The Fractured Power
How to Overcome Tribalism
STRESSES AND STRAINS
IT is nearly ten years since Pakistan became an ally of the West. In May 1954, Pakistan signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States. Later in that year it became a member of SEATO along with the United States, Britain, France, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. A year later, it joined the Baghdad Pact, another mutual defense organization, with Britain, Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The United States has not joined this organization, but has remained closely associated with it since its inception. In 1958, when Iraq left this pact, it was renamed CENTO (Central Treaty Organization): it continued to comprise Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as its regional members. Early in 1959, Pakistan signed (as did Turkey and Iran) a bilateral Agreement of Coöperation with the United States, which was designed further to reinforce the defensive purposes of CENTO.
Thus Pakistan is associated with the United States through not one, but four mutual security arrangements. In this sense, it has been sometimes termed "America's most allied ally in Asia." It is the only Asian country which is a member both of SEATO and CENTO.
The strategic location of Pakistan is of some significance in this connection. West Pakistan borders on the Middle East, is close to Soviet Russia's southern frontier and shares a common border with China. It stands across the great mountain passes through which all land invasions of the Indian sub-continent have taken place in recorded history. East Pakistan, on the other hand, borders on Burma. Thus West Pakistan and East Pakistan flank India on her northwest and on her northeast. So situated, Pakistan virtually constitutes a defensive shield for India. It constitutes also the gateway to South Asia. It should therefore be in the interest of world peace, particularly of India's security, that Pakistan remain strong and stable.
Nevertheless, Pakistan came in for bitter criticism from India when she joined these purely defensive alliances. India charged that by so doing "Pakistan had brought the cold war to the subcontinent." The real purpose of this Indian outcry became clearer, however, as time advanced, and more particularly when in 1959 Pakistan signed the bilateral Agreement of Coöperation. According to this agreement, the United States would under certain circumstances assist Pakistan if she became the victim of aggression. India demanded and, according to Mr. Nehru, received a "specific assurance" from Washington that this pact "could not be used against India."[i] Shorn of sophistry, this demand amounted to seeking an assurance that if India should commit aggression against Pakistan or threatened Pakistan's security, the United States would not come to the assistance of Pakistan under this pact. There could not be a more illuminating commentary on India's historic attitude toward Pakistan.
This attitude also explains why India has throughout opposed the grant of military aid to Pakistan. It is not that she feared that Pakistan-a fifth her size and with armed forces a quarter the size of hers-would, through the kind of military aid program the United States contemplated, become a serious military threat to India. In actual fact the military aid to Pakistan was designed to give it merely a deterrent force. Even with the aid, the armed forces of Pakistan were not to be more than one-third of India's strength before her border clashes with China. Therefore, Pakistan could not possibly pose any threat to India.
The real reason behind India's opposition to Pakistan's receiving military aid was a combination of several factors, including the bitter opposition of the Hindu community to the very creation of Pakistan, India's refusal to honor her solemn pledges in respect of Jammu and Kashmir, and India's desire to dominate what she considers to be her own sphere of influence in Asia.
I have spoken of India's hostility to Pakistan's alliance with the United States. She resorted also to direct pressure to prevent Pakistan from joining it. In August 1953, after bilateral negotiations lasting over some months, Mr. Nehru and Mr. Mohammad Ali, Pakistan's Prime Minister at that time, issued a joint communiqué on Kashmir. In it, they agreed, inter alia, that: "It was their firm opinion that this [Kashmir dispute] should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State. . . . The most feasible way of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by fair and impartial plebiscite." Further, "it was decided that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed by the end of April 1954. . . . He will then make such proposals as he thinks proper for preparations to be made for the holding of a fair and impartial plebiscite in the entire State and take such other steps as may be considered necessary therefor."
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Nehru got wind of the fact that Pakistan was likely to enter into an alliance with the United States and receive military aid from that country. In a protracted correspondence with Mr. Mohammad Ali, he protested strongly and indicated that if Pakistan went ahead with that project, their agreement on Kashmir would lapse.[ii] Mr. Mohammad Ali replied that he did not see why any military assistance that Pakistan might receive from the United States for purely defensive purposes should make it less imperative for them to improve India-Pakistan relations by settling the Kashmir dispute. In particular, he did not see why, if Pakistan joined an alliance with the United States, this would disqualify the people of Kashmir from exercising their right-which the United Nations, India and Pakistan had acknowledged-to a free vote to decide whether their state should accede to India or Pakistan.
In December of that year-although Pakistan had not by then either entered into any pact with the United States or received any military assistance- Mr. Nehru indicated that he could not go forward with the agreements set out in the joint communiqué on Kashmir, because "the whole context in which these agreements were made will change if military aid comes [to Pakistan] from America."[iii] Obviously Pakistan could not allow Mr. Nehru to dictate her foreign policy. In May 1954, Pakistan went ahead with the signing of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States. From that point on, the fact that the Indian Prime Minister would repudiate the joint communiqué on Kashmir became a foregone conclusion. Pakistan's efforts to save it eventually collapsed when the Prime Ministers met for the last time in May 1955.
In that same year the alliance with the United States came under heavier pressure. The Soviet Union reacted when, in 1955, Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact (now called CENTO). Up to that time, the Soviet Union had maintained a neutral stand on the Kashmir dispute. Its representatives had abstained from voting whenever this issue came up in the Security Council. The Soviet Union charged that by joining the Baghdad Pact, Pakistan had become a member of "an aggressive Western alliance," and it responded by radically altering its stand on Kashmir. Thenceforth, the Soviet Union began to subscribe to India's claim that no plebiscite was possible or necessary in Kashmir and that Kashmir was an "integral part" of India. In pursuance of this new stand, the Soviet Union has, since then, vetoed every resolution of the Security Council on Kashmir to which India has objected- regardless of its merits. For some time, the Soviet Union's stand was that the Kashmir dispute was being exploited by the Western powers for their own ends and that it would prefer to see it decided through direct negotiations between India and Pakistan, without the intervention of those powers. Last year, the Soviet Union went further. Obviously at the instance of India, it even vetoed the Security Council resolution of June 22, 1962, which, in essence, merely called upon India and Pakistan to settle this dispute through bilateral negotiations.
In contrast, over the last decade, the policies of the United States have undergone a change which has operated progressively to the disadvantage of her ally, Pakistan, vis-à-vis neutral India.
When we first joined the alliance with the United States, neutralism-"non- alignment" as India prefers to call it-was suspect in American eyes. It was in fact regarded as "immoral." It was another name for "playing both sides of the street." Over the years, it has come to assume a mantle of respectability in American eyes. Indeed, some four years ago it gradually began to occupy, in American estimation, a privileged position. The favor of neutral countries began to be actively sought, in some cases in competition against the Soviet Union. In particular, influential American circles began to advocate "massive aid" to India.
At the same time, there grew a feeling among the allies of the United States-not in Pakistan only-that, in a variety of ways, they were being increasingly taken for granted. Gradually, as a result of this change in American thinking, neutral India became the largest recipient by far of American economic aid, while she continued freely to castigate the United States in the United Nations and outside whenever opportunity offered. Pakistan watched this transformation in American foreign policy with increasing perplexity and dismay.
India regards herself as a big power in Asia. Her eventual aim has been, and still is, to have her sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. The Indian leaders have often stated that their true border extends from the Hindu Kush mountains to the Mekong River, that is to say, wherever the influence of Hinduism has existed in the past. Their earlier friendly overtures to China were based on the hope that there would be an understanding between them and China over their respective spheres of influence in Asia, and that China would recognize and endorse India's claim. They moreover felt that as long as the American influence existed in Asia, the achievement of any such objective would not be possible. That was the reason why India, although accepting aid from the United States, made strenuous efforts to oppose the United States on every major issue in the world forum and elsewhere in order to belittle its prestige and influence. If America lost face before the whole world it did not matter so long as her influence was reduced, if not eliminated altogether, in Asia.
It follows that as soon as India arrives at some sort of settlement with China, she will revert to the traditional policy of eliminating United States influence from Asia. It is for this reason that India's façade of neutrality is still maintained in spite of massive arms aid from the West and close collaboration in the military field. She has retained sufficient flexibility and political freedom to revert to her traditional anti- American policy as soon as circumstances permit. The receipt of arms and economic aid now is not going to make any more difference than the previous supply of military and economic aid made in India's open hostility to the United States.
In the past, if the United States gave economic aid to India we were not against it as such. We were concerned rather over its massiveness and scale. It enabled India to divert her own resources very substantially to the strengthening of her armed forces; she was, in effect, receiving indirect military aid. Our concern arose from the fact that the Indian military build-up was aimed solely against Pakistan. The pronouncements of Indian leaders and the continued massing of India's army on Pakistan's borders clearly suggested this.
Until last fall, however, the policy of the United States continued to distinguish somewhat between a "non-aligned" India and the American ally, Pakistan. Although under a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed in 1951 (reaffirmed in 1958), India also was receiving certain military aid from the United States-without accepting any of the obligations that devolve on an ally-American policy continued generally to maintain, in the matter of direct military aid, a substantial difference between an ally and a neutral. An ally was qualified to receive military assistance on a scale that the United States considered justified in the light of that country's obligations under the alliance; a neutral, by and large, was not entitled to receive military aid on any commensurate scale. However, this remaining distinction between Pakistan and "non-aligned" India also disappeared last fall when the border disputes between India and China flared up into an armed clash.
Despite the fact that over the decade the distinction in American eyes between an ally and a neutral had become increasingly blurred to a vanishing point, Pakistan continued steadily to stand by the alliance. Our view has been that, so long as we are in this alliance, we must continue honorably to discharge so far as we can whatever obligations devolve on us as a member.
Last fall, however, Pakistan received a new cause for disillusionment with American foreign policy. Following the India-China border clash, the United States proceeded to rush arms to India on a scale which to us seemed totally unjustified by the requirements of the situation. Since then, arms aid has been flowing into India continuously on a very substantial scale, not only from the United States but also in almost equal measure from Britain and, to a small extent, from some other members of the Commonwealth. We are profoundly concerned over this new development. We consider that this continued arming of India, in which the Soviet Union has also, for reasons of its own, joined, poses a serious threat to Pakistan's security.
It is possible that some of our friends abroad are perplexed by this reaction. They may ask: Is not the military assistance given to India by Pakistan's allies meant exclusively for fighting Communist China? Has not India pledged that she will not use these arms against Pakistan? Have not the United States and Great Britain also given assurances that if India employed these weapons in an aggression against Pakistan, they would act to thwart the aggression? Are not these assurances, they may ask, sufficient to protect Pakistan against the possible misuse of Western arms against her? Why then, they may inquire, are the Pakistanis alarmed?
Before I proceed to answer this question, let me briefly recapitulate the facts leading up to the current Western policy of arming India in a major war.
On October 20 of last year, fighting flared up between China and India at a number of points along their disputed border, in Ladakh (Kashmir) and in the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) area lying east of the state of Bhutan. A week earlier, Mr. Nehru announced that he had ordered the troops to throw the Chinese "out of our territory" in the NEFA area, and then left for Ceylon on a state visit.[iv] There is some independent evidence also to the effect that the Indians opened the first attack. Why Mr. Nehru chose that particular time to make that announcement has been the subject of considerable conjecture. What prompted him to do so is, at any rate at this point, immaterial. What happened subsequently is, however, fairly generally known. During two brief bouts of fighting-the first in October and the second in November-the Indian army met with serious reverses. By November 20, the Indians had surrendered another 2,000 square miles of disputed territory in Ladakh, thus putting the Chinese in control of almost the entire 15,000 square miles of territory which they claim in that part of Kashmir. In the NEFA area, the rout of the Indian forces assumed even more serious proportions. By November 20, not only the entire disputed NEFA territory but even Assam lay at the mercy of the rapidly advancing Chinese forces. Then, suddenly, on November 21, the Chinese declared a cease-fire and offered unilaterally to withdraw to points behind the MacMahon Line from the entire territory they had overrun. This undertaking they subsequently fully carried out, offering at the same time to negotiate their border differences with India peacefully. Since then, there has been no significant military incident on any part of the entire disputed border.
It was after the first India-China clash in October that the United States Government decided to rush military equipment to India. The British and to a minor extent some other countries also joined in what was called emergency assistance to India.
At Nassau on December 29, long after the cease-fire on the India-China border, the United States and Britain decided to continue to supply India on an emergency basis with up to $120,000,000 worth of military aid. The program included a variety of military equipment, but its central feature was the arming of six Indian divisions for mountain warfare. Arising also from the Nassau decision, a United States-British-Canadian Air Mission visited India to examine into what would be India's air needs should China attack again. And another U.S. Mission went out to India to study the question of how to expand India's arms production capacity.
Subsequently, on June 30, at Birch Grove, the United States and Britain decided on a further substantial program of military aid to India, over and above that agreed to at Nassau. Apart from additional arms, this program provides for extensive radar, communications, air transport and training facilities as well as for American and British assistance to expand greatly India's own armament production. India has also been assured that there is no need for her to enter an alliance with the West in order to continue to qualify for military assistance against China. Indeed, she has been given to understand that it is in the Western interest that she should continue to remain "non-aligned" and receive military aid from the Soviet Union as well. Taking advantage of this favorable Western response, India has decided to raise her standing army from 11 to 22 divisions as rapidly as possible and to expand substantially her air force and navy as well-all ostensibly for use against China.
Let us first examine briefly whether the arming of India on this extensive scale is necessary or justified. It may be recalled that the American- British military aid program to India was originally put in motion at a time when the West feared that the India-China conflict might escalate into a major war. From the very outset it has been our view that the fighting last fall was only in the nature of a border conflict. On November 5, after the first India-China clash, I made a statement to that effect, and expressed concern over the Western decision to rush military aid to India on a scale based apparently on an assumption that India was faced with a major war with China. There was no valid basis for this assumption. It made no sense militarily, I said, that China should have decided to launch an invasion of India over the Himalayas in the depth of winter. Under the circumstances it seemed logical to conclude that the Chinese objectives were limited.
This, I consider, has been borne out by subsequent events. The unilateral declaration of a cease-fire by the Chinese forces at a time when not only the disputed territory but the whole of northeastern India, including Assam, lay within their easy grasp, their withdrawal from the entire NEFA territory which they had overrun, and their offer to settle the dispute peacefully-none of this supports the thesis that the Chinese had planned to embark on a major attack on India. Since then, the Chinese military threat to India has, it is now generally recognized, receded. The Chinese have demonstrated their willingness to settle the dispute peacefully. The Indians, on their part, are anxious to avoid any further fighting with China and have been working steadily for a peaceful settlement. Yet India continues to demand-and receive-military assistance from the United States and Great Britain on a large scale and has embarked upon a massive increase and re-equipment of her land, air and naval forces. Considering the terms on which neutralist India is receiving this assistance-terms which amount virtually to a gift-the inducement to do so must be very strong.
India currently presents three faces to the world: one to the West, simulating a resolve to fight China in order to secure the maximum of Western arms assistance; a second to Russia, stressing her resolve nevertheless to remain "non-aligned"; and a third to China, seeking a peaceful settlement of the dispute by secret peace overtures through neutral emissaries.
The hope is held in certain quarters in the United States and Britain that the military assistance given or proposed would enable India to fight the Communist threat in South Asia. Some people in those countries fondly imagine that a "newly awakened" India would act as a rallying point for South Asian nations against Communist expansionism. In actual fact, India has no such intention.
Mr. Nehru himself has been at pains to explain that the India-China conflict has nothing to do with Communism but is the result of Chinese "imperialist expansionism."[v]
Last April a well-informed Indian journalist threw interesting light on the objectives of New Delhi's policy toward China. He had, among other things, this to say:
Some of the truths of Mr. Nehru's earlier utterances need to be repeated. One of these is that China, Communist or otherwise, aggressive or peaceful, is a neighbor with which somehow India must learn to live. It is a geographical truth that cannot be wished away. . . .
Visions of a devious and infinitely cunning Chinese plot to dominate India or Asia, thrilling theories of an Indian "way of life" threatened by an aggressive ideology from the north, interesting academic parallels between the Indian and Chinese race for economic development-all this sounds plausible but is liable to turn into so much fluff when thoroughly examined.
New Delhi's policy is, very rightly, to work for an understanding with a powerful neighbor. If this is not possible soon, as it probably is not, the alternative is patience, vigilance, adaptability and calm determination. It is most certainly not to set an ideological example for other Asian States to follow or to lead them in any kind of crusade or to interpret the Chinese aggression in the "perspective" most palatable to the United States.[vi]
It is our belief that the Sino-Indian dispute can and will be resolved peacefully. In our view, therefore, the continuance of military aid to India is unjustified. Furthermore, it poses a grave threat to Pakistan's security. We apprehend that after India has settled her dispute with China, she will revert to her traditional policy of intimidation of Pakistan. And she may even turn her newly acquired might against Pakistan when a suitable opportunity occurs, particularly at a time when the Western countries are so preoccupied with their own internal and external problems that they cannot undertake military commitments in this subcontinent or they find it inadvisable to do so for fear of provoking a world conflict.
Even in the unlikely event of a recrudescence of border fighting between China and India, India could not, considering the mountain terrain, deploy more than 3 to 4 divisions against the Chinese. One may justifiably ask, then, why India is doubling the size of her standing army to 22 divisions. Even allowing for the necessary reserves, what are the remaining divisions aimed against? The fact of the matter is that, taking advantage of the favorable Western response to her demands for arms, India is planning to raise two armies, one with which to face China and the other to use against Pakistan and her other smaller neighbors in pursuance of her expansionist objectives. It should also be noted that any army meant for China would by the nature of things be so positioned as to be able to wheel round swiftly to attack East Pakistan. Thus both the armies pose a grave threat to this country.
Having built up this enormous war machine, India's leadership would need to justify the great hardships it has imposed on the Indian people in that process. It might also want to regain face which India has lost in the fighting with China. It is possible, therefore, that India might decide to do so-as soon as a suitable opportunity offers itself-by throwing its massive armor against Pakistan, and possibly striking, in the first instance, against that part of Kashmir which is under Pakistan's control but which India claims to be "Indian territory."
It may be recalled in this connection that in the Security Council last year, India, while claiming "sovereignty" over the whole of Kashmir, charged that Pakistan was guilty of "continuing aggression" against India so long as she remained in possession of any part of Kashmir. Several prominent Indian leaders have, from time to time, openly urged the use of force to drive Pakistan out of Kashmir.[vii] That this demand is not at variance with the official view is apparent from a White Paper, "Kashmir and the United Nations," which was issued by the Government of India when the Kashmir dispute came up before the Security Council in 1962. After stating that "Pakistan continues to occupy half of the Indian Union territory of Jammu and Kashmir," the White Paper goes on to say, "Pakistan should vacate this aggression on Indian territory." It then proceeds to warn: "India is prepared to be patient and tolerant and not resort to force to remove Pakistan aggression, but it is obvious that there is a limit to patience and tolerance." Such a warning is open to only one interpretation.
There are other reasons why we apprehend India may launch an aggressive venture against Pakistan. It is well known to students of the sub- continent's history that the Hindus of India were against the creation of a separate homeland for Muslims in the form of Pakistan and, after opposing it tooth and nail for years, gave in because they could not otherwise get rid of the British. Thereafter, while consolidating and building up their own strength, the Indians have let no opportunity pass of weakening and neutralizing Pakistan. The present Indian leadership makes no secret of the fact that it regards Pakistan as "India's enemy number one." It is therefore the height of naïveté to say, as one State Department official in Washington said recently, that there is nothing in Pakistan which India wants.
Until the outbreak of fighting with China, and even during most of that fighting, more than three-fourths of India's best-equipped forces remained massed on Pakistan's borders. In December 1962, Mr. Nehru himself admitted that Indian military preparedness had been directed primarily against Pakistan.[viii] This still remains India's basic position, and although there have been some changes in the disposition of the Indian forces, the collective strength of those massed on the borders of West Pakistan and East Pakistan remains formidable.
Nor, indeed, would an act of aggression by India be unusual. India has used force time and again to settle her territorial disputes. Let me recall some of these instances. Immediately after independence in 1947, Junagarh, a state with a Muslim ruler, acceded to Pakistan. India strongly protested when she learnt that the ruler contemplated this. In a telegram to the Pakistan Prime Minister, the Indian Prime Minister said that since the population of Junagarh was 80 percent Hindu and was opposed to accession to Pakistan, the Government of India could not acquiesce in the ruler's decision to accede to Pakistan. They would, however, be willing to accept the verdict of the people of the state on this question, provided the plebiscite was held under the joint supervision of the Indian and Junagarh Governments.[ix] Since Pakistan would not agree to this proposition, Indian troops marched into Junagarh and seized it by force.
In the case of Kashmir, on the other hand, Indian logic was conveniently reversed. There, the Indian army marched into the state on the strength of an instrument of "accession" signed by the Hindu Maharaja against the known wishes of the 80 percent of the people of Kashmir who are Muslims. In fact, at the time the Maharaja signed this document his armies were in retreat against the popular forces and he himself had fled the state capital, Srinagar, and taken refuge in Jammu. It was at that time, when his writ had practically ceased to run in Kashmir, that the Maharaja sought the help of the Indian armed forces. This was promptly offered, but on condition that his state accede to India, whereupon he was prevailed upon to sign an instrument of accession. (It was on the basis of this document that India keeps claiming "sovereignty" over Kashmir.) Thereafter, the Indian forces moved in, took possession of the major part of Kashmir and have held it ever since. A pledge repeatedly given by Mr. Nehru that India would let the people of Kashmir decide the question of accession to India or Pakistan in a free plebiscite still remains to be honored.
On September 11, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah died. The nation was plunged into sorrow over the death of the Founder of Pakistan. India chose that particular moment to march her forces into Hyderabad, another state with a Muslim ruler, and forcibly seized it, not because Hyderabad had wanted to accede to Pakistan, but because it had hesitated somewhat to accede to India.
India again employed the same technique recently to settle her territorial dispute with Portugal over Goa. Within a few weeks of Mr. Nehru's visit to Washington in November 1961, in the course of which he declared that India had "a passion for peace," the Indian army invaded and forcibly annexed Goa. It is interesting also to recall in this connection that on several occasions in the past Mr. Nehru had strongly repudiated any suggestion that India take over Goa by force. On one such occasion, speaking in the Indian Parliament on September 17, 1955, Mr. Nehru said: "From the very outset our policy, both at home and abroad, has been to solve all problems peacefully. If we ourselves acted against that policy we would be regarded as deceitful hypocrites."
Mr. Nehru could hardly have given a stronger assurance to Goa against a forcible seizure. Nevertheless, when the opportune moment came, those high- sounding declarations were forgotten and another territorial dispute was settled by use of force. What is more, Mr. Nehru's conscience was outraged when the West took unkindly to the Indian grab of Goa. He castigated his critics for "being ignorant of the facts of today and of the past dozen years."[x]
It is because of this background of India's hostility toward Pakistan, her expansionist designs and her aggressive policies that Pakistanis view the continued flow of Western arms into India from their allies with deep dismay and alarm. Indian assurances to the effect that she will not use American arms against Pakistan fail to carry conviction with the people of Pakistan in the light of India's repeated repudiation of her solemn pledges regarding Kashmir and her record of aggression.
Neither do American assurances against the misuse of these weapons reassure our people. They argue that the Indians have thus far successfully got away with every one of their acts of aggression, including that against Goa. Here was aggression against a NATO ally-and neither the United Nations, which was paralyzed by a Soviet veto, nor NATO nor the United States did anything to undo it. If India attacked Pakistan or Pakistan-held Kashmir on the excuse that she was "recovering" what she claims to be "Indian territory," our people fear that the great powers might again be either unwilling to intervene out of consideration for their global policies or unable to thwart Indian aggression.
Apart from the fact that continued Western arms assistance to India causes deep concern in Pakistan and subjects Pakistan's alliance with the West to increasing strain, it is unlikely that it will achieve the objective in view. For if the security and welfare of the Indian sub-continent are the objective, then what is needed is not the injection of massive doses of military aid into India but a rapprochement between India and Pakistan, such as would ensure a disengagement and could even open the way to a reduction of the Indian and Pakistan forces. Such a rapprochement can be brought about only through a just and honorable settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It can be achieved in no other way.
On the other hand, so long as the dispute over Kashmir continues, India- Pakistan tension will continue to mount, immobilizing the bulk of the Indian and Pakistan armies in a senseless confrontation. In such a situation the flow of arms into India would fail to strengthen the sub- continent's defense posture. It would, moreover, make-as indeed it already has made-a resolution of the Kashmir conflict even more difficult.[xi] The recent move to integrate occupied Jammu and Kashmir with India, in defiance of the Security Council resolutions, cannot but be regarded as a further manifestation of India's determination to absorb the state irrespective of her international commitments and pledges. All this is going to aggravate India-Pakistan bitterness, heighten their mutual fears and suspicions and force on them an arms race that could spell disaster for both countries. Such an arms race would inevitably necessitate imposition of heavier economic burdens on the peoples of both countries and an even greater diversion of their meagre resources to armament; it would dangerously slow down their already inadequate economic growth rate, create popular discontent and thus make them an easier prey to subversive forces. Surely this could not be the way to promote the security or welfare of the peoples of the sub-continent. A massive Indian military build-up would, further, imperil the existing precarious balance of power in this area. It would increase the existing sense of insecurity among India's smaller neighbors, which could force them to courses of action that might undermine the West's position throughout South Asia.
[i] Speaking in the Indian Parliament, March 14, 1959.
[ii] "We, in India, have endeavored to follow a foreign policy which we feel is not only in the interests of world peace but is particularly indicated for the countries of Asia. That policy is an independent one and of non-alignment with any power bloc. It is clear that the policy which Pakistan intends to pursue is different. . . . It means that Pakistan is tied up in a military sense with the U.S.A. and is aligned to that particular group of powers. . . . This produces a qualitative change in the existing situation and, therefore, it affects Indo-Pakistan relations, and, more especially, the Kashmir problem." (Mr. Nehru's letter of December 21, 1953, to the Pakistan Prime Minister.)
[iii] Statement in the Indian Parliament, December 23, 1953.
[iv] Times of India, October 13, 1962.
[v] Philip Potter, in the Baltimore Sun, November 10, 1962.
[vi] Nanpuria, Editor of the Times of India, April 8, 1963.
[vii] Sanjiva Reddy, President of India's ruling party, the Congress, inaugurating its Annual Session on January 4, 1962, stated: "Cease-fire could not be accepted as a permanent solution of the Kashmir problem. The whole country is behind the Government in liberating the one-third of Kashmir which is under Pakistan's illegal occupation." He added: "We hope that within a short period the Government will take steps to liberate that part of Kashmir."
[viii] Explaining the reasons for Indian reverses in the fighting against China, Mr. Nehru said that "most of our military thinking" had been conditioned to the possibility of a war with Pakistan. (Philip Potter, Baltimore Sun, December 28, 1962.)
[ix] Mr. Nehru's telegram dated September 12, 1947.
[x] Mr. Nehru on Mr. Adlai Stevenson's criticism of India's "aggression" in the Security Council, December 19, 1961.
[xi] Since the Birch Grove decision, Mr. Nehru's attitude on Kashmir has been rapidly hardening. His latest stand on this dispute is reflected in his statement in the Indian Parliament on September 3, 1963, to the effect that any change in Kashmir would have "disastrous consequences." (Times of India, September 4, 1963.)