THE Chinese Eastern Railway has bred trouble ever since it was conceived of in 1896. It led to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, it continued for over thirty years to create international suspicion, it caused the "near" war between China and the Soviet in 1929, and now once more it forms a bone of contention in the Far East. How does it happen that a railway with only 1,067 miles of single track, and annual gross receipts normally of only about 40,000,000 rubles, at the pre-war rate of exchange, should be able to stir up so much trouble? Why should Russia's proposed sale of a half interest in it to Japan attract attention the world over?
To begin with, we may recall that the modern history of Manchuria started with the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and is interwoven with the history of its activities. Since its completion in 1902, the Chinese Eastern (with its southern branch, now known as the South Manchuria Railway) has been the center of all the political and economic activities of Manchuria, both domestic as well as international. In the original contract of 1896, which Count Witte negotiated with Li Hungchang on the occasion of the Tsar's coronation, it was agreed that the Chinese Eastern Railway should be owned and operated by a private company. Among other things, this contract provided that the shares of the company could be acquired only by Chinese and Russians, and that the President of the company should be of Chinese nationality, appointed by China. It further provided that at the end of thirty-six years of operation (that is, in 1938) China should have the right to redeem the railway by paying the capital cost of construction plus the accumulated losses of operation, and that at the end of eighty years China should enter gratis into possession of the railway and its appurtenances. Excessive profits, after the sums allowed shareholders as dividends, should be applied to the redemption fund on behalf of China. Capital expenditure and operating deficits, in the meantime, were to be financed by the Russian Government.
In practice, however, China had very little to do with the management of the Railway. Although it was agreed that the shares of the railway company could be acquired by Chinese and Russians, the Tsarist régime so manipulated matters that the Chinese were prevented from exercising their right. The tactics were quite simple. By arrangement, the shares were printed in St. Petersburg, and were bought up by the Tsar's agent as soon as they came off the press. Thus the Russians became the sole shareholders and secured the entire proprietary control of the railway. The contract said that the President must be Chinese, but it strictly limited his duties and powers. It stipulated that the undivided surplus of the railway should be applied to the redemption fund on China's behalf, but it did not say what was the maximum dividend to be declared, which in practice meant that there was never any surplus.
Apart from these manœuvres for the control of the railway, the 1896 contract apparently was honest enough. There is every reason to believe that at the beginning the Tsarist régime honestly intended, as it solemnly promised Li Hung-chang, to build the Chinese Eastern Railway through Chinese territory as a purely commercial line with only one non-commercial privilege -- the through transit of Russian troops, and of merchandise which originated in and was destined for Russian territory. This measure was for the purpose of saving about 500 miles in distance over the circuitous Trans-Siberian Railway, which follows the left bank of the Amur River. As regards the free transit of goods, the status of the Chinese Eastern is somewhat like that of the railways through the Polish Corridor. As regards the transit of troops, there seems to be no other railway in the world subject to such a provision.
Had Russia kept her promise and observed the terms of the 1896 contract, the Far East in general and Manchuria in particular probably would be in a totally different condition today. As fate would have it, before the ink on the 1896 contract was dry, the jingo party in St. Petersburg got the upper hand and began to exploit the situation for ulterior motives of conquest. As Count Witte says in his memoirs, they shamefully broke Russia's promise and demanded the extension of the Chinese Eastern from Harbin to Dalny (now called Dairen) and Port Arthur. Every excuse was made to read extraneous meanings into the 1896 contract. Every occasion was seized upon to push Russia's expansionist schemes.
Russia's bad faith not only alienated China, who had quite sincerely looked to Russia for neighborly help, but alarmed Japan. When the Russo-Japanese War broke out, China, in spite of a secret treaty of alliance with Russia, declared friendly neutrality in favor of Japan, and the local Chinese did much to help the Japanese army. As Count Witte remorsefully observed, it was Russia's bad faith that brought about Russia's shameful defeat at the hands of the Japanese.
By the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905, Russia, with China's consent, ceded to Japan the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern from Changchun to Dairen and Port Arthur, as well as all her other interests in South Manchuria. From the moment that Japan secured the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern she at once began to outdo Russia in using it to further her own expansionist schemes. But that is another story.
The first public appearance of the Soviets in connection with the Chinese Eastern Railway was when Karakhan made his famous declaration in 1919. The Soviets condemned the Chinese Eastern Railway as a symbol of imperialistic oppression of the Tsarist régime, and made the grand gesture of returning the railway to the Chinese people without compensation. The gesture made a profound impression upon young China. But by 1924, when Karakhan came to Peking to settle the Chinese Eastern question, the Soviets were no longer in a position to honor the generous offer which they had made five years before. It must be observed that the Soviet's change of heart was not due necessarily to a lack of good faith in making the original declaration, but rather to the subtle influence of the Russians in Manchuria, who, for obvious reasons, like most seaport gentlemen in the Far East, would oppose any proposal that their home government should relinquish any special privilege.
To a certain extent China was also to blame for the Soviet change of heart, because at the time of the Karakhan declaration China was so solicitous of the good will of her neighbors -- all of them anti-Bolshevik -- that she did not venture to make any rapprochement with the Soviets. Indeed, it was largely the recognition of the Soviet by the British Labor Government in 1923 which seems to have emboldened China to take up seriously the negotiation with the Soviets which resulted in the settlement of May 1924.
By the 1924 agreements China and the Soviets gave the Chinese Eastern Railway the plain status of a joint government enterprise. As a temporary arrangement, pending the redemption of the railway by China, it was to be managed by the two countries on a half-and-half basis. It was agreed that a conference should be convened within one month after the signing of the agreements (which took place in May 1924), and should be "completed not later than six months from the date of the opening of the Conference," and that its task was to be "to settle the amount and conditions governing the redemption as well as the procedure for the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway" to China. The agreements reaffirmed that the railway should be operated entirely as a commercial enterprise and stipulated that all profits should be held by the Board of Directors pending the redemption of the railway by China. The time limit for the free reversion of the railway to China was reduced from eighty to sixty years, i.e. to 1962.
At that time both China and the Soviets blamed the Tsarist régime for all the past woes of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Both promised to do better. From all appearances, it seemed that the final liquidation of the question by China's redemption of the railway was only a matter of months. This optimistic atmosphere, however, did not last long. The agreements of 1924 between Soviet Russia and Republican China proved no more wholesome than the old contract of 1896 between the Little Father of All the Russias and the Son of Heaven. Indeed, instead of simplifying matters it added a few more complications to the numerous old ambiguities bequeathed by the Tsarist régime. To begin with, the new agreements provided that, pending revision, the original contract and statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company of 1896, in so far as they did not conflict with the new agreements or prejudice the sovereign rights of China, should continue in effect. This provision refers to some rather voluminous and ambiguous documents. It is extremely difficult, to say the least, to determine which articles in the statutes conflict with the new agreements and which do not. As to China's sovereign rights, it is well nigh impossible to say which provision is prejudicial and which is harmless. As this differentiation is left to the directors of the railway, who are appointed by the two governments sometimes for political considerations, the confusion cannot but become worse confounded. Thus by one stroke of the pen the ghost of the Tsarist régime was reincarnated into the body of the new management.
The new agreements also provided that pending redemption the railway should be managed by a board of five Chinese and five Soviet directors with equal rights -- six votes being required for positive action. To manage a railway by one government is difficult enough, but to manage a railway by two nations with five directors appointed by each government, with the Chinese directors speaking little Russian and the Soviet directors understanding no Chinese, is atrocious.
To make matters worse, the Soviet proposed that in case the Chinese and Russian directors failed to agree they should refer the matter in dispute to the "two governments for a just and amicable settlement." China suggested arbitration by neutral experts for the settlement of such disagreements; but the Soviets were so opposed to interference by nationals of the "imperialistic" nations that its proposal was finally adopted. Thus an additional cause for diplomatic squabbles was introduced.
The obvious soon happened. Questions involving disagreement soon began to outnumber those of accord. Both sides, quarrelsome and exasperated, could do nothing but "pass the buck" by referring an ever-increasing number of disputes to the two governments "for a just and amicable settlement." The net result of this peculiar way of managing a railway was the "near" war between China and the Soviet which began in July 1929 and was not patched up until finally Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang gave in at the end of the year.
Despite the difficulties, the Chinese Eastern Railway up to September 1931 had been working well enough for the Soviets to find it "profitable both economically and politically" -- so much so that they showed an increasing tendency to prolong the "temporary" arrangement. Every effort was made to put off the conference for the settlement of the questions of redemption which, according to the 1924 agreements, should have been completed not later than December of that year. In the meantime the surplus of the railway became too tempting to be kept by the directors as stipulated and therefore was divided equally by the two contracting parties from time to time.
To a certain extent, local conditions in China have been responsible for the delay in calling the conference of final settlement. On the other hand, it is evident that the Soviets have never been eager for China to redeem the railway. Indeed, since the conclusion of the 1924 agreements the Soviets apparently have experienced another change of heart, as shown by their efforts in delaying the detailed arrangements concerning redemption. The fact that by the 1924 agreements the Soviets purposely required that the redemption should be made only with Chinese capital (knowing full well China's lack of funds) seems to indicate that even at the time of negotiation they might have had mental reservations regarding this question. Whatever the underlying causes, the fact remains that the conference for the redemption of the railway, which should have been completed early in 1925 at the latest, was never convened.
The illegitimate incarnation of "Manchukuo," however, has totally altered the situation. Brigandage along the whole length of the Chinese Eastern has become more serious than ever before. Sabotage, train-wrecking and burning of stations have become an everyday affair. Numerous demands of the most irritating and costly sort, such as for the free transportation of Japanese troops and Manchukuo guards, the restriction of train movements, etc., have been made in dictatorial language and carried out by force. Valuable properties of the railway have been seized; many Russians have been summarily arrested; numerous railway employees have been killed, disabled or kidnapped by bandits for ransom. Even the railway itself has been cut several times by Japanese officers in the employ of Manchukuo, both at Manchuli and Pogranichnaya, for the purpose of stopping all traffic between Manchuria and Siberia. Life and property, the Soviets declare, "have never been so insecure along the Chinese Eastern as they are today." It is even rumored in Harbin that no attempt is made to keep order along the line, on the theory that the more trouble that occurs the cheaper will be the purchase price of the railway.[i] There may be no truth in this. But the fact remains that provocation from Manchukuo has become infinitely more unbearable and menacing to the Russians than that which led to the "near" war between the Soviets and China in 1929.
Nevertheless, the Soviets apparently realize that Mr. Henry Pu-yi, with the backing of Japanese troops, deserves a different consideration than that accorded to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang with Japan pulling his leg from behind, and therefore have been remarkably conciliatory in all their relations with the puppet. As the Peiping Chronicle commented April 29, 1933, "everything was done to avoid friction for the sake of maintaining the principle of joint Russian control." But the Soviets' forbearance has only led to ever-increasing encroachments. After numerous protests and some feeble bluffs the Soviets finally settled down to face realities. They definitely offered their interest in the railway to Japan for a monetary return. Japan curtly declined the offer and suggested that the purchase be made by Manchukuo instead; and the Soviet immediately accepted Japan's suggestion.
On learning of the proposed sale, the Chinese Ambassador at Moscow, under instructions from Nanking, at once called the attention of the Soviets to the fact that all matters pertaining to the Chinese Eastern Railway should continue to be governed by the agreements concluded between China and the Soviets in 1924, according to which it was mutually agreed that the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway should be determined by the Republic of China and the U. S. S. R., to the exclusion of any third party or parties. The Ambassador also pointed out that any new arrangement concerning this important means of communication made without China's consent would constitute a violation of the Agreements of 1924 and should, therefore, be considered as null and void and would never be recognized by the Chinese Government. The Soviets replied[ii] that they were entitled to sell their interest in the railway to any purchaser willing to buy it because the Chinese Government had forfeited its rights when it ceased to be a partner in the management of the railway.
China immediately sent another note[iii] of protest to the Kremlin in which it stated that the Chinese Government had been much surprised at the Soviet authorities' disregard of the treaty obligation as well as their inclination to conclude an unjustifiable transaction with an unlawful régime. Besides reminding the Soviets of the stipulation that the Chinese Eastern should be redeemed by "the Government of the Republic of China with Chinese capital," which the proposed sale would directly violate, the Ambassador recalled the solemn pledge mutually made by the Chinese and the Soviet Governments in Paragraph 2 of Article Four of the 1924 Agreement, which says: "The Governments of both Contracting Parties declare that in future neither Government will conclude any treaties or agreements which prejudice the sovereign rights or interests of either Contracting Party."
The Chinese Government argues that although recently it has been prevented by force majeure from participating in the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway, China has not for that reason given up any of her contractual or sovereign rights in the railway nor can she admit the argument that on account of the existing state of affairs, which must be felt as painfully by Russia as by herself, the Chinese Government should be debarred from claiming the rights under the agreements in question.
The Note also emphasized that the whole world regards the present situation in Manchuria as the product of military aggression contrary to the letter and spirit of the Paris Pact of August 27, 1928, to which the Soviet is a party, and that all civilized states have pledged themselves not to recognize such a situation de jure or de facto. To transfer the railway to Manchukuo without China's agreement is, under the present circumstances, tantamount to recognizing an entity which has been internationally condemned as unlawful and rendering aid and assistance to the aggressive party. The consummation of such a scheme is clearly contrary to the Soviet Government's professed desire of peace.
The Soviet claim[iv] that "the toiling masses of Russia had paid for the construction of the railway with their hard-earned money" is incorrect, because that is exactly what the toiling masses of Russia did not do. With the exception of supervision and the building of the steel structures, the entire work on the railway was carried out by Chinese laborers who were paid with Romanoff ruble notes, introduced into the country by Russia. After the completion of the railway in 1902, food stuffs and other valuable goods produced by the toiling Chinese in Manchuria were purchased with the same Romanoff notes and were transported to Russia in train-loads, year in and year out until by 1917, when the Tsarist régime which had built the railway, collapsed, about 1,000,000,000 rubles -- in notes -- were in circulation in North Manchuria. When the Soviets renounced the ruble, the value of this enormous amount of Romanoff money evaporated. Inasmuch as it is clearly printed on the Romanoff notes that all "the resources of the Russian Empire" are pledged as security, the holders of these notes obviously have a direct claim upon the Chinese Eastern Railway. Therefore, it is the toiling masses of Manchuria who have paid for the Chinese Eastern Railway and consequently are entitled to take over that railway in partial satisfaction of their losses caused by the Soviet's renunciation of the Romanoff ruble.
But these arguments are legalistic. We must recognize the unenviable position of the Soviets. Japan's attitude vis-à-vis the Chinese Eastern Railway is such that the Soviets must either surrender their interests in the line or defend it by force. The only other course seems to be to follow America's example by protesting against the encroachment and then let matters take care of themselves, while waiting for a better day to make a reckoning. Realizing, however, that force is still the final arbiter, in spite of all the efforts made at Geneva, the Soviets apparently have decided to choose the first and probably the easiest course.
In selling their interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway the Soviets will also violate one of the cardinal doctrines which has governed the railway from the time of its conception in 1896. According to this doctrine, as clearly stipulated in Article 1 of the 1896 contract, the ownership of the railway should remain in the hands of Chinese and Russians. The Soviets have heretofore attached great importance to this doctrine, because it was their proposal that actually led to the embodiment of the doctrine in the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924, which not only gives the right to redeem the railway solely to the Republic of China but even goes so far as to exclude the possibility of China's purchasing the railway with borrowed money. During the negotiation of the 1924 Agreement people were very much surprised by the strenuous Soviet efforts to safeguard against the possibility of China's redemption of the railway with foreign money. The sudden and radical Soviet change of attitude is so much the more significant.
Incidentally, it is largely the provision in Article 1 of the 1896 contract limiting the ownership of the shares of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company to Chinese and Russian subjects, mentioned above, that has prevented certain foreign Powers from claiming any proprietary rights in that railway, in spite of the fact (often reported in the press) that the original shares of the Chinese Eastern Company fell into the hands of a certain bank in Paris during the Russian Revolution. The reason is obvious. Because of the above-mentioned stipulation no bank or any other institution can claim legal ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company's shares unless it is Chinese or Russian. Therefore the possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company's shares does not at all bring ownership of the railway to that bank.
It has also often been reported that the line was built with money borrowed in Paris and that therefore the French creditors have a claim on it. These reported claims always arouse much interest, because it is an undeniable fact that France had lent a tremendous amount of money to Russia during the years when the Chinese Eastern Railway was being constructed. Indeed, press reports tell us that lately the French Ambassador in Tokyo has actually lodged a protest against the disposal of the Chinese Eastern and called attention to the French interests in that railway.
We do not know on what ground the French protest is based or to what specific French interests the French Ambassador refers. During all his years of study the writer has failed to find any document, either in Chinese, English or French, which throws any light on the frequent reports of French loans to the Chinese Eastern. The original contract of 1896 itself is silent on this point as well as on the railway's borrowing power in general. In the Chinese Eastern Statutes of 1896 certain principles governing borrowings by the railway were set forth. Two methods were authorized. Firstly, the Chinese Eastern, with the permission of the Ministry of Finance, could borrow by the flotation of bonds of which the payment of interest and principal were to be guaranteed by the Russian Government.[v] A second method was to be by the issue of short term certificates. Article 16 of the Statutes states that in case the railway is unable to meet its operating expenses or to pay interest or principal on its debts at the end of any year the Russian Government undertakes to advance to the Railway sufficient funds for meeting such requirements. In return for such "advances" the Railway shall issue short term certificates to the Russian Government.
All available evidence, however, seems to show that the only kind of instrument of indebtedness ever issued by the Chinese Eastern was in the nature of short term certificates handed to the Russian Treasury in return for the "advances" made to the railway from time to time or to the various contractors for materials or services. No formal bond issue seems to have been made. By the nature of things, even if bonds were issued, such bonds would have been guaranteed by the Government, as provided in the Statutes, instead of being secured on the Chinese Eastern. Of course some -- or even a great part -- of the "advances" to the railway might well have come from the proceeds of loans made by France to Russia; but these Paris loans apparently were in the nature of general loans to the Russian Government and were guaranteed by that Government. At any rate, in so far as the Chinese Eastern was not pledged as security for these Paris loans, the French creditors apparently would have about as much claim on that railway as on the Russian battleships sunk in the Sea of Japan, some of which were also built during the time when the Chinese Eastern was being constructed.
Moscow's frank and plain disregard of the legal aspect of the Chinese Eastern question, coming so soon after the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the Soviets, produced an immediate and profound reaction among the Chinese people. All the Chinese newspapers, both supporters and opponents of the Nanking Government, were unanimous in their criticism of the Soviet action. Even Mr. Eugene Chen, a consistent advocate of close relations with Soviet Russia, came forward and voiced his opposition. Incidentally, one effect of the Soviet action has been to make the Chinese people less critical of the weakness of the League of Nations. Although it has done nothing to protect the rights of China, the League has at least put on record that those rights exist and ought to be upheld against the aggression of Japan. In contrast to this stand of the League of Nations, the Soviets not only fail to uphold those rights but expressly sell them out for what they can fetch.
But China's protests and all the legal argument and criticism have failed to make much impression on the Soviets. At this writing, as negotiations proceed in Tokyo, the only question still to be settled before the conclusion of the deal is the price. The Soviet asks 250,000,000 rubles and Japan bids 50,000,000 yen. Supposing both currencies to be of gold standard, the bid is just about 20 percent of the sum asked. This is quite in line with the fashion of bargaining east of Suez, where, as the proverb says, good manners permit prices to be asked sky-high and to be bid "hellishly" low. Therefore, far apart as are the bid and the price asked, a successful bargain may yet be struck at any moment.
It is not known on what basis the price is asked or the bid is made. Generally speaking, in fixing the price of a railway the existing contracts governing the question must be given first consideration. The original agreement of 1896 provides that the price to be paid for the redemption of the railway should cover the capital cost of construction plus all the losses which the operation of the railway may incur up to the time of redemption. According to this stipulation the price to be paid would be in the neighborhood of 800,000,000 gold rubles, for the capital cost of construction was about 400,000,000 rubles, whereas the accumulated operating losses amount to another 400,000,000 gold rubles.
In other words, the construction of each mile of the Chinese Eastern Railway cost on the average about 400,000 gold rubles at par, which is about three times as much as the average per mile cost of the Chinese Government railways as a whole. If the accumulated operating loss is also to be met, in accordance with the 1896 contract, then what will be paid for the redemption or purchase of the Chinese Eastern will be more than sufficient to build another railway similar to, but six times as long as, the Chinese Eastern. It was rumored at the time that the Tsarist régime purposely spent money lavishly on the railway so as to make it unattractive for China to redeem it. If they had that aim the Russians of the old days certainly accomplished it. As we read the report concerning the efforts of the Tsarist régime to increase the redemption price of the railway alongside of the Harbin report just referred to revealing tactics of Manchukuo in reducing the value of the railway in anticipation of the purchase, we feel fate must have willed that it should be tit for tat.
A second and more up-to-date way of reckoning is to use the earning power of the railway as a basis for estimating the price of the sale; whereas a third method is to fix the price by the estimated cost of rebuilding the line. The latest report is that Manchukuo sets store by the former method while the Soviets hold by the latter.[vi] Since the Chinese Eastern Railway is badly menaced by the Manchukuo bandits and is operated without any profit, its value on the basis of its earning power must be small. On the other hand, to rebuild the Chinese Eastern today would probably cost something like 120,000,000 gold rubles. Therefore, the price which the Soviets ask is considerably less than the original cost of construction, but is more than double the cost of reproduction; whereas Japan's bid must be based largely on the negligible value of that railway to the Soviets in its present unenviable position. The final price of settlement, we presume, will probably be between 60 and 200 million rubles, with the party which can better afford a break getting the upper hand.
It must be pointed out that the proposed sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway, coming as it did right after the resumption of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Nanking, cannot have arisen out of purely financial considerations. It is obvious to those familiar with Far Eastern affairs that the interest of the Soviets in the Chinese Eastern Railway is of paramount importance to their position in the Far East. Vladivostok, Russia's only port on the Pacific, largely depends upon the Chinese Eastern. The whole structure of Russian economic, cultural and political interest in Manchuria is based on and built along that railway. To take the Chinese Eastern Railway away from Russia is like removing the lead from the pencil so far as Russia's influence in North Manchuria is concerned. The Soviet, more than any other nation, must be aware of all these possibilities, and its declination early in the year of the League's invitation for coöperation in dealing with the Manchuria situation indicates that its decision to sell the Chinese Eastern is the result of matured consideration.
Furthermore, once Japan secures the control of that railway, she will hold all Russia's territorial possessions east of Chita at her mercy. It is evident that the proposed sale must mean that the Soviets are forced to compromise their position in that vast region of Eastern Siberia, which is so rich in mineral, forest and other resources. Whether the boundaries of Manchukuo will extend to the north bank of the Amur, whether the Far Eastern Republic will reappear so as to serve as companion to Manchukuo, or whether the Maritime Provinces will remain Russian as part of a bargain for the Soviets to give recognition to Japan's freedom of action in all Manchuria, time will tell. Whichever event may take place, the actual change of hands of the Chinese Eastern Railway is bound to foreshadow developments as momentous as those which followed the inception of the line years ago. In the meantime the suggestions recently made by some Japanese newspapers (as reported in the Manchester Guardian of July 1, 1933) that the Russian Government might sell not only the Chinese Eastern Railway but also the territory of Vladivostok, the Amur Provinces and Northern Sakhalin, seem to indicate the direction of the wind so far as Japan's mind is concerned. Incidentally, the Soviet proposal to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan proves beyond any doubt that the Soviet fear of Japanese encroachment, although never openly acknowledged, is far more genuine than Japan's repeated and widely broadcasted dread of a Soviet invasion. And the Red Mask, which Japan has manipulated so artfully in scaring the capitalistic nations, is robbed of its magic.
[i] See The Manchester Guardian, June 12, 1933.
[ii] Cf. the London Times, May 12, 1933.
[iii] Official Bulletin No. 109 of May 16, 1933, issued by the Chinese Delegation at Geneva.
[iv] As reported in the London Times of May 12, 1933.
[v] Article 11 of the Statutes. See C. C. Wang, "Railway Loan Agreements of China," 1921, Vol, 1, page 19.
[vi] London Times, July 19, 1933.