THE men who conduct Australian foreign policy are charged with a difficult and delicate operation. Although this is characteristic of the diplomacy of many countries today, the statement may seem surprising to those who still think of Australia as a remote, sparsely occupied agrarian country, lacking the sinews of a modern economy, and devoid, because of some curious affiliation with the United Kingdom, of a fully developed international personality. But contemporary Australia is none of these things. The isolation which for so long conferred a measure of immunity has vanished; the economy, possessing as it does a great steel base, is highly industrialized; the peopling and exploitation of the continent proceeds apace stimulated by largescale migration, impressive development projects and the discovery of new mineral wealth. Indeed, what is taking place is not greatly dissimilar to the transformation now occurring in Canada.

Australians could well devote all their energies to the immense task of occupying and developing a country roughly as large as the United States. They cannot, however, afford the luxury of domestic concentration to the extent which was possible for Americans in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth, the doctrine of isolation could be only a dangerous illusion and most Australians have come to recognize that fact. If anything, the changes in Australia's international situation are even more revolutionary than those which have occurred internally. This has enormously complicated our task because material and mental resources have had to be diverted from internal development to the political and military defense of the country.

Until the Second World War Australia had enjoyed immunity from any serious external threat. Her security rested upon what has been called "a fortunate combination of circumstances," one not likely to be repeated. Distance and the isolation which it produced had real meaning. More important was the situation prevailing to the north in Asia, where large areas were under European (especially British) rule or influence, a fact which tended to diminish any potential threat to Australian security from the one geographical area from which aggression might come. Elsewhere in Asia, notably in China, there was a division and discord destructive of national strength. Japan alone seemed capable of transforming herself into a modern national state, and it was no accident that Japan was the country which Australians most feared. Yet even Japan was hardly a first-rate Power until the late 1920s, and as she grew in strength, her rise in the Pacific was counterbalanced by the more rapid growth of American power. Finally, and of decisive importance, was the immense strength of the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century and beyond. How unchallengeable that strength was tends now to be forgotten. It was behind the shield of the British Navy that the Australian society grew and developed.

These were the traditional foundations of Australian security. They were crumbling away in the period after 1919, but the extent to which the process had gone became fully apparent only with the shock of near-invasion by the Japanese in 1941. Almost overnight, Australians found that they had to discover new and solid guarantees for their future security. They had to rethink many previous notions, redefine existing attitudes and, in a sense, construct for the first time a coherent set of principles for the conduct of foreign policy.

In one respect the task was not excessively difficult. The major objectives of any Australian policy had been made clear by the very circumstances in which Australia found herself in the postwar period. The kind of policy that had to be adopted was in fact dictated by her history, her geography, her wartime experiences and her relative lack of power. By history she was linked with the United Kingdom and Europe, by geography with the world of the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Australia is a Western outpost and her people were anxious to preserve a way of life which, while distinctively Australian, is deeply rooted in the values of Western civilization. To do so they had not only to come to terms with neighboring Asian communities, but to develop a new and intimate association with the United States as the most powerful member of the Western world.

Wartime experience and a changing balance of power, not least in the Pacific, made it abundantly clear that for the foreseeable future the security of Australia was bound up with American strength. Australians, whether they have liked it or not, have had to recognize that fact and act accordingly. But the existence of American strength is not enough in itself; it is also necessary that Americans should be willing to exercise it in Australia's defense should assistance ever prove necessary. Equally evident, because of her geographical position, was Australia's imperative need to develop durable and cordial relations with at least a significant number of the newly independent nations of Asia. Finally, it was axiomatic that the old and tried relationship with the Commonwealth as a whole, and with the United Kingdom in particular, should be sustained and where possible developed. Here sentiment was married without discord to a hardheaded appraisal of economic interest and political influence in world affairs.

There are, of course, many other components of Australian foreign policy: support of the United Nations and a desire to substitute principles of international law and order for the uncertainties of power politics; the defense of what majority sentiment would regard as specific national interests, for example, New Guinea; domestic control of migration; the protection of Australia's overseas trade; the development of welfare policies in the southwest Pacific; the Australian stake in Antarctica, and so on. But the essence of Australian foreign policy is to be found in the necessity to cultivate the threefold relationship already referred to--with the United Kingdom, with the United States and with non-Communist Asia. As objectives these are no doubt unexceptionable. What makes Australian policy such a difficult and delicate operation is that in the Australian judgment success in all three endeavors is essential to the country's long-term security. All three therefore have to be pursued concurrently and in such a way as to avoid conflict between them. A measure of irritation and misunderstanding from time to time is recognized as unavoidable. The nightmare of Australian statesmen is that they might on some occasion be forced to make invidious choices between the three partners to Australia's interests.


Australian governments in the postwar period, whether under Chifley or Menzies, have pursued each of these three branches of policy tenaciously, although it must be said that the major parties differed somewhat in their interpretation of the proper balance of interests. The need of sustaining the traditional link with the United Kingdom was never in question. One might have expected, however, some weakening of ties because of the disasters to British arms in Malaya, Britain's inability to maintain adequate forces in the Pacific and the evident signs that in the postwar world she would no longer command her previous degree of influence. In fact, the tendency would seem to have been in the opposite direction, towards a strengthening rather than a weakening of the British association.

Perhaps most striking evidence of this was the conversion of the Labor Party under Mr. Chifley to the pursuit of a policy of closer Anglo-Australian accord. The Labor Government had come to realize just how prejudicial it would be to Australia if Britain lost the battle for economic stability. Chifley pursued a program of close collaboration, especially in financial matters, with the object of assisting British economic recovery and sustaining British and hence Australian international influence. Cooperation extended to financial and commercial policies designed to assist British economic recovery. It included a gift of £25,000,000 to the British Government; it embraced suggestions for improved consultative machinery; and it involved Australia in the conduct of a more active regional foreign policy which was aimed at least in part at relieving excessive British commitments. Subsequent Liberal and Country Party governments in Australia have tried even more actively to sustain and develop the existing association with the United Kingdom.

The relative decline of British power, however, carried with it unfortunate implications for Australia. Clearly the United Kingdom in the future would no longer be able to contribute decisively to Australian security. Britain's resources were already over-committed in many parts of the world, the liquidation of her Asian interests amounted at best to a partial withdrawal and the trend clearly was in the direction of an increasing involvement in European regional and economic security arrangements.

These developments inevitably involved important changes in the conduct of Australian foreign policy. Heavier policy and defense commitments had to be undertaken in the area of Australia's own regional interests and assistance had to be sought from other powerful quarters. The increased regional initiative in policy-making has been seen in the creation of the South Pacific Commission, large-scale collaboration in economic and educational assistance programs under the Colombo Plan, active assistance in the Korean War, the provision of facilities for rocket experimentation, and the acceptance of onerous obligations for mutual security under the ANZUS and SEATO Agreements.

Self-reliance and a willingness to accept responsibility are important to national self-respect as well as being invaluable assets in an ally. There are of course shortcomings in the Australian record; for instance, defense expenditure could well have been more productive had there been a clearer definition of objectives. Nevertheless, it has to be recognized that there are rigid limits to Australia's capacity to achieve her own salvation.

A realistic appraisal of the power position in the Pacific left no doubt about the desirability of fostering closer American ties, but this desire for friendly and intimate coöperation was not only the outcome of a hardheaded assessment of power realities. It was based also upon gratitude to the United States for wartime assistance, upon the recognition of United States leadership in the Western alliance, and upon the widely held belief that American and Australian ways of life have much in common. It is a point which Prime Minister Menzies has put in the strongest terms. "And since in a hundred ways the character of life in the United States so closely resembles that in British communities, it would be strange indeed if we, the British people, regarded the citizens of the United States as being in a true sense foreigners. When we turn from the world scene to consider our own position in this corner of the world, it would be hard to find any Australian of this generation who did not recognize that the friendship and coöperation of the United States are vital to our own safety. In effect, our natural friendship and intuitive understanding coincide with our legitimate self-interest."[i]

It has seemed unthinkable to Australians that with so much in common any serious long-term breach could develop between the United Kingdom and the United States. This attitude of mind is important because it puts Australia's relations with both the United States and the United Kingdom in their proper context. It requires emphasis because much of the debate both in Australia and the United Kingdom over the question of Australia's relations with the United States has been couched in misleading terms. The assumption has been that Britain and the United States represented alternative poles of attraction and that if Australia were to develop more intimate relations with the United States it must inevitably drift away from Britain. Evidence for this was drawn from the ANZUS Pact, which seemed to indicate a willingness to seek American protection even at the cost of British exclusion. It was reinforced by other instances in which the Australian Government appeared to follow American rather than British initiatives, for example the nonrecognition of Communist China and the broad coincidence of American and Australian views in the discussions leading up to the establishment of SEATO.

Misleading conclusions can easily be drawn from these examples. The Australian view of ANZUS in particular was that it was a regional security arrangement contributing in the area of Australia's interest to the common defense of the non-Communist world in exactly the same way as Britain's participation in NATO, from which Australia was excluded, contributed to the strengthening of the security of the democratic world as a whole. ANZUS, rightly interpreted, therefore represented a contribution to what was after all a common enterprise in which both Britain and the United States were mutually engaged. "It is generally acknowledged," said Mr. Casey, "that the hard core of democracy for the future must be found in the closest possible relationship between the British people and the American people. The ANZUS Treaty is only a local manifestation of closer British-American relations."[ii] Viewed in this way the maintenance and even the strengthening of traditional ties with the United Kingdom could be reconciled with the development of an intimate relationship with the United States. So long as the interests and policies of the two great English-speaking democracies were in broad harmony the dilemma of an agonizing choice could be avoided.

Reconciliation of views was not so easy, however, when the Australian Government concentrated on the fostering of cordial relations with the newly emancipated states of Asia. The endeavor to foster mutual understanding and contribute to the economic development and military security of the area was formulated by a sense of urgency about the immensity of the problem and the gravity of the threat. Australian diplomatic, trade and information posts have been rapidly expanded, as have broadcasting services to Asia. Missions of every conceivable kind have been encouraged to visit Australia and draw upon Australian experience and expertise. Large numbers of Asian students have been granted scholarships to study in Australian universities, technical and agricultural colleges as well as in industrial and administrative organizations. The Government has given extensive support to United Nations and Commonwealth schemes to extend economic and technical aid to underdeveloped Asian countries. The Australian contribution, while relatively small and no doubt pitifully inadequate in the face of Asian needs, has nevertheless had its practical and psychological value. Australian prestige has undoubtedly grown, and the increasing flow of Asian students sponsored by Asian governments is testimony to the esteem in which Australia is held and to the opportunities which Australia can provide.

In these undertakings the Australian Government began with a number of assets. Australia was herself a young country which had passed through several stages before achieving self-government and full international status. She was not tainted by previous association with the colonial exploitation of Asia. Moreover, in the eyes of the leaders of the Asian national movements her record was good. Her Government had displayed active sympathy and support for the Indonesian national movement, had expressed open approval of the British decision to grant independence to India, Pakistan and Ceylon, and had given those states a warm welcome as equal partners in a transformed Commonwealth association. Indeed, the Commonwealth link was itself no inconsiderable asset. At the very least, it provided a point of approach and an easier channel of communication. But above all Australia possessed the very great advantage of Western knowledge and organization without at the same time possessing the military and economic power which might represent a threat to the genuine independence of Asian countries.

Nevertheless, Australian efforts to cultivate Asian good will have to some extent been impeded by obstacles which the Australian Government could not easily remove. Nothing has done more to frustrate the basic objectives of Australian policy than the internal divisions and, indeed, quarrels, within the non-Communist Asian world itself. Leaving aside minor disputes over questions associated with migration (between Ceylon and Burma on the one hand and India on the other), essential damage has been done by the Kashmir dispute. Not less important has been the divergence in outlook which is the outcome of a differing historical experience. This has meant that on a series of crucial issues, such as Indochina, SEATO, Communist China and the question of Dutch-administered West New Guinea, the Australian Government's judgment has differed essentially from that of her Asian neighbors. Whereas Australia had observed closely the experience of Communist operations in Europe, Asian governments until comparatively recently would seem to have paid little heed to the European record of Soviet expansion and Soviet intransigence. They have tended to look upon developments in Communist China as simply part of a pattern of Asian revolt and Asian national self-expression against Western domination. The Australian view has been that, while there was no conclusive evidence that Chinese policy would prove aggressively expansionist, it was nevertheless desirable to take precautions against such a possibility. India, in particular, with its policy of neutralism, has taken positions diametrically opposed to those of Australia. Finally, there is the question of colonialism which colors Asian judgments on so many issues. This led to the withholding of support from efforts to stem the Communist advance in Indochina and resulted in collective support for the Indonesian claim in West New Guinea, a claim which Australia has resolutely opposed.

Differences of outlook and judgment between Asia and Australia were, of course, to be expected. Disagreements over such questions as West New Guinea do some damage to the Australian desire for more cordial relationships; but they do not prevent Australia from pursuing her general objective.

What is ironic is that American policy towards Asia in the postwar years should have enormously complicated the Australian task of cultivating good relations simultaneously with Asia and the United States. The Australian dilemma could be stated in oversimplified terms by saying that when Australia has been closest to the United States she has been furthest away from Asia. This in many ways is a paradox. The anti-colonial record of the United States and its long-standing sympathy with aspirations for independence had built a tremendous fund of good will for it in almost all areas under colonial rule. This should have been of incalculable value in dealing with Asia. Yet this fund of good will was expended incredibly quickly, due to a series of policy misjudgments, a lack of sensitivity toward Asian attitudes when they diverged from those of the United States, and a failure to appreciate the psychological reactions that were bound to occur in Asian countries when faced by enormous American economic and military power. The leaders of recently emancipated countries are sensitive on questions of status and prestige and fearful of anything that might endanger the reality of their independence. Many are afraid that American policies which led to the presence of American troops or American military installations in Asia may indirectly impair their freedom of action. They are no less afraid that American economic power might place them in a position of dependence.

Australians and New Zealanders can understand these Asian reactions even when they do not approve of them. This is in part because of their own experience in dealing with the United States. Indeed, Australians are inclined to wonder whether there is real understanding in the United States either of the legitimate responsibilities of allies or of the requirements imposed upon America by its world leadership. In the Australian view, an ally has a responsibility not only to defend his own legitimate interests but to criticize what it may regard as weaknesses in the allied position. At times there has been a tendency in the United States to assume that the essential function of an ally, or indeed of any country not committed to the Communist camp, is to accept unquestioningly the American outlook and the American political tactic. No doubt the President repudiates such a concept, but it is disconcerting to discover the extent to which influential Americans have made rigid, ideological conformity the test of rectitude. When, for instance, the New Zealand Government indicated that it was having second thoughts about the recognition of Communist China, this was equated with treachery in some American quarters and even the worth of continuing the ANZUS Agreement was called into question. Such an emotional response not only arouses a natural resentment but implies that certain Americans in positions of responsibility allow their judgments to be clouded by prejudice.

Events of the past nine months have provided an important opportunity for the United States to make a fresh start in her relations with Asian peoples, and it should not be lost. If wisely embraced, it could be used to demonstrate that the United States has no ulterior motives in its dealings with Asia, that its objective is essentially that of the maintenance of stability and security. It was therefore all the more unfortunate that Mr. Dulles should have chosen the SEATO meeting at Canberra in March as the occasion for an even more determined reaffirmation of United States objections to the recognition of Communist China. Two SEATO members, the United Kingdom and Pakistan, had already granted recognition and were certainly determined not to budge from this position. Opinion in both the United States and Australia seems to be steadily moving in the same direction. It is time that the United States Government reconsidered this question and in doing so divorced the issue from the emotionalism which up till now has surrounded it in America. Recognition does not imply moral approval. The argument which Charles James Fox advanced for the recognition of the French Revolutionary government still holds good: "It was the true policy of every nation to treat with the existing government of every other nation with which it had relative interests, without inquiring or regarding how that government was constituted, or by what means those who exercised it came into power." Few actions would do more to strengthen the American influence with the non-Communist governments of Asia, few actions would do more to assist the Australian policy of close and cordial relations with the Southeast Asia area.


The Suez crisis brought out more clearly than ever the inherent difficulties of Australia's triangular foreign policy. In Australia, as elsewhere, the Anglo-French decision to use force precipitated a great debate about both the legitimacy and the wisdom of the action. The Prime Minister as leader of the mission to President Nasser had been intimately involved at an earlier stage. He now came out in strong support of the British Government and carried his own governmental parties with him--though not, there is reason to suppose, without differences of opinion with Mr. Casey, who has long been regarded as the foremost advocate of close American ties, nor without a good deal of disquiet among some at least of the Prime Minister's supporters. Dr. Evatt, as Leader of the Opposition, was insistent that the Anglo-French action was illegal and unwise. His view throughout was that methods of gunboat diplomacy were anachronistic and that the dispute should be dealt with by the United Nations. The metropolitan press was, on the whole, critical of the action; it hoped that some good might come of it but feared that it would injure British prestige, place an intolerable strain upon the Commonwealth, damage Anglo-American relations and excite Asian antagonism. When after the British withdrawal it became possible to draw up some kind of a balance sheet, the majority of the Australian newspapers found their fears justified and looked upon the whole episode as a cardinal blunder. Despite consistent support of the British position by the Menzies Administration, it could be said that the Suez incident deeply divided the nation along much the same lines and for much the same reasons as happened in the United Kingdom.

Perhaps the hardest thing for Australians to accept was the failure of the British Government to employ the machinery of consultation or even to inform Australia in advance of its crucial decision to take independent action. This deliberate failure (as also in the case of the United States and Canada) aroused a great deal of animosity and not least because the Australian Prime Minister had been so actively involved in the earlier stages of the dispute. Beyond this, however, it struck at one of the basic assumptions upon which the Commonwealth rested. A British government acting in secret and on its own initiative could hardly expect other members of the Commonwealth who had not been consulted to share in the attendant risks of the policy pursued. Without full and frank consultation, which does not necessarily imply a binding collective decision, the Commonwealth as an organization has little if any meaning.

Despite the early dismay at the British Government's action, and the incessant criticisms by Dr. Evatt (which were directed at least as much against Menzies as against Eden), opinion rapidly firmed up in support of Britain, if not in support of the specific Suez policy. In more moderate degree the same distinction was made by other members of the Commonwealth. It had been considered possible that the Anglo-French action might lead to the disruption of the Commonwealth; it was almost certain that it would breed dissension within it, diminish British prestige and influence, and in view of Australia's formal stand on Britain's side, worsen Australian relations with her Asian neighbors. It was encouraging from the Australian point of view that the leaders of political opinion in India, Pakistan and Ceylon decided against the drastic step of severing their connection with the Commonwealth. It was also of importance that Asian leaders recognized that in expressing their opposition they were echoing the sentiments of large and influential sections of United Kingdom opinion. The trenchant criticism of the Suez adventure among Britishers themselves had the effect in Asian communities as elsewhere of directing opposition against a particular measure and a particular government rather than against Britain as such. Nevertheless, only those who wish to deceive themselves would argue that no important damage had been done to Asian relations either with Great Britain or with Australia. It will require long, patient and imaginative effort to restore full confidence and close coöperation.

The second and in many ways most significant consequence of Suez was the complete breakdown of Anglo-American unity of purpose. For the first time in the conduct of Australian foreign policy since the war a government was faced with the necessity of making what it must have regarded as the most invidious of choices--a choice between the United Kingdom and the United States. It decided to give open and formal support to the United Kingdom and in doing so stood almost alone both within and without the Commonwealth. That the choice should have been made in favor of the United Kingdom is testimony both to the influence of the Prime Minister and to the strength of the continuing domestic support for close association with Britain. It is understood that while Cabinet solidarity was formally maintained the decision created deep divisions among ministers. On one question, however, there was no dissent. The Prime Minister, the Minister for External Affairs and the Government supporters as a whole held firm to the belief that the interests of the non-Communist world could not be defended without the closest concert of policy between the United States and the Western European democracies. From the outset the press expressed concern that the greatest casualty of all from Suez might well be in Anglo-American relations. Australian alarm had, of course, an even more specific cause. Enmity or a failure to coöperate for common ends would destroy one of the basic propositions upon which Australian foreign policy has rested.

Two other repercussions of the Suez conflict call for brief comment. The first is a discernible change in attitude on the part of the Government and some sections of the press towards the United Nations. This change reflects dissatisfaction with the position which the General Assembly has come to occupy and more especially with the growing divorce between the power to make a decision and responsibility for its execution. The growth in solidarity and numerical strength of certain voting blocs, notably the Afro-Asian, is felt to have given such groups an influence quite out of proportion to their real ability to contribute to economic stability, international order and world peace. There is also the belief that the Assembly is being more and more used as an agency for political group agitation and that many critical issues are not being examined impartially on their merits but are being approached from preconceived positions of prejudice and determined by doctrinaire considerations.

The handling of the Middle Eastern situation disclosed further grounds for criticism. A majority within the Assembly seemed more concerned with technical definitions of aggression--who crossed the frontier first?--than with an examination of the underlying causes of tension or with the discovery of a solution to the problems of the area. Again, while few Australians quarrelled with the decision to establish an international police force, many thought it curious that having insisted on an Anglo-French withdrawal the Assembly did not equally insist on laying down the terms and conditions upon which Egypt should admit such a force. So far as the present government is concerned, these misgivings have been reinforced by the Assembly's handling of the Hungarian and West New Guinea issues. Its misgivings are not shared, however, by Dr. Evatt or the Labor Opposition, both of whom continue to insist that the United Nations should occupy a position of utmost prominence in Australian international thinking.

The Suez crisis also emphasized more sharply the divergence in outlook between the parties on questions of foreign policy. It not only made the difference in approach towards the United Nations explicit but, by widening the gap on a specific issue, also led the Labor Party at the Federal Conference at Brisbane in March to emphasize more strongly other aspects of foreign policy about which they disagreed with the Government. The major area of disagreement continued to be Asian policy. The Conference urged recognition of Communist China and her admission to the United Nations, the withdrawal of Australian forces from Malaya, more determined efforts to develop both official and unofficial contacts with all Asian peoples, and a reshaping of SEATO policy. SEATO in particular was subjected to severe attack. "This conference is of the opinion that SEATO has failed to perform its basic functions, that it is fast becoming an instrument for bolstering reactionary régimes as in Siam, and that the Liberal-Country Party coalition government has contributed to SEATO's ineffectiveness."[iii]

It is of course easy to exaggerate the extent of genuine difference between the Labor and non-Labor parties. Both are in agreement over the New Guinea issue and both subscribe to the importance of close ties with the United States. Nor would the present Government have much difficulty in agreeing with many other sections of the Labor Conference resolutions--"generous assistance to Asian peoples," "the end of colonialism whenever and wherever the people are fit for self-government" and "recognition of the dignity and self-respect of Asian nations and peoples."[iv] The points of difference therefore narrow down to the withdrawal of troops from Malaya, recognition of Communist China and the problem of SEATO.

What Labor does in office may of course differ widely from what Labor says in opposition. It is not easy at this point, however, to see much possibility of compromise between the Government and Opposition positions over SEATO and the use of Australian troops in Malaya. The Government is strongly committed to close collaboration with the United States in planning its security arrangements and SEATO forms an integral part of the pattern of both American and Australian security thinking. How the Labor Party would sustain an equally close association with the United States without at the same time an active participation in Asian security arrangements is something which it has so far not explained and about which it will need to do a good deal of hard thinking.

Despite Suez there are many instances of a practical strengthening of Australian-United States coöperation in the Pacific and Asian areas. One might point to the Australian willingness to make the Woomera Range available for American use, the negotiations designed to ensure a closer integration of Australian and American military and civilian air programs, the decision to standardize Australian and American military equipment, the reiteration by Mr. Dulles of the American promise that Australia would never stand alone in the Pacific, and the rationalization of the Australian defense program in order to ensure a larger ground force for any emergency in the Southeast Asian area.

In assessing the prospects of SEATO and the wisdom of close coöperation with the United States in Asian security arrangements, we must bear in mind that the Asian reaction to both may well have been affected by the Suez and Hungarian issues. Soviet prestige has suffered a severe blow and many people in Asia will undoubtedly be more cautious than before when assessing whether or not Communism may prove aggressive. It is true, of course, that United Kingdom prestige has also heavily declined; but even here much responsible Asian opinion has contrasted favorably the willingness of the United Kingdom to accept United Nations verdicts with the refusal of the Soviet Union to act in accordance with them. What is more important, however, is the fact that American prestige has very greatly increased in Asia because of her action in leading the opposition to the Anglo-French exercise of force and because of her sustained support for the United Nations.

[i] "Foreign Affairs and Defense." Statement in the House of Representatives, April 20, 1955. Current Notes on International Affairs, April 1955, p. 285.

[ii]Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (Canberra: Government Printer), September 17, 1952, p. 1558.

[iii]Sydney Morning Herald, March 14, 1957.


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  • GORDON GREENWOOD, Professor of History and Political Science, University of Queensland; Chairman, Research Committee, Australian Institute of International Affairs; Editor of The Australian Journal of Politics and History.
  • More By Gordon Greenwood