The Future of History
Can Liberal Democracy Survive the Decline of the Middle Class?
The Future of the Liberal World Order
Internationalism After America
The Future of American Power
Dominance and Decline in Perspective
Hegemony and After
Knowns and Unknowns in the Debate Over Decline
Can America Be Fixed?
The New Crisis of Democracy
In Defense of American Engagement
The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy
Why Iran Should Get the Bomb
Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability
Getting to Yes With Iran
The Challenges of Coercive Diplomacy
The Lost Logic of Deterrence
What the Strategy That Won the Cold War Can -- and Can't -- Do Now
The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50
Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy Today
Is Helping Others Charity, or Duty, or Both?
God and Caesar in America
Why Mixing Religion and Politics Is Bad for Both
The twenty-first century began with a very unequal distribution of power resources. With five percent of the world's population, the United States accounted for about a quarter of the world's economic output, was responsible for nearly half of global military expenditures, and had the most extensive cultural and educational soft-power resources. All this is still true, but the future of U.S. power is hotly debated. Many observers have interpreted the 2008 global financial crisis as the beginning of American decline. The National Intelligence Council, for example, has projected that in 2025, "the U.S. will remain the preeminent power, but that American dominance will be much diminished."
Power is the ability to attain the outcomes one wants, and the resources that produce it vary in different contexts. Spain in the sixteenth century took advantage of its control of colonies and gold bullion, the Netherlands in the seventeenth century profited from trade and finance, France in the eighteenth century benefited from its large population and armies, and the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century derived power from its primacy in the Industrial Revolution and its navy. This century is marked by a burgeoning revolution in information technology and globalization, and to understand this revolution, certain pitfalls need to be avoided.
First, one must beware of misleading metaphors of organic decline. Nations are not like humans, with predictable life spans. Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the peak of its power, and even then it did not succumb to the rise of another state. For all the fashionable predictions of China, India, or Brazil surpassing the United States in the next decades, the greater threat may come from modern barbarians and nonstate actors. In an information-based world, power diffusion may pose a bigger danger than power transition. Conventional wisdom holds that the state with the largest army prevails, but in the information age, the state (or the nonstate actor) with the best story may sometimes win.
Power today is distributed in
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