Sacrificing His Core Supporters in a Race Against Defeat
IT IS a year since China and Japan went to war. The accompanying arguments and controversies should have covered exhaustively all the possibilities, contingencies and potentialities in the Far East. Yet there is one argument which has emerged seldom, if at all, into explicit discussion, but which nevertheless has played a large part in forming opinion abroad. Employed quietly by Japan, it tends to reconcile many to the prospect of China's defeat and absorption into the Japanese political and economic system. It needs to be examined.
The argument is briefly this: From the point of view of material interests, it makes little difference to the West whether Japan conquers China or not. So far as there is any difference, a Japanese victory will actually be of material advantage to the West, for Japanese occupation and control of China would mean the more speedy development of China's resources. True, the West will participate in the ensuing profits at one remove. But the profits to be shared will be greater than any conceivable without the help of Japanese "law and order." True, also, American, British and other Western enterprises will be evicted from China as they have been from Manchukuo, and foreign interests will henceforth have to use Japanese concerns as intermediaries. Yet through Japan the West would sell more to China than it does now and it would be able to invest more capital in China than it does now.
For Japan is efficient, technologically advanced, and experienced in industrial and financial organization, whereas China is inexperienced and inefficient. Japan can ensure stable government in China; the Chinese cannot. The industrialization of China thus will be accelerated under Japanese control, whereas under continued Chinese independence it will lag, as it has for decades. The great Chinese market, long a myth, will become a reality. Open Door or no Open Door, without industrialization the Chinese market will remain meager, to be picked at on the edges for scant findings. With industrialization -- possible only under Japanese tutelage, in turn possible only under Japanese political control -- the purchasing power of the 400,000,000 Chinese can be expanded and the world will find the commercial outlet it so sorely needs. Western individuals and firms now established in China will suffer, of course. But to British and American industry as a whole, and to British and American factory workers, it matters little whether British and American products are sold to China directly through British or American firms or indirectly through Japanese firms. The banker, industrialist and worker at home benefit either way, so long as the products are sold. And if Japan can stabilize China, organize it and develop it, they will benefit immeasurably more because immeasurably more products will be sold.
The argument is plausible. It sounds hard-headed and practical. It is being presented as plausibly as possible by the unofficial Japanese representatives who are seeking to get credits in London and New York -- the credits without which Japan cannot capitalize on victory if she wins, and without which she even may not win. If influential groups in London and New York should be induced to furnish credits to Japan they will do so largely because they find the argument tempting. But though the argument sounds plausible, it is far from being convincing to those who know the Far East at first hand; indeed, to many of these it seems quite fallacious.
Before proceeding further it should be emphasized that the analysis which follows has no reference to the moral issue as to whether Japan ought to win the war or the military issue as to whether she can win the war. Those are questions apart. As a matter of fact, the world has expressed itself fairly clearly on the first; and the second is open to considerable doubt, with or without outside financial help for Japan. Clearly, Japan is much less sure to defeat China than seemed the case a year ago. But for the purpose of this article the question under discussion is only what the effect on Western interests will be if Japan should conquer China.
Two things must be shown if the Japanese argument is to be established as sound: first, that the acceleration of China's industrialization under Japanese control and the resulting increase in China's demand for goods from abroad will be great enough to compensate other countries for the loss of direct access to the China market; second, that Japan will not prevent artificially the equitable diffusion of the benefits arising out of China's industrial development. Unless these two things can be shown, then all abstract arguments, however valid as economic reasoning, are irrelevant; Western interests are directly imperilled by the possibility that Japan will win the war; and at the best Western countries will, if she does win, trade with China only on Japan's sufferance. And the experience they have had in cases where they have had to trade on Japan's sufferance are definitely not such as to allow them very rosy hopes about China.
One point must be cleared at the outset. If Japan is victorious, Western countries will in any case be debarred from direct commercial intercourse with China. From the day China signs a treaty of submission (if she does), the Open Door will become a myth or an historical vestige. No juridical measures will be required. Tariff schedules will be drafted as necessary to accomplish the purpose. Customs regulations will be drawn to the same end. Supporting import and export rulings will be introduced as necessary. More than these: all the internal pressures, ranging from moral suasion to open and direct threat, will be exercised to interpose barriers between Chinese and foreign trading interests. Credit will be niggardly for Chinese who continue to buy from Europeans or Americans. Chinese currency will be pegged to the Japanese yen, and credit arrangements will be made difficult for other than Japanese. Freight cars with foreign shipments will be mysteriously misdirected and delayed or lost. Foreign shipments in customs houses will be mysteriously damaged or will be found to have violated customs rulings and thus be subjected to penalties. Foreign factories will be submitted to irregular and unceasing inspections, restrictions and penalties. The cumulative effect will be to leave foreign industrial and commercial enterprises already in China no reason to remain and foreign exporters no reason to make an effort to place their goods there.
Analytical reasoning is not needed to demonstrate this. The past provides clear evidence. Japanese rule has now lasted in Manchukuo for seven years. An American business man may be found there by diligent search; but he usually proves to be a transitory phenomenon. The same holds true for Korea. And the first steps already taken by Japan in North China foreshadow a similar future there.
With regard to Manchukuo there is, first, statistical evidence. This must always be accepted with reserve in international trade; for trade statistics cover only the first stage of transactions, and the ultimate benefits resulting from multilateral commerce are hard to trace and assess. But the Manchukuo statistics reveal tendencies, and within the reservations stated they seem to be decisive.
In 1930, the year before Japan's conquest, Manchukuo (then Manchuria) took 36 percent of her total imports from Japan; in 1936 she took more than 72 percent from Japan. In 1930 Manchukuo (Manchuria) took 7 percent of her total imports from the United States; in 1936 she took some 3½ percent. In other words, while Japan sold twice as much after six years of occupancy, the United States sold half as much. In 1930 Manchukuo purchased from abroad goods at a total value of $462,000,000 (Manchurian currency); in 1936 the figure was $691,000,000. In the same years her purchases from Japan alone increased from $166,000,000 to $507,000,000. Thus, while total imports increased by $229,000,000, the imports from Japan increased by $340,000,000. In other words, Japan absorbed the whole gain from the intensive development of Manchukuo and 50 percent more besides. That margin of 50 percent came from the trade that other countries had once had with Manchuria. As a concrete example, in 1930 the United States sold goods worth $32,000,000 (Manchurian currency) to Manchuria; in 1936 it sold goods worth $23,000,000 to Manchukuo. The tendency has been unswerving. From 1935 to 1936, for example, Manchukuo's imports increased by $87,000,000. Of that increase Japan got $73,000,000 and Korea (which is Japan at one remove) got $5,000,000. In the same year the imports of the United States to Manchukuo fell from $25,000,000 to $23,750,000. On any statistical base the results are the same: both absolutely and relatively all countries other than Japan have lost by virtue of Japan's conquest of Manchuria, except in so far as the increase of Japan's trade with Manchukuo has increased Japanese purchases from other countries.
The last point is hard to establish. It is true that the value of Japan's imports from the rest of the world increased from one and a half billion yen in 1930 to more than two and a half billion yen in 1936. But for a number of reasons no conclusions can be drawn therefrom. In the first place, 1930 was a depression year. In 1925, for example, Japan's total imports were almost two and a half billion. If the average of the five years before the depression be taken, the increase in Japan's imports since it absorbed Manchukuo is moderate, considering the fact that Japan is still in the stage of industrialization. In the second place, the years after 1930 were also the period of Japan's intensive campaign in other markets, which necessitated larger imports of raw materials. And this would have come in any case, for reasons internal to Japan. Depreciated currency, the fall in raw material prices in the world markets, and low wage costs played more of a part in this connection than Japan's aggrandizement on the Asiatic continent. In the third place, a large part of Japan's imports in the years after 1931 consisted of materials for armament, which can hardly be credited to the development of Manchukuo, except in so far as the conquest of Manchuria exacerbated an international conflict in the Far East. In the fourth place, in the years between 1930 and 1936 prices of primary products rose from near the nadir to near normal. In quantity, for example, Japan's purchases of raw cotton increased by only 10 percent between 1931 and 1935. As a matter of fact, Japan imported more cotton in 1927 than it did in 1935. Between 1930 and 1935, imports of iron and oil rose sharply; but armament could account for them also.
The statistical evidence is not final but it is clear. It is supported and illustrated by evidence drawn from the nature of Manchukuo's development. The exclusion of foreign trade and of the opportunity for trade follows almost automatically from a policy of state monopolies and quasi-monopolies. The establishment of the oil monopoly in Manchukuo and the resulting exclusion of British and American oil companies is well known. There have been other measures more basic in their general effect. As early as 1933 it was laid down by the Manchukuo government that "national control will be exerted on important economic activities." This has been given rigorous execution, and by 1937 there was not a single important industry that was not wholly or partly under governmental control. In the words of the "Oriental Economist," the principal Japanese economic periodical, in May 1937: "Since its foundation Manchukuo has followed the policy of planned economy and the major industries have been brought under some sort of State control one by one." And in May of 1937 an industrial control law was passed formalizing "planned economy." Thereby all enterprises were put under government license and the government was empowered "to issue necessary directions regarding the operations of those engaged in the key industries in the light of the public interest and the State control." Books and reports must be submitted for inspection and permits must be obtained when enterprises "want to expand or modify their arrangements of production." Thus were unified and made official all the semi-official restrictions in force theretofore.
Since the beginning of the war with China, an attempt has been made to give the impression that the strict control of economy and the consequent exclusion of foreign trade have been relaxed. But no change in ordinance can now affect the basic fact, which is that all except minor enterprises are in the hands of great interlocking trusts, which have so much of state participation in them as to be quasi-political -- the South Manchuria Railway, the Showa Steel Works, the Manchuria Coal Mining Company, etc. The chance which foreign business agencies have to break through the circle of companies, state-owned, under semi-official management or officially favored because affiliated with military groups, is virtually nil. The proof lies in the withdrawal of practically every foreign firm from Manchuria (the British-American Tobacco Company almost alone excepted). The barrier to foreign business may be rendered invisible, but it is impenetrable. So while it may be that no final conclusion can be drawn from the case of Manchukuo, the hypothesis can be set up -- and supported by considerable evidence -- that the benefits of Manchuria's development by Japan have inured thus far only to Japan. In any case, so far as direct relations with Manchuria are concerned, the rest of the world has been excluded.
The non-Japanese world will be excluded in the same way from China if Japan secures political power there. The loss would be far from negligible. China's foreign trade has increased steadily in the last generation. From 1912, the year after the founding of the republic, to 1930, when the combination of war and world depression introduced abnormal factors, it had increased more than two and a half times -- from 840,000,000 Haikwan taels to 2,200,000,000 Haikwan taels (the average value of the tael is 65 American cents). The share of the United States in that trade has been noteworthy, not so much in absolute figures as in tendency. Comparing the average of the four years before the World War and the average of the four years between 1926 and 1930, we find that American exports to China increased four and a half times, e.g. from U. S. $31,000,000 to $134,600,000. While never bulking large in the whole of American foreign trade, the exports to China have risen from 1 percent of the total American export in 1910 to more than 3 percent in 1930. And what is significant is that the rise has been steady and, still more, that in the last few years the United States has been the largest single exporter to China. So a substantial material loss is involved when it is said that other countries will lose by Japan's acquisition of control in China, except in so far as her exploitation of China will in turn add to her own power -- and willingness -- to purchase from abroad. This brings us back to the two points that were called crucial: the rate of acceleration of China's industrial development under Japanese control and the interposition of impediments to the free flow of resulting benefits.
When we talk of acceleration we mean a comparison of what will happen if Japan wins and what will happen in any event. Not even the most impassioned Japanese army advocate maintains that China will not make some progress in industrialization whatever happens. She has been doing so for years. That she began doing so in earnest soon after the World War is shown by the fact that her foreign trade almost doubled in value in the succeeding decade. The last few years witnessed an almost fanatical movement for modernization, and under its impetus both industrialization and foreign trade have increased.
That China lacks Japan's technical proficiency and would need years to attain it is undeniable. She has tremendous social and political obstacles to overcome, old institutions to modify or uproot, new ones to create. Further, she is handicapped by lack of free capital, though this is not irremediable. Given a continuance of progress toward unification and stabilization as evidenced in the last year or two before 1937, China would have had little difficulty in raising loans abroad. Japan is even more handicapped in this respect unless Western nations come to her assistance. And it is at least arguable that foreign lenders would be less reluctant to lend to a unified China than to a Japan victorious over China but left in a precarious domestic position as a result of a costly and prolonged war. With all the factors that operate against China conceded, it may also be said that forces had been set in motion that only the war could have arrested. Had the war not come, China would have proceeded with modernization at a geometric rate of progression. She would have extended means of communication and transportation, multiplied public utilities, established factories. For all of these and cognate enterprises she would have required goods, which would have come from abroad. With these, in turn, she would have produced enough to increase her purchasing power for imports not only of durable goods but consumers' goods. And if Japan should be repelled and China should retain her independence, the Chinese will resume at the point at which the war forced them to suspend all activities not directly connected with self-preservation. Under normal conditions nothing could have prevented China from offering a large and constantly growing market for the world's manufactured products. Under normal circumstances in the future nothing can prevent this from happening, regardless of events in the next year or two. The tide of social evolution is setting that way.
The argument might even be made that this tide would be arrested if Japan should defeat China and then take over both the government and economy of the country. Japan would begin with her own resources depleted by the war. Her surplus capital, already decreased by the expenditures in Manchukuo and the armament program indispensable to safeguarding her subsequent continental position, would be exhausted. She, too, would need years for recuperation. Moreover, she would have to undertake the reconstruction of China in the midst of an embittered and hostile population, a considerable part of which can be expected to continue some form of resistance for years. Both Japan's resources and energies, or what is left of them after the war, would have to be divided between the attempt to develop China and the compulsory task of pacifying and policing the country. It may even be confidently predicted that the larger share of both would go toward pacification and policing. This would be true whether Japan were spending her own money or money borrowed from Great Britain and the United States. Any credits advanced to Japan would be used for completing the subjugation of China as well as for developing a market in China for foreign goods.
Japan must complete the conquest of China, guard against recurrent uprisings and at the same time set about the construction of an administrative mechanism extending over half a continent and governing more than 400,000,000 people. She must do this, too, before she can proceed with building railways, opening mines, erecting factories and carrying out other projects which will need foreign raw materials and machinery from abroad. In sum, against all the factors making for the accelerated development of China under Japanese auspices and a consequent increase in China's demand for foreign goods can be set just as many factors that make for retardation of China's development under Japan. That China's economic progress has been checked by the war, no matter how it ends, is obvious. There are perfectly good grounds for believing that it would be checked even more drastically if Japan won.
We come now to the second point: what impediments will Japan interpose? If normal economic processes were allowed to function, then it might well be that in accordance with economic law the increment from China to all industrial countries would be the same no matter which of the two nations was sovereign. The same quantity of steel rails, motors, locomotives, machine tools, oil and cotton would then be required for China whether the government of China was Chinese or Japanese. Goods would, in the second case, merely be sold to China through Japan. The increase of prosperity accruing to Japan from its profits in China would be reflected in Japan's increased purchases from Western countries. The addition to Japan's wealth might be employed in investment in other Far Eastern regions, increasing the purchasing power of these regions and Japan's purchasing power through them. The volume of goods interchanged and, therefore, produced would be larger or at least as large. The question of who happened to act as intermediate agents in the transactions would be of minor importance.
The condition to such a consummation, however, is that normal economic processes should function. It is indispensable. And it is most unlikely to be fulfilled. If Japan's past practices were not sufficient to warrant doubt, there is more direct evidence in Japan's declarations of intention. These give little reason to believe that Japan will undertake the problem of developing China with the main purpose of extracting Chinese wealth as quickly as possible and opening the Chinese market as fully as possible. All the tendencies in Japan's own economic organization in the last few years and the declarations of ruling Japanese groups are in the opposite direction, indeed, almost constrain her to act in the opposite direction. Japan will develop China according to what she conceives to be her own national needs and with regard to the profits of certain groups in Japan allied with the military rulers. To understand what lies behind Japan's hopes and plans in China it is necessary only to skim through the periodical press, the economic journals, the reports of the Diet debates and the published statements of government officials, bankers and industrialists. Faint verbal tinctures of the ideas of nineteenth century free economy may be detected; but meaning and purpose are quasi-totalitarian. Granted that labels describing Occidental social institutions cannot be fitted patly to Eastern social forms, and that the word "autarchy" covers too much to describe accurately even war-time Japan, it remains true that the main tenets of economic nationalism have been adopted in Japan and are being steadily applied. And this is the scheme into which Japan will fit China if she has the power, just as already she has fitted Manchuria. This is what is meant by the words "the Japan-Manchukuo-China economic bloc," so commonly used in Japanese public discussion.
There could not be a more explicit declaration of what we may expect from Japan in China than was contained in the address of Prince Konoye, the Prime Minister, at the opening of the Diet on January 22 last. This was a formal, considered statement of national policy on the future relations of the two countries. Prince Konoye said: "In the field of industry the basic principle of the Government will be laid in the increase of our nation's productive power under the one comprehensive scheme covering Japan, Manchukuo and China, and efforts are to be exerted toward supplying the articles needed for national defense, promoting all the important industries and expanding our export trade."
This should be read in connection with the terms of peace offered China in January through German mediation. In Foreign Minister Hirota's official version, the third point read: "Conclusion of an economic agreement among China, Japan, and Manchukuo." And if Prime Minister Konoye's translation of this condition was not enough, Mr. Hirota gave further details in answer to a question in the Diet as to what he meant by an economic agreement. He answered: "Geographically speaking, Japan is considering the conclusion of an economic agreement applicable to the whole of China. I understand that agreements in connection with the exploitation of natural resources, communications and trade will be set up. It is possible that special arrangements will be made between Japan and China in view of their special conditions."
In other words, China's economic rôle will be to supplement Japan's national needs, the criterion being first military and then economic. China will be "coördinated," in all the authoritarian connotations of the word. Exchange, production and trade will be rationed. The principle governing the plan of rationing will be Japanese self-sufficiency. Decisions will be taken in Tokyo, with reference mainly to considerations of Japanese national power and profit. In the nature of things, when one of the three must be subordinated to the others it will be China, just as Manchukuo has already been subordinated to Japan. The idea of the tripartite bloc is one of planned economy for purposes of military power primarily, and then the assurance of Japanese self-sufficiency. Europe has shown us how wide and free the play of economic forces is under that principle, how equitable the diffusion of the benefits of a productive system.
This is not a theoretical analysis. The steps already taken in China by Japan provide the documentation. The so-called Federal Reserve Bank established in Peiping in March attaches the currency of North China to the yen, so that though to buy foreign exchange in order to make payments in countries other than Japan is possible it is not feasible. More important are the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company, both organized under Japanese government direction. The first has a capital of Yen 350,000,000, half of which is subscribed by the government, and the other a capital of Yen 100,000,000, half subscribed by the government. Both are gigantic holding companies, designed to serve in China the same purpose as the Oriental Development Company in Korea and the South Manchuria Railway Company in Manchukuo. Already franchises have been allotted to certain subsidiaries (newly formed or already existing) of a favored group, for the substantially exclusive exploitation of Chinese resources. In the words used in the Diet in February by General Sugiyama, then War Minister: "The projected company (North China Development Company) will manage six enterprises -- telegraphs, telephones, electric power, gas works, water works and transportation." Other important industries are being parcelled out to subsidiaries. Two companies have been chosen to divide the field in tobacco. Wool has already become the monopoly of a "guild." A company is being formed to monopolize shipping in China waters. The Japan Electric Power Federation will have power development, the Japan Coal Mining Association the exploitation of coal, the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company the exploitation of iron. An oil monopoly, similar to that in Manchukuo, has been formed to the exclusion of the foreign companies that formerly supplied the North Chinese market. Step by step, the procedure followed in North China parallels the first steps in Manchukuo. An enlightening comment on the outlook for free enterprise is contained in a statement in the Diet by a Mr. Miyazawa, a member of the Lower House. "In North China," he said, "the commercial and industrial possibilities of the field are coming under the domination of influential Japanese capitalists, with the result that industrialists and business men of lesser financial resources have been denied similar prospects."
If that is the situation of smaller Japanese business men, what chance will there be for European and American business men? There are several indications already. The so-called Provisional Government set up by the Japanese in Peiping has promulgated a new tariff, which by coincidence reduces rates on commodities in which Japanese are most interested. Wang Keh-ming, head of that government, in a formal interview in Tokyo on May 2, promised that a system of foreign exchange control would be introduced in North China "in the near future." And while still Foreign Minister, Mr. Hirota gave an interview to Reuter in which, asked point blank whether Japan would impose the same exchange control in North China as in Japan, he answered that it would be done "in case it is deemed necessary," but that the time had not yet arrived.
With regard to freedom of enterprise and unimpeded development of China, there may be quoted a statement by Mr. Kaya, made while he was Minister of Finance, before the budget committee at the last session of the Diet. Asked to explain the government's refusal to approve certain investments in China, he answered: "It is true that the restoration of spinning and other industries in China is urgently necessary, considering the need of economically developing China under China's new régime and of accelerating Sino-Japanese economic coöperation. However, if the government gives wholesale permission, this will result in reckless investment of capital in non-urgent and unnecessary enterprises. . . . Indiscriminate permission for investments in China at this moment is against the policy of the Finance Ministry."
Finally, typical of public discussion in Japan now is a long article in the Nikkan Kogyo, a generally well-informed publication, purporting to be based on information from the Ministry of Finance. After describing the scheme by which the currency of North China has been pegged to the yen, the paper goes on: "If the North China foreign trade is left free, with the result that its excess of imports reaches an enormous amount, Japan will have to pay for it. Even in case of direct trade between Japan and North China, the result will be the same. Especially if North China's trade balance becomes unfavorable, Japan will have to readjust the situation by establishing credits. Therefore the import excess of North China will be shifted to Japan after all, threatening to make this country's [Japan's] adverse balance worse and worse. These things have determined the Finance Ministry to start positive action with the Peiping régime to prevent the situation from becoming worse. Except for goods really necessary to North China, imports from countries not in the yen bloc will have to be restricted more or less severely."
The last sentence should be pondered carefully. Though only a newspaper statement, it reflects the general belief and intention of those who carry power of decision in Japan. It is a summation of the prospectus for China in the event of a Japanese victory.
Advocates of the theory that Japanese tutelage will open China to penetration by Western trade make loose generalizations about the wealth that will flow thence when, for example, North China is brought within the system of industrial production, her resources are unlocked to the world, and her inhabitants are given a higher standard of living and the means to satisfy it. But what evidence is there that Japan has any plans for that region that can be so described? What is it that Japan wants from North China and will get if she can? Raw materials mainly: iron, coal, salt, and above all cotton, in order to emancipate herself from dependence on the American supply. In the scheme of the integrated tripartite bloc, North China's rôle is that of reservoir of raw materials. Its population will remain predominantly a peasant population. Only such light industries will be established as can produce certain simple consumers' goods for local use more cheaply than they can be produced in Japan. There will be no industries that can compete with Japan's. In short, Japan will be the manufactory, North China the source of supply of raw materials. What, then, is offered to Western trading interests? What machinery will they sell, how many automobiles and typewriters and radios? Without a balanced industrialization and the earning power that goes with industrialization, what will the inhabitants use to pay for imported articles? Peasants live at subsistence level. Japan will organize the production of the area to yield such raw materials as she needs and as much as she needs, striking some equation between what she needs and what the region must produce to exchange for the cheap manufactures that Japan expects to sell there. All the instrumentalities of exchange control, quotas, bounties and subsidies will be employed to bring about such a balance -- a balance as between Japan and North China.
The question whether this program is feasible need not be dwelt on here since it is not germane to our subject. It has not been feasible in any other area, however, and it is doubtful whether all the devices of totalitarianism can make it work. More likely Japan will find herself in the same position vis-à-vis North China that the older industrialized countries have found themselves in vis-à-vis the East. When the pressure to dispose of surplus products becomes irresistible, it will be found desirable to dispose of them in China. To that end, China's purchasing power will have to be raised. The temptation to sell producers' goods to China will not be resisted, just as England could not resist the temptation to sell power looms and spindles to Japan. Thus Japan in China will be setting up competition with Japan proper. This has been the cycle of Western expansion everywhere. The expansion of Japan in China is not likely to be an exception.
Western countries will have no place in China under Japanese control. China -- colony, protectorate or "independent" ally of Japan after the fashion of Manchukuo -- will not be quite closed to Western enterprise. A little trade may steal through the interstices left by Japan's own deficiencies in raw materials. A certain amount of steel will be sold for, say, the railways that Japan decides to build either to export certain natural resources or to satisfy her strategic necessities. Japan may permit the sale of capital goods which she herself is not yet able to produce and which she thinks China must have right away. Other countries may be called on to supply what the Japanese quasi-totalitarian régime requires to attain its ends. But no more; and much more than this Western countries could expect in the normal course if China were to remain independent, even though her independent development might not be so spectacular as it might be in the first few years under Japanese domination. On balance, Western countries have nothing to gain from Japan's success in China and much to lose. And for them to provide credits to Japan in the belief that Japan will act as their pioneer traveling salesman in Eastern Asia is to underwrite their own undoing.
The United States Helped Spark the Battles. Now It Must Help End Them