American Power After Afghanistan
How to Rightsize the Country’s Global Role
FIFTY years ago Halford John Mackinder delivered a lecture on "The Geographical Pivot of History" before the Royal Geographical Society in London. Supported by five diagrams, it was published by the Society in April 1904,[i] together with comments by several students of geography. Probably few who read the lecture in 1904 guessed that Figure 5, bearing the caption "The Natural Seats of Power," would become one of the most famous maps of our time. It embodied one of the most thought-provoking views of the world in the twentieth century and has exercised profound influence on foreign affairs and on history.
On his Mercator-projection Mackinder had boldly shifted the conventional European center and showed the Americas on the edge of each side of Africa, Europe and Asia. In this manner he indicated that he saw the world "as a whole." Enclosing this novel picture with an earth-girdling oval, he made his message dramatic by dividing the natural seats of power into three areas --one, a "pivot" area, wholly continental; a second, an "outer crescent," wholly oceanic; and a third, an "inner crescent," partly continental, partly oceanic. Mackinder had shattered the old, comfortable picture of the relations of the continents as well as complacent notions of the relations of sea power and land power. His own countrymen paid little heed, but German strategists pondered carefully what he had disclosed, and Hitler came close to bringing sea power to destruction by capturing land bases on which it rested. Today, statesmen, generals, seamen and airmen everywhere see the round world through Mackinder's eyes. And they see the Soviet Union in control of what he described as its Heartland.
When he delivered his now famous lecture Mackinder was 43 years old. Born at Gainsborough in Lincolnshire on February 15, 1861, he was the oldest son of a country doctor, Draper Mackinder, and Fanny Hewitt of Lichfield. On a wall of the Gainsborough Grammar School was a picture which greatly attracted him--a drawing of the naval engagement in March 1862 between the ironclad Union Monitor and the armored Confederate Merrimac. On the Continent at this time Bismarck was forming the German Empire by waging wars against Denmark, Austria and France; and when, in September 1870, Napoleon III surrendered with his army at Sedan, the boy read the announcement that was tacked on the post-office door at Gainsborough and took home the startling news. It was the first item of public affairs that was to remain in his memory. He was an imaginative lad. His local environment in Lincolnshire and Nottinghamshire aroused his interest in topography and in the physical processes
of nature. Travel stories, such as Captain Cook's voyages, induced him to prepare a discourse on Australia at the age of 12, much to the delight of his father.
He was sent to Epsom College in 1874, and thence to Oxford, where he matriculated at Christ Church in 1880. His father had hoped he would study medicine, but young Halford decided to study "the surgery of the earth." He received his B.A. in 1883, and in the same year was elected President of the Oxford Union Society. "The Historical Register of the University of Oxford" indicates that Mackinder "read" two Honor Schools, one in natural science (devoting his principal attention to biology) and a second in history; he was also a Burdett-Coutts Scholar in natural science with emphasis on geology. He made a brilliant scholastic record, and with it read for the bar. International law was for him the geographical aspect of law. The Inner Temple called him to its bar in 1886, but he chose to follow the academic career.
His friend at Christ Church was Michael Sadler, with whom he served the Oxford University Extension movement for adult education during the next two years, travelling over most of the country and giving more than 600 lectures on the so-called "new geography." A syllabus on "The New Geography" was published in pamphlet form in 1886, and the attendance at his lectures grew rapidly, soon arousing the attention of prominent members of the Royal Geographical Society. One of the Honorary Secretaries, Francis Galton, requested Mackinder to put down in writing what he meant by the phrase he had used for the title, and as a result Mackinder delivered an outstanding address on January 31, 1887, "On the Scope and Methods of Geography," published in the Society's "Proceedings" in 1887. In later years Mackinder liked to recall that he was "a young revolutionary," and that "a worthy Admiral, a member of Council, who sat in the front row, kept on muttering 'damned cheek' throughout the lecture." His revolutionary idea was that the study of geography should be approached "from the human standpoint." Nine out of ten students of the subject, he said, wished "to study the world as man's environment." He proposed to assist them to do so. Galton supported his views and prophesied that "Mackinder was destined to leave his mark on geographical education."[ii]
Fortified with the M.A. in 1887, Mackinder began as Reader in Geography at Oxford with lectures "On the Principles of Geography" and on "Geography of Central Europe." He started from scratch; at his first lecture (as he later enjoyed explaining), "There was an attendance of three, one a Don, who told me that he knew the geography of Switzerland because he had just read Baedeker through from cover to cover, and the other two being ladies who brought their knitting, which was not usual at lectures at that time."[iii] But his impressive method of teaching soon attracted hundreds of students and they applauded him. Mackinder's aim was to enlarge the rôle of the study of geography. Not all at Oxford shared his point of view; it was alleged that the study of maps smacked of strategic and tactical ways of thinking, out of place in an abode of scholars. In the spring of 1892 he visited the United States and called at Harvard, Princeton and Johns Hopkins in order to inquire as to their geographical teachings. At that time he spoke to a large audience of teachers in Philadelphia.
And Oxford, indeed, has a way of finding a place for great talent. Mackinder was awarded a "studentship" (Fellowship) at Christ Church in 1892, for a term of three years, and largely as a result of his successful extension work at Reading the Dean of Christ Church opened a college there. Mackinder was chosen to serve as Principal. An unemployed history teacher, W. M. Childs, knocked at Mackinder's door for a job and became his successor in 1903, when Mackinder left for London. Reading College was later raised to University rank, and Dr. Childs, commemorating his predecessor's 11 years of pioneer work there, has written of him: "He was a talker, convincing and provocative. He had a way of blending dreams and hard sense, subtlety and simplicity, and he never seemed to know when he passed from the one to the other. He made some opponents as a leader in stark earnest is bound to do. He sometimes ploughed ahead leaving a wake of troubled waters, and he certainly gave the rest of us plenty to think and talk about. Masterful, he yet made us partners."[iv]
Mackinder shared the aim of all great teachers--not only to lecture himself, but to train teachers. He wanted a school of geography. As President of the geography section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science he argued for it, pointing out the rise of the German schools of geography. The London School of Economics was founded at this time and Mackinder took a teaching post there in addition to those at Oxford and Reading. Financial support by the Royal Geographical Society finally made possible in 1899 the establishment at Oxford of the first School of Geography with Mackinder as its Director. Along with all of this he was mountain-climbing in the Alps and Africa (making the first daring ascent of Mt. Kenya), and in 1900 contested Warwick as a Liberal candidate for Parliament. In this endeavor he was defeated. But at the end of the year 1903, he had been honored with the Silver Medal from the Scottish Geographical Society for promoting the study of geography, and had been appointed the Director of the new London School of Economics.
His first lengthy book, "Britain and the British Seas," had appeared in 1902. The introductory chapter included a photograph of the globe, in order that Britons might see the true picture of the Atlantic Ocean, and his topics included economic and military strategy. The preface read:
The idea of this book was first suggested to me by the needs of some foreign students visiting Britain. My aim has been to present a picture of the physical features and conditions of a very definite natural region, and to trace their influence upon the human societies dwelling within it. Britain is so small, and is known in such detail, that it has been possible to attempt a complete geographical synthesis. The phenomena of topographical distribution relating to many classes of fact have been treated, but from a single standpoint and on a uniform method.
An autograph written nearly 20 years later adds a lively footnote:
The occasion of the writing of this book is correctly stated in the preface. The reason of its writing was that the author was caned as a boy at school for drawing maps instead of writing Latin prose, and that for thirty years afterwards he thought visually and therefore geographically. In the end the impulse to write what he saw mastered him. Voilà tout.
The two principal features of his famous lecture of 1904 that decades later provoked closer study, and great controversy, were the theory of "closed space" and the conception of the "pivot area."
From the present time forth, in the post-Columbian age, [he said] we shall again have to deal with a closed political system, and none the less that it will be one of world-wide scope. Every explosion of social forces, instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply reëchoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and economic organism of the world will be shattered in consequence. There is a vast difference of effect in the fall of a shell into an earthwork and its fall amid the closed spaces and rigid structures of a great building or a ship. Probably some half-consciousness of this fact is at last diverting much of the attention of statesmen in all parts of the world from territorial expansion to the struggle for relative efficiency.
It appears to me, therefore, that in the present decade we are for the first time in a position to attempt, with some degree of completeness, a correlation between the larger geographical and the larger historical generalizations. For the first time we can perceive something of the real proportion of features and events on the stage of the whole world, and may seek a formula which shall express certain aspects, at any rate, of geographical causation in universal history. If we are fortunate, that formula should have a practical value as setting into perspective some of the competing forces in current international politics. . . . I propose this evening describing those physical features of the world which I believe to have been most coercive of human action, and presenting some of the chief phases of history as organically connected with them, even in the ages when they were unknown to geography. . . . Man and not nature initiates, but nature in large measure controls. My concern is with the general physical control, rather than the causes of universal history. It is obvious that only a first approximation to truth can be hoped for. I shall be humble to my critics.
Mackinder then proceeded to present his historical analysis, in order to explain the concepts inscribed in the legend of his Figure 5. He wished especially to make clear the idea of the constant pressure upon the rest of the world originating from the "pivot area." "It was under the pressure of external barbarism that Europe achieved her civilization," he declared. "I ask you, therefore, for a moment to look upon Europe and European history as subordinate to Asia and Asiatic history, for European civilization is, in a very real sense, the outcome of the secular struggle against Asiatic invasion." He held that, "The most remarkable contrast in the political map of modern Europe is that presented by the vast area of Russia occupying half the Continent and the group of smaller territories tenanted by the Western Powers."
With the aid of four other diagrams, Mackinder analyzed his thesis, maintaining that "all the settled margins of the Old World sooner or later felt the expansive force of mobile power originating in the steppe." In summary, his argument ran somewhat as follows:
A certain persistence of geographical relationship becomes evident as one examines the broader currents of history. Is not the pivot region of the world's politics that vast area of Euro-Asia which is inaccessible to ships, but in antiquity lay open to the horse-riding nomads and is today about to be covered with a network of railways? Here were the conditions of a mobility of military and economic power of a far-reaching character. And now that Russia has replaced the Mongol Empire, these conditions remain. Russian pressure on Finland, on Scandinavia, on Poland, on Turkey, on Persia, on India and on China replaces the raids of the Mongol steppemen. In the world at large Russia occupies the central strategical position which in Europe is held by Germany. She can strike on all sides and be struck from all sides, save the north. The full development of her modern railway mobility is merely a matter of time. Nor is it likely that any possible social revolution will alter her essential relations to the great geographical limits of her existence. Wisely recognizing the fundamental limits of her power, her rulers have parted with Alaska; for it is as much a law of policy for Russia to own nothing overseas as for Britain to be supreme on the ocean.
Outside the pivot area, in a great inner crescent, he continued, are Germany, Austria, Turkey, India and China, and in an outer crescent, Britain, South Africa, Australia, the United States, Canada and Japan. A tipping of the balance of power in favor of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit it to use the vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be within its grasp. This might happen if Germany were to ally herself with Russia.
My contention, said Mackinder, emphasizing that he spoke as a geographer, is that particular combinations of power are likely to rotate around the pivot state. This state is always likely to be great; but its mobility is limited, compared with that of the surrounding marginal and insular countries. The actual balance of political power at any given time is, he continued, the product of geographical conditions, both economic and strategic, and also of the relative number, virility, equipment and organization of the competing peoples. In proportion as these quantities are accurately estimated are we likely to adjust differences without the crude resort to arms. And the geographical quantities in the calculation are more measurable and more nearly constant than the human quantities. Hence we should expect to find that our formula applied equally to past history and to present politics.
The discussion which followed the reading of the paper at the meeting of the Society is interesting and brings forward names and ideas which were to become noteworthy. Sir Thomas Holdich remarked on "the absolutely immeasurable cost of geographical ignorance." Twenty years later this was to become a favored quotation of the German geopoliticians. Mr. L. S. Amery, subsequently First Lord of the Admiralty and Secretary of State for India, concluded a long and prophetic speech with the observation that the controversy between "the relative merits of railways and ships as a means of mobility would be altered by the use of the air as a means of locomotion," and added that "those people who have the industrial power and the power of invention and of science will be able to defeat all others." (The Wright Brothers had flown their plane at Kitty Hawk in December 1903, while Mackinder had noted in his lecture that Christendom possessed the widest possible mobility of power, short of winged mobility). Mr. D. G. Hogarth joined Mr. Amery in his objection to Mackinder's conception of "Graeco-Slavs," and raised the question as to whether Mackinder believed that a "stationary state of affairs" was being developed in the pivot area. Did the lecturer mean--he asked--that the great region would no longer send its populations down into the marginal countries? Mackinder--only partly answering the question--maintained his view that Russia was the heir of Greece, and "a great stationary population was being developed in the steppe lands--a revolution in the world that had to be faced." He emphasized that his aim was not to predict a great future for this or that country but to make a geographical formula into which any political balance might be fitted. His belief was that the future of the world depended on "the balance of power between the marginal region and the expansive internal forces."
Tall, erect and distinguished, Halford J. Mackinder was a figure of the kind on whom other writers enjoy letting their imaginations play. The small dining club called "Coefficients" which he attended was described by H. G. Wells in his "Experiment in Autobiography" and appears in that queer, confused novel, "The New Machiavelli," as the Pentagram Circle. Besides the Webbs, Haldane and Sir Edward Grey, Leo Maxse, editor of the National Review, belonged to this brilliant group. Leo Maxse had been given the National Review by his father, Admiral Maxse, for what sport he cared to have with it. He turned it into one of the great reviews of the time. The Admiral, incidentally, provided the model for the central figure of Meredith's political novel, "Beauchamp's Career." Mackinder published in this magazine (1905) another important article, "Man-power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength," which he pointed out should be read as a supplement to his "Geographical Pivot of History." The Army Course for the training of officers for higher appointments on the Administrative Staff of the Army, instituted at that time at the London School of Economics by Haldane as Secretary of War, was known as "Haldane's Mackindergarten."
The attraction of those who sought to imagine the lineaments of the figures of power at the time was returned by Mackinder in his own desire for an active rôle in British politics. He broke with the Liberal Party on the subject of free trade, when Joseph Chamberlain made the issue one of immediate controversy. Apparently L. S. Amery was responsible for bringing Mackinder over to the side of those who favored some form of imperial preference. In his recent book he says, "I did succeed, after several talks, in persuading Mackinder. Not to his personal advantage, I fear, for he would almost certainly, if he had stayed with his party, have risen to high office in the 1906 Parliament."[v] Mackinder contributed to the "Lectures on Empire" (1906-7), edited by his old friend, M. E. Sadler, a paper titled "On Thinking Imperially"--a slogan propagated by the Nazi geopoliticians two decades later.
Mackinder resigned as Director of the School of Economics on becoming a Liberal Unionist candidate at a bye-election for Hawick Burghs in 1909, remaining, however, as lecturer and later becoming Professor of Geography. This second attempt to enter Parliament was also unsuccessful. But in January 1910 he was elected for the Camlachie division of Glasgow, retaining his seat at the general election in December of the same year by a narrow margin, and holding it until defeated in 1922. Mr. Amery's retrospective verdict that, whatever the cause, Mackinder never quite made the mark in Parliament once expected of him, is incontestable. His greatness was of a different order-- as a counsellor for general staffs, as Sir Alfred Zimmern has remarked, not as a practising politician. And in the meantime, Mackinder lectured--without notes, but with many sketch maps --to thousands of students who crowded to hear him. Inspirational to his appreciative students, he repeatedly defined his outlook: "Every event takes place both in space and in time, so it has both a geographical and an historical aspect."
The book for which he is best known appeared in 1919--"Democratic Ideals and Reality." It was built on the thesis of 1904, but the "pivot area" became the now famous "Heartland area." The book was intended to reach the peace negotiators at Versailles, and it included the dramatic and often quoted (and misquoted) slogans:
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.
It was a warning, not a prediction, written "for the sons of light against the black forces," and "enlisting geography as an aid to statecraft and strategy," as two reviewers put it at the time.[vi] Had the German General Staff elected to hold on the Western Front in 1914, and to strike with full force on the Eastern, Germany might then have gained the Heartland; and she came close to winning it in any event. Mackinder was profoundly concerned that the victorious Allies appreciate the necessity of constructing an effective barrier of independent nations between Germany and Russia. But only in Germany was the significance of Mackinder's warning understood. After the publication of his book, in the autumn of 1919, he was afforded an opportunity to function briefly as British High Commissioner in South Russia, then under the control of Denikin. He was knighted, upon his return in 1920, and thereafter played a valuable, if inconspicuous, part in Empire Affairs, being made a member of the Privy Council in 1925.
The major center of studies of geography and strategy in the Germany of the Weimar Republic was Major General Karl Haushofer's school of Geopolitik in Munich. Essentially, Haushofer's doctrine was a rationalization of wars of conquest. Assuming the necessity of "autarky," or national self-sufficiency, it proceeded to the idea of Lebensraum and the right of a powerful state to acquire whatever territory it felt it needed to attain self-sufficiency. In English and American literature it is still stated that Haushofer did not discover Mackinder until 1925. This is not quite correct. Returning as a defeated general from the First World War, Haushofer was made professor of anthropogeography at Munich, and in 1921, in a booklet under the innocent title, "The Japanese Empire in Its Geographical Development," he analyzed Mackinder's theory of closed space, and used it as the basis for a theory of German encirclement. Lifting one sentence from the context of the British geographer's lecture which had described a situation existing in the "mediaeval age," Haushofer quoted: "Thus the settled people of Europe lay gripped between two pressures--that of the Asiatic nomads from the East, and on the other three sides that of the pirates from the sea." It was Haushofer's opinion that such a situation still prevailed in 1920, and he proceeded to draw on the cover of his booklet a "suggestive" map of Japan, with "mutilated" Germany in comparison. On the map he drew geopolitical power lines showing Japan's prospective southern expansion; and an arrow pointing to Hawaii. Haushofer referred again to Mackinder's 1904 lecture in a book of which he was co-author titled, "Concerning the Battle for Liberty in South-East Asia," in 1923, and the following year he perverted Mackinder's ideas more definitely in a redrawn map in his work, "The Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean." He coupled this with a resentful and fatalistic statement about the "900 million southeast Asiatics" who were Germany's "companions of disaster." Together with Germany, he said, they must struggle against "our merciless economic and political enemies and oppressors."[vii] Haushofer's "reversed" map attempted to show how the land-locked Powers were allegedly put under pressure by the seafaring Powers. His grand strategy for Germany was therefore to break through this encirclement by forming a great Eurasian bloc with Russia and Japan.
When the sensational pact between Nazi Germany and the U.S.S.R. was signed on August 23, 1939, The New Statesman and Nation published an article discussing the way in which Mackinder's concept of the "geographical pivot of history" had been utilized by General Haushofer to help bring about the Nazi-Soviet pact.[viii] Haushofer, who applauded the Soviet-German agreement "as a triumph of geopolitical statesmanship," retorted in his monthly contribution to the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, October 1939, "honor-bound," he said to explain:
In the last period of preparation [before the war] there occurred what Sir Halford Mackinder not only in 1904, but also in 1919 ("Democratic Ideals and Reality") had warned against: "the vital necessity of Germany and Russia joining forces." As early as 1913, in Dai Nihon, I had called for the logical supplement of this pact, namely, for the alliance of both [Russia and Germany] with Japan, in order to create a giant transcontinental bloc capable of counterbalancing the two great Anglo-Saxon powers. . . .
The New Statesman calls "these ideas hard and realistic" and blames us "for purloining them, to a considerable extent, from the intellectual arsenal of British imperialism." Where does world history say that one may not learn from the enemy? Fas est ab hoste doceri (It is a duty to learn from the enemy) was already laid down as a rule of statesmanship by the ancient Romans. . . . Russia and Germany both lost the war because they fought on opposite sides. It took a long time, a much longer time than Sir Halford Mackinder had expected, for the Germans and Russians to find that out.
The pact created an increasing interest among Americans in Mackinder, and in Haushofer as well. In his 1904 lecture Mackinder had observed that "the development of the vast potentialities of South America might have a decisive influence upon the system. They might strengthen the United States, or, on the other hand, if Germany were to challenge the Monroe Doctrine successfully, they might detach Berlin from what I may perhaps describe as a pivot policy." The Nazi challenge to the Monroe Doctrine grew to such an extent that in the summer of 1940, by a virtually unanimous vote of both houses of Congress, the principles laid down in the Monroe message of 1823 were reaffirmed and embodied in the wider idea of the self-defense of the Western Hemisphere by all the American republics.
With the extension of the Nazi shadow over Europe, maps illustrating Mackinder's Heartland conception began to appear in American publications, and Americans became aware of the importance of global thinking and the need of maps for the air age showing the skyways over the top of the world and the distances of American cities from other parts of the globe. This interest was redoubled when Japan formally joined the Berlin-Rome axis on September 27, 1940; and global thinking became a matter of crucial immediacy when the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, instigated and forecast by Haushofer in 1921, took place on December 7, 1941. In a lengthy article, supported by a map showing the line of attack on Pearl Harbor, Haushofer then rejoiced to find his own geopolitical prognostication confirmed. "Thus," he declared, "the forced defense of the much-plagued marginal spaces of the Old World in the triangle of Berlin-Rome-Tokyo by the 'pirates of the sea and the steppe' was widened to a global theater of war."[ix] It is evident that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was implicit in the Tokyo-Berlin bargain of September 1940.[x] Thus incited by Germany, Japan stormed south. "The tempo of affairs has quickened," observed Mackinder, "and the fields of action have widened in a single generation as by a miracle." The greatest and fiercest struggle in the history of mankind ensued.[xi]
In 1943 Sir Halford was asked whether he considered that his strategical concept of a Heartland had lost any of its significance under the conditions of modern warfare. He furnished his answer in the pages of this review, in a significant article entitled "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace."[xii] In it he reiterated his faith in the Heartland idea as "more valid and useful today than it was either 20 or 40 years ago." The concept did not, he granted, admit of precise definition on the map: enough to say that the territory of the U.S.S.R. was equivalent to the Heartland--with the exception that the Soviet Union was bulwarked still more by the area which he called "Lenaland," the territory drained by the great river Lena which flows northward from Mongolia to the Arctic Ocean. In short, the Heartland provided "a sufficient physical basis for strategic thinking." The Soviet Union, he saw, would emerge from the Second World War the greatest land power on the globe.
He lived to see the war brought to a close by the explosion of atomic bombs, but not long enough to write about it. In 1943 he did not feel that air power had revolutionized military strategy. "The conquest of the air gave the world's unity a new significance for all mankind," he said; but he agreed with those airmen who noted that the effect of airpower depends upon the efficiency of its ground organization: "It can only be said that no adequate proof has yet been presented that air fighting will not follow the long history of all kinds of warfare by presenting alternations of offensive and defensive tactical superiority, meanwhile effecting few permanent changes in strategical conditions."
In his summing up, as always, he thought in metaphors. There was the Heartland, he said; there was the North Atlantic basin-- what we have come to call the Atlantic Community; and there were two other great strategic areas--"the mantle of vacancies," the tropical forests of South America and Africa to be subdued to agriculture and populated, and the Monsoon lands of India and China. The problem of the winning of the peace, he concluded, was the problem of finding a balance among them.
Two problems were concrete--Germany and Russia. The former could be controlled, he hoped, by "embankments of power"--the North Atlantic basin on one side and the Heartland on the other. To defeat Germany's global aspirations, he declared, there must be effective and lasting coöperation among America, Britain and France--the first needed for depth of defense, the second as the moated forward stronghold, the third as the defensible bridgehead. Mackinder hoped that Russia would be friendly; but however that might be, the tremendous new strategic fact was that the Heartland--"the greatest natural fortress on earth"--was now manned by a garrison sufficient in number and quality to close its gates to the German invader. In his 1904 lecture he had noted that "Russia's pressure on Finland, on Scandinavia, on Poland, on Turkey, on Persia, on India, and on China replaces the centrifugal raids of the Mongol steppemen." In 50 years the wheel has turned full cycle.
Ten years before his death, in 1937, in an eloquent address entitled "Music of the Spheres," Sir Halford had made this observation:
The imagination of mankind, massed by the new instantaneous mobility of thought and playing on the stern inelasticity of the globe has been panicked into rival ideologies, "communist" to embrace all the world in a single community, and "nationalist" to find safety in the self-sufficiency of each of a number of regional communities.
This remained his picture of the political problem. In the search for freedom men's minds will return again and again to his great pictures, facts and prophecies.
[i] Geographical Journal, London, April 1904, p. 421-44.
[ii] Cf. J. F. Unstead, "H. J. Mackinder and New Geography," Geographical Journal, 1949.
[iii] Geographical Journal, 1921, p. 378.
[iv] "Making a University: An Account of the University Movement at Reading," by William Macbride Childs. London: Dent, 1933.
[v] "My Political Life: Vol. I, England Before the Storm, 1896-1914," by Leopold S. Amery. London: Hutchinson, 1953.
[vi] Geographical Review, New York, 1919-20.
[vii] Cf. "Haushofer and the Pacific," by Hans W. Weigert. Foreign Affairs, July 1942.
[viii] "Hitler's World Revolution." The New Statesman and Nation, August 26, 1939.
[ix] Petermanns Geogr. Mitteilungen, 1942, No. 1.
[x] Cf. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, "The Undeclared War, 1940-1941." New York: Harper, 1953.
[xi] Cf. Charles Kruszewski, "Germany's Lebensraum," The American Political Science Review, October 1940, p. 964-975; Joseph S. Roucek, "Political Geography and Geopolitics," "Twentieth Century Political Thought," New York: Philosophical Library, 1946, p. 313-336; George H. Sabine, "A History of Political Theory" (revised edition), New York: Holt, 1950, Lebensraum, p. 891-7.
[xii] Foreign Affairs, July 1943.