16, advocated the mandatory system, it was not to be for the "barbarians of Africa," as he called them, but expressly the contrary; he proposed that the principle of mandates and not annexation be applied to Russia, Austria-Hungary and Turkey.

If we turn now to the drafts written by Wilson at Paris, we find that what he took from Smuts' paper was the language, but making it applicable to Turkey and the German colonies, and originally to Austria-Hungary also. A good deal of confusion prevails about these drafts.[iv] There were in fact three, and in the first two of them is to be found the Smuts language, though Wilson's proposals were even more sweeping, as the following extract from his Second Paris Draft (January 20, 1919) shows:

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory State or agency shall in each case be explicitly defined by the Executive Council[v] in a Special Act or Charter which shall reserve to the League complete power of supervision, and which shall also reserve to the people of any such territory or governmental unit the right to appeal to the League for the redress or correction of any breach of the mandate by the Mandatory State or agency or for the substitution of some other State or agency, as Mandatory.

The idea of Wilson as to the inclusion of Austria-Hungary was expressed by him in a conversation with Orlando on January 30, from a note of which I extract the following:

The President asked for Signor Orlando's views on the Covenant[vi] which had been submitted to him the day before.

Signor Orlando replied that he was in the main in entire agreement with President Wilson, but he had a few technical suggestions to make. He drew special attention to Article I of the supplementary agreements which, he thought, was open to misconstruction. If the Trentino and Trieste were to be handed over to a mandatory by the League of Nations, it would seriously compromise Italy's dignity.

The President pointed out that this was far from his mind. In fact, he intended that this question should be settled before the creation of the League of Nations. In other words, the Trentino and Trieste had, as far as he was concerned, already been ceded to Italy. He said that the reason why he had drafted the paragraph in this form, was because Jugoslavia might be divided into one, two or three States. He was prepared to admit two Jugoslav States to the League of Nations but, if it were found advisable to separate them into three parts, he would prefer to place the more unformed and less developed of the new States under the mandatory of the League of Nations.

Signor Orlando thanked the President warmly for this explanation but he nevertheless recommended that the language of Article I be altered.

This, the President promised to do.

No one dissented at Paris from the proposal that Germany should lose her colonies, and all of them. This was Wilson's earlier view, as has been seen; and his First Paris Draft of the Covenant (January 10, 1919) formulated it. The matter was settled in a few words in the Council of Ten on January 24, recorded as follows:

All he (Mr. Lloyd George) would like to say on behalf of the British Empire as a whole was that he would be very much opposed to the return to Germany of any of these colonies. . . .

President Wilson said that he thought all were agreed to oppose the restoration of the German colonies.

M. Orlando, on behalf of Italy, and Baron Makino, on behalf of Japan, agreed.

(There was no dissentient and this principle was adopted. . . .)

It was General Smuts who fathered the resolution[vii] which was offered by Lloyd George at the meeting on January 30 of the Council of Ten.

If we go back to the Smuts plan we find very naturally a considerable variance between the Smuts plan and the Smuts resolution. In proposing in his plan the idea of mandates, General Smuts had expressly excluded from its application "the barbarians" of Africa. Now, however, they were to be included; and so clause 8 of the resolution introduced for some[viii] of these "barbarians" the mandates in their mildest and most milk and water form, that nearest to the annexation which Smuts desired, -- what we now call "C" mandates, the territories which "can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory State as integral portions thereof." Indeed much of the Smuts resolution (aside from clause 8[ix]) may be found in a British "Draft Convention regarding Mandates" which, as "Revised January 24, 1919," divided the mandated areas into "vested territories" and "assisted states;" that paper also contained a clause for a Mandates Commission, whose functions in the administration of Article 22 have been of the highest importance.

Previous to the meeting of the Council of Ten on January 30 the Smuts resolution had been discussed at a meeting of the British delegation on January 29. President Wilson saw the resolution on the morning of the day of the meeting of the British delegation; for my copy of the resolution had on it a marginal note from Colonel House to the President reading as follows:

L. G. and the colonials are meeting at 11.30 and this is a draft of a resolution that Smuts hopes to get passed. He wants to know whether it is satisfactory to you. It seems to me a fair compromise.

The resolution, as adopted, including the slight amendments made at the meeting of the Council of Ten, read as follows:

1. Having regard to the record of the German administration in the colonies formerly part of the German Empire, and to the menace which the possession by Germany of submarine bases in many parts of the world would necessarily constitute to the freedom and security of all nations, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that in no circumstances should any of the German colonies be restored to Germany.

2. For similar reasons, and more particularly because of the historic misgovernment by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Kurdestan, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. This is without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire.

3. The Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that advantage should be taken of the opportunity afforded by the necessity of disposing of these colonies and territories formerly belonging to Germany and Turkey which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, to apply to these territories the principle that the well being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League of Nations.

4. After careful study they are satisfied that the best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience of their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations.

5. The Allied and Associated Powers are of opinion that the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

6. They consider that certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a state of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power.

7. They further consider that other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory subject to conditions which will guarantee the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications of military and naval bases and of the military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League of Nations.

8. Finally they consider that there are territories, such as South West Africa and certain of the Islands in the South Pacific, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the Mandatory State, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory State as integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate, the Mandatory State shall render to the League of Nations an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

A comparison of this resolution with the language of Article 22 of the Covenant shows that all of the resolution (other than its first two paragraphs) is carried into the Covenant, with almost no changes except those made necessary by the different characters of the two documents, and except also that the words "and who are willing to accept it" are inserted in its second paragraph; but otherwise the two papers are to this extent as alike as two such papers could well be.

In the Covenant Article, however, are two added paragraphs of importance. One provides for the framing of the mandates by the Council of the League, and the other for a permanent Mandates Commission, a body thus deriving its powers directly from the Covenant, and without which it is difficult to see how the system of mandates could have worked at all. These clauses came into the Covenant text at a later date, at the sixth meeting of the Commission on the League of Nations on February 8, 1919, when the resolution of January 30 was in substance proposed by Smuts as the text of the mandates article of the Covenant, with these additions.

When the question came before the Council of Ten on January 30, there was a noteworthy clash of views in the matter of the German colonies between Mr. Wilson on the one hand and Mr. W. M. Hughes of Australia and Mr. Massey of New Zealand on the other; and according to common report, the earlier discussions within the British delegation had been even more heated and violent, for the Dominion Premiers wanted annexation, and nothing less.

At the Council of Ten, Lloyd George offered the resolution, explaining that it was a compromise, "that Great Britain had deliberately decided to accept the principle of a mandatory, but that decision had not been wholly accepted by the Dominions." He said that so far as Turkey was concerned, the resolution dealt only with those regions "which had actually been conquered. Districts such as Smyrna, Adalia, the North of Anatolia were purposely excluded." Wilson, who had not agreed to the proposal in advance, pointed out that, while "the Great Powers had agreed that the League of Nations should form an integral part of the Peace Treaty," the scheme had not been drawn up, without which any mandates system was necessarily incomplete. This suggestion of the provisional character of the resolution and of the necessity of completing the League of Nations scheme, a statement which Lloyd George said "filled him with despair," led up to very vigorous speeches by Hughes and Massey, both of whom said that they desired annexation and not a Mandates system. Wilson finally asked the direct question whether Australia and New Zealand had presented an ultimatum to the Conference. Massey replied in the negative and, after some blustering, Hughes did also, although he had previously said that he would have to consult his Government. This clearing of the air was followed by a very moving and attractive speech by General Botha who opened by saying that he was "not a British subject of very long standing."

The result of the two meetings of the Ten was the acceptance of the resolution and, while it was a compromise, it must be regarded as a victory for Mr. Wilson, not complete but still substantial.

Even in the "C" mandates, as we now know them -- in other words, German South West Africa, New Guinea, and other Pacific Islands -- which by the Covenant may be "administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory," the principle of trusteeship is firmly established; this was clearly shown in connection with the uprising of the natives in the former area in 1923. And as to the other territories in Africa and those formerly in Turkey, the world took a very long step forward when Article 22 of the Covenant came into force.

There is one point regarding this Resolution of January 30 which may easily escape attention. The broad language of its first paragraph is to the effect that none of the German colonies should be restored to Germany. Similarly, the language of the third paragraph is equally broad in applying to "these territories," meaning all of them theretofore mentioned, the principle that the well being and development of their peoples "form a sacred trust of civilization," and so on. But when the Resolution goes on to classify the various peoples in the sixth, seventh and eighth paragraphs, it speaks first of "certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire" ("A" mandates); then "other peoples especially those of Central Africa" ("B" mandates); and finally "territories such as South West Africa and certain of the Islands in the South Pacific ("C" mandates). Thus the islands in the North Pacific, while doubtless included in some of the general language, are not specifically mentioned at all. These were the islands held by Japan, and no others. The "South Pacific" meant the Pacific south of the Equator; and Samoa is south of the Equator, and so is Nauru.

Mr. Wilson was thinking of these islands held by Japan and had taken notice of the fact that they were not specifically mentioned in the Resolution. My Diary records a conversation with him at the Quai d'Orsay, from which I quote:

After the meeting (on January 30) the President came up to me and talked for fifteen or twenty minutes. He said that he spoke of the ultimatum so as to clear up the situation; that Australia and New Zealand with 6,000,000 people between them could not hold up a conference in which, including China, some twelve hundred million people were represented.

He then spoke of the resolution as not going as far as he had hoped, to which I replied that it was in my opinion a great achievement and pointed out how far it went in respect of Turkish territories and in Central Africa. To this the President assented, saying that he had not thought of it as going quite that far.

He then spoke of the limitation in the resolution to the islands in the South Pacific and asked me to consider this question in respect of the islands in the North Pacific which Japan held. He said that these islands lie athwart the path from Hawaii to the Philippines and that they were nearer to Hawaii than the Pacific coast was, and they could be fortified and made naval bases by Japan; that indeed they were of little use for anything else and that we had no naval base except at Guam.

The discussion at these meetings of the Councilof Tenon January 30 was not directly on the question of the distribution of the mandates; this matter was passed on by the Supreme Council some months later, on May 7, except as to Turkish territories; but no one can read the debates on January 30 without observing that, in part, such a distribution had already received the tacit assent of everyone. Indeed the claims of the British Dominions had been presented at length to the Council of Ten on January 24. So it was assumed that German South West Africa was to be under the control of the Union of South Africa, New Guinea under the control of Australia, and German Samoa under the control of New Zealand; and despite the statement of Lloyd George that "the resolution did not deal with the distribution of mandates at all," it was also admitted in the conversations about the black armies in Africa that France was to have certain African mandates, and these of course would be none other than in Togo and the Cameroons.

The distribution of the mandates was thus obviously in everybody's mind. Lloyd George, for example, said (as above quoted) that the British had not the slightest idea of being the mandatory for Armenia or Syria or Kurdistan, a not unfair implication from this being that the British would look with favor on a mandate for Mesopotamia; and just after the passage of the resolution of January 30 the Belgians were heard by the Council of Ten regarding their claims to a portion of East Africa, claims which were subsequently realized, although not completely settled till 1923. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the French contention regarding recruiting of troops in their mandated territories in Africa was accepted at the afternoon meeting of the Council of Ten of January 30. The language of Clemenceau could hardly have been more explicit; in the original unrevised text of the minutes the rather long discussion ended thus:

Mr. Lloyd George said that there was nothing in the clause under review to prevent that. The words used there were "for other than police purposes and the defense of territory." He really thought that those words would cover the case of France. There was nothing in the document which would prevent their doing exactly the same thing as they had done before. What it did prevent was the kind of thing the Germans were likely to do, namely, organize great black armies in Africa, which they could use for the purpose of clearing everybody else out of that country. That was their proclaimed policy, and if that was encouraged amongst the other nations even though they might not have wars in Europe, they would have the sort of thing that happened in the 17th and 18th century in India when France and Great Britain were at war in India, whilst being fairly good friends in Europe. Then they were always raising great native armies against each other. That must now be stopped. There was nothing in this document which prevented France doing what she did before. The defense of the territory was provided for.

M. Clemenceau said that if he could raise troops, that was all he wanted.

Mr. Lloyd George replied that he had exactly the same power as previously. It only prevented any country drilling the natives and raising great armies.

M. Clemenceau said that he did not want to do that. All that he wished was that the matter should be made quite plain, and he did not want anybody to come and tell him afterwards that he had broken away from the agreement. If this clause meant that he had a right of raising troops in case of general war, he was satisfied.

Mr. Lloyd George said that so long as M. Clemenceau did not train big nigger armies, for the purposes of aggression, that was all the clause was intended to guard against.

M. Clemenceau said that he did not want to do that. He therefore understood that Mr. Lloyd George's interpretation was adopted.

President Wilson said that Mr. Lloyd George's interpretation was consistent with the phraseology.

M. Clemenceau said that he was quite satisfied.

The language of the Resolution itself (as resulting from an amendment of Sir Robert Borden) was not perhaps perfectly clear. It speaks of "defense of territory" which might mean simply the mandated territory; but the French view that this meant home territory as well was accepted. My own pencil note of the discussion, written during the meeting, read as follows:

Clemenceau and Pichon speak against the clause preventing voluntary recruiting in colonies -- they want this right in mandatories as well as present colonies. This right is admitted by L. G. and W. W.

But the language of the Resolution was not changed; it remained "defense of territory," and so it is in Article 22 of the Covenant. Later on an attempt was made by the French to change this language of the Covenant by adding to it "and of the territory of the mother country." That attempt did not succeed owing to the opposition of President Wilson.

The result of all this is a rather curious one. The six "B" mandates, all for African territory, are not all alike. Four of them, those over British Togo, British Cameroons, Tanganyika (British) and Belgian East Africa do not contain the following clause, which is found in the French mandates for their portions of Togo and the Cameroons:

It is understood, however, that the troops thus raised may, in the event of general war, be utilised to repel an attack or for defense of the territory outside that subject to the mandate.

However, the development of the mandate system under Article 22 of the Covenant is beyond the scope of this article. Its history forms already a very interesting chapter in present-day international affairs. The non-ratification of the Treaty of Versailles by the United States was followed by unnecessarily long negotiations as to our relations with the mandated territories; but what I may call the mandate status is now completely recognized. The rights of its cestuis que trust have become fixed rights, which very likely will, from time to time, be increased, as events in Syria and Mesopotamia and elsewhere have indicated; but certainly they will never be diminished.

[i] Cf. Lansing's two pages of questions about sovereignty, which Wilson called "mere technicalities." Lansing: "The Peace Negotiations," pp. 151-153.

[ii] See generally,"African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference," by G. L. Beer, Macmillan, 1923.

[iii] The meetings of the representatives of the Great Powers during the Peace Conference of Paris were held in different forms. Sometimes the five Great Powers met as the Council of Ten, there being two representatives from each country; sometimes the five Foreign Ministers met and these meetings were usually referred to as the Council of Five. The meetings between the four heads of States, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau and Signor Orlando, were referred to as the Council of Four; this was the case even during the period when Orlando was absent. All these meetings -- the Council of Ten, the Council of Five and the Council of Four -- were called meetings of the Supreme Council.

[iv] For example, in Mr. Ray Stannard Baker's book, "Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement," much of the comment on the second of these Drafts is applicable only to the third, which is not mentioned at all.

[v] In these Drafts the Council of the League was called "Executive Council."

[vi] i.e. Wilson's Second Paris Draft.

[vii] For the text, see next page.

[viii] Namely those of South West Africa. All other mandates in Africa are "B" mandates; but, as mentioned earlier, all the Pacific mandates are also "C" mandates.

[ix] The vital clause, in the view of Smuts, W. M. Hughes and Massey.

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  • DAVID HUNTER MILLER, of the New York Bar, technical adviser to the American Commission at the Paris Peace Conference
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