PREPARATIONS are under way for another meeting of the Imperial Conference, to take place in London while representatives from the Dominions are gathered for the coronation of George VI. This will be the first full and official meeting of the Conference since 1930 [i] and the thirteenth since the original Colonial Conference was summoned to London in 1887. In view of the disturbed condition of the world and the breakdown of the League, questions of foreign policy and defense are certain to have first place on the agenda. Amid the enthusiasm stimulated by the Coronation, and faced with the threat of war, the older school of imperialists, well represented in the British Government, are likely to bring strong pressure to persuade the Dominions to tie their foreign policy more closely to that of Great Britain and to share in schemes for imperial defense. How will the Canadian delegates respond to these suggestions? What attitude will they adopt toward the various other topics that will come up for discussion? These questions are giving rise to much speculation in Canada, and in certain quarters at least to no little apprehension. For Canadians at present have very strong and very divided opinions on the subject of Canada's obligations toward the Commonwealth, and there is great uncertainty regarding the stand which the Dominion Government proposes to take.

The coming Imperial Conference will differ from all its predecessors in that for the first time the Dominions will meet on terms of legal equality with Great Britain. The last two meetings of the Conference, held in 1926 and 1930, were primarily concerned with evolving a new political theory for the Commonwealth, and in bringing the law of the constitution into harmony with that theory. These aims have now been accomplished. The principle of equality of status and complete autonomy for the component parts of the Commonwealth in every aspect of their domestic and external affairs was enunciated in the Balfour Declaration of 1926. It became legally a fact, in so far as legislative capacity is concerned, through the adoption of the Statute of Westminster in 1931. Certain developments since then have rounded out the work of the last Conferences and clarified the meaning of the formal texts. The Union of South Africa, by legislation adopted in 1934,[ii] established full internal control not only over its own constitution but also over the methods by which the royal assent may be given to statutes and other documents, thus rendering possible independent action by the Union probably even on matters of peace and war. The Irish Free State successfully contended before the Privy Council its right to disregard the restrictions imposed in the Treaty of 1922,[iii] and it also has virtually full internal control over the exercise of the royal prerogative in foreign affairs. Canada's power to prevent appeals from its courts to the Privy Council by purely Canadian legislation has been upheld,[iv] and though her capacity to give legislative effect to treaties has been grievously weakened by the recent decision of the Privy Council with regard to Mr. Bennett's "new deal" legislation, the power to negotiate all treaties short of those relating to separate peace and war remains somewhere in the Dominion.

The events surrounding the abdication of Edward VIII, while in one sense indicating the unity of the Commonwealth, also demonstrated the equality of status enjoyed by the Dominions, since their consent had to be obtained before the Abdication Act could be passed by the British Parliament; and they have since adopted their own Abdication Acts into the bargain. Those portions of the constitutional unity of the former British Empire which remain -- and they are not inconsiderable -- rest clearly on the voluntary agreement of the Dominions to retain them rather than on the absence of Dominion capacity to dispose of them. This is true even of Canada's present inability to make her own declarations of war and peace. She has not yet acquired a separate right to control these vital matters, and so in this respect is far from equality with Great Britain; yet it would appear that she could at any time follow the example of South Africa and obtain the power by making the necessary constitutional changes. In any case, the right of every Dominion to decide how far it will participate in a British war has been fully recognized by previous Conferences. The coming Imperial Conference, then, which ought now to be renamed the " Commonwealth Conference"[v], will represent nations more legally independent of one another, more free to adopt separate courses of action, than at any time in their history.

These considerations alone would suffice to give the approaching meeting a special significance. It will disclose to what extent the new freedom of the Dominions will be exercised. But there is another factor which will make the Conference of particular importance, not only to the members of the Commonwealth but also to the world at large. The modern idea of the Commonwealth was evolved along with the new concepts of international behavior which found embodiment in the League of Nations. The separate Dominion membership in the League heralded the constitutional changes in the Empire. Dominion autonomy came to maturity under the aegis of Geneva, and the loosening of the legal bonds with Great Britain was peacefully arranged in a world that subscribed to the idea of collective security. If it had not been possible for the Dominions to look to the alternative protection of the League in place of the weakening Imperial guarantees, their constitutional evolution might have been very different. Today the League is powerless. Collective security can scarcely be termed even a remote ideal.

How will this change affect the policies of the Dominions? Will it drive them to seek an old security by strengthening the defenses of the Empire, thus creating a military unity to replace the constitutional autonomy? Or will they keep clear of the political implications of such a policy and look to new regional groupings dictated more by geography than sentiment? And what possibility is there of the Commonwealth nations coming forward as champions of a revivified League? These are the basic questions of the forthcoming Conference. Other matters of lesser importance, such as trade agreements, immigration, communications and shipping, will doubtless receive their share of attention. But it is the decisions on the larger political issues, whether these decisions be express or tacit, which will be of prime importance in shaping the Commonwealth's future development.

To show how completely the outlook has changed even since the informal British Commonwealth Relations Conference met in 1933, we may cite a portion of the report of the special subcommittee appointed by that Conference to go into the question of a Dominion's right to neutrality in the event of a war involving Great Britain. The all-important question was disposed of in the following manner:

It seems to us academic and unprofitable to consider legal constitutional difficulties which might arise if there were no Covenant and no Kellogg Pact. The principles of freedom and coöperation and "agreed anomalies" on which the Commonwealth is based, may create difficulties in many fields and we feel, therefore, that it would serve no useful purpose to try and foresee problems in one field, that of war, which we are entitled to hope are never likely to arise, and to seek to apply to them legal conceptions as to war and neutrality appropriate to the pre-League world.

Today the "academic" question of neutrality is uppermost in the minds of Canadians, and the "legal conceptions as to war and neutrality appropriate to the pre-League world" are precisely the ones in the light of which the obligations of the members of the Commonwealth must now be decided.

Thus the Canadian delegates to London, like those from the other Dominions, will be faced with decisions of the greatest moment. But unlike some of their colleagues, the Canadians will labor under the added difficulty of having to represent an extremely divided public opinion at home. In view of the racial and religious composition of the Canadian population, and the conflicting economic interests of different sections of the country, this division is scarcely surprising. No mistake is more common, even among Canadians, than to talk about "Canada" as though the term represented a single people with well-defined political allegiances. Because Canadians have a white skin and a parliamentary system of government they are assumed to be a "British" people with a natural tendency to take a British view of world affairs. An examination of the facts will give a different impression. Some 30 percent of the people are French-Canadian, and fully another 20 percent have non-British origins. At the 1931 census the Canadians of British descent amounted to only 51.8 percent of the population, and the non-British, whose natural increase is greater, are almost certainly in the majority today. In other words, Canada has ceased already to be racially British. Further, no less than 41 percent of the people in Canada are Roman Catholic (as against 6 percent in Great Britain). The fact has an increasing political significance in a world where international conflicts are taking on more and more the aspects of wars of religion. And while some "assimilation" (which to the British-Canadian means "anglicization") of the foreigners has taken place, while they may speak English, or a variant of it, and are accustomed to a holiday on Empire Day and the King's birthday, these factors are more than offset by the growing North American character of the political thinking of the Dominion, especially in those areas far removed from contact with any country save the United States. These racial and religious diversities are additional to the economic and geographic factors which have always divided Canada into sections, setting the industrial East against the agricultural West, and cutting off the St. Lawrence Valley from the Prairies and separating the Pacific seaboard from both.[vi]

The inescapable social facts here briefly indicated produce conflicting attitudes within Canada. And it is her internal conflicts, not any nastiness of temperament in the Canadians, which chiefly explains why the Dominion has always been so lukewarm toward proposals for closer Imperial coöperation. Canada's real difficulty is not how to coöperate with other members of the Commonwealth, but how to secure coöperation within herself. The constitutional evolution within the Dominion during the past forty years has accentuated the internal divisions. The Privy Council, through its interpretations of the British North America Act, has steadily whittled away the authority of the federal parliament, and exaggerated, against all reason, that of the provincial legislatures; the recent decisions on Mr. Bennett's legislation are the most destructive of all, virtually undoing all the work of nation-building that has gone on since the World War. The consequence is that national unity is still further delayed and both Commonwealth and international coöperation are rendered more difficult. The Privy Council has been an important factor in weakening the Imperial sentiment in Canada.

Today there are at least four important groups of Canadian opinion on foreign policy. There are, first, the pure nationalists or isolationists, who argue that as Canada has no enemies and is under no conceivable threat of invasion she should keep clear of all entanglements in the Empire, the League, or elsewhere, and devote herself to the solution of her own internal problems. The second group, closely allied in sentiment, would welcome isolation from European commitments, but would willingly see Canada join the Pan American Union in an attempt to create a regional system of security in the Americas. It is safe to say that all French-Canadians belong to one or other of these two groups of thought, as well as a great preponderance of the 20 percent of the population who are neither of French nor British origin, and a fair proportion -- greatly increased in the past two years -- of the Canadians of British descent. Thus a substantial majority of Canadian citizens would almost certainly be "North American" in the prevailing temper of the country, and though they have no desire to see the British connection broken, some cause or ideal greater than mere Commonwealth solidarity would be needed to make them support the idea of active participation in European affairs. Such a cause was felt to exist in the Italo-Abyssinian affair, and the prompt application of sanctions by Mr. King undoubtedly met with general approval in Canada outside Quebec; but even then the isolationist sentiment reappeared suddenly with the Government's repudiation of Dr. Riddell's suggestion of the oil sanction. In the absence of a strong League and collective international action, there probably is no cause for which a preponderant number of Canadians would be willing to go to war in Europe. Certainly another appeal to save democracy would be a doubtful rallying cry.

The other two schools of opinion are still influential in Canada though their numbers are declining. One consists of the "imperialists," the other of League of Nations supporters. The imperialists are still heard to say that the British Empire is the strongest bulwark of world peace, and that Canada should stand ready to answer the call of the motherland in every emergency. They want closer ties with Great Britain generally, larger expenditures on Canadian defense, and more British immigrants. Mr. J. W. Dafoe has recently said that this old type of imperialism "has almost completely vanished from the minds of the people of Canada" in the years since the World War.[vii] This is probably an over-statement, though it is true that the process is going steadily on. The imperialists usually occupy the more dignified positions in church and state and thus sound more numerous than they actually are. No one would deny the reality of the pro-British sentiment in Canada; but it is more and more becoming a respect for certain ideals, institutions and forms of government, and it is ceasing to include either a blind faith in the continual rightness of England's foreign policy or a tacit assumption that the Commonwealth constitutes an offensive-defensive alliance. The Englishman may see that his frontier is on the Rhine; the Canadian finds it a little difficult to believe that his is also. From this position it is only a step to the demand for the right to neutrality. Similarly, the fourth block of opinion in Canada, composed of those who believe in collective security, is important because it has representation in responsible quarters. The members of this group hope against hope that some turn of affairs may restore the prestige of the League and make possible a revival of the collective system, to which they would want to see Canada give full support. Should such a revival occur, public sympathy for the League would revive with it; but at the moment there are no signs of either event.

These groups of opinion are not always mutually exclusive, and their relative strengths vary with changes in the international situation. Only present tendencies can be analyzed; future alignments cannot be forecast too precisely. This much seems clear, however. French-Canadian opinion is steadily nationalist; most of the other Canadian opinion appears to fluctuate between support of the collective system and some form of isolationist policy. The true imperialist fares badly. Recent political changes, both in the international and in the domestic sphere, have tended to move public opinion rapidly toward isolation. The principal factor, influencing especially the English-Canadians, has been the foreign policy followed by the National Government in Great Britain since 1931. Whether the Canadian interpretation of that policy be correct need not be argued; in these matters it is not the truth of the opinion, but its acceptance, which counts. Briefly, many Canadians feel that the National Government betrayed the principles of the League over Manchuria, throwing away the chance of coöperation with the United States;[viii] that its sudden use of the League in the Abyssinian incident was mere support of the traditional imperialist policy of protecting the sea route to the East, and not at all a defense of the Covenant, of international law or of weaker member states -- the Hoare-Laval treaty being an unexpectedly abrupt dropping of the disguise; that the subsequent day-by-day conduct of British foreign relations, almost without regard to Geneva, shows an absence of vision and leadership and a frank preference for office politics of the old type; and that a government like that now in office in London will simply try to use the Commonwealth as a supplier of men and munitions for the inevitable and futile war that its policy will produce. This belief has driven many former imperialists, and many more of the League supporters, into the isolationist camp.

Other events, different in kind, have had similar consequences. The successful working of the new Reciprocity Treaty with the United States, the reëlection of President Roosevelt on a progressive program, the recent and widely publicized Pan American meeting at Buenos Aires, have convinced many Canadians that their natural and proper affiliations lie more in the Americas than in Europe. The old fear of absorption by the United States seems completely to have disappeared from the Canadian mind, due partly, no doubt, to the stronger national consciousness found in Canada today as a result of the ending of the colonial status, and partly to a greater belief in the absence of any desire for expansion in the minds of people in the United States. Canada is ceasing to feel herself a sort of semi-European visitor in the North American household. Even some of the French-Canadian newspapers have recently supported Dominion membership in the Pan American Union, and though the full implications of the idea have not yet been appreciated the idea is undoubtedly finding much favor. A North American system of security would furnish a common meeting ground for the extreme isolationist and the disappointed League supporter, each of whom finds it preferable to participation in the European armament race toward war. Those who have once tasted the larger loyalty to the League will not now, in their disillusion, revert to a narrow imperialism, whatever the guise in which it may appear -- not even though it be described, in the truly ingenious phrase of an English Member of Parliament, as "collective security within the Empire."

Amongst the French-Canadians the most important development has been the revival of nationalism in the Province of Quebec. Never before has this movement been so vocal or so aggressive.[ix] Its extreme wing is openly secessionist, aiming to create an independent French-Canadian republic on the banks of the St. Lawrence. The resurgence of nationalism was the principal reason for the overthrow of Mr. Taschereau and the provincial Liberal Party in August 1936, and the coming to power of Mr. Duplessis at the head of a new party, the Union Nationale. The instinctive isolationist attitude of the French-Canadian is fortified by the movement, and every suggestion of closer ties with the Commonwealth is now being met with vigorous opposition. The pressure of this nationalist influence upon the 59 French-Canadian members of Mr. King's Liberal Party will tend to make the Canadian Government's policy more cautious toward proposals for coöperation in imperial defense, assistance to immigration, and kindred matters. It would be utterly impossible, in Quebec's present temper, to induce any French-Canadians to take part in another European war simply because Great Britain was engaged in it; and any attempt by the Dominion to enforce conscription for this purpose would create civil disturbance on a large scale. The knowledge of this fact has a sobering influence on the impulsive loyalties of certain imperialists in Canada.[x]

Such, in broad perspective, are the movements of Canadian opinion which Mr. Mackenzie King will have to bear in mind when he sits with his colleagues around the conference table in London. The net result will be discouraging for those who expect Canada to assume further responsibilities toward the Commonwealth. Mr. King himself has stated that "Canada's first duty to the League and to the British Empire, with respect to the great issues that come up, is, if possible, to keep this country united."[xi] The impossibility of maintaining Canadian unity on a policy of rigid Commonwealth commitments should be clear to the reader. If attempts are to be made to bring the Commonwealth closer together in a political and military sense because of the League's breakdown, Canada will be inclined to draw farther away. A united move by the Commonwealth nations to restore the League would undoubtedly command wide sympathy in Canada, and would have the effect of strengthening the Imperial connection, for then the one loyalty would incorporate and give new purpose to the other. It is difficult, however, to see the initiative for such a policy coming from Mr. King. He has indicated on more than one occasion that Canada must take a back seat at Geneva.[xii]

The policy of promoting Canadian unity, however, will necessitate some degree of Commonwealth coöperation on the part of Mr. King in order to satisfy the imperialist sentiment. In so far as defense is concerned, the recent large increases in the Canadian defense estimates, which were explained as being required solely for Canadian purposes, are clearly intended to ease the pressure for greater military preparedness without unduly exciting the isolationists. There is not likely to be further concession to the proposals that Canada should share in the cost of British rearmament. Some English imperialists would do well to remember that any attempt to impose additional taxation on Canada for defense purposes, by veiled implications that Canadians are enjoying the privileges without the responsibilities of membership in the Commonwealth, are simply going to force Canada to consider the question whether those privileges cannot be too dearly bought. The membership dues paid by Canada between 1914-1918 amounted to some 60,000 dead and a legacy of internal debt of over four billion dollars. Moreover, it is difficult for Canadians to believe that the existence of Canada today has added one farthing to the amount which the British Government was determined to spend on rearmament in any event. England cannot solve her military problems by invoking the military aid of the Dominions to help her dominate the Continent or isolate herself from it, and in so far as the Dominions foster that illusion they are doing a disservice to the true interests of the British peoples and to Europe also.

More important even than defense is the vexed question of neutrality. This delicate issue has so far been successfully evaded by the Dominion Government, and the uncertainty continues as to what Canada's position would or could be in the event Great Britain were involved in a war. In the debate on January 25, 1936, on Mr. J. S. Woodsworth's resolution supporting a policy of neutrality, Mr. King and Mr. Lapointe talked at length on the subject, and only added to the confusion. "So far as participation in war is concerned," Mr. King said, "It will be for the Parliament of Canada to decide . . . It will be for this Parliament to say in a given situation whether or not we shall remain neutral." This sounds as though Canada were free to do as she pleased, and doubtless was intended to convey such an impression. Yet the fact is that under the existing Canadian constitution a declaration of war by the Crown in Great Britain would automatically avail to make Canada at war. The royal prerogative in foreign affairs has not been fully delegated to the Dominion Governor-General. Therefore Mr. King's decision in the event of such a declaration could only be a decision as to how far Canada would supply troops and materials; it could not be a decision to "remain" neutral, since war would have begun in Canada. In his remarks in the House he has confused the right to neutrality with the right to "passive belligerency," and his word "participation" is ambiguous. Such language is the language of political dodgery rather than of fact; it can only be intended to stave off an open fight on the issue, so that Mr. King can carry on his government while avoiding a revelation of the wide differences of opinion which exist within his own party.

Public opinion in Canada will not long be satisfied with evasion, and already is moving to demand that the situation be clarified whether or not the coming Conference intends to deal with it frankly. The consequences of independent action in time of war are difficult to weigh.[xiii] But the right to neutrality will have to be granted sooner or later, and the theory of a permanent personal union under a divisible Crown expanded to meet it. Canada can never be held permanently in the Commonwealth if a mere majority party controlling the House of Commons in London is to be able at any time to involve Canadians in war. The lack of racial unity in the country, if not plain self-respect, would make the British connection impossible on those terms. The full implications of the Balfour declaration of 1926, that the Dominions are to be autonomous in every aspect of their domestic and external affairs, will have to be accepted very shortly, and the decision as to whether Canada will lend aid to Great Britain must be made independently by Ottawa on each occasion as it arises, free from the technical condition of belligerency which the present position automatically involves. It should be the task of this coming Conference to provide in advance a method for possible Dominion neutrality; only so can the Commonwealth avoid the confusions and recriminations that independent and unprepared action by a Dominion will inevitably entail. The right to non-participation has already been conceded; the right to neutrality is the next step.

Turning from defense and neutrality to the less fundamental issues, we find it easier to guess at the probable attitude of the Canadian delegates. As regards the Ottawa trade agreements of 1932, it has already been announced that a revision has been arranged. The details are not yet public, but it is clear that the scheme will not be completely abandoned. In essence the agreements were simply an extension of the principle of Imperial Preference, to which Mr. King and the Liberal Party have long been committed. But whereas the "preference" under Mr. Bennett's administration was increased by the process of raising still further the tariff against non-Empire countries, under Mr. King it is likely to be increased rather by a process of reduction in specific articles, principally textiles. The Canadian Liberal Party believes in free trade, which means that it will always try to put the tariff back to the point where it stood before it was last raised.

Since the Ottawa agreements went into effect in 1932, Canada's trade with the Empire has not remarkably increased. Exports to the Empire rose from 42.1 percent of the total exports in 1932-33 to 47 percent in 1935-36; imports rose from 29.6 percent to 31.6 percent. Part of this increase was due to the increased American tariff of 1930, and part of the increase in British imports was due to the inevitable consequences of economic depression -- for in a depression, trade in capital goods and manufacturer's raw materials decreases more than trade in other commodities. Canada buys more of the former from the United States and more of the latter from Great Britain. Already the non-Empire countries have begun to regain some of their share of Canadian trade, and as the present treaties with the United States, Germany, Japan and France continue to take effect and new treaties are negotiated this recovery will become more apparent. It is not likely that Mr. King's government will risk these new benefits in pursuit of "a vague and somewhat mystical imperial commercial policy."[xiv] Dr. Buell's fear that "the conclusion of the Ottawa agreements marked the final abandonment of the principle of the Open Door" in the British Empire would appear to be unfounded, and Canada may well serve the cause of Anglo-American friendship once more by the influence she is likely to bring to the Imperial Conference against the doctrines of economic imperialism.

In so far as immigration is concerned, Mr. King may be expected also to pursue a cautious policy. There has been some detailed statistical investigation undertaken lately into the results of Canada's past immigration schemes, and the results are not encouraging.[xv] In the first place, Canada is not a country of "great open spaces" -- at least, not habitable spaces. Only 16.25 percent of her land area is "potential agricultural land," and much of this is uncleared and marginal land. In the second place, it is doubtful whether Canada's rural population can be expanded much further within the next decade. In the years 1921-31 the net immigration of foreign-born to rural Canada was 142,000; the net exodus of native-born to the cities and other countries was about 550,000, or 71.2 percent of the estimated natural increase in rural population. In that decade, therefore, more than 400,000 people left the rural districts. Immigrants, many from Central Europe, drove out Canadians. The 1936 census in the Prairie Provinces showed that between 100,000 and 150,000 people had left since 1931. Professor Hurd has calculated that "if agriculture merely holds its own and other rural employment is not forthcoming, a rural surplus of 800,000 is quite within the realm of expectation during the next decade." [xvi] Add to this the fact that nearly a million Canadians were on relief in January 1937 (a larger number than in January 1936) and the logical reasons for new immigration cease to exist. The reference in the proceedings of the 1926 Imperial Conference to the "conspicuous success" of the scheme to place 3,000 families on the land in Canada, should be read along with a press dispatch from Ottawa, dated January 12, 1937, stating that only 45 percent of those same families were still on the land. The rest had drifted to the cities or had been voluntarily deported back to England. The sickness in the Canadian economy is not due to lack of population. Yet immigration propaganda is being spread within the Dominion, sponsored by the imperialist group and certain commercial interests which hope to gain by the influx of new British settlers. In view of the opposition of the French-Canadians, however, and in face of the tale told by population and relief statistics, it is unlikely that any new plan for fostering immigration will come out of the Conference in so far as Canada is concerned.

If this analysis of Canadian sentiment is broadly correct, the coming Imperial Conference will not see the Canadian delegates posing as the champions of any particular Commonwealth policy. Their attitude, however, is likely to carry the implication that the principle of complete autonomy for the Dominions must not now be abandoned. If they do only this, they will have made a real contribution. The way of armaments, of military alliances, of exaggerated kingship and imperial pageantry will lead to no solutions. What men seek today in every country under the sun is the chance to live in freedom and to develop their native powers in security and peace. It is only in so far as the Commonwealth serves these ends that it has a present validity and can hope to command a heartfelt allegiance amongst its myriad peoples. And since it is an artificial and widely separated grouping of nations, it can never hope to supply from within itself the security which can come from a world society alone. In a multitude of matters coöperation between the parts of the Commonwealth is potentially of great value. Markets can be opened, resources developed, research institutes coördinated. Experiments in economic planning may be promoted, and the results of social security schemes exchanged. There are vast populations of native peoples to be educated, and there are obligations to be fulfilled towards less fortunate nations which lack essential raw materials. Little enough has been said of these things in previous Imperial Conferences, and little enough can be hoped for without great social and economic change within the Commonwealth itself. Yet it is along such lines alone that growth and permanence lie. The old concept of unity based on race and a common history must be replaced by positive aims and practical objectives which will be found not to distinguish the Commonwealth from, but to unite it with, other progressive peoples. Empire must cease to exist if Commonwealth is to survive; and Commonwealth itself will fail unless it coordinates its activities with those of a world community. Realistic thinking about Commonwealth problems leads to the necessity of ceasing to think about them in terms of the Commonwealth alone.

[i] The Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa in 1932 discussed commercial matters only; the British Commonwealth Relations Conference at Toronto in 1933 was entirely unofficial.

[ii] Status of Union Act, and Royal Executive Functions and Seals Act.

[iii]Moore v. Attorney-General for the Irish Free State, 1935 Appeal Cases, 484.

[iv]British Coal Corporation v. The King, 1935 Appeal Cases, 500.

[v] The "Colonial" Conference became the "Imperial" Conference in 1907; since the Statute of Westminster, the Imperial Conference would more properly be called the "Commonwealth" Conference.

[vi] See further on this point, "The Social and Economic Bases of Canadian Foreign Policy," by Professor A. R. M. Lower, in "Canada, The Empire and the League," Nelson, 1936, p. 100.

[vii] FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1936, p. 298.

[viii] The Canadian delegate at Geneva supported the British laissez-faire policy at the time, but his action was severely criticized on his return to Canada.

[ix] See "Nationalism in French Canada," THE ROUND TABLE, December 1936.

[x] At the same time it must be remembered that the French-Canadian is first of all a Catholic, and will always support a Vatican foreign policy. He is more under the influence of Rome than the English-Canadian is of London. The French-Canadians, despite their isolationism, sent a contingent of volunteers to Rome to fight for the Pope in 1870, and might be expected to lend assistance to Great Britain if she should join the Fascist powers in an attack on the Soviet Union. The sympathy of the Quebec nationalists, which was pro-Boer in the South African War because of a fellow feeling for the small nation fighting imperialism, was completely pro-Italian in the Abyssinian war and is now strongly pro-rebel in Spain.

[xi] Canadian House of Commons Debates, March 23, 1936, p. 1441.

[xii] On this and other aspects of Mr. King's foreign policy, see articles by Escott Reid in University of Toronto Quarterly, January 1937, and in Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, February 1937.

[xiii] See P. E. Corbett, "Isolation for Canada," in University of Toronto Quarterly, October 1936, and Escott Reid, "Can Canada Remain Neutral?," Dalhousie Review, July 1935.

[xiv] See on this Professor K. W. Taylor, "The Effect of the Ottawa Agreements on Canadian Trade," in the Canadian Papers for the Yosemite Conference, 1936.

[xv] They are summarized by Professor Forsey in The Canadian Forum, February 1937.

[xvi] See Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, May 1935, p. 222 ff.

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