Canadians like to remind their more turbulent friends that they have grown by evolution rather than revolution. In the language of the country, therefore, the present might be described as a pre-evolutionary phase. The change of Government from Conservative to Liberal in April may usher in changes, but politics are only the surface manifestation of a crisis which involves the whole fabric of national life. For several years there has been an intense examination of Canada's economic, constitutional and cultural foundations, conducted in a charged political atmosphere, by no means entirely rational, but a grand debate nevertheless. Canadians have been staring with less blinking than usual at the harder facts, even asking themselves whether the continued existence of the country is justified. They have been stung by criticism from abroad which reached beyond the acts of the Government to question Canadian institutions and traditions- criticism which was unqualified by the benevolent indulgence to which nicely behaved lesser powers have become accustomed. Canada has perhaps suffered too long from the illusion that it is a young country with the license of youth in world affairs, and its course may be firmer as Canadians realize that they are not only middle-powered but middle-aged. The sobriety which has followed a tumultuous election, with the world for the first time looking on, is a mood in which fundamental changes can be accepted. On the eve of the hundredth anniversary of confederation, Canadians in anguish have been discovering its worth and seem disposed to meet present challenges with restored faith-if only they and their leaders can work out some answers.

At issue are: the viability of Canada in the modern age; its role in the world; the unity of the federation; and the national identity of the Canadian people. The relationship with the United States is a factor in all of this, but it is a distortion to see in the Canadian debate a contest between pro- and anti-American forces.

The economic malaise is fundamental because, more than anything else, it has undermined confidence in the future of the nation. At the moment, the economy is looking up. Trade balances have improved in 1963, and the growth rate of 8 percent compares more than favorably with those of the Common Market countries. Disquiet comes from the persisting high rate of unemployment because this bears on Canada's expectation of population growth. For a vast country bent on developing an economy sophisticated enough to nourish a full national life, population is the heart of the matter. Canadians now see their destiny as that not of an eventual great power but of a high-class performer in the minor league. Nevertheless, it is a conviction that the population of 19,000,000 ought to be doubled if Canada is to maintain an economy which it can control and is to fulfill its international obligations. Prosperity isn't necessarily good unless it supports more Canadians on Canadian soil. Canadians are bothered not only by the profits which cross the border but also by the skilled and talented citizens steadily drained away. Fear that the perpetual skimming process will leave the country a second-rate home is a strong element in the malaise.

The Conservative Government's lack of enthusiasm for a broader European union was not shared by economists and businessmen who, by and large, were tantalized by the economic miracle of the Common Market, favored Britain's entry and minimized the dislocations Canadian trade would suffer. However, prevailing ideas about the inevitability of economic regionalism inspired the fear that Canada would become, as was said, "the Outer One." Contrast with European prosperity stimulated bitter self-disparagement. Criticism was intensified by reason of the increasing disapproval of the Government by the economic community, and Mr. Diefenbaker's charge that the Opposition were prophets of "gloom and doom" had some justification. After a decade and a half of heedless confidence, this self-criticism has been purgative, but it was beginning to paralyze the national will.

In such a mood Canadians wondered whether a continental solution was inevitable. They have on occasions contemplated-and a century ago even practiced-forms of continental economic union, and consideration has of late been given in private to ways and means. It is a prospect, however, which Canadians approach grimly, fearful of gambling on the political consequences. Some are single-minded enough to believe that economic considerations alone matter, but the attachment to a political entity called Canada is strong. Because of the political uneasiness and the lack of industrial self-confidence, interest is directed toward schemes for rationalizing industries and production on a continental basis as preferable to headlong precipitation into a common market or free trade area. In spite of indications to the contrary, Canadians are not easily moved from the assumption that Americans would digest them unhesitatingly if they offered themselves.

Preoccupied with Commonwealth trade and the E.E.C., Canada was slow to recognize in President Kennedy's trade expansion proposals the route for a country excessively dependent on trade but geared to no regional configuration. Washington, likewise, was so fascinated with Europe that it omitted Canada from its calculations. Although the United States does more business with Canada than with the whole of the Common Market area, Canada was not included in the "dominant supplier" category of the Trade Expansion Act. By the end of 1962, however, Canada was adjusting itself to Britain's entry and looking to the trade expansion program as a means of establishing acceptable relations with a united Europe. When the unblessed event failed to come off, Canadians were left in a state of arrested development, more uncertain than ever on what set of facts to plan their future. It would be imprudent to suggest that Canada's problem is more a depression of the mind than of the economy, but it is at least partly one of morale. The country is unlikely to proceed far toward solving its problems unless it can find some formula for its place in the sun which makes an increased national effort worthwhile.


The debate over Canada's function in the world came to a head in the argument over accepting nuclear arms. Though the circumstances differ, the problem for Canada is similar to that of other Western countries: how to work out a reasonable basis of association with a super-power in an alliance of unequal partners. There are two elements in the disinclination to have nuclear weapons on Canadian soil which illustrate the dilemmas of the lesser ally. One is the suspicion that Canada is the victim of questionable military decisions in Washington over which it has no control. The other is the desire to make some national contribution to halting the spread of nuclear weapons.

The present Canadian malaise had its roots in the cancellation of the Arrow aircraft in 1959. Canadian industry had perfected a military aircraft which it had reason to consider the best of its class, but the United States could not be persuaded to adopt it. Production was stopped and hundreds of Canada's best technical experts left for California. It was a traumatic experience, and a mood of hopelessness about Canadian industrial and military prospects settled on the land. The suspicion that Canadian interests had been sacrificed to the U.S. aircraft industry was inevitable, in spite of persuasive arguments for the decision. At the time, it was hard to see that Canada was a victim of the inevitable integration of Western defense production and the inexorable technological developments which affect American and non-American producers alike. This kind of trouble is more easily absorbed, however, into a versatile economy, especially when the causes can be traced to domestic rather than foreign decisions. Canada accepted American Bomarc missiles and Voodoo aircraft to replace the Arrow- under the pressure, it should be said, of circumstances rather than the Pentagon. Bomarcs, like Skybolts, however, are contraptions on which long- range policies cannot be based. It is inevitable that decisions be made in Washington because Washington alone has the requisite knowledge and responsibility. It is equally inevitable, however, that countries like Canada and Britain will seek after strategic roles which are distinct, as self-contained as possible, complementary rather than merely supplementary. From one point of view, this search for a special function may seem petty in a perilous age, but it reflects an understandable desire of a country to have a defense policy which is, in so far as possible within an alliance, adjustable to the requirements of its own foreign policy and its own economy-and which does not blow up in its face every five years.

The opposition to nuclear weapons reflected also the persistent Canadian anxiety to make some useful contribution beyond the cold war to the cause of world order. This urge was confused by arguments of dubious logic and morality, but behind it was a conviction that, regardless of who retained ultimate control, as few countries as possible should have nuclear weapons. The willingness to leave nuclear defense of the West to the United States is not an intrinsically anti-American position and reflects a trust which the United States might be grateful to find among its European allies. There is, of course, in Canada as elsewhere (including the United States), criticism of American nuclear policy. The objections to nuclear weapons cannot, however, be attributed simply to pacifists, unilateralists or neutralists. It would be a mistake, furthermore, to see in the election a simple victory for accepting nuclear weapons. Canada has yet to be convinced that the cause of the Alliance, of the United States, or of the international community is necessarily served by Canada's having nuclear weapons. It is not a question, as is often charged, of Canada's hypocritically seeking shelter under the American nuclear umbrella. It is a question of a rational distribution of functions, having in mind both the military effectiveness of the Alliance and its interest in reducing the peril from nuclear weapons. The Liberals think Canada should fulfill its agreed commitments, whatever they might be, but they have carried into office their doubts over the advisability of continuing indefinitely the strategy which assigns nuclear weapons to Canadian bases and nuclear weapons to Canadian forces in Europe. Whether these doubts will survive the friendly persuasion of high NATO and NORAD councils is, of course, questionable.

Canadians are, of course, open to the charge of inconsistency in that they have not extended themselves to provide non-nuclear forces for NATO. The excuse is partly that conscription of any kind would exacerbate already strained relations between English-and French-Canadians. There is also widespread skepticism about the logic of Canada's maintaining expensive forces in a populous and prosperous country like Germany. Canadian Governments have been reluctant to rock the NATO boat by withdrawing their forces, but this is a further reason why the new Government wants a reëxamination of NATO assignments. In Canada there is also a strong opinion that its most useful services are those which it provides for international peace-keeping operations in the Middle East, the Congo, Indochina and elsewhere and that its armed forces should to an increasing extent be trained and organized for these middle-power functions. There is no sound reason, however, why the two need be incompatible if the establishment is large enough.

The need for a special function in the world may reflect a pretentious nationalism, or it may reflect the need of a country, particularly a country uncertain of its identity, to feel responsible, to fulfill a mission, limited though this may be. Canadians tasted the exhilaration of a mission well done in the first decade after the War, and their recent irascibility is partly attributable to a feeling that they have lost the way. Unlike the great empires of the past, Canada has had to adjust itself to a swift cycle of rise and decline in international rank even while it was growing in experience and strength. It is superficial simply to attribute this depreciation to the change of government in 1957 and assume, therefore, that the new Liberal Government will automatically restore the status of six years ago. Canada has been reverting to a more natural position after a giddy experience in the postwar years as one of the major Western countries during the temporary exhaustion of the European powers. Furthermore, the rise of new nations, powerful in political influence if not in resources, and the multiplication of United Nations members, have increased the roster of middle powers and altered old patterns. Instead of being a fresh new power in international diplomacy, Canada is a relatively elderly member, and in the course of an active diplomacy has acquired enemies and stimulated grudges. Perhaps, too, something of the earlier pragmatism has been lost.


The economic question may be fundamental, but the question of unity is critical. These two issues, however, set up contradictions because the economy requires national direction at a time when the bonds of federation may have to be eased if Quebec is to remain part of it.

The crisis of unity is partly ethnic and partly regional. A source of recent disquiet was the disintegration of the national consensus revealed in the election of June 1962, when the two minority parties gained strength and the voting of the regions was so at variance as to leave doubt whether they were all participating in the same election. The threat to the convention of two major parties roused anxiety not so much because coalition government is impossible as because the governing party is expected to embrace all regions and is looked to, therefore, as the most important institution for holding the country together. The election this spring did not alter the pattern greatly, but the forces of disintegration were checked. It accentuated, in fact, a growing breach between the big cities, where the Liberals and New Democrats flourish, and the small towns and the countryside, dominated by the Conservatives and Social Credit. In that it counters the graver dangers of regionalism, this schism may even be healthy.

The election's most important contribution to unity is that the governing party now has an equally solid basis in Ontario and Quebec, and French Canada will have greater strength in the Cabinet than under the previous régime. The Canadian political instinct abhors a French party and an English party. At this of all times, such a division would be disastrous, because the most critical issue for the country arises from the new intransigence of French-Canadians.

Though historians differ, French-Canadians look upon confederation as a compact, an agreement to political coexistence between partners. The position of French Canada is in no way comparable to that of any ethnic groups in the United States or with other ethnic groups in Canada. The French are not immigrants but first settlers, not a conquered race but one of the two communities which, by various understandings and statutes over two centuries, have agreed to union within a bicultural country. Over these centuries French and English have learned to live in amiable coexistence, accepting rather than understanding each other. Prevailing attitudes among the English-speaking majority have been mellowing. The acceptance of a bilingual state as a burden has given way, particularly in intellectual circles, to a warming enthusiasm for the French element as something unique in Canadian life. Unfortunately, however, these relatively happy relations have been based on the convention that the English speak English and the French are bilingual; the nation's business is conducted in the English language and in the Anglo-Saxon way, although the rights of the French to translations are to be respected.

Such arrangements have assumed the continuing docility of the French, but the political, social and cultural revolution which followed the ousting of the reactionary régime of Maurice Duplessis in Quebec in 1960 has roused a new spirit of assertiveness in that province. Unlike previous French nationalist movements, this one is neither protective nor nostalgic but progressive. The irony of the situation is that the liberation of the French spirit, with its emphasis on reform in education, is welcomed by English-Canadians as the new factor which could bring English and French closer together and make equal partnership possible. French demands for a revision of the practices of confederation get a surprising amount of sympathy in English Canada. Militant separatism has had a useful shock effect, but the danger cannot be ignored that extremist demands and terrorist acts will awaken old animosities. It remains a question, furthermore, how far English-speaking Canadians, culturally and commercially embedded in an English-speaking continent, are prepared or are free in practice to make the institutional as well as personal sacrifices which true biculturalism involves. Meanwhile the French are impatient for change. Although only a minority are separatists, many more say that they will give confederation one last chance.

The mentality of French-Canadian nationalism has much in common with that of new nations. The emphasis on French culture draws them toward Paris but there is no suggestion of political enosis. With Gaullism the nationalists have little in common save a suspicion of Anglo-Saxondom. Rather, they are anti-imperialist and anti-militarist, socialist or at least statist in their ideas about developing and protecting their resources. They are not deliberately anti-American but are out of tune with contemporary attitudes in the United States. French Canada is united in opposing nuclear weapons for Canada, and although the nationalists are non-Communist they can evince sympathy for Castro and Latin Americans struggling against the power and wealth of the Anglo-Saxons. The stronger voice that French Canada has now obtained in foreign policy is not likely to be exerted in favor of orthodox NATO policies, not because French-Canadians are opposed to NATO but because they are more interested in other aspects of international policy-forming ties with Latin America or French-speaking Africa, for example. It should be borne in mind, however, that although these nationalist attitudes are important because they are the views of the articulate, the solid middle classes of French Canada-particularly the million or more who live outside Quebec-are more conditioned to the continental climate of opinion and traditional attitudes such as those reflected by Premier Lesage.

Quebeckers complain of the domination of Anglo-Saxons in much the same terms as Canadians in general use about the prevalence of Americans. Concern over the national identity is an important cause of the present malaise and a factor which paradoxically draws English and French together, because it is the presence of the French that contributes the sharpest quality of individuality to the country. Concern over identity is often expressed in the misguided proposition that Canada is becoming Americanized. Canada cannot be Americanized, however, because it is already an American country. Its cultural habits are, as they have been for nearly two centuries, part of a continental pattern with regional and historic variations. The American way of life is not an alien culture but one in the development of which Canadians participate. Even French Canada, easily identifiable in language and literature, is American in its habits of work and play. To say that Canada is becoming Americanized is like saying that Belgium is being Europeanized; it may mean something but not much.

What is distinct, however, is the Canadian political identity-both in the structure and purposes of government and in political attitudes.[i] "Canadian history," as Professor W. L. Morton has pointed out, "is not a parody of American, as Canada is not a second-rate United States, still less a United States that failed."[ii] Canada is closer in principle to Switzerland in that it is a constitutional framework within which people of different language and historical association group themselves. Because of the quite different concept of a nation existing in the United States, Canada, as Professor Morton says, is not a creation of a covenant, or a social compact embodied in a declaration of independence and written constitutions, but the product of treaty and statute. "As America is united at bottom by the Covenant, Canada is united at the top by allegiance. Because Canada is a nation founded on allegiance and not on compact there is no process in becoming Canadian akin to conversion, there is no pressure for uniformity, there is no Canadian way of life."[iii]

Such is the pressure of American political assumptions, however, that Canadians themselves have too often lost sight of the peculiar quality of their constitution. Now, however, the yearning for identity, which in cultural matters is often artificial, encourages appreciation of the significance of creating a nation in which two cultures and diverse regions can flourish-an experiment significant not for Canada alone. Multi-tribal political structures must be proved viable in a world threatened by the excessive proliferation of states on a tribal basis. This is, of course, a sophisticated approach to sell to the general public, and even among the highly educated the contemporary prejudice against nationalism and sovereignty-a prejudice which makes sense in specific applications but as a nebulous generalization encourages anarchy-inhibits the acceptance and frowns upon the glorification of even a respectable idea of national mission. In spite of their petulant patriotism, it is difficult to persuade Canadians to take their country seriously.


In such a climate of opinion, what has been the significance of the April 1963 election? The most important may be the mood of the fresh start. The voters made no decisive choice of who was to lead the fresh start but indicated they wanted someone to lead them out of frustration and discouragement. The fact that the Liberals will be somewhat dependent on the support of the socialist-inclined New Democratic Party might suggest to Americans a leftish trend. It is unwise, however, to apply exotic terms like "right" and "left" to the pragmatic politics of Canada. It would be difficult to say, for instance, whether the Liberals are left or right of the Progressive-Conservatives. In the last election they had the support of big business, but within their brain trusts are those who are interested in using the state in unorthodox ways to achieve practical results in the specific Canadian context. They are admirers of the European Common Market which has made planning respectable.

Stimulation rather than protection of the national economy seems to be the aim of policy. The new Government, however, is likely to be more active than its supposedly anti-American predecessors in seeking to reduce the percentage of American ownership of Canadian industry. The new Minister of Finance, Mr. Walter Gordon, has continually stressed the problem presented by the imbalance of payment with the United States and the implications of too much absentee ownership. This does not mean that expropriation is to be expected or United States capital banned. Mr. Gordon speaks rather of changing the tax laws to discourage Canadians from selling out and of establishing a National Development Fund to expand the Canadian share of ownership.

Mr. Mitchell Sharp, the new Minister of Trade and Commerce, wants to stimulate Canadian industry by subjecting it to more international competition. "Protectionism," he declared in his first major statement in office, "is no answer to our problems of unemployment and under-utilization of Canadian abilities and resources or to our balance-of-payments problem." Thereupon, he set off for Geneva where he promised to be a tough but not reluctant bargainer. The Government is committed to joining with the United States in a world-wide trade liberalization program, but neither the Government nor Canadians in general are convinced that the present American proposals for across-the-board tariff reductions, designed for populous units like the United States and a united Western Europe, are acceptable without modification for a country in Canada's position.

With a former diplomat as Prime Minister, the orientation is bound to be more international than that of the previous Government, although the change may be mostly in style. Mr. Howard Green was a dedicated internationalist in the ends he sought, though he insisted on independent Canadian means. On many issues of importance the new Government will be closer to the Washington view. It is making a determined effort to restore Canadian influence in Washington and may even find it difficult to resist the too friendly embrace. Public opinion, however, would not be pleased by a speedy alignment on such subjects as trade with China or relations with Cuba. On Atlantic and European questions there is likely to be closer harmony and special appreciation for United States support of the United Nations. The Atlantic idea was nourished by a previous Liberal régime, and Mr. Pearson has a progenitor's concern for NATO. He is, however, almost unique as a statesman associated closely with both the United Nations and NATO, and he is unlikely to support the North Atlantic isolationists.

The new Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, has had a long and successful experience in the United Nations and especially in disarmament negotiations. He has always advocated and practiced easy and confidential relations with the United States, but it is worth recalling that his most notable diplomatic achievement was in 1955 when he led the lesser powers in revolt against the great powers, despite the wrath of Mr. Dulles, to secure the admission of 16 new members and thereby alter the history of the United Nations.

Although past Liberal Governments were not disposed to bring Canada into the Organization of American States, both Mr. Pearson and Mr. Martin have recently indicated a more favorable attitude. The obstacle to membership in recent years has been not so much theoretical as practical: the heavy diplomatic commitments and financial involvements of a country of 19,000,000 people-commitments which usually loom larger in office than in opposition. If the step toward O.A.S. should be taken, it would reflect the venturesome internationalism of Messrs. Pearson and Martin and a growing public interest in Latin America rather than a break-away from traditional alignments. In the O.A.S. the Canadian Government would certainly have independent views, even on Cuba, but the Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary are too sophisticated to accept membership, as some Canadians advocate, with a calculated determination to act as a "mediator" between Latin America and the United States. For Canada a hemispheric association would be not an exclusive regional tie but an additional sphere of interest which, along with NATO and the Commonwealth, would add flexibility to its middle-power role-and a few more complications. It is a basis which might not be acceptable to the Latin Americans.

A neat but inaccurate formula for foreigners is that the Conservative Party is pro-British and anti-American and the Liberals pro-American and anti- British. It is doubtful, however, if any national party could be successful in Canada if it were anti-American or anti-British beneath the skin. Genuine anti-Americanism of the virus kind, as distinct from the resistance to American pressure which is endemic, or vigorous disagreement with specific American policies, is rare in Canada. Anti-Americanism was not, as reported, a decisive element in the election; most of the talk about it came from those who got various forms of satisfaction out of deploring it. A sharply critical pronouncement from the State Department touched off the events leading to the fall of the Government, but it is ludicrous to suggest that Washington, either intentionally or unintentionally, overthrew it. If the Administration was conspiring to get rid of Mr. Diefenbaker, which is highly unlikely, then their tactics of intervention have improved little since the Bay of Pigs; every pronouncement by the State Department or Mr. McNamara was, to say the least, counter-productive. In the election the Conservatives stressed Canadian independence and American interference but never questioned the basis of the alliance.

Relations with Britain also cooled during the Conservative régime-partly because the Canadian Conservatives irritated the British Conservatives by supporting the non-white members of the Commonwealth over South Africa and the Common Market. Nowadays, favoring the Commonwealth does not necessarily mean favoring Britain. The new Liberal Prime Minister, however, went to London a week after taking office and was received with indiscreet enthusiasm by the British Conservatives. As for the Commonwealth, the Canadian Liberals have been prominent among its begetters. Their attitude toward the institution is still friendly although the Commonwealth itself has suffered a sea-change. The souring of opinion in Britain toward the Commonwealth, and the prevalence there of regionalist dogma, have lowered the priority accorded the relationship by other members as well. Regionalism, however, makes the continued existence of the Commonwealth as a political if not an economic entity more, rather than less, necessary as a counter-force-complementary rather than contradictory to continental alignments.

In its foreign policy Canada has sought an equilibrium between the requirement to be a loyal ally and the requirement to play an independent role on the world's stage. Attachment to NATO on the one hand and the Commonwealth on the other, with a predominating respect for the United Nations, has provided historic justification and an appropriate framework for such a diplomacy. In the view of Canada's associates, however, the role of ally has of late been subordinated to that of knight-at-arms (or knight- without-arms). Having had considerable success with the equilibrium, the Liberals may be expected to return to it instinctively. It is a sophisticated policy, eschewing absolute positions-a package which does not appeal to the unsophisticated citizen but responds to the consensus of a complex nation in which are mixed continentalists and internationalists, isolationists and imperialists, neutralists and nationalists, most of them taking their views skeptically. The late disequilibrium in Canadian foreign policy is attributable, however, not only to the attitude of the Conservative Government but also to the fact that the inexorable concentration of power and decision in the hands of the United States has been twisting the alliance from its early assumptions about what Mr. Pearson once called "coalition diplomacy." Much has changed since 1957. The trend toward polarization between Europe and the United States has threatened Canada with isolation. On the other hand, the exorcization of Anglo-Saxondom by General de Gaulle has, for the time being at least, tilted us back toward the triangular relationship with Britain and the United States on which Canadian foreign policy traditionally rested. It is tempting to see here a mediatory role for bicultural Canada, but there has never been a meeting of minds between Paris and Ottawa.

Perhaps the climate of opinion has swung against independent action by lesser powers. Unity, integration and community are in the air, and regard must be paid to these worthy if amorphous principles. Mr. Pearson was never one to concern himself unduly with the theoretical role of a middle power; he sought merely to make use of the particular advantages Canada enjoyed in international politics to do whatever needed doing. In spite of all the emphasis on unified action and the abandonment of sovereignty, the inescapable fact is that the world in general and the United States in particular constantly need the services and initiative of useful and responsible middle powers of which Canada can be one. The new Canadian Government may be expected to pay honest tribute on all occasions to the need for Atlantic integration while demonstrating by its actions the general advantage of the independent middle power, integrated in its intentions but not in its tactics.

It is always easier for a junior partner to demonstrate its independence when the larger partner is behaving, in its eyes, foolishly. Canadian governments differed honestly with Mr. Dulles because they did not share his view of the world. It will be harder to demonstrate independence of the Kennedy-Rusk approach. There is no justification for Canada's picking quarrels to prove its non-conformity, but it is under some compulsion to make clear that it is an independent agent, not merely to satisfy domestic opinion but also to reassure its associates in the United Nations that they are not dealing with a chosen instrument of American policy. This can be done, however, positively rather than negatively. In the present age a country satisfies the requirements of national mission more effectively by a vigorous contribution to international causes than by a rigid concern for things that were once the symbols of sovereignty. It is more profitable, furthermore, for a lesser power to be known as a wise and trusted counsellor than a bold public critic. The United States, in spite of its generous effort to extend nuclear responsibility to its European partners, will become more and more lonely in its ultimate decisions. Lonely power corrupts the perspective of even the wisest governments, and the United States will have more and more need of loyal but candid no-men at its elbow. It is a relationship which is, of course, easily acceptable by governments in communiqués but less easily sustained by public opinion in days of crisis.

[i] If proof of the latter were required, one need only look at the recent elections. In spite of the vertical cultural affinities along the Pacific Coast, British Columbia, a near neighbor of California, sent a majority of socialists to represent them in Ottawa; and the provinces bordering on the American Midwest voted for the party which sold their wheat to Communist China.

[ii] W. L. Morton, "The Canadian Identity." Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1962, p. 93.

[iii] Ibid, p. 85.

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