The Hollow Order
Rebuilding an International System That Works
SOME MAXIMS AND AXIOMS
WILLIAM JAMES divided philosophers into the tender-minded and the tough- minded; similarly, anyone who has given concerned study to South Africa and the present international situation may find it useful to categorize his thoughts into what he would like to happen and what he thinks likely to happen. This article is an attempt to summarize in a highly condensed (and therefore oversimplified) form some personal conclusions from these two angles and to suggest certain maxims or lines of policy for Britain and the United States.
In Britain, the question of South Africa has been looked at lately from many different points of view-sometimes from the angle of high morality, sometimes from that of national interest. Among those who put moral considerations first, there are both professing Christians and humanist- agnostics. The Christians, however, are divided, perhaps more sharply than the humanist-agnostics; some are resolutely militant, but others feel that militant intervention can only cause violence and that the calculation of whether such violence is outweighed by ultimate good is too nice to be susceptible of any clear conclusion; some indeed would consider it one on which a Christian should not embark. In this article I propose to deal with the second set of arguments-those pertaining to national interest-but this is not because I think the moral arguments unimportant.
Here too, among those who proceed from the point of view of national interest, there is sharp division. Some, probably a majority, argue quite simply that we have substantial stakes both in capital and trade which would be lost by any interference in the present situation; others regard these stakes as something to be balanced against loss elsewhere if we persist in a support of South Africa that might lead to isolation. From whatever angle the question is regarded, it is highly complex and there are many factors capable of different assessment; all that seems clear is that almost any course that might be adopted involves considerable disadvantages alike for the United States and for Britain.
To clarify thought, it seems useful to state certain propositions which for me have come to look like axioms, because on these I have reached some degree of certainty as to what is likely to happen. They are not of course really axioms in Euclid's sense, because most of them are controversial and many people would differ with them. But using them as points of departure, it is possible to consider whether what one would like to happen can be reached from them, and finally whether any of them need reassessment in view of the conclusions to which they have led. We must look at them and see whether they can be shaken, like the alibis in an old-fashioned detective story.
First Axiom: South Africa is our business; it can no longer be held that its internal affairs are purely domestic.
This is clearly a crucial point on which all others turn. Many would argue that the principle is dangerous; there are, they say, many other countries where human rights are denied, and once we have international bodies interfering with a sovereign state there will be no end to it. There are two answers to this argument based on merit and a third on the political facts.
The first is that the denial of human rights in South Africa differs in kind because it is so complete over so wide a field, and because nowhere else is it so explicit or based so clearly on a quality over which a man has no control-namely, the color of his skin. It would not be easy to judge whether the right to security of person-that is, freedom from torture and arbitrary arrest-is respected any more or any less in South Africa than in one of the Iron Curtain countries. But equality before the law, freedom of movement, freedom to marry, are clearly much less evident in South Africa. Catholics in Poland may not have the right to educate their children as they want, but they are not debarred from living with their wives and children in large areas of the country, nor forced if they lose a job to give up their houses and move to some remote part of the country. They are not confronted with benches on which they may not sit and vehicles in which they may not travel. They are not sent to segregated schools and forbidden to marry outside their community. But let me emphasize that it is not only the extent of the denial of rights but also the fact that it is explicit and open that makes the South African tyranny different in kind from that of other oppressive states.
Secondly, I suggest that the whole argument about the right of a sovereign state to do what it will with its own subjects within its own boundaries is becoming more and more out of date. At an earlier stage of social development, it was no doubt permissible to beat one's wife and any interference with such chastisement was an infringement of the right of the head of the house. At another stage, it was common for great landowners to keep private armies. We begin to reach a stage in international affairs where the sovereign independence of single countries is becoming progressively limited in the same way as that of individuals in domestic law. A network of obligation is being established which constitutes international law. And international law does proclaim quite loudly that certain human rights ought to be observed,[i] while it embodies, somewhat uncertainly, the beginnings of provision for making this fact. Every disregard of these rights is dangerous to all of us because the appalling prospect of nuclear war makes it of paramount importance to strengthen respect for international law. Surreptitious breaches of human rights are constantly occurring and in themselves are deplorable, but they are less dangerous to international law and the future of mankind than the open and explicit refusal to acknowledge observance as even desirable. In this, South Africa alone is guilty.[ii]
These are arguments on merits; in addition, certain facts must be taken into account. One by one, the powers which argued that the affairs of South Africa were solely matters of internal jurisdiction have abandoned this position; the last Resolution of the Security Council was unanimous and the Resolution of October 10, 1963, in the Assembly was carried by a vote of 106 to 1 (recorded by South Africa). Those who take the other view have been beaten. It is no use ignoring this.
Second Axiom: Revolution from within will not succeed without outside help.
Arguments that "a people cannot be held down forever" are unconvincing; they proceed either from cases where the government was ineffective or had scruples or where the government was in a hopeless minority. In the French and Russian Revolutions, workers, peasants, soldiers and the middle classes were united against an aristocracy which was not particularly efficient and by comparison was small in numbers. In India, the government was responsible to a distant parliament which in its turn was responsible to an electorate with strong humanitarian elements and no conviction that its own interests were involved. In South Africa, the aristocracy of white men is a fifth of the population; it is on the spot, its interests are very much involved and it has in its hands all weapons and posts of importance. It is efficient and ruthless. Further, the terrain is quite different from Malaya or Kenya; there is no jungle and the country can be divided into sectors by railway lines and rivers which can be patrolled by helicopter.
Third Axiom: The South African Government will not fail through internal weakness.
This is clearly a more controversial axiom than the last. But the "crack in the Dutch Reformed Church" which has been prophesied for many years does not grow very wide; a small minority are deeply disturbed in conscience by what is happening-they have established the Christian Institute which is non-racial-but, so far, whenever there has been a General Synod, this minority has been over-ruled. In general, recent events have brought the English-speaking whites closer to the Afrikaners; for one idealist lost they have gained a materialist, and humanly speaking there is no foreseeable likelihood of the government losing power through constitutional means.
Fourth Axiom: Prosperity does not make the South African Government's policy acceptable to the African.
It is argued that wages are high in comparison with other parts of the continent and the African is therefore better off. But in the first place the urban wage is often supplemented in other parts of Africa by produce from the reserve or country area, and this is seldom the case in South Africa; second, the cost of living in the towns is high and real wages are low;[iii] third, the ratio of white wages to African has not grown less, as might have been expected by analogy with other countries where industrialization has reduced the differential between skilled and unskilled labor; on the contrary it has increased.[iv] In the reserves, mortality rates indicate how widespread is malnutrition;[v] in the towns high mortality rates and malnutrition must be set against the emergence of an apparently prosperous middle class. The prosperity, then, is more apparent than real. But even if prosperity were real, experience elsewhere does not suggest that an emerging and prosperous middle class with no civil rights is likely to be a stable element; on the contrary, it is likely to be revolutionary. There is, however, no exact precedent for an emerging and prosperous middle class faced with so menacing a network of personal restrictions and privations.
Fifth Axiom: More prosperity will not end apartheid.
It is argued that the growth of industry will in time bring an end to apartheid and that the right policy for outside powers is to invest more in South Africa and speed up industrialization. But this-the hormone weed- killer argument-does not stand up to the facts. For the last 15 years South Africa has been getting more and more prosperous and more and more industrialized; apartheid has been getting sharper and sharper. Most of the great industrialists would prefer to have a more mobile and interchangeable labor system, but political considerations come first and they have to sacrifice economic desirability to keeping in with the government. The same thing happened in the southern states of America when industry had moved from the north; the factory manager usually behaved in accordance with state customs which did not suit him rather than become unpopular with state and local authorities.
Sixth Axiom: Direct armed intervention by other African states will not be successful without direct help from a major power.
This needs no elaboration. Even the Organization of African Unity would not argue to the contrary.
Seventh Axiom: Things will not stay as they are.
Other African states, though unable to mount military action directly against South Africa, are already training guerrillas, some of whom will find their way into South Africa. They are likely to be helped considerably by Communist powers, particularly if no legal action is taken by the United Nations. Guerrilla action will not by itself produce decisive results; but in South Africa it will produce increasing misery and destruction and outside it will increase hostility to Britain and the United States, since they are South Africa's trading partners and allies. Forced to choose between their interests in South Africa and their interests elsewhere, Britain and the United States will step by step renounce their special relations with South Africa.
Eighth Axiom: Economic sanctions in the form of an embargo on a single commodity will not be successful in forcing South Africa to change her policies.
It is urged that the South African economy is particularly vulnerable in respect of oil, ball bearings and gold. Oil has been chosen by many as the commodity best suited for restrictive action; being bulky, it is easier than others to control from outside the country. But no agreement to deny oil to South Africa is likely to be complete. There is a world surplus of oil competing for markets and if an agreement to deny oil were to be reached between the larger companies and producers, the profit to a small producer which did not join might be considerable. Moreover, the South African economy is based on cheap coal, and oil represents only 10 percent of fuel requirements. True, it is for agriculture and defense that oil is needed; but stocks are certainly between three and six months' supply and probably nearer the latter, particularly for defense. Any idea of an embargo is likely to be debated for some time and the South Africans would have enough warning to impose rationing in good time and, to a certain extent, to stock up (though this does mean construction of storage capacity). They could also increase in about one year's time the production of oil from coal. Rationing might be expected to double the period for which stocks would last, and even if the embargo were complete (which is unlikely) it seems that at least a year would elapse before it would be seriously felt. The considerations which apply to ball bearings and gold are different, but of course these items are less bulky and easier to transport; the broad conclusions are similar, that is to say, that the effect on the economy of any restrictions on these commodities would be slow to operate and would not be entirely crippling.
Ninth Axiom: Sanctions will not be effective unless backed by a blockade.
Only a blockade seems likely to be able to hold out any prospect of controlling the supply of oil; it follows that general sanctions in respect of all supplies to South Africa (which would include many items that were more difficult to control) would also be controllable only by blockade.
Tenth Axiom: General sanctions could not be successful without the coöperation of the United States and the United Kingdom.
Britain has the largest volume of trade with South Africa, and the United States is the next largest trader. Their coöperation would thus be required for an embargo; it has already been indicated that an embargo by itself would be useless and would be effective only if backed by a blockade. In any case, it may be taken as certain that Britain would not give up trade with South Africa unless confident that other powers would be forced to do the same. Furthermore, a blockade would require the use of aircraft carriers. Only eight powers possess aircraft carriers, and it is suggested that one would be needed off each of the five main ports. The burden seems likely to fall heavily on the United States and the United Kingdom.
Eleventh Axiom: Britain and America will not undertake a blockade unless there is a unanimous vote by the Security Council in support of a legal issue.
The interests of the two powers are similar but are distinct. Britain has approximately £1,000,000,000 worth of investment in South Africa and about £150,000,000 a year of trade. (According to what is included in the calculation, these figures can vary widely, but they appear to provide a reasonably accurate indication of the size of the interests involved.) This is far larger in absolute terms than the American interest and in proportion to national income it is of course very much larger still. Exports to South Africa constitute about 4 percent of Britain's total exports; in certain areas of the country and of industry the percentage is considerably higher, and in certain constituencies the political effect of unemployment resulting from action against South Africa might be considerable.
Then there is the Simonstown base. This is perhaps of some importance to NATO, much more certainly to Britain, in the event of any minor wars or threats to the peace in the Indian Ocean or Southeast Asia. It seems unlikely that it could be of major importance in a major war. But we cannot disregard it.
More important, in many eyes, is the question of the three High Commission Territories-Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. Basutoland is entirely surrounded by the territory of the South African Republic and is highly vulnerable to economic action. All three are eventually part of the South African economy; Basutoland and Bechuanaland, however, are set on the normal British colonial course toward ultimate independence under democratic institutions. This is a markedly different pattern from that of the South African native reserves, the so-called Bantustans. In both Basutoland and Bechuanaland there are leaders who believe it is better to avoid open conflict with South Africa, but in both countries there would be considerable reluctance to become part of the South African political system and there is great sympathy with the Bantu-speaking inhabitants of South Africa. Both countries send migrant workers into South Africa and would be hard hit if this were stopped. Both know what it is like to live in South Africa. The relative strength of these contradictory pulls is hard to assess but there can be no doubt that any international action against South Africa would involve initial suffering for the Protectorates. Almost any attempt to mitigate their hardships-for instance, dropping food from aircraft-would be likely to provoke retaliation in which they would suffer more severely still and which might result in shooting.
The case of Swaziland is somewhat different, as this alone among African territories has voted overwhelmingly for traditional chiefs who have indicated a much greater readiness than is found in the other two territories to accommodate themselves to South Africa, perhaps in fear of British democratic processes. Whatever happens in Swaziland, it seems certain that Basutoland and Bechuanaland will remain hostages to South Africa; for Britain this reinforces the prospect of loss of trade and capital as arguments for inaction.
In the United States there is much less personal involvement with South Africa, in the sense of fewer relations and friends; and while there is apathy and ignorance among the public in both countries, it is more marked in the United States. Investment in South Africa, though growing, is balanced by an investment in the rest of Africa which is larger. On the other hand-though it is a bold foreigner who pronounces on trends in United States policy-the civil rights question is surely likely to influence the policy of the United States. Those who opposed the Civil Rights legislation will probably feel an inclination to support South Africa rather than intervene. A majority, however, supported the Bill which has now become law. But it will not bring a new heaven on earth. It seems likely that pressures on the United States will mount from the 20,000,000 Negroes and those who most actively supported the Bill. The President is likely to need all the Negro support he can get. It will be easier to accede to pressure urging intervention in South Africa than to end all domestic grievances; and there will of course also be mounting pressure from the United Nations.
All this seems likely to incline the Administration more and more toward intervention. But this is a matter in which the United States will wish to persuade, rather than drag, the United Kingdom. Step by step the two are likely to move in this direction, the one more, the one less, unwillingly. But at present, it seems that only a clear breach of international law will bring the United States to the point of sanctions and only pressure from the United States will induce Britain to acquiesce. At the time of writing, both would veto sanctions. This, however, might well not be the case in 18 months' time and on a legal issue.
This brings to an end the list of axioms, or points on which I feel some confidence as to what is likely to happen. The general picture is one of a strong and increasing determination among the Africans and Asians (and to a lesser extent the South Americans) in the United Nations to achieve some positive intervention in South African affairs. The fact that this embarrasses Britain and the United States will not be a deterrent. But it will be Britain and the United States which are asked not only to give up substantial advantages in trade and capital investment but also to undertake the expensive and thankless task of enforcing the policy of blockade. Technically an act of war, a blockade might easily lead to a shooting war because, if South Africa did grow desperate, resistance would at some stage almost certainly be offered.
South Africa is not the only problem in the world. What action would the Communist powers be taking elsewhere, notably in Southeast Asia, while the blockading forces were engaged in a prolonged and exhausting operation against South Africa? What would they be doing in Africa if Britain and the United States refused to take part in action against South Africa and thus found themselves diplomatically isolated? Whatever course is taken by the United States and Britain, if pushed to extremes, can be used to advantage by the Communists.
What would be the results of international intervention? Rhetorical phrases such as "bringing the South African Government to their knees" are used, but it is not clear what exactly they mean. Economic measures seem likely in the first place to rally white opinion to the government, but prolonged and effective measures with real determination behind them might persuade some of the more materialistic among the present supporters of the government that their interests lay in another course. It seems unlikely, however, that they would be given constitutional means of registering a change of mind. The present government has a majority in Parliament, and in what was virtually a state of war this would not be shaken. The life of Parliament could be prolonged. Meanwhile, the burden of economic sanctions would fall first on the African working class; if, driven by hunger and unemployment, they demonstrated against the government, they would be shot down. Insurrection has no more chance of success when a blockade is in progress than before. In fact, it seems likely that once sanctions were imposed there would be little likelihood of surrender until in fact military occupation became necessary.
This is a course on which no one would lightly wish to embark and it would not be easy to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion. Even if a war was won, an occupation would present the considerable problem of disengagement. This is an additional argument for being clear as to the kind of result we want to produce. Otherwise, the present South African Government and its followers are forced to fight for all they hold vital to their national life, with no option but total surrender; they will go on until the only choice lies between a period of anarchy and chaos and one of prolonged international occupation. Analogy with other recently independent African countries is apt to be misleading. In South Africa the economy and the administration are wholly in white hands as they have not been elsewhere; except in the former Belgian Congo, there was at least some preparation for independence. In South Africa there is no machinery for a peaceful transition of power because the government does not contemplate such an outcome. Further, it seems almost impossible to visualize a South Africa from which all white persons-there are 3,000,000 of them-would be wholly banished. This would indeed be genocide; operations which resulted in this would be substituting one intolerable evil for another.
It is urged that in order to avoid demanding total surrender and the last ditch mentality which it produces, sanctions might be imposed with the limited object of bringing the South African Government to a council table with the Africans. But would a lasting agreement result from a conference forced on one party? On the other hand, if the government has clearly recognized that it has to agree to whatever the other party imposes, with the alternative of finding itself back again in a war it no longer can hope to win, this is only marginally different from total surrender.
All these considerations point to the extreme difficulty of imposing sanctions and to the unpalatable nature of the results likely to follow. Premature and unsuccessful action by the United Nations would be perhaps the supreme disaster. It would also be a disaster if Britain and America were isolated diplomatically by refusing to take part in action against South Africa. They would be fighting against the course of history.
The conclusion seems to be that while the United States and Britain cannot afford to ignore the problem or postpone dealing with it, any measures taken should be designed to give the South Africans some opportunity for concessions without complete surrender, in the hope that this might lead to formation of a government that would negotiate. Any solution which is to last must surely have its roots in South Africa, yet it is impertinent to attempt to force concessions on South Africa unless one recognizes the difficulty of its position and unless one has some general idea of a solution that would be acceptable to the rest of the world.
The South African Government's own solution is unacceptable to the rest of the world because apartheid does not represent a partition of the country based on any fair principle. Further, it is not proposed that the inhabitants of the Bantustans should have any rights in the white part of South Africa, which at present is about 87 percent of the whole. But is it not possible to contemplate eventually a very different kind of partition, in which rights between the two areas (or groups of areas) would be reciprocal, in which resources and territory would be divided in some degree of relationship to the numbers involved, and in which there would be necessarily a non-racial zone for the highly industrialized area of the Rand? Can one not see, for example, a predominantly white area in the Western Cape and predominantly black states in other parts of South Africa, perhaps linked in a loose confederacy based on agreements derived ultimately from mutual convenience? In both areas, it would be necessary to guarantee human rights for all inhabitants. This is the merest speculation, but it seems the least objectionable outcome of which there is any hope. If confederacy is impossible, separation might have to be complete, but what is essential is that there should be no explicit denial of human rights by either state.
Many South Africans believe that the fully independent African states of the north will crumble and display an inability to govern themselves, thereby gradually convincing Britain and America of "where their true interests lie." They visualize, in short, a breakdown of faith in international action and a line-up of the rich white nations against the poor non-white nations. It is assumed for the purpose of this article that it is a major aim of British and American policy to avoid such a result.
On this assumption, it seems that four main objectives remain. Most of them would be generally recognized as valid objectives, but what is important is the order of priority. The first three are primary or world objectives; the fourth is of vital and immediate importance, but it is local in nature and ought to rank behind the other three. The objectives are:
First: To strengthen forces making for a system of international law which will command respect and ultimately enforce compliance.
Second: To avoid any attempt by international forces to carry out a policy which lacks an adequate chance of success. (This flows from the first.)
Third: To avoid the diplomatic isolation of the United States and Britain. (This again flows from the first, because the international system cannot succeed without the United States.)
Fourth: To achieve in South Africa a transition to a democratic government with a minimum of bloodshed. (This is the local objective).
In this view, we should try to achieve the best solution we can to the last objective, bearing in mind always the fact that the means adopted must not hinder the first three. To make this order of priorities clear may well be the best way of achieving the local objective, because what holds the South Africans on their present course is the belief that in the last resort Britain and America will support them against the rest of the world.
If, then, we are to avoid either a long-drawn-out and inconclusive war or, on the other hand, economic sanctions escalating into an internal revolution backed by external force and eventual occupation, we must face the fact that war is a possibility. Surely history has shown that, between two negotiators, one who is determined to get his own way will prevail over one who is undecided. If there were in the United States and Britain a clear determination that the priorities are as suggested here, there might be a real chance in South Africa of a growing recognition that it was useless to fight against irresistible power.
The pledges which the South African Government hold against Britain are Simonstown, the High Commission Territories and our investments (and here Americans are concerned too). The first question to be asked is how long we can hope to preserve these if we take no action. We have decided against throwing in our lot with the South Africans; we have not yet decided that we cannot be neutral. If we stick to our present line of policy, it seems likely that these hostages will be stripped from us as we are dragged protesting into action in which we make the major sacrifices and for which we obtain no credit.
In any case, the Simonstown strategy is questionable; many believe it needs rethinking and replacing. The High Commission Territories are ultimately part of the South African economic system, and anything which brings nearer a democratic government in South Africa would probably be to their advantage in the long run. Again, in the long run, it is arguable that investment in South Africa has a better prospect once a democratic government is in power than before. This has certainly been the view taken by substantial interests in Northern Rhodesia; and an African government in South Africa would have on call a far larger number of educated Africans, and with wider experience, than in Northern Rhodesia.
It is here that the suit brought by Liberia and Ethiopia against South Africa in respect of South West Africa becomes of importance. It provides a legal issue, and if the International Court of Justice at The Hague hands down a decree against South Africa it may provide it with a demonstration of the strength of world opinion. There are many who believe that, after all possible procrastination, the South African Government would in the end abandon South West Africa rather than provide the United Nations with grounds for legal action. If that were so, the lesson would be salutary and might induce a real change of opinion. If it is accepted that only a legal issue will bring the United States to the point of action, it seems clear that this must be the test case against South Africa.
But to African nations-and possibly to Asian and South American ones also- this involves intolerable delay. Lives, they point out, are being ruined by the present régime. But more lives would be ruined by premature action. We can only succeed in persuading the Africans to let this be the testing case and to delay other action if we make our ultimate position perfectly clear, both to the South African Government and to African nations. Our present policy of secret diplomacy and private warnings, which is designed to avoid rallying the South Africans behind their government, leaves all parties uncertain as to our ultimate intentions. Such a report as that of the U.N.'s Expert Committee does not provide the unshakable legal ground that South West Africa would provide for proceeding against South Africa; and it will not bring the United States or Britain to the point. It is therefore surely preferable to delay until the stronger ground has been tried and the white people of South Africa are shown how powerful international action can be.
In the light of this discussion, the following maxims seem to emerge:
First Maxim: We-the United States and Britain-must make it clear that we prefer the friendship of the world to that of South Africa, that we shall not use the veto to save her from international action and that we are determined to see a change of government.
Second Maxim: We-the United States and Britain-should provide the South Africans with occasions on which to retire gracefully, as preliminary exercises in preparation for the final concession of calling a national convention.
Third Maxim: We-the United States and Britain-should make it clear to the rest of the world that this is our intention and that we are already prepared to give up certain local and temporary advantages. For Britain, this would mean bringing to an end all forms of special relationship such as those in connection with the sterling area, Simonstown and the supply of arms.
This policy has no chance of success unless we have firmly made up our minds that we may in the last resort have to face blockade which may lead to war. It is not a particularly attractive policy from any point of view, but it is preferable to being gradually forced into the same course without any credit to ourselves and with no chance at all of producing a change of government not accompanied by violent revolution. If we reëxamine the axioms in the light of these disheartening conclusions, our attention will center on the third-that the South African Government will not fail through internal weakness. The policy suggested might alter this, because it would destroy the main hope of the nationalist white South African and might produce a peaceful change of government.
This is to be tender-minded and hopeful. If I am tough-minded and revert to what I think likely to happen, the eleven axioms seem solid. Further, it seems unlikely that either the United States or Britain will make up its mind as suggested. That is not the way of democracies, particularly just before or just after an election. What seems likely is that we shall reach these conclusions too slowly and too late to achieve their objectives.
To some, the thinking in this article will seem to present black and white too starkly. It is a British habit of thought to seek for compromise, a middle way out of every dispute, to believe that things will not be so bad after all. And most politicians tend to consider every day that passes a day gained. It is to combat this tendency to complacent drift that thought has been expressed here in harsh terms.
Two factors stand out. It is almost impossible to overstate the conviction of African leaders that something must be done about South Africa; it is very easy to under-rate the determination of the Afrikaner people.
[i] See the second paragraph to the preamble of the United Nations Charter and the 2nd and 3rd Purposes of the United Nations under Article I. The Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly on December 4, 1948, and all Members were called on to publicize it.
[ii] South Africa has repeatedly refused to accede to requests and suggestions from the United Nations respecting the treatment of Indians, the mandate on South West Africa and visits of United Nations teams, as well as on the denial of human rights on grounds of race.
[iii] Accurate statistics are not easy to obtain. But the Chairman of the Bantu Wages and Productivity Association said on October 30, 1963, that the average monthly income of heads of households was $58.87 per month. In 45.8 percent of households, the head is the sole breadwinner. The minimum family income needed for subsistence is calculated at $64.40 per month. There must therefore be many families below it.
[iv] Average monthly wages calculated from figures published by the Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of Mines Annual Report for 1962 were $20.80 for 392,000 Africans, $294.00 for 48,639 Europeans. Most of the Africans are living as single men and are housed and fed. The cash wage is about half the total cost to the company, the other half consisting of housing, food and recruiting. Europeans also get some benefits not in cash, but these are probably equivalent to not more than 10 percent of salary.
[v] Infant death rate in 1961 per 1,000 live births for white children was 27.6, for Asians 43.3, for colored 126.8; for Africans it is estimated to be as high as 400 per 1,000 in some rural areas.