The provisions of the Japanese Constitution barring the resort to war as an instrument of Japanese policy, and effectively committing Japan not to maintain armed forces on a major scale, has long raised the question how Japan's security is to be assured in a world still replete with sources of international conflict. As late as 1948 it was still General MacArthur's view, if the writer of these lines understood him correctly, that it would not be essential for the United States to maintain armed forces on the Japanese archipelago permanently or for a protracted time either for its own security or for that of Japan; in his view, the most suitable status for Japan would be one of permanent demilitarization and neutralization under such general protection as might be afforded by the United Nations and by the friendly interest of the United States. He appeared to believe, as did this writer, that if such a status could be arranged with the concurrence of the Soviet Government, the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Japan would be minimal; and it was not easy to see from what other quarter Japan could be seriously threatened. This concept assumed, of course, an eventual agreement between the Soviet Union, the United States and other interested parties, on the terms of a Japanese peace settlement.

In the following year-1949-however, the decision was taken in Washington, for reasons still not fully clear, to proceed at once to the negotiation of a separate United States-Japanese treaty, one which would envisage virtually a bilateral alliance between the two countries and the retention for an indefinite period of American bases and defense facilities on the Japanese islands. Preparatory talks on such a treaty were well advanced when the Korean War broke out. To what extent these discussions, and the American disposition they reflected, were a factor in the Communist decision to launch the attack in Korea is a question which still awaits exhaustive historical scrutiny. Certainly, they were not the only factor; but it would be surprising if they had had no effect at all on this decision.

The Korean War changed the entire aspect of the Japanese security problem quite basically. The dream of a demilitarized and militarily neutralized Japan now faded from sight. That concept was not at all in accord with the view, so hastily embraced and fondly cherished in Washington officialdom, that the Communist attack in Korea was not the result of local causes but represented only the first move in a Soviet program of worldwide military conquest. Not even the greatest efforts of those who had closer knowledge of Soviet affairs could serve to disabuse the policy-making echelons of the Administration of this belief; and in the face of this interpretation, the idea of a Japan left without strong outside support, questionable enough anyway in the light of events in Korea, appeared, quite naturally, as the wildest frivolity.

The result was, of course, the Security Treaty signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, and the Administrative Agreement which accompanied it- arrangements which were basically renewed and prolonged by the Treaty of Mutual Coöperation and Security concluded in January 1960.

It might be useful to attempt now to reconstruct the assumptions on the American side on which these arrangements were originally established. These may have varied somewhat in the minds of the various personalities involved, but probably it would be not too wide of the mark to suppose that the following were among them:

1. That Japan was seriously threatened with invasion or with overt military intimidation from the Communist mainland of Asia; and that such dangers were being averted, and could be averted in future, only by an active American commitment to the maintenance of Japanese security, involving the more or less permanent stationing of American forces in Japan.

2. That a similar situation prevailed with respect to South Korea, where any relaxation of the American presence would be the signal for an immediate renewal of hostilities by the Communists. In this connection, it was further postulated that the security of South Korea was essential to the security of Japan; and that American bases in Japan, in addition to their relation to the defense of Japan proper, were also necessary to support the security of South Korea.

3. That Japanese opinion could be brought to share these assumptions, at least in adequate degree, and thus to understand and accept the need for a strong American military presence in Japan proper and in neighboring territories.

II

It will be interesting to examine the extent to which these assumptions have been affected by subsequent developments.

Let us take first the threat of invasion or of military intimidation. Here the greatest change that has occurred since these assumptions were first made is that what was once seen as a single problem has now, quite obviously, become two. The policy and behavior of Peking can no longer be identified with that of Moscow. One has to recognize that Japan has two possible opponents, not one, on the mainland of Asia; and one has to consider each of these separately.

It can be argued, in the case of Moscow, that not even in the days of Stalin did Soviet policy ever envisage anything resembling a full-fledged Soviet invasion of Japan. It can be argued with even greater ease that the idea of such a military action had no place at all in the political outlook of Nikita Khrushchev, and would have had none even if the conflict with Peking had never arisen. But it is not necessary to be satisfied on either of these points in order to recognize that today, in the light of the conflict with China and of other problems of the Soviet Union and the bloc, nothing could be further from the thoughts of policy-makers in Moscow than a venture of this nature. It would play directly into the hands of the Chinese Communists, who have no more fervent dream than to see Moscow embroiled in a conflict with the United States (and any Soviet military action against Japan could not fail to produce such a conflict, security treaty or no security treaty, bases or no bases) from which they could themselves remain aloof. It would split the bloc even more woefully than it is split today. It would bewilder a Soviet public fed for years on the pap of peaceful coexistence. It would involve the operation of immensely lengthy and difficult lines of communication around the great salient of Manchuria, with the Chinese installed securely on the flank. Altogether, it is permissible to say that if American diplomacy had no greater problem than the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Japan in the conditions of 1964, a great many people could go home and go to bed.

In the case of the Chinese Communists, the picture is somewhat different. Their policy in Asia is obviously dynamic. Nothing could be more enticing to them than a wide power of disposal over the financial and industrial resources of Japan. It is they, not the Russians, whose influence is dominant today in the Communist Party of Japan. It is they who might hope mainly to profit from a communization of Japan.

But there are powerful reasons why the Communist Chinese leaders cannot contemplate direct military action as a conceivable means of realizing their aspirations with regard to Japan, and why they could not contemplate it, in the face of a general American commitment to Japan's security, even if American forces were not physically present on the Japanese islands. There is their lack of amphibious strength. There is the problem of Korea, the solution of which in a manner favorable to Peking would be a prerequisite to any successful exertion of military pressure against Japan. There is the obvious undesirability of committing Chinese Communist forces in a major way on a single sector of the vast perimeter of China so long as other problems-Taiwan, Southeast Asia, the frontier with India and above all the long frontier with the U.S.S.R.-remain unsettled. If a Russia contemplating an invasion of Japan would have to think of China on her flank, a China contemplating such a project would have to think of Russia in her rear. And there is, finally, the fact that any direct and unprovoked military action against a neighboring country would quite destroy the image Peking is trying to establish, and would play directly into the hands of Moscow in the competition for dominant influence within the world Communist movement.

Too much should not be made of these reflections. Conditions can always change. Great military establishments have a way of remaining important for the shadows they cast, even where there is little likelihood of their actual employment. In particular, these considerations should not be taken as suggestions that either the needs of Japanese security or those of peace in the eastern Pacific area generally could be adequately met at this juncture without our continued interest in, and commitment to, Japan's security. Certainly, any abrupt withdrawal of this interest and commitment would create a new situation, to which the above considerations might not be relevant. It is enough, for the moment, to note that a change has come over the Japanese security problem, and that it has important connotations.

III

It was not the intention to treat in this article the present state of the perennial problem of Korea. But again, there are certain points, affecting the security of Japan, where elements of change ought to be noted.

At the time of the attack on South Korea, in 1950, one of the considerations which inspired the vigorous American reaction, in the minds of at least some Americans involved, was the threat which a Communist seizure of South Korea would have posed for the internal security of Japan, particularly in view of the important part played by Koreans in the Communist Party of Japan-especially in the larger Japanese cities. Even today, Japan is sensitive (and she must always remain so) to whatever occurs in the southern part of Korea. But the stabilization of conditions in Japan has somewhat altered the dimensions of this problem. While these are questions of degree, there is good reason to regard Japan as having entered, or being in process of entering, the ranks of those advanced nations the nature of whose economy not only undermines the rationale for any Communist take-over but raises the question whether the Communists would be capable, even if initially successful in the political sense, of directing an economy so complex and so extensively geared to the economies of other advanced nations. One is obliged to ask whether Communist administrators, not too successful even in the case of much more primitive economics, could hope even to keep this one in operation without drawing extensively on cadres outside their own ranks and without watering down their own doctrinal approaches to something like those of the contemporary Western welfare state. In any case, the position of constitutionally appointed authority in Japan is far stronger today than it was in 1950. Today, the effects on Japan of possible political developments in Korea have to be looked at from the standpoint of the reactions of the great non- Communist majority of the Japanese people, not in the light of the anxieties that related to the relatively fragile internal political situation of 1950.

In 1950, furthermore, it was primarily Russian influence with which the United States was confronted in Korea. Today, by all accounts, the preponderant weight of outside influence would seem to have shifted to the Chinese. So far as concerns basic political attitudes and aspirations, this is certainly no improvement. The Chinese Communists have, if anything, even more reason to wish today that South Korea could be brought under Communist control than did the Russians in 1950. But it is reasonable to suppose that their enthusiasm for any new aggressive action by the Communists in Korea would stop sharply at the point where it threatened to require their own military support. When in late 1950 the Chinese finally committed their forces in the Korean War, under the flimsy pretext of these being volunteers, they could count on the benevolent sympathy and support of Moscow, and they had no cause for anxiety over the security of their frontiers elsewhere in the North Asian area. Today, this comforting assurance would scarcely be present. Peking cannot today lightly contemplate any developments on the Korean peninsula which would require the involvement of Chinese Communist forces but from which the Soviet Union could remain aloof; for this would certainly weaken the general Chinese position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. One must suppose, accordingly, that Peking would observe utmost caution in giving approval or encouragement to any new initiatives by the North Koreans which might place demands on Chinese resources.

Finally, one has to recognize, as a factor which did not enter into the original assumptions of American policy toward this area, the lack of success encountered to date in the effort to achieve an ordered and productive working relationship between South Korea and Japan. The sad significance of this is not greatly changed by the fact that the difficulty has been caused less by the Korean Government itself than by violent sectors of public opinion. Whatever the reasons, it has to be recognized that efforts to achieve a normal relationship between South Korea and Japan have thus far been unsuccessful and at present show small prospects for success.

This is a reality which, in the long run, will have to be taken account of in determining American policy. Those in Korea who oppose the establishment of acceptable relations with the overwhelmingly peace-loving Japan of the present day show scant appreciation for the advantages of American protection and little inclination to be helpful to the United States in the exercise of the responsibilities it has assumed in that area. Surely, no one on the American side conceived, in 1950, that the United States was moving to the support of South Korea merely to create or to perpetuate another source of hostility to the postwar Japan, whose effort to found a new national life was partly a matter of American inspiration and for whose success the United States bore a considerable measure of responsibility. If the régime in South Korea, whose domestic failures are serious enough in any case, is forced to remain a dead weight on American policy toward Japan, it will eventually compel a reconsideration of American policy toward Korea generally; for Korea is important, but Japan is more important still.

The developments mentioned above do not represent, in themselves, any sudden or fundamental alteration in the conditions which have been seen thus far to require an American military presence in Korea, with all the implications this carries for the American military presence in Japan and elsewhere in that region. They do, however, represent significant changes in the background of circumstances against which American policy was formulated at the time of, and in the wake of, the Korean War.

IV

There remains the question of Japanese opinion. Ten or twelve years ago, when the present security arrangements were in process of formation, Japanese opinion was still strongly affected by the numbness of defeat and occupation. Only to a limited extent had it begun to occupy itself actively and responsibly with the problems to which these arrangements were addressed. The intervening years have brought a great change. The earlier passivity has not been everywhere overcome, but there is a growing consciousness that the major responsibility for Japan's security must be borne, in the long run, by Japan herself; and the outlines of popular attitudes toward these problems are becoming clear.

These outlines, unfortunately, indicate a sharp division of opinion between the Socialist and intellectual Left, which continues to regard the present security arrangements with varying degrees of skepticism, hostility and bitterness, and more conservative opinion which, with many shadings and gradations, tends to accept them as a necessary if not desirable evil. The sharpness of these differences, and particularly the violence of left-wing and intellectual opinion, became evident (even, finally, to an American Government decidedly slow on the uptake) in the appalling disorders which attended President Eisenhower's ill-considered effort to visit Japan after the 1960 Summit fiasco.

The reasons for this division run very deep. They are at least as much emotional as intellectual. They involve internal political problems as well as problems of foreign policy. They reflect the whole great schizophrenia of thought and feeling induced in the Japanese people by the shock of defeat, the destruction of old values, and the introduction by the victors of concepts at odds with the traditional premises of political and social thought. The United States Government has a measure of responsibility for this conflict of conscience by virtue of the abruptness with which it altered its own concepts of international security in the years following the Second World War. Americans will have to recognize that if they are to indulge themselves in such violent fluctuations of outlook as those that affected their view of world Communism in the years from 1943 to 1953, they must not expect others, however well-inclined, to follow them in such inconstancy.

On the liberal and Socialist-intellectual side, the negative attitudes toward the present security arrangements embrace many varieties and shades of opinion. These range all the way from a Marxism so radical as to place itself to the left of both Soviet and Chinese régimes, at the one extreme, to outlooks founded mainly on an uneasiness about American policy in Asia generally and a desire for minor modifications in the security arrangements that would give Japan greater influence and freedom of action in shaping them to the needs of the future. They reflect the strong feelings that prevail in Japan on the subject of nuclear weapons. They reflect the resentments and sense of humiliation that so naturally surround any maintenance of foreign military establishments on a country's territory. They reflect even more intensely the unfavorable reports received in Japan about the state of affairs in Okinawa: the size of the American military establishment there, the burden it imposes on the local population, the depressingly narrow limits in which it has been allegedly willing to concede the rights of self-government, the uncertainty concerning the future of this island. They reflect pessimism about the prospects for success of American policies in Korea and Southeast Asia. Above all, they reflect an uneasiness about American policy toward China.

One has to visit Japan to appreciate the extent to which Communist China now dominates the external horizon of Japanese opinion and the depth of the desire there for better relations with the Chinese Mainland. Russia has been virtually eclipsed, in Japanese eyes, by the Communist China that lies so near and is so little known. In student and other left-wing circles, outlooks are determined largely by an uncritical acceptance of Marxist semantics and Marxist interpretations about the United States, but also by a naïveté about the Communist régime in China and an idealization of it no less devastating than that with which worthy Americans once viewed its Nationalist-Kuomintang predecessor. The involution of values evoked by these distortions has to be seen to be believed. It results in an outlook in which the United States is everywhere the predatory imperialist and Peking the peace-loving force, defending Asian independence and freedom.

But even in more conservative circles, where Marxian semantics have little or no hold, the desire for closer relations with the Communist mainland has powerful currency. This is more than just a matter of a Japanese "guilt complex" toward China, about which so much is spoken today. It is also not fully explained by the frequent references to an ancient cultural affinity, or by hopes for increased commercial exchanges. There is-and Americans may as well face it-a perfectly natural desire among the Japanese to escape at least partially from the cloying exclusiveness of the American tie, from the helpless passivity it seems to imply, from the overtones of "anything you can do we can do better," which so often accompanies American friendship, and to throw open a sector of the international horizon where Japan could have a set of relationships and an importance of her own, not dependent on American tutelage, perhaps-who knows?-even helpful, ultimately, to the United States in an area where we seem to have difficulty helping ourselves. One is moved to reflect, as one travels about this world, how much Americans would stand to gain if they would admit to limitations in their ability not just to cope with world realities but also to understand them, and would occasionally accept help from their friends as well as proffering it.

Behind this reaction, there are, of course, real differences of interpretation, ones of degree but differences none the less, between even the moderate Japanese view of objective conditions surrounding the China problem and the view that seems to predominate in official circles in the United States. Neither in point of the intentions and reactions of the Peking régime, nor of the political prospects of the government on Taiwan, nor of the appraisal of the dangers of trading with a Communist power, nor of the prospects for a successful international boycott of such a power, does most Japanese conservative opinion fully accord with concepts which would be dominant today in Washington, particularly in the legislative branch of the government. Such divergencies are bound to have some effect on bilateral security arrangements which by their very nature imply a wide community of outlook on the political problems of the area.

The casual visitor to Japan will hear reassuring things in official circles, both American and Japanese, about this question of Japanese opinion. The Socialist intellectuals, it will be pointed out, are not in power, and have little chance of achieving a parliamentary majority. Among Marxist students, opinion has become divided, and feelings are not so strong as they were in 1960. The Japanese Government remains steadfast in its loyalty to the existing arrangements. It is necessary only to brave out the criticisms of the opposition and to proceed as before.

Superficially, and for the short term, all this sounds plausible. But such reflections can lead only too easily to that special complacency into which it is so easy to fall when problems are not acute. Surely, it is in principle undesirable that an American military presence in another country should be the subject of so painful a division of local opinion as has been the case in Japan in recent years. This is particularly dangerous where the division coincides with the outlines of a deep inner-political division, as is also the case in Japan today. The fact that many students and intellectuals, frustrated by the failure to prevent renewal of the Security Treaty in 1960, are today bewildered, discouraged and of divided counsel does not mean that basic misunderstandings have been overcome or that they could not again assume dangerous forms. Nor are the differences of interpretation that divide American opinion from that of moderate or conservative Japanese circles to be lightly ignored. Their sharpness of outline may well be dimmed, today, by lack of urgency and by the Oriental addiction to a courteous indirectness and understatement when delicate political matters are discussed. But they could quickly be moved, by external events, to the status of painful misunderstandings. An admission of Communist China to membership in the United Nations, for example, would almost certainly be followed at once, as things now stand, by full-fledged Japanese diplomatic recognition, whatever the American feelings. And the demonstration by Peking of the capability of detonating a nuclear device, however limited its real military significance in the light of advances elsewhere in the development of such weaponry, may be expected to throw into Japanese opinion a shock which will take the most varied, partly contradictory, forms, and will put Japanese-American relations to a severe test.

V

For the present, if there are any changes that are needed in the Japanese- American security arrangements, they would seem to be small ones, and ones of degree-designed merely to eliminate rough edges and to achieve better understanding. Commendable progress has already been made in reducing the number of the American forces stationed in Japan and in limiting the inconvenience and annoyance they bring to their Japanese hosts. The presence in Tokyo of an American Ambassador sensitive to all shades and sectors of Japanese opinion, conversant with the Japanese language, culture and history, and supported by a highly trained and competent staff, has already done much to dissipate the misunderstandings which American diplomacy, as well as the military presence, have encountered. The tasks of intellectual mediation between these two countries, where the technical difficulties of communication are truly formidable, is one for specialists. It is not accomplished, as many Americans like to believe, merely by thrusting ordinary people together and "letting them get to know each other." That the United States Government has recognized this represents the most positive contribution it has made in recent times to the development of relations with Japan, and one which-if properly supported at home-may be expected to bear further fruit.

The specific point at which, for the moment, there is greatest opportunity for improvement is probably Okinawa. Here, all one could ask is that the American military authorities bear in mind that the fate of the Okinawans is something to which Japanese opinion is extremely sensitive. With the appointment in August of a new High Commissioner to the Ryukyus, there has seemed to be a new recognition that there can be instances where measures to curtail the weight of the American military establishment, as it rests on the local population, are warranted by regard for Japanese opinion even if they constitute something less than the military ideal.

The longer future is a different matter. It presents both greater dangers and greater possibilities. The present Treaty of Mutual Coöperation and Security has a ten-year term. It does not automatically expire at the end of that term; it continues unless one side or the other gives notice of a desire to terminate it. It might be difficult, in these circumstances, for the Japanese to call for its renegotiation without this appearing to be something more of a political demonstration than it was meant to be. When the difficulties arose in 1960 over ratification of the Treaty, one of the principal objections voiced, even in moderate Japanese circles friendly to the United States, was that the Treaty's term of validity was too long and would give the Japanese Government inadequate opportunity to assure that its terms and operation remained at all times suitable to the needs of a developing situation.

One wonders whether the purposes both of courtesy and of political expediency would not be served if the United States Government, instead of simply letting the term of the Treaty run its course and invite automatic renewal, were to enter into consultations at an early date with a view to affording the Japanese Government an opportunity to state its views on the suitability of the various arrangements in the current situation, and perhaps on the question of the Treaty's term as well.

There is, incidentally, a further reason why it would be desirable to keep currently in touch with the Japanese Government concerning the future of the Treaty. The NATO treaty comes up in 1969 for review and possible revision. This will no doubt occasion a good deal of public and official discussion in the preceding period. Japanese opinion will be sensitive to whatever is said and done concerning the future of NATO. For the Japanese to be confronted with anything in the nature of a fait accompli on this sector would be almost certainly deleterious to the American-Japanese relationship in general; and this is something which timely consultation could prevent.

In judging the advisability of consultations with the Japanese concerning the future of the special security relationship, Americans can usefully bear in mind certain considerations.

There is, first, the fact that the establishment of better relations between Japan and the countries of the Asian mainland is, in the long run, an essential requirement, politically and psychologically, of Japanese policy. The instincts, outlooks and needs of the Japanese people simply will not tolerate for long anything that appears to be an effort to enlist Japan as a passive instrument in an all-out cold war to which no one in Japan can see a favorable issue generally and which seems to imply the indefinite renunciation by Japan of all hopes for a better relationship with the mainland. Anything of this sort can only exacerbate the divisions already existing in Japanese society, increase the difficulties of the Japanese Government, and be destructive of the foundations of the U.S.- Japanese relationship. If the United States wishes to preserve as an effective ally the most industrious and economically advanced of the East Asian peoples, a people with extraordinary civilizing and technological talents, disposing over what is already far and away the greatest industrial workshop of Asia, it will have to shape the mutual security relationship between the two countries in such a way that it conduces to overcoming rather than prolonging the division now so unnaturally prevailing between Japan and her mainland neighbors.

Many of us may have our doubts-some Japanese have them, too-as to how much Japan would stand to gain, in the present circumstances, from the cultivation of closer relations with Communist China, in particular. But if these doubts have merit, this is something the Japanese will have to discover for themselves, as a lesson of experience. It will not do just for us to assure them of it. It need not be considered that American policy has failed if the effort to create a better relationship between Japan and the mainland proves abortive. What is important is that American policy should not be permitted to appear as an obstacle to the effort itself but should rather reflect a generous tolerance for special Japanese needs and feelings, and should let it be demonstrated, at every point, that if there are limits to the possibilities for improvement of Japan's relations with the mainland, these lie in the outlooks and policies of the mainland powers themselves and not in the preconceptions of American policy-makers.

The second point that might well be borne in mind, as one considers the future of the Security Treaty, is that, in addition to these psychological and political aspects, arrangements designed to assure Japanese security would be intrinsically strengthened, and very greatly so, if they had the general assent and support of at least one of the two great mainland powers, and that, viewed from this standpoint, the position of Russia is quite different from, and more encouraging than, that of China. This state of affairs could, of course, be greatly affected by the development of Soviet-American relations on a global scale. The active insertion of Soviet power against American efforts to preserve the independence of South Viet Nam could obviously create complications in the face of which what is being said here would have little relevance. But assuming that Soviet disapproval of these American efforts is not given active military form, and that there is no major deterioration in the Soviet-American relationship from other causes, there should be no reason to despair of the possibility of achieving a more constructive Soviet relationship to the problem of Japanese security.

It is not inconceivable, for example, that in return for relatively moderate concessions on the American side the Soviet Union might be prepared today to make satisfactory settlement of the question of the Soviet-occupied islands off Hokkaido, which have thus far stood in the way of a normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations, to agree to a common peace treaty with Japan, and to associate itself with the United States in a joint guarantee of Japanese security under sanction of the United Nations, thus realizing, at long last, General MacArthur's far-sighted concept. The approach to such a solution may appear long and difficult; there may be many reasons why it could be undertaken only after most careful preparation and with the observance of many safeguards. But the very fact that such a solution is no longer beyond the range of reasonable imagination represents an important and hopeful change in the situation, and one of which American policy-makers should not lose sight.

V

The question remains as to how these concepts would fit with American policy further afield in Asia, and particularly with American policy toward China. Would an American policy designed expressly to leave open the way for an improvement of relations between Japan and the mainland not conflict with the American position with relation to China, or call for modification of it? And would a readiness to admit the Soviet Union to a share in the responsibility for Japanese security not bewilder allies taught to believe that American policy is aimed at the destruction of Communism, generally, in Asia? The answers to these questions may be brief.

In the case of our China policy, there is no appreciable conflict here in so far as Communist China itself is concerned. There is no reason why Japanese policy toward Communist China should be identical with that of the United States. We have to do here with two different countries, in wholly different geographic and historical situations, with needs and interests which, while compatible, are not identical.

When it comes to the government on Taiwan, the conflict is potentially more serious. The Japanese are, by and large, not without sympathy for the American effort to preserve Taiwan from conquest by the Communist mainland. They are less enthusiastic and less hopeful about the pretention of the Taiwan régime to be the government of all of China, and understandably skeptical about any policy which, by definition, cannot be called successful unless Communism is overthrown and the authority of the Nationalist Government reëstablished throughout the entire Chinese Mainland. At the heart of this difficulty lies the assumption, so lightheartedly embraced by F.D.R. and Harry Hopkins at the Cairo Conference and imbedded ever since in U.S. policy, that the only possible future for the island of Taiwan was as an integral part of China. The Japanese, one senses, would feel far more comfortable if the United States were to take a less doctrinaire position on this point and recognize that the final status of this island, in the light of all that has occurred since 1943, is something which ought ultimately to be determined with due regard to the feelings of the inhabitants and to the needs of peace and stability in the Pacific area generally-a formula which would not preclude a permanent association with China but would also not assure it or attempt to define what it might conceivably be. Were this adjustment to be made in the American view, so that one could treat the problem in terms not just of a possible "one China" or "two Chinas" but also in terms of a possible "one China-one Taiwan," there would be no reason why the Japanese-U.S. relationship should be at any point seriously disturbed over the China issue.

So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the answer is simple but basic. If it is the purpose to destroy, everywhere, all that calls itself Communist, regardless of how it conducts itself in its external relations, then, of course, one cannot contemplate the encouragement of a better Soviet- Japanese relationship. If, on the other hand, it is the purpose to oppose and to frustrate any and all efforts of any power, Communist or not, to subvert and subjugate other peoples or to disrupt world peace, and if Communism is to be fought wherever-but only wherever-it places itself in this category, then there is no reason why a better Soviet-Japanese relationship should not have its place among the objectives of American statesmanship, and there are formidable reasons why it should.

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