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The United States and Japan approach a changing relationship. Japan wants the continued nuclear guarantee of the United States but is restive at the protracted American control of Okinawa and the irksome problems arising from American military bases in Japan. The natural desire of a leading industrial nation for a more "independent" foreign policy, including what is vaguely expressed as "autonomous defense," appears to be steadily growing. At the same time, the United States, under a new Administration and in a post-Viet Nam period, can be expected to reassess its responsibilities overseas, particularly in Asia. The simultaneous meeting in Japan of these forces for change could, if the gears mesh smoothly, produce a healthy transition toward a sounder, more mutually responsive Japanese-American relationship. On the other hand, misunderstandings or misplaced expectations on either or both sides could block such a happy result and damage the interests of both countries.
There is a timetable. In June 1970, when the security treaty becomes subject to notice of intent to terminate, political action is threatened by the Left. A goal for the opposition and a deadline for the government, 1970 symbolizes Japan's most important and most discussed foreign policy issue today. In essence it is the problem of Japan's security. To understand it, one should look at Japan's current "mood," its effort in self-defense, the security treaty itself and the problem of Okinawa.
The year 1968 marked the 100th anniversary of the accession to the throne of Emperor Meiji. The Japanese take pride in the achievements of the Meiji era but in spirit seem somewhat closer to the pleasures of the long Tokugawa peace than to the militancy of the Meiji period which followed. In fact, an all-pervading "peace mood" is the strongest element in the state of the Japanese mind today. The Japanese "peace constitution," which in its Article 9 prohibits the maintenance of "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential," is today supported almost unanimously by the Japanese people (91 percent in a recent poll). In fact, the Japanese Socialists attribute Japan's postwar peace and prosperity to Article 9 rather than to the security treaty with the United States.
The Japanese devotion to their peace constitution is reinforced by a "nuclear allergy," a psychological result of the national experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The government recognizes this popular feeling and seeks to influence it; the Left finds endless opportunities to exploit it.
The Sato government has declared its nuclear policy to be built on three principles, namely, that Japan shall not possess, manufacture or permit the entry into the country of nuclear weapons. This is one of the few government policies approved by all political parties. Still, the Prime Minister has refused to go so far as to support an opposition-sponsored Diet resolution endorsing the three nuclear principles. He explained that he would feel uneasy to have the Diet thus "bind the Japanese people forever."
The Left has made the most of the "nuclear allergy," particularly in connection with the visits to Japanese ports of American nuclear-powered naval vessels. Demonstrations reached new heights during the call at Sasebo of the aircraft carrier Enterprise in January 1968. A furor again erupted in May when a slight degree of radioactivity was discovered in Sasebo waters after the visit of a nuclear-powered submarine. Although the United States, after full investigation, announced that the submarine could not have been responsible, public concern was not allayed. As a result of these incidents, all port calls of American nuclear-powered naval vessels were discontinued for the time being.
The inconsistencies between the "nuclear allergy" and the facts that Japan plans to build its own nuclear-powered ship and that nuclear energy will undoubtedly become a chief source of Japan's electric power by the end of the century, are still lost on many Japanese. To them the presence in a Japanese port of a nuclear-powered warship conjures up the spectre of possible Japanese involvement in war; this fear is a strong element in the peace mood of the nation today.
Many Japanese have observed the war in Viet Nam with a sense of fear that the pressures of escalation and Japan's close ties with the United States might implicate their own country, particularly if Chinese-American hostilities should result. Peace talks in Paris brought a sense of relief to the Japanese and for many of them Viet Nam became a faraway issue, a "fire on the other side of the river."
Peace is not only a mood. The Japanese recognize that their advance to the top ranks of the world's industrial powers has been measurably assisted by the fact that under 1 percent of GNP has been spent on defense, a percentage less than that of any other nation of consequence. The Japanese obsession with economic advance has led to Japan's being labeled an "economic animal" and to the stereotype of the Japanese abroad as the "transistor radio salesman." Twenty-three years of peace and security have provided the environment for the achievement of Japan's "economic miracle."
The most popular "ism" in Japan today is "my-home-ism," which, along with "my-car," "my-room" and the many "my" words so prevalent in the present-day Japanese language, symbolizes the feeling of cozy satisfaction in achieving one's wants. "My-home-ism" is a kind of selfish concentration on getting for oneself as many of the good things of life as possible. The Japanese work hard and now play hard. The resulting "leisure boom" has produced a major industry; in 1967 Japanese families spent 37 percent more on leisure activities than they did in 1964. In the rush for comfort, pleasure and a better life for the "salary-man," "my-home-ism" excludes worry about the world's troubles and responsibility for doing something about them. Many Japanese critics deplore it as selfish indifference unbefitting a country assuming the rank and status of a great power.
Prime Minister Sato recognized the appeal of "my-home-ism" during the election campaign of last summer. Inspired by Herman Kahn's prediction that the 21st century will belong to Japan, he painted a rosy future for the Japanese-peace and prosperity ahead, with continuously rising standards of living, surpassing Europe and by the end of the century even the United States.
As a natural result of developing confidence and as a kind of reaction to "my-home-ism," a new nationalism is growing in Japan. Defeatism has given way to pride in country, and economic single-mindedness no longer fully satisfies. This spirit is not the property of any party or ideology. While it contains no nostalgia for the militarism of the past-although the Socialists warn that it does-it envisages a country with the ability to defend itself, at least to a certain degree. "Autonomous defense" is a popular phrase in Japan; no one has clearly defined it and its significance may change in the future; today it seems to mean: "We ought to do more about defense, but not too much, and of course we still need the American security guarantee."
The new nationalists will not be satisfied with a purely economic role for Japan, particularly in Asia. They can be expected to urge greater diplomatic activity to acquire international influence more commensurate with Japan's economic power.
Leadership of the new nationalism has yet to emerge. Several younger politicians belonging to the Liberal Democratic Party and known as the "New Right" would like to speed the changes and break out in new directions. Given the strength of tradition, the rigidity of the political system and the present trend of voting patterns, there is little likelihood of sudden change. One can surmise, however, that over the corning years, as the postwar generation gains influence and its members come into positions of power, the peace mood and "my-home-ism" may lose some of their pervasiveness while the concept of Japan as a great power becomes a national ideal.
The purpose and role of the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) are clearly set forth in the defense concept approved by the National Defense Council on November 29, 1966:
The basis of our national defense is to prevent aggression before it actually occurs by maintaining a security structure with the United States and by maintaining an effective defense force by Japan herself. Furthermore, Japan will, with her own capability, cope with an indirect aggression and a small scale direct aggression and any armed aggression on a larger scale will be repelled with the cooperation of the United States. In this case, strategic defense operations will be primarily conducted by Japan.
Thus we see that Japan's Self Defense Forces are organized to cope with conventional threats of moderate scale while the United States maintains the nuclear deterrent.
Probably no other country in the world maintains armed forces whose constitutional legality is open to challenge. Japan's Self Defense Forces exist in spite of Article 9 of the constitution. The principal political parties opposing the government consider the SDF unconstitutional and Japan's Supreme Court has never passed on the question. General MacArthur stated in 1946 that in Article 9, Japan "surrenders rights inherent in her own sovereignty." However, successive Japanese governments have taken the position that the constitution does not and cannot take away from Japan the inherent, sovereign right of self-defense. It is on this interpretation that Japan's defense structure is built.
Revision of the constitution was a live issue a few years ago, but no Japanese government would propose it today. Not only does the party in power, the Liberal Democratic Party, lack the necessary two-thirds majority in the Diet to amend the constitution, but popular support for changes, particularly in Article 9, is totally lacking in the country. Many LDP leaders personally favor revision, but the hazards of saying so were proved in February 1968 when the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in the Sato government was forced to resign after a casual remark to some journalists suggesting that Japan's constitutional restrictions on military power hampered its diplomacy. Prime Minister Sato has publicly stated the position of the government by describing the "pacifism" of Article 9 as the "flesh and blood of the Japanese people today."
Interpretation rather than revision has been the constitutional road followed by Japan, and in this manner most legal blocks to the development of a competent defense force have been circumvented or removed. Along the way it has been established that Japan will not engage in offensive warfare nor possess offensive weapons. Yet Japanese defense experts note that technological developments are making it more and more difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons. Although it is accepted that Japanese forces are not to be dispatched overseas to engage in combat, successive government spokesmen have agreed that Japanese bombers must be allowed to attack enemy bases should this prove the sole available means of defense. Similarly, from the time of Prime Minister Kishi, Japanese governments have asserted the constitutionality of "defensive" nuclear weapons. However, these would still face legal prohibition by the Atomic Energy Law which provides that nuclear power must be used for peaceful purposes only.
A live question is whether the SDF may legally join in a United Nations peacekeeping force. Engagement in combat overseas in a Korean or Congo-type U.N. operation would be out of the question. On the other hand, participation in U.N. actions of a non-combat nature, such as supervising armistices or inspecting elections, while not violating the constitution, might conflict with laws establishing the Defense Agency and the Self Defense Forces. Still, it seems likely that, should a United Nations presence be established in Southeast Asia after the Viet Nam war, Japan's urge to coöperate would be strong enough to overcome legal obstacles.
Japan ranks approximately twelfth in the world in defense expenditures. Budgets have increased annually but have represented progressively smaller percentages of GNP and national income. Expenditures for 1967 were a little over $1 billion, or 0.91 percent of GNP and 7.44 percent of the national budget.
The Third Defense Build-up Plan began in 1967 and runs through 1971. The emphasis of the plan is on the qualitative improvement of the Self Defense Forces through research and development, the modernization of equipment and the production of equipment in Japan. Primary attention will be given to "coastal water defense capability, vital area air defense capability, and mobile capability by various means." Equipment to be acquired under the present plan includes destroyers, submarines, helicopters, Nike-Hercules missiles modified to carry only non-nuclear warheads, and fighter aircraft. The plan also calls for an increase of 8,500 men in the Ground Self Defense Forces, bringing total authorized ground strength to 180,000 by the last year of the plan. SDF personnel at present number about 275,000 including land, sea and air forces.
The Self Defense Forces are competent and well equipped; their problems lie more in manpower than in matériel. No military conscription means no reservoir of reserves. Entering volunteers are sometimes too few to meet requirements and, after receiving valuable technical training, many men resign to take profitable jobs in private industry. This turnover, highest among ground forces, has the educative advantage of spreading SDF experience through the population but is naturally detrimental to the efficiency of the forces.
More important, the SDF, an organization which cannot even call itself "military," has developed no ideology and little sense of purpose. For these reasons, coupled with a lack of prestige and popular support in the past, morale has suffered. In the words of one commentator, "National support is worth more than a hundred jets." Fortunately for the SDF, its image has improved markedly in recent years. Public opinion polls now show majority support for the continuation of the Self Defense Forces, but, it should be noted, "at their present level."
In their communiqué issued November 15, 1967, after meetings in Washington, President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato declared "it to be the fundamental policy of both countries to maintain firmly the Treaty of Mutual Coöperation and Security between the United States and Japan in order to ensure the security of Japan and the peace and security of the Far East."
"Automatic extension" of the treaty, or "automatic continuation," as the Japanese Foreign Office prefers to call it, would require no specific action by either government: the treaty would become subject at any time after June 23, 1970, to termination upon one year's advance notice by either party. While the Japanese government would thus become vulnerable to continuing opposition proposals for abrogation, a Diet confrontation like that in 1960 would be avoided. Another procedure, amendment of the treaty to extend its validity for a specific period of years, would not only invite a Diet struggle possibly more violent than that of 1960 but might well inspire amendments when submitted to the United States Senate, in view of American criticism that this so-called "mutual" treaty in fact imposes one-sided commitments on the United States.
The Liberal Democratic Party interpreted the successful retention of a majority in the House of Councillors elections last July as popular endorsement of the security treaty. In fact, the Japanese voters probably based their choices at the polls less on their judgment of the treaty than on their concern over prices, housing and other problems of daily life, and in response to the local appeals of individual candidates. Recent public opinion polls reveal fair support for continuation of the treaty, but the percentages of "don't know" answers are large. There is obviously a considerable body of opinion favoring a "weakening" of the security relationship although "outright termination" receives only small minority support in most of the polls. Most Japanese probably expect the treaty to continue in effect although many do not understand its contents or significance.
The Socialist and Communist parties propose an end to the treaty in 1970. The Socialists alone favor unarmed neutrality; the unpopularity of this policy may have been one element in the resounding defeat which they suffered in July; in fact, in a poll of Tokyo Socialist Party members, 47.7 percent rejected unarmed neutrality in favor of "self-defense power" for Japan. Even the Communists admit that in certain future circumstances, Japan might have to take defense measures "in a military sense." The other two opposition parties, the Democratic Socialists and Komei-to, are prepared to accept a revised security treaty for a limited period of time: the former advocate an arrangement whereby American forces would no longer be stationed in Japan, but would return in cases of emergency; the latter proposes "gradual dissolution" of the treaty, with final termination during the 1970s.
Three aspects of the treaty problem deserve attention. First, it should be noted that the basic effect of the treaty is to guarantee the security of Japan through American nuclear forces, or, in popular language, the "nuclear umbrella." At the same time, the parties to the treaty both subscribe to "a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East" and the treaty provides that American bases in Japan are to be used not only for the defense of Japan but also to defend "the peace and security of the Far East." Furthermore, the Japanese government has consistently maintained that there is an inseparable relationship between the defense of Japan and the peace and security of other parts of Asia. Yet it is doubtful that this concept is fully accepted by the general public and it is under constant attack from the opposition. In this vein, on August 9, 1968, in the budget committee of the House of Representatives, a Socialist member argued that because application of the treaty to the "Far East" brought apprehensions to the Japanese people, the "Far East" clause should be eliminated in 1970. Foreign Minister Miki replied that the government had no intention of proposing such a change.
As the war in Viet Nam has expanded, the use of the Japanese bases has appeared to be less related to the defense of Japan than to events in Southeast Asia. For example, visible increases in air traffic, repair operations and hospital usage are widely publicized by the Japanese information media. At the same time, American use of the bases for direct combat operations in East Asia is limited by the agreement which requires prior consultation with the Japanese government, not only before major changes in the deployment and equipment of United States forces in Japan can be made, but also before bases can be used to launch combat operations outside Japan. The phrase "major changes in equipment" is understood as referring to the introduction of nuclear weapons. The "prior consultation formula" does not apply to the bases in Okinawa.
A second aspect of the treaty is that, for obvious Japanese constitutional reasons, it places no reciprocal obligations on Japan to come to the defense of the United States. Instead, Japan provides bases and facilities for the use of American military forces. The Japanese government recognizes that the bases are a small price to pay for the American security guarantee and are themselves an essential element in Japan's own defense. Among left- inclined Japanese, however, the bases are frequently seen as an indemnity, first exacted from an occupied Japan and which, instead of offering protection, act as a kind of dangerous lightning rod to attract retaliation from enemies of America and to embroil Japan in unwanted conflict.
Japan's rapid urbanization and the mounting pressures of population have intensified the problems of the bases, a good number of which are unfortunately located in the densely populated Kanto plain surrounding Tokyo and Yokohama. American military installations now number some 149, contrasted to more than 2500 in 1952. Most of the facilities used at present are inconspicuous and generate no trouble, but the few large air bases present problems of land use, noise, incidents and accidents. American and Japanese authorities coöperate closely in seeking to prevent or ameliorate these problems and have achieved notable progress. In continuing and speeding up the process already under way, additional bases can be eliminated, relocated or transferred to the Self Defense Forces, and American personnel can be further reduced. In the cases of relocation and transfer to Japanese control, heavy expenses are involved, and the Japanese government is not always ready and willing to assume these extra financial burdens. Needless to say, bases are exploitable political issues and the opposition parties and Japan's hyper-active mass media keep them vivid in the public mind.
A third element in the treaty problem is the fact that the Japanese in general feel no immediate external threat to the security of their country. The government is reluctant to specify such a threat or to designate any country as a potential or hypothetical enemy of Japan. Although Mr. Sato subscribed to language in the joint communiqué with President Johnson which referred to the "present intransigent attitude" of Communist China, the Prime Minister has stated before a Diet committee that he would "neither affirm nor deny" that China had aggressive tendencies. He has denied repeatedly that Japan looks upon Peking as a "hypothetical enemy."
Although few would doubt that Japan's defense strategy is directed against mainland China and the Soviet Union, the Japanese do not now fear attack from either of these nations. Peking's rapid progress in developing nuclear weapons surprised and sobered many Japanese and jarred some of their genial assessments of China. Japanese military analysts predict the successful Chinese production of ICBMs in the early 1970s; yet many Japanese have accepted Peking's arms program as largely defensive in character and have believed Mao Tse-tung when he promised never to be the first to use a nuclear weapon.
As for the U.S.S.R., the Japanese were encouraged by the constructive steps in Soviet-American relations and were themselves intrigued with the possibility of trade and economic cooperation, particularly in Siberia. In fact, Soviet-Japanese negotiations for the development of Siberia have so far made little concrete progress, although trade between the two countries has increased. The Soviet government has continued to refuse discussion of Japan's claims to the "northern territories." The invasion of Czechoslovakia produced a profound reaction in Japan and reawakened the deep suspicions and mistrust of Russia, traditionally strong among the Japanese. The result was a heightened wariness toward the Soviet Union which has not, however, translated itself into a sense of direct threat.
American visitors to Japan are often surprised at the seeming complacency of many Japanese toward an external communist threat. Especially one would expect that the Japanese might worry about a possible attack in Korea across the 38th parallel. Although recently increasing attention has been directed toward Korea, serious concern is rarely expressed. A public opinion poll taken in Tokyo in March 1968 attempted to discover whether the Japanese felt any "sense of crisis" and, if so, for what reasons. Results showed that about half of those polled did feel a sense of crisis; however, only 6 percent of these believed the danger came from a possible attack on Japan by a communist nation; 51 percent attributed their uneasiness to the "possibility of becoming embroiled in conflicts through coöperation with America's Asian policy."
If, as expected, the Liberal Democratic Party maintains its majority into 1970-there is the possibility that the House of Representatives may be dissolved and an election held in 1969-the automatic continuation of the security treaty can be expected to take place in 1970 without serious disruption of Japanese life. If an election should be held, the government would consider a victory a mandate in support of the treaty. Although the Left will stage demonstrations and may attempt a general strike in 1970, most competent observers believe that, barring an unforeseen resurgence of opposition strength, the anti-treaty movement will not succeed.
However, if a solution is not soon found for the problem of Okinawa, this issue could dominate all others, stimulate the forces opposing the treaty and cause serious difficulties in 1970.
The problem of Okinawa is a problem of when and how rather than of what. All are agreed-Americans, Japanese and Okinawans-that the Ryukyu Islands belong to Japan, are part of the "homeland" of Japan, and will be returned to Japan. The governments concerned have also been agreed that the military bases on the islands will be retained by the United States for a considerable time in the future. Reduced to its essentials, the problem is when can the United States turn over to Japan responsibility for administering the islands and how, or under what conditions, can the United States maintain the bases.
At the time of Prime Minister Sato's visit to Washington in November 1967, both countries agreed to "keep under joint and continuous review the status of the Ryukyu Islands, guided by the aim of returning administrative rights over these islands to Japan. . . ." Since then, Sato has expressed his conviction that agreement on a date can be reached "within two or three years." Undoubtedly the Prime Minister has had 1970 in mind. But fixing a date is not a simple matter of the calendar. The United States maintains that agreement on the use of the bases must be an integral part of the reversion process and cannot be postponed until after the transfer of administrative rights.
The use of the bases poses tough political problems for Japan. If the United States is permitted to continue to maintain the bases without restrictions, as at present, while the "prior consultation" formula continues to control bases in Japan, Okinawans will charge discrimination. Already they have shown their sensitivity. When in the past B-52s have taken off from bases in Okinawa to bomb North Viet Nam, the clamor from Okinawans, as well as from Japanese, has been loud and strong. The use was legal and the Japanese government could not protest; still the bases were on soil of the acknowledged "homeland" and national feelings were aroused. Needless to say, the value of the Okinawan bases has gone up as the war in Viet Nam has intensified, and while the war continues the United States can scarcely be expected to agree to restrictions.
There are three ways in which the base problem could be resolved at the time Japan assumes administrative rights. The first would continue the status quo, according the United States unrestricted use of the bases, including the possible presence of nuclear weapons. Presumably this would be most satisfactory to the United States. A second arrangement would place the Okinawan bases under the same restrictions that obtain for American bases in Japan; in other words, the "prior consultation" formula would be operative and no nuclear weapons would be allowed. This would be supported by public opinion in both Japan and Okinawa. A third solution would be to ban nuclear weapons from the islands but grant the United States "free use" of the bases in all other ways; for example, military units could be sent directly into combat without prior consultation with Japan. This would probably be politically more acceptable in Japan than continuation of the status quo but would be open to the charge that sending forces into combat without Japanese knowledge or consent could involve Japan in American conflicts. Thus far Sato has been noncommittal on the future of Okinawan bases, taking a position he calls the "clean slate."
The victory of the candidate supported by all opposition parties in the first direct election of the Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Islands held on November 10 has injected a troublesome note in the calculations of both Japan and the United States. The outcome was not only a defeat for the Liberal Democratic Party and its Okinawan counterpart; the victor's obligations to his supporters, who include Communists and Socialists, could complicate the smooth exercise by the United States of its administrative authority over the islands. Certainly the vote indicated Okinawan impatience and added urgency to the search for a solution of the Okinawa problem.
Resolution of the Okinawa problem will require hard decisions by both sides. The Japanese government must evaluate for itself the contribution that the Okinawan bases make to Japanese security as well as to that of South Korea and Formosa, neighbors whose relations with Japan are of critical importance to Tokyo. Japan must above all calculate the effect on Communist China of a weakening of the American deterrent on Okinawa through a change in the status of the bases. In the light of these judgments and of political factors in both Okinawa and Japan proper, the Japanese government must determine what arrangements for continued American use of the bases are desirable and acceptable. At the same time, the United States government, in reëxamining its military bases around the world, must strictly evaluate the strategic importance of Okinawa, considering the situation in East Asia, technological developments and the fundamental American interest in maintaining the solidarity of the Japanese-American relationship.
Given the urgency and the stakes on both sides, it seems imperative that Japan and the United States rapidly achieve an agreement on the terms of a return of the administrative rights to Japan and the future status of the bases. If an understanding on the timing and conditions of a solution is not reached before 1970, the problem of Okinawa could seriously corrode Japanese-American relations.
In a post-Viet Nam Asia, a changing relationship between Japan and the United States must be based on a realistic understanding of what each country can and cannot do and on the political determinants in both Tokyo and Washington. Regardless of the kind of strategy the United States chooses to pursue in East Asia, an effective American military presence in either Japan proper or Okinawa can be maintained only with the full support and cooperation of the Japanese government. Furthermore, the Japanese government operates within a democratic system and is subject, in spite of its Diet majority, to the pressures of public opinion and the opposition parties. A national consensus on foreign policy does not exist in Japan and the Sato government has thus far failed to instill among the Japanese people much feeling of concern or responsibility for the security of Asia. However, the spirit of nationalism is growing and national attitudes are changing.
What, then, can we expect of Japan?
First, the security treaty will continue in effect after 1970. Japan will continue to recognize the value of the American security guarantee and the paramount importance of the relationship with the United States.
Second, Japan's defense establishment will not suddenly or drastically exceed its present strength, but will gradually expand over the coming years. No change is likely in the role of the Self Defense Forces, although the return of administrative rights over Okinawa will add to their responsibilities and duties. It is conceivable that some way may be found to participate in a United Nations peacekeeping force, particularly in the wake of a Viet Nam settlement.
Third, Japan will continue to develop the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. While a few voices suggest that to become a great power Japan must make its own nuclear weapons, sentiment against them is now so strong that no Japanese government would consider such a step. True, there is satisfaction and pride in Japan that, if the political decision were taken, a nuclear weapon could be made speedily and efficiently. However, without a complete change in the mood of the nation, plus a combination of unexpected internal and external events, a reversal of present nuclear policy could scarcely occur. In a decision to build the bomb, the Japanese would not fail to consider the effect on Japan's neighbors. Many have already foreseen that a nuclear weapons program, necessarily aimed at China and carried out in competition with China, would seriously complicate Japan's diplomatic efforts to develop relationships in Asia.
Fourth, it is natural that Japan should in the future pursue its so-called "peace diplomacy," the principal objective of which is to reduce tensions in Japan's immediate area through efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China. Particularly with regard to China, the difficulties of maintaining a firm position in Taipei while trying to develop profitable exchanges with Peking are obvious. Certainly the principal obstacles lie in Peking. Nevertheless, Japan will undoubtedly persist in trying to build a friendly relationship with mainland China without, however, sacrificing the Japanese stake in Taiwan. For the long run, this would seem to be in Japan's interest.
Finally, Japan will not replace the United States in Asia. Japan will continue efforts to expand trade and investment and to increase its economic stake in Taiwan, Korea and in Southeast Asia. It is also likely that over a period of years Japan will develop a political influence in Asia. Growing trade and aid and participation and leadership in regional organizations such as ASPAC (Asian and Pacific Council) and the Asian Development Bank seem certain to lead Japan toward greater concern and responsibility for the political as well as the economic stability of East Asia. However, Japan will not assume security responsibilities outside of the country nor enter pacts of a military nature. A military role in Asia for Japan is out of the question for a long time to come, and, indeed, if it were to develop, would destroy many of Japan's constructive economic accomplishments in Southeast Asia. In spite of warnings on the Left, there is now no sign in Japan that militarism will rise again. Japan, in its peaceful, prosperous, "my-home" mood, is not about to undertake spectacular adventures.
Through the close consultation posited by partnership, Japan and the United States should be able to work out the changes in roles and positions that altered events require. In this dialogue, Japan will have to understand the difficulties which beset the United States-the imperatives of our domestic problems and our balance-of-payments difficulties. The implications of the growing deficit in our trade balance with Japan will have to be appreciated. In the total context of the problems facing both of our countries our respective roles in Asia must be projected and evaluated. If indeed the urge for greater autonomy in defense and diplomacy is real in Japan, then a new role, not to replace the United States, but to complement American activities in Asia, should be possible. In such a role, Japan could assume greater responsibilities for defense of the country and at the same time, through expanding aid to the developing nations, contribute in areas where American aid and activities may diminish.
Japanese-American relations are at a point when talk of partnership is not enough and taking the other for granted evades reality. Each nation acts in its own self-interest, but in the modern world of entangling communications and relationships, no nation acts alone. Therefore, Japan and the United States, though their premises and perspectives may occasionally differ, must each be sensitive to the urgencies of the other. To an important degree, the stability and prosperity of East Asia depend upon the compatibility and coördination of action of these two leading industrial powers.