Xi Jinping in His Own Words
What China’s Leader Wants—and How to Stop Him From Getting It
THREE years ago Argentina displayed all the phenomena of the world depression: low commodity prices, unemployment, debtors faced with foreclosure, an unbalanced budget, declining foreign trade. Today she has emerged from the crisis to an extent beyond any other American country.
The depression reached its nadir in South America in the course of the year 1933. It made frightful ravages there because of the catastrophic declines in the price of basic raw materials on the export of which the continent chiefly depends. Recovery has been due to the combined action of a number of factors, some of them measures taken by local authorities, others of them world-wide in operation. The domestic measures grew out of the determination of governments to set their house in order, and comprised a variety of expedients, many of them inspired by the policies of the Roosevelt Administration in the United States. Of much greater importance has been the influence of two other factors in play since the beginning of 1934. One is the slight but substantial rise in world markets of the prices of most of South America's principal exports. The other is the depreciation of the national currencies, which enhanced the benefit of rising prices for the native producer. In most of these countries the currency is today more or less stabilized at from 30 to 90 percent below the gold parity of six years ago. And despite this depreciation, the cost of living has not risen in proportion, largely because these countries themselves produce the elements necessary for their subsistence.
In Argentina circumstances have been especially propitious. An agricultural and pastoral country of vast extent, she is developing a diversified range of exportable products. Thanks to her extremely fertile soil, her industrious white population, and a favorable climate, she is able to meet competition in the outside world with unusual success. Moreover she is fortunate in having a government which has conjured her economic ills with expertness and intelligence.
The management of the national finances is perhaps Argentina's most striking achievement -- the work of the late Secretary of the Treasury, Federico Pinedo, and of some of his associates. The budget is practically in a state of equilibrium; indeed, in December last, by virtue of an anticipated budgetary surplus of twenty million pesos, a reduction of the income tax was announced, as well as the abolition of certain license taxes bearing upon small tradesmen and professional men. The national government, moreover, almost alone among those of Latin America, has not defaulted on any of its foreign obligations.[i] Although in 1933 there was open talk in some quarters of the desirability of suspending the debt service, in 1934 and 1935 the public credit was so far consolidated that various foreign and domestic loans, both federal and provincial, were successfully converted from 6 percent to 5 percent and 4½ percent.[ii] The system of taxation has also been remodeled and simplified, the federal government assuming the entire responsibility of collecting most of the internal taxes formerly belonging to the provinces, and distributing the proceeds to them on a quota basis adjustable every ten years. This innovation, while emphasizing the tendency to federal encroachment upon provincial autonomy, should result in more efficient administration and largely increased revenues.
In the spring of 1935 Congress also enacted a thoroughgoing reform of the monetary and banking systems. A Central Bank has been created with an initial capital of 30,000,000 pesos. It is given the exclusive privilege of issuing bank notes,[iii] and must maintain a minimum reserve in gold, currency, or foreign exchange equivalent to 25 percent of its outstanding notes and other sight obligations. It has taken over the gold reserve of the former Caja de Conversión at the current market value instead of at the old value of the gold peso, which in effect cuts the gold value of the peso from 44 to 23¼ centavos, and permits a coverage of over 100 percent of the paper currency.
The Central Bank serves as the depository and financial agent of the government, and as adviser in foreign and domestic credit operations and in the issue and control of public loans. It becomes the new clearing house, exercises the function of rediscount, and may engage in open market operations by selling and buying government securities; and it exercises general oversight of the banking system as a whole. At the same time the system is reformed by laws establishing compulsory reserve percentages in the Central Bank, restricting the investment of commercial bank funds in securities beyond two years, and providing for the strict supervision of all banks and banking operations at large. A Liquidation Institute has also been created to purchase the frozen assets of commercial banks with bonds or cash, such assets to be liquidated gradually by the Institute and applied to the redemption of the bonds given in payment. Whatever losses are incurred by the Institute will be met out of the profits realized by the Central Bank in the devaluation of the peso. The Caja de Conversión and the former rediscount and liquidation commissions of course disappear, and the old Bank of the Nation becomes a semi-official commercial bank, although retaining a few minor public accounts and sharing with the new bank its function of lending money to the government.
These reforms have long been a crying need in Argentina, and are without doubt the outstanding achievement of President Justo's administration, although they have aroused a surprising amount of criticism in some old fashioned quarters. They stabilize the peso at about its present international value, and offer no great danger of subsequent inflation. The situation of the private banks is considerably improved by the new control law, for some of them were very weak and reform was essential; and the Liquidation Institute has already permitted the reorganization and merging of several of the most important banks in the republic. The old system with its dispersion of functions among a number of autonomous institutions was incredibly clumsy, and the monetary system was about as inelastic as could be devised. By the Law of 1899 establishing the Caja de Conversión, any gold exports or imports as a result of fluctuations in the balance of international payments were immediately and automatically reflected in corresponding changes in the outstanding volume of notes of the Caja. The new legislation makes for centralization of control and for the more elastic currency essential in an exporting agricultural country.
In other respects the New Deal in its Argentine version has been remarkably successful in putting the country on the road to recovery. It has included control of grain prices and of foreign exchange, restriction of imports, increase of exports through bilateral trade treaties, a mortgage moratorium, and a program of public works. It is true that fortune favored Argentina in the form of rising world prices for agricultural and pastoral products, due in large measure to the North American drought of 1934. But for much of the recovery the measures of the federal government must receive credit. Most of the cost has been met not by taxation, but by the profits from exchange control and by the blocking of remittances abroad; in other words, it has been put upon the importers and those who purchase their wares.
With declining exports foreign exchange became scarce. The government therefore had to act to protect the peso. It forbade remittances without special permit. The result was a large accumulation of funds representing the cost of imported merchandise and the profits of foreign corporations. This exchange problem, serious for the government as well as for the private interests affected, was solved by the government's offer to borrow the blocked funds for 20 years at 4 percent interest; and thereby it came into possession of some 300,000,000 pesos with which to help finance its domestic program, including the conversion of the public debt. In November 1933 it issued decrees depreciating the peso 20 percent, requiring virtually all export bills to be sold to the government at a fixed rate, and setting up an import rate which was higher but more or less subject to supply and demand. It also established minimum prices for grains, and created a Grain Board to maintain the Argentine market and to sell for export at whatever price the world market afforded. Largely because of lack of storage facilities, the Board sold its stocks to exporters as rapidly as possible without unduly depressing the local price. For months it operated at a loss. Only the North American drought saved it from serious consequences in 1934.[iv]
The government's profits from exchange transactions, estimated by bankers at about 200,000,000 pesos,[v] were used to finance the grain operations, and later for other purposes, such as subsidizing meat exports to Italy and paying bounties to the dairy farmers. Importers from countries with which Argentina had unfavorable trade balances were not permitted -- as Americans know only too well -- to bid for official exchange. They had to buy their drafts in the free market, which made their goods cost from 20 percent to 30 percent more. At the same time, in order to increase exports the government has made trade agreements with Great Britain and other nations, under which she promises that the full amount of exchange arising from Argentine sales to these countries will be made available for remittances to them. More recently, in April 1935, the Minister of Finance issued an additional decree providing that merchandise imported through the free exchange market must pay a customs surcharge of 20 percent. The government's contention is that purchases of Argentine products by any country must provide exchange sufficient to cover Argentine debt payments to that country, before any exchange can be granted for the importation of merchandise from it. This policy has imposed the greatest hardship upon the trade of the United States, and has left the impression in some quarters, perhaps unjustified, that the present Argentine administration, or at least some of its ministers, were not too friendly to this country.[vi]
Other boards have been set up from time to time: a foreign trade advisory board; two meat boards, one charged with finding new export markets for beef and mutton, the other to establish an Argentine-owned packing house to compete with British and American packers who monopolize the industry; also an unemployment board, a dairy industry board, a grain elevators construction board, a board for coördinating transportation, a fruit board, a foodstuffs board, and a colonization board. Under the auspices of the National Meat Board has been created a nationwide coöperative to which all cattle breeders must contribute one percent of their sales. Of the proceeds, 80 percent will be used as capital of the coöperative, each producer receiving one share in the organization for every ten pesos paid into the fund.[vii]
The public works program of the administration includes the construction of motor highways. Argentina until very recently almost completely lacked modern, paved country roads, due in part to the absence of stone in the pampa, in part to the opposition of the British-owned railways. There is still everything to be done. The program also involves the building of grain elevators in the interior -- long a crying need, until now unheeded largely because of the opposition of the large exporting interests in Buenos Aires, who have no desire to see the farmer protected by the easy availability of storage facilities. On these and other public works some 300,000,000 pesos are being spent over a period of three years, met largely by the issue of public works bonds.
The extreme nationalism evinced in the Argentine recovery program has occasioned, as in Chile and Brazil, a considerable expansion of native industry to supply articles formerly purchased abroad. Domestic industries have been promoted and protected in every possible way. During the past few years there has been an impressive growth along many lines: shoes, textiles, canned goods, toilet preparations, glass, furniture, pneumatic tires, etc. Argentine shoes already equal the British-made in quality and workmanship, and the development of textile manufactures is rapidly making the country independent of the foreigner. In fact, some New England textile interests, after steadily losing their export trade, have been transferring their plants entire to Buenos Aires.
In spite of Argentina's limited mineral resources, a considerable amount of industrialization is inevitable, given the large opportunities of the domestic market. Yet that market is not large enough to afford the cheapness, efficiency and good quality of really large-scale production. This is especially true because industry, as in most South American countries, is protected by a very high and uneconomical tariff. Under such conditions, foreign markets, even in the peripheral countries, are out of the question. Argentina's neighbors thus will probably find it more to their interest to continue to import from the United States and Europe. Industrialization, moreover, binds the nation to the policy of high protection, which means in the long run a higher cost of living than would otherwise be necessary. And high prices for manufactured goods do not contribute to the country's ability to produce agricultural crops at competitive prices for the world markets. Nevertheless, although further development of Argentine industry may be slow, the republic will never again import in quantity many articles which formerly came from abroad.
With good crops and rising prices, Argentina's foreign trade during the past two years has been expanding, as in the case of most other South American States. Exports in 1934 increased about 28 percent in value and 11 percent in volume over those of the previous year, and the favorable trade balance rose from 223,-000,000 pesos to over 300,000,000. During the first eleven months of 1935, exports increased again by 7.4 percent, to over 1,415,-000,000 pesos, and the trade balance stood at 336,700,000. Although during the past year commerce with the United States has doubled, and that with Great Britain has somewhat declined, the latter country still holds the premier position in the markets of Argentina and purchases nearly a third of her exports. After the World War, when New York was for a time the world's financial capital, Argentine currency came to be tied to the American dollar; but since 1929, with the drying up of the American market for loans and the official depreciation of the dollar, Argentina seems again definitely to have aligned herself with the sterling bloc. It would perhaps be too much to say that Buenos Aires is the financial satellite of London. The government, however, is reported to be keeping a balance in London, in gold, of close to £60,000,000.
Argentina is also branching out into new lines, such as fruits and cotton. To the United States and Europe she is sending raisins, pears, apples and melons. Cotton acreage during the past decade has increased over 500 percent. In the northeastern areas -- Chaco, Formosa and Corrientes -- and in the neighboring provinces of Santiago del Estero and Santa Fé, future possibilities are said to be excellent. The rapid expansion of cotton production is due directly to official encouragement, and dates from the announcement of the cotton curtailment program of the United States Government. A vigorous "plant-more-cotton" campaign was begun, pioneers were provided with land and selected seed, the creation of standard types of fibre was accelerated, and in May 1935 a National Cotton Board was organized under the Ministry of Agriculture to supervise these manifold activities. The result was that in 1934 Argentina increased her production 34 percent, and exports rose to over 27,000 tons (about 120,000 bales), most of them sent to England and Germany. In 1935 production and exportation continued to expand at a startling rate. The acreage has been officially announced as 70 percent above that of the previous year, or over 800,000 acres, and exports as close to 200,000 bales. The government also plans to bring ten Texas and Mississippi cotton farming families to Argentina in 1936 to serve as "missionaries" among the Argentine planters.
The chief cotton problem for Argentina is to find an adequate labor supply. Most of the cotton is grown by small planters who are financed by various purchasing companies. Living conditions are very primitive, wages are low, and the climate of the Chaco (which at present produces 90 percent of the cotton) is distinctly hot and not conducive to labor by white colonists. Although since 1914 the population of the Chaco Territory has increased from 46,000 to over 200,000, it is a question whether sufficient numbers can be persuaded to settle in that area to make cotton the important source of national wealth which the government seems to have in mind. Nevertheless the possibility remains of producing considerable quantities for export on a competitive basis.
The economic crisis of the past six years, in Argentina as in many other countries, has been reflected in unsettled political conditions, including the threat of a conservative or fascist dictatorship. Although after the Revolution of September 6, 1930, the republic within a year returned to constitutional government, the political situation still remains somewhat obscure. In the September Revolution the conservative elements of the country (out of office since the Radical victory of 1916), in league with a group of the high command in the army, took advantage of the general discredit into which the Irigoyen administration had fallen to seize the government. The provisional régime of General José F. Uriburu which followed made the mistake of trying to use the situation to restore this conservative minority to permanent political control; and when finally forced to hold a general election in the autumn of 1931, it succeeded in keeping the Radical Party, the most powerful in the country, from participation.[viii] The resultant election of General Agustin P. Justo to the presidency was achieved by the votes of the conservatives and of some of the so-called anti-personalista foes of Hipólito Irigoyen. The only opposition candidate, Lisandro de la Torre, had the support of the socialists of the great city of Buenos Aires.[ix]
In the previous decade the Radical Party had been split into two camps, the anti-personalistas, or followers of President Alvear (1922-28), and the personalistas, or followers of the party's remarkable chieftain, Irigoyen. General Justo, since the time he served as minister of war under Alvear, had been identified with the anti-personalist group. But his administration has leaned heavily upon the conservatives (or National Democrats as they have called themselves since the 1930 revolution), although the government represents various shades of political opinion. Until recently the cabinet was divided into two antagonistic sectors: one, led by the Minister of the Interior, Leopoldo Melo, advocated democratic methods and the maintenance of popular control; the other, led by the Ministers of Finance and Agriculture, Federico Pinedo and Luis Duhau, seemed to incline toward arbitrary methods of government and control by the cultivated and well-to-do minority. The victory of the former would mean the assurance of free elections and the return to power of the Radicals; if the other should prevail, Argentina will revert to government by an oligarchy of the wealthy such as existed before 1916. Much, if not everything, depends upon the decision of the President. Melo and his associates, as former anti-personalistas, probably feel that the recovery of the Radicals will insure their own political future. The conservatives now in control wish to hold on for fear of what the Radicals will do to them if they regain the ascendency.
Without doubt the most numerous and powerful party in Argentina is the Radical. Today it has no share in the national government, and it is questioned whether it will be allowed to win the national elections of 1937. Under the leadership of ex-president Alvear, internal dissensions seem to have disappeared, and the party is taking on renewed strength and vigor. In the Province of Tucumán early in 1935 the Radicals won the governorship against a conservative candidate, the first election in which the party has officially participated since 1931. And in several more recent contests, in the Federal District and in the Province of Cordoba, the government parties suffered defeat. The greatest attention, however, was focussed upon the Province of Buenos Aires in November 1935, where most people conceded that in a free election the Radical Party would win by a sweeping majority. Electioneering was of the bitterest sort, and the methods used by the conservative (governing) party were described by Buenos Aires newspapers as the most fraudulent, scandalous and violent in the country's history. In consequence of these methods the Radicals were overwhelmed, except in the capital, La Plata, where the polls were more fairly managed. Honorio Pueyrredon, former ambassador in Washington, was the candidate for governor on the Radical ticket.
These events have given much comfort and encouragement to the rapidly growing fascist movement. There have been two national fascist organizations in the country, the Guardia Argentina, divided into some seven societies, and the Legión Cívica. The latter, the original fascist group and perhaps the largest, was organized in 1931 during the provisional presidency of General Uriburu, by the Minister of the Interior, Matías Sánchez Sorondo, as a private militia to protect the government against a Radical counter-revolution.[x] The two groups were reported in November 1935 to have united as the National Party.
The fascists are scattered throughout all the provinces, with a small nucleus in every important center; but their total number is probably not large. They claim some 50,000 members in the city of Buenos Aires and 150,000 in the country at large, but these figures may be exaggerated. Their chief weakness seems to have been lack of central direction and of a prominent, outstanding leader. Their program apparently includes the abolition of the present political parties and of the national congress, a reduction in the size of the bureaucracy, the complete centralization of political power, and the creation of a legislature embodying corporate representation. On the economic side they propose to develop a planned economy which will eliminate the "parasitism" of the middleman and abolish the financial and commercial hegemony of the city of Buenos Aires, insuring a more equitable distribution of wealth and population throughout the provinces, and a fairer return to the producer for his labor. The conception of Buenos Aires as a gigantic and parasitic complex of bureaucrats, middlemen and lawyers, exploiting the producers and sucking the life-blood of the country, is shared by some of the extreme radicals, and is perhaps not without a basis of truth. In other words, in Argentina as elsewhere in the world, in their practical program extreme Right and extreme Left have much in common.
The success of the fascists, however, depends in the final analysis upon the army, for another coup d'etat would be possible only with its support and coöperation. And as to the army, opinions differ. Traditionally the military services of Argentina have remained divorced from politics, and Argentine liberals believe that they will so remain. The fascists apparently think otherwise: in other words that the higher officers may again play an important rôle as in 1930. Under the provisional presidency of Uriburu they enjoyed an importance and prestige they had not known since the days of President Roca a half-century earlier. They were brought into contact with the best social circles, gaining experience and self-confidence and a consciousness of political and administrative capacity. This is the chain of fascist reasoning, and doubtless sub rosa they are endeavoring to make good the argument. But whether radical or conservative sympathies predominate among army and navy officers as a group, it is impossible to say.
Much seems to depend upon the course pursued by President Justo, himself a soldier by profession, to whom the bulk of the army is probably loyal. Without Justo's support the establishment of a fascist or conservative dictatorship is extremely unlikely. In spite of the reactionary tendencies observable in many spheres of administration, both national and in some of the provinces, the president's sympathies probably lie with the liberals. Moreover, he may be certain that a fascist coup would inevitably lead to his elimination from the government. There is also no question but that the opinion of the great mass of the citizens (and incidentally of the foreign residents) is opposed to the violation of constitutional practice and of democratic suffrage. Without the president, and with the bulk of the nation hostile, a coup d'etat cannot be permanently successful.
There is however every indication that if the Radicals return to power there will be an intensification of the campaign against foreign capital, the beginnings of which were apparent in the congressional debates of 1935. A large section of the population believes that the country is being exploited by the railways, the frigorificos (cold-storage plants), the light and power companies, the telephone company, and the great grain exporting firms.
The frigorifico question is an old one. English and American packing companies have long been accused of maintaining a combination in restraint of trade, fixing arbitrarily the prices paid to the estancieros (ranch owners) and making profits not justified by industrial efficiency. This relates especially to the export trade with Great Britain, the principal consumer of Argentine beef and mutton, in which the cold storage plants are closely connected with the maritime freight conference and with the wholesale and retail distributors. A system of quotas for export existed long before the London Treaty of 1933, for several of the firms possess packing houses in other countries, including the British Dominions. Their privileged position is due in part, it must be admitted, to the indifference of the Argentine ranch owners, who until recently have never seriously tried to enter into the business of preparing and marketing their cattle; they were content to enjoy the convenience of selling to the buyers at the ranches at prices which formerly gave them a handsome profit. Today, with lower prices and meagre profits and the threat of reduced markets abroad, the cattle-breeders are aroused; and although the position of the packers is not easily assailed, measures to break the foreign monopoly are not unlikely in the near future.[xi]
The livestock industry of Argentina faces a serious problem in the efforts of the British Dominions at the Ottawa Conference and since to exclude Argentine meat from the English market in the interest of "Empire trade." When the London Treaty comes up for revision this year, an attempt may be made to abolish the quota system and substitute an import duty. Such a duty, even if it gave some preference to the dominions, might be of advantage to Argentina, since it would enable her to bring into play the factor of low production costs. In any case, since from 75 to 80 percent of the country's entire livestock production is consumed at home, the outlook for the industry, in view of Argentina's increasing population, is not tragic.
Within the past few years the export trade in grain has come to be concentrated in the hands of two great export houses with world-wide connections, a circumstance which gives them more or less the same privileged, monopolistic position in relation to the producer which is charged against the packing companies. And it is not unlikely that, should fascists or Radicals come to rule the country, this situation will occupy the attention of the government.
The principal railways of Argentina are British-owned, and represent the largest single item of foreign capital investment in South America. They are beginning to feel the competition of motor traffic which has so seriously undermined the position of railways in other countries. Because of this and the circumstances of the depression, their income has declined from 185,000,-000 pesos in 1928-29 to 48,000,000 in 1934-35. And with the federal government's extensive program of road building their troubles are going to increase. Their past financial policies have not aimed to build up large reserves, and they have done little to improve or modernize their equipment. Freight rates, too, have always been high; indeed, it is said that 40 percent of the export cost of Argentine grain is in transportation to the sea. Railway profits have meanwhile been concealed by the device of interlocking equipment companies. The future for motor trucking in a flat country like the Argentine pampas is obvious, and the fact that the railways in the past have consistently used their influence to oppose the building of adequate roads does not strengthen their position in public opinion. On the other hand, Argentina's most important foreign market is England; the spectre of "imperial preference" has not been exorcised; and the Argentine Government will perhaps hesitate to treat in cavalier fashion enterprises in which British capital is so heavily involved.
The electrical industry in Argentina is also beginning to come in for its share of public attention. At present over a billion pesos is invested in "light and power," represented by 471 companies maintaining 783 plants which distribute electrical energy to about 800 towns and cities.[xii] The capital is mostly foreign (American and Foreign Power acquired a large stake in the industry before 1930). The light and power interests are accused of charging monopoly rates, in a country which has no public service commissions, and of obtaining or renewing their concessions, especially in the smaller towns, by irregular if not dishonest means. There has, as a matter of fact, been a widespread tendency to build municipal plants when the old concessions run out, and the circumstance that some of these plants charge half as much for current per kilowatt hour as do most of the private companies, whether justified on a strictly business basis or not, furnishes argument to the Radical politicians. Probably most of the small companies are over-capitalized. At any rate, the opening guns of the anti-utilities campaign have already been fired in the national congress, and no one can tell what the future will bring forth.
That future hangs largely upon the outcome of the present conflict between oligarchy and democracy. In recent cabinet changes one may detect a growing tendency to recognize the strength of the Radical Party, although there may also be a desire for greater harmony in the national administration. The resignation in December 1935 of Manuel de Iriondo, Minister of Justice and Public Instruction, so as to be eligible as a candidate for the governorship of the Province of Santa Fé (in itself of no great significance) provided the occasion for the elimination of the two ultra-conservative ministers, Pinedo and Duhau. After the acrimonious debates in Congress last July, culminating in the assassination of Senator-elect Bordabehere, they had stood practically alone in the cabinet, and only the determination of the President to see consummated the plans for the Central Bank and the Liquidation Institute prevented a "crisis." The November provincial elections in Buenos Aires may have helped to bring it to a head. At any rate, on December 30 the whole cabinet offered their resignations; but only those of Messrs. Iriondo, Pinedo and Duhau were accepted.
The three ministers who replace them are moderate men. One is an anti-personalist Radical and two are conservatives. The change does not seem drastic. Nevertheless the general feeling prevails that President Justo is gradually swinging toward the Left. Within two or three years most of the provinces will be controlled directly or indirectly by the Radical Party, and the composition of Congress will be considerably altered. Nor will the fact that the conservatives, who came into power in 1930 with a demand for clean politics and honest administration, have almost everywhere behaved as badly as their predecessors be an obstacle to the recovery of power by the Radicals.
[i] This was not true of some of the provincial issues.
[ii] The floating debt, which in 1930 amounted to over a billion pesos, has also been reduced, by repayment or consolidation, to 120 millions.
[iii] Subsidiary money will be printed or coined by the national government on the demand and under the control of the Central Bank, but in no case may the amount outstanding of subsidiary money exceed 20 pesos per inhabitant.
[iv] On December 13, 1935 the Grain Board suddenly raised the minimum prices of 5.75 pesos for wheat and 11.50 pesos for linseed per 100 kilos to 10 and 14 pesos respectively, causing an immediate rise in the price of these grains in the world market.
[v] The Exchange Commission, by selling some official exchange in the free market, also exercises a measure of control over the free rate.
[vi] Up to the end of September 1935 Argentina had a favorable trade balance for the year with the United States, but discrimination continued, the surcharge being reduced to 12.5 per cent.
[vii] In November 1935 retail butchers in Buenos Aires were reported to have declared a boycott against meat produced by the Coöperative, because it increased livestock prices by as much as 70 percent.
[viii] By refusing to accept as candidates the only leaders whom the radicals would put up for election.
[ix] The socialists in Buenos Aires are very well organized under able and experienced leaders. Their representatives seem to be among the few men in Congress who make careful studies of social and economic problems, and they contribute largely to the enacting of constructive legislation.
[x] Sánchez Sorondo is now a senator from the Province of Buenos Aires. The commander-in-chief of the Legión Cívica is Colonel Emilio Kinkelin, a prominent member of the conspiracy which overthrew President Irigoyen in 1930, the man who unattended entered the Government House on September 6 and forced the resignation of Acting President Martínez.
[xi] In November 1934 Mr. Richard Tootel, general manager of the British-owned Anglo-Packing Company, was arrested for refusing to answer questions of the Senate meat investigation committee. Later he was released, but was re-arrested when a midnight police raid on a steamer owned by the parent Vestey interests disclosed that the Anglo-Packing Company's books were being shipped to London in cases marked "canned beef". He was again released on the plea of ill health, and remained under police guard in his home, but eventually was allowed to retire to England.
[xii] From a recent report of the Ministry of Agriculture.