From the Sun King to Karzai

Lessons for State Building in Afghanistan

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In December 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama announced the fruits of his administration's lengthy review of Afghanistan policy: temporary troop reinforcements and a new military strategy designed to reverse recent gains by the Taliban, efforts to increase the quality of Afghan governance, and a stronger partnership with Pakistan. The troop increases and the proposed withdrawal starting date of July 2011 dominated the headlines, but in the long run the effects of what Obama called a "civilian surge" will be even more important.

As General Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, noted last August, Washington's mission will not be accomplished until the Afghan government can "sufficiently control its territory to support regional stability and prevent its use for international terrorism." But this would require a dramatic turnaround from the current situation, which, as McChrystal has put it, is marked by a "crisis of popular confidence that springs from the weakness of [government] institutions, the unpunished abuse of power by corrupt officials and power-brokers, a widespread sense of political disenfranchisement, and a longstanding lack of economic opportunity."

Calls for strengthening Afghanistan's state institutions have become a cliché, duly repeated in every major speech or report on the war. Yet there has been relatively little serious discussion about just what buttressing these institutions would actually entail. Perhaps this is because the deeper one digs, the more entrenched the obstacles appear. Powerful warlords; traditions of local, rather than central, governance; the dominance of tribal and ethnic identities over a national one;

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