CHINA, fourth among the United Nations in military strength, is the only one of the chief anti-Fascist Powers whose role in the postwar era is still shrouded in uncertainty. Will this great nation remain in general an exploited country with a low standard of living and an economy dependent upon the initiative and capital of other lands? Or will it become economically independent and self-supporting?

Political stability is of course one of the preconditions for economic health in China; but an analysis of China's political problems lies outside the province of the present inquiry. It has been rightly argued that the great hope for the amelioration of poverty in China lies in industrialization. If it be granted that China will turn to a more liberal social pattern and that the misunderstandings between the Generalissimo and the Communist elements are susceptible of solution, what then are China's potentialities for industrial power?

The two economic prerequisites for industrialization are an abundant supply of labor and the necessary raw materials. And if raw materials are present in such quantities that they can be exported as well as converted into finished products at home, the process of industrialization becomes easier. Such exports provide foreign exchange with which to purchase machinery for further enlarging the domestic industrial plant.

China has the manpower. The word "coolie" which to foreigners connotes a hard-working but bare-handed laborer, means in Chinese "bitter effort." It exactly describes the type of labor available. Such workers, if they are willing as they are in China, and if they are physically able, can be technologically trained. The physical capacity of China's millions for efficient industrial work, however, should not be too readily assumed; for example, certain important reforms of diet are essential, as will be noted below.

What of China's raw materials? There is a divergence of opinion about their extent. Some people discuss the alleged enormous figures with bated breath, while others maintain that they have been exaggerated. It should be emphasized at once that although dependable information about Chinese mineral resources is available, not more than one-third of the territory of China has been geologically explored, in the sense in which Europe and the United States have been. Future exploration may greatly change the present picture. The large western province of Sinkiang, for example, which borders upon the territory of the U.S.S.R., may contain much more natural wealth than has so far been located. The rest of western China -- Tsinghai, Sikang and Tibet -- may likewise yield important discoveries. But enough is now known to draw the main outlines of China's industrial resources.


It is fashionable to maintain that iron and steel will not be the basic materials for heavy industry in the future, but the forecast is valid only if we measure time in an almost geologic sense. The light metals, aluminum and magnesium, have certainly mounted fabulously in importance with the growth of air transportation; copper and zinc are likewise used on an increasing scale, and plywood and synthetic plastics have been rapidly developed during the war. But no material available in quantity today can be substituted for iron and steel in the myriad uses to which they are put. We understand the alloying, processing and fabricating of iron and steel far better than we do those of the light metals. Plywood and plastics may displace steel as covering materials when only moderate rigidity is required, but their low tensile strengths and their destructibility make it improbable that they will serve as substitutes in boilers and pistons, tool steels and dies for some time to come. And steel and the other ferrous alloys are overwhelmingly in demand as structural materials.

Iron ore and coal are the major raw materials of a great steel industry. Coal furnishes carbon, an essential alloy in most steel. It yields the gas that is the commonest fuel in modern open hearths, rolling mills and steel fabricating plants; and coal converted to coke is the almost irreplaceable reducing agent in the blast furnace. Iron ore, coal and food crops are the foundations of national strength in the modern world. The United States, England and Germany (which export surplus coal in exchange for iron ore), and more recently Russia, have built their power on the two minerals. Coal and iron ore come first in an analysis of China's mineral resources.[i]

Chinese coal deposits are admittedly rich and widespread, though the estimates of the total quantity vary. Minimum figures are 234 billion metric tons; maximum, 997 billion tons; [ii] and it has recently been suggested that estimates of the reserve in Manchuria should be raised another 10 billion tons. By way of comparison, estimates for the United States and Canada are, respectively, 3,536 billion metric tons as of 1919,[iii] and 1,234 billion tons as of 1915.[iv] The reserves of Soviet Russia are apparently about equal to those of Canada or slightly greater. German reserve tonnages are comparable to those of Canada and Russia, but only if much low-grade coal (lignite) is included. The reserves of Great Britain are only approximately 190 billion tons as of 1913,[v] a fact that appears noteworthy when it is recalled that Great Britain actually produces the third largest amount of coal mined in the world. In brief, Chinese total reserves are apparently very great, exceeded at most by those of only three countries.

Coal is technically classified by "rank." Anthracite or hard coal is the least common and the highest in combustible matter, and hence of first value. Bituminous, or soft coal, is next in rank and is followed by lignite and peat. Chinese coals are of high rank for the most part. Of the 234 billion tons previously mentioned, about 45 billions are anthracite, 185 billions are bituminous, and only the small remainder is lignite.

Most of the coal production of free China comes from Szechwan province: 2,552,000 tons were produced there in 1939. The major part of the Chinese coal reserves may be described as lying mainly in four regions (see map): Shansi (wholly in Japanese hands) and Shensi (now partly under Japanese control) in northern China; southern Manchuria near Peiping (also in Japanese hands); Chekiang and Kiangsu in east central China; and southwestern China, especially Hunan, Kweichow, Yunnan and Szechwan. The northerly fields have been actively exploited by the Japanese, especially the area around Chopeh and the fields in the southerly and eastern parts of Liaoning. In general, the northern coals are of higher rank than those farther south. By far the greatest Chinese coal reserves -- more than half the total tonnage -- are in Shansi province; the Japanese invasion of this province was an especially severe blow to the Chinese coal mining and steel industries. The next largest reserves are in Shensi, however, and a major part of them, as well as those of Szechwan, are still in Chinese hands.

The coal fields of east central China produce good, inexpensive bunker coal for coastal shipping and have been highly productive. But the fields farther west, now being actively mined because of the military situation, may be expected to rival and in time even to displace the eastern regions in importance. A westward movement of industrialization is already well advanced in Szechwan and has been accelerated by the fact that much of the coal produced there cokes better than coals mined farther east, is cleaner and is of somewhat higher rank.

Estimates of China's reserves of iron ore vary greatly. It has been reported that Japanese exploration in Manchuria has lately uncovered new deposits containing 100,000,000 tons of high-grade ore, making a total for all grades of 1.218 billion tons. The dependability of this estimate is an open question. We know with considerable certainty, however, that at least three ore-bearing areas in southern Manchuria are of great magnitude.[vi] There are large reserves along the Yalu River, just north of the Korean boundary, in which good replacement ore occurs in limestone. The largest deposits appear to be those of Anshan in Liaoning, southeastern Manchuria, but these ores are lean, bearing only somewhat more than 30 percent metallic iron. And there are fields with richer ores farther west and northwest in Manchuria, around Hsuan-Lung in Chahar and Chengteh in Jehol. The relative flatness of the beds in Chahar which makes mining more easy, and especially the high grade of the ores (50 percent metallic iron), favor operations in that field.

The total reserves for China, exclusive of Manchuria, are believed to be between 250 and 500 million metric tons of good grade ore.[vii] Especially in central and eastern China along the Yangtze there are many deposits which in the aggregate are large but which in themselves are small and widely scattered.[viii]

Map of China

Those at Tayeh are an outstanding example. Shortages in higher grade iron ore will ultimately force the Chinese to look for a supplementary supply. It will probably be imported from the Philippines and perhaps also from the great deposits of east-central India, which can be made available to Chinese coastal steel centers by ocean shipment.

As is customary everywhere, Chinese centers of pig iron production are mostly near the iron ore deposits or near the coal fields or assembly centers accessible to both raw materials. The larger furnaces have hitherto been located in Liaoning, Hupeh, Hopeh, Shansi, Honan and Kiangsu (Shanghai). But the capture of Manchuria by the Japanese forced the Chinese Government to stimulate production of steel, as well as of coal, in areas less accessible to the invaders. There has been a noteworthy shift in both iron ore mining and iron smelting to the region around Chungking and to Luku, west of that city. Luku is said to be the largest and most important source of ore and of unfabricated pig iron and steel in independent China today, despite the presence of more extensive and more easily worked deposits farther north. This shift marks the beginning of the industrialization of southwestern China, which will make the badly needed machined products available to the potentially great markets of west China. Hitherto these markets were poorly served by the coastal steel centers of the east and north.

In summary, then, it may be said that China has the coal and iron ore necessary for a growing if not an immense steel industry. The coal supplies are exceptionally large and high grade. The iron ores are far less promising, but, as we have noted, may be supplemented by imports from the Philippines and India. The maximum development of the steel industry of course awaits the expulsion of the Japanese from Manchuria and the northern provinces of China proper; and it also depends upon the construction of a net of railways, especially in western China.


An industrialized country can, if forced to do so, import the various subsidiary metals used in the manufacture of standard and alloy steel. The major non-ferrous metals employed in industry, such as the light metals aluminum and magnesium and the base metals copper, zinc and lead can also be obtained from abroad. Before the war, for example, as highly industrialized a nation as Germany imported 80 percent of her copper; England imported all of her copper (though about half came from other parts of the empire); and France was compelled to purchase abroad virtually every ton of it she used.

China fortunately has supplies of tin and of one important ferro-alloy metal, tungsten, far in excess of her needs. Noteworthy amounts of copper may be available. And it is legitimate to hope that a country as large as China will, upon adequate exploration, yield manganese for steel making, bauxite deposits and other aluminum sources, and zinc and lead in quantities sufficient to meet her domestic needs for some time to come.

In 1939, free China produced only 706 tons of metallic copper,[ix] and in 1940 China and Manchuria together yielded only about 1500 tons of metallic copper. By comparison, Japan produced 100,000 metric tons, the Philippines 35,000 tons and India and Burma 10,000 tons. China's annual consumption of metallic copper is usually only slightly less that 10,000 tons. There are some copper deposits of fair size and grade in south-central China, notably in Yunnan at Tungchuan. These mines, controlled by the Government until recently, unfortunately seem to be approaching exhaustion.[x] Other deposits of moderate richness and quantity are reported in Szechwan; and still others, in which ores of lead and zinc are mixed with the copper, are in Kirin, northeastern Manchuria. A large deposit of rich ore is said to have been found recently in Fencheng-Hsien. Probably the greatest hope for copper production in China, however, is offered by the disseminated deposits, somewhat like those of northern Chile and the southwestern United States. These are low-grade ores which can be profitably extracted only by large-scale operations.

Chinese consumption of zinc and lead is about 7,000 to 10,000 tons of each metal annually. Some production has been recently reported by the Japanese in Liaoning, near the Korean border. One large deposit has been developed at Shuikoushan, near Changsha, in Hunan. Despite these and smaller mining operations in scattered localities, domestic production satisfies only about a tenth of the Chinese demand, and no large body of ore of either metal has yet been reported. Further careful exploration for lead and zinc as well as copper is still needed.

Mineable sources of magnesium (magnesium brines, magnesium salts in salt beds, and magnesite or magnesium carbonate deposits) and of aluminum (at present, chiefly bauxite ore) are not yet well known in China. Aluminum plants under Japanese control are now said to be in operation in Manchuria, using bauxite taken chiefly from Liaoning; other reserves of bauxite are known to exist in Shantung, Yunnan and Kansu.[xi] Magnesium brines might profitably be sought by drilling; here again exploration is needed.

China is rich in deposits of three somewhat rarer metals: tungsten, tin and antimony. Tungsten is especially valuable as an ingredient of high grade steel and is used in electric light filaments. Geologic conditions in China are exceptionally favorable for tungsten mining, since the climate is warm enough to produce heavy rock decay and thus to free the ore from the containing rock, and to make work feasible all year around. These circumstances, plus cheap labor and the rich deposits, have made the country the arbiter of the world's market of this important metal. A table of the yields of the leading producing countries in 1940, in metric tons of concentrate bearing 60 percent tungstic oxide, puts China at the top with an estimated yield of 14,500 tons, followed by Burma (9,000 tons estimated), United States (4,825 tons estimated), Bolivia (4,183 tons exported) and the Japanese Empire (2,000 tons estimated).[xii]

The workable tungsten deposits of China are chiefly in Kiangsi, Hunan, Kwangtung, Yunnan and Kwangsi. Two belts parallel the southeastern coast, turning westward to enter Indo-China after following the southern border of China; of these the northwesterly is the more productive now and is probably the more promising one for the future. Tayu in Kiangsi is the best-known single district and is believed to be the richest.

The world's major deposits of tin are found in the Malayan region, China and Bolivia. China usually occupies fourth or fifth place in annual world production, preceded by Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, Bolivia and Siam in the order named. The chief mining areas in China today are in Yunnan. The relatively primitive methods heretofore in use are now being improved. The newly-established governmental Yunnan Engineering Bureau has fostered a program looking to the adoption of modern techniques.

Chinese antimony production almost completely dominates the world market, usually accounting for 75 - 80 percent of the total. Some is shipped to Europe, but most goes to the United States for use with other metals in babbit and bearing alloys, hard lead and type metals. The chief center of production is in Hunan.[xiii] The Chinese Government has repeatedly sought to stabilize production of antimony and to create a kind of government monopoly.

To complete the record, a word should be said about the production of mercury or quicksilver, valuable as a constituent in pigments, chemicals and explosives. Though its production in China is not large it has been steady and may increase in the future. Mercury ore has been found in several areas, notably Kweichow province. Further search for it appears justified, since the war has largely depleted the reserves of Spain, northeastern Italy and the United States, hitherto the most important world sources; but it is doubtful that mercury will ever become a mineral for Chinese export. The production of the precious metals, silver and especially gold, is widespread though not conspicuous in China and has little bearing on the industrialization of the country.[xiv]

Certain non-metallic minerals such as limestone, salt, gypsum, building stone and cement materials are of great value in construction and in the manufacture of chemicals. In an industrially undeveloped country such as China these products are chiefly of local use; as China becomes more of a manufacturing nation and the standard of living rises, there will be a wider domestic market for them. And the probable development of heavy chemical industries which produce such basic materials as sulphuric acid, simple lime compounds and soda ash will likewise create a heavier demand for the above group of non-metallic minerals.

The exploitation of certain of the industrial minerals is already under way. Among such products are magnesite or magnesium carbonate, greatly needed not only as a source of magnesium metal but also as a refractory and flux in steel making and as a raw material in the chemical and cement industries; fluorspar, used as a flux in metallurgy and in glass manufacture; gypsum, essential in most high-grade plasters; and salt, that most important of chemical raw materials, now derived from the sea in the eastern provinces and from mines in Szechwan and Yunnan. China is the greatest producer of high-grade talc, an industrially valuable lubricant, filler and refractory. And she has clay of unusual purity, from which our term "china" for high-grade crockery orginated.

The magnesite deposits in southern Liaoning, Manchuria, may prove to be the world's largest. As early as 1925 they were estimated to contain 200,000,000 tons of this valuable material [xv] and in 1937 they yielded 331,000 metric tons,[xvi] rivalling the deposits of Austria and Soviet Russia. Fluorspar is being produced by Japanese interests from mines in Chekiang; other deposits of this mineral, as yet apparently unworked, are known in Shantung. The other mineral products mentioned are widespread in China, being found in southern Manchuria, where they are now worked by the Japanese, and in east-central China, especially in Honan, Hupeh and Chekiang.

It is customary to expect any country as little known geologically as China to yield petroleum. To date, however, only a few producing districts have been found, and these are of little significance in the huge petroleum production of the world. The most promising producing area at present is in southwestern China, extending from Sinkiang through Kansu, Shensi and Szechwan. Sikang, only very recently explored, probably has a larger reserve and its output might attain world importance.[xvii] Manchuria may also produce petroleum but, so far as known, no exploratory drilling has been done there. Most of China's present production comes from northern Shensi and western Szechwan; a minor quantity comes from Sinkiang and a little more comes from Kansu. The Sinkiang region offers promise, though little is actually known about the possibilities of petroleum in this westerly part of China. In recent years the total annual output for the nation was not more than 70,000 barrels. Three refineries are now in operation or under construction, two in Kansu, and one in Sinkiang.[xviii]

Manchurian shale oil is of more immediate significance as a source of petroleum, gasoline or lubricants than Chinese petroleum, and appears to have been of great and immediate value to the Japanese during the current war. The reserves are chiefly near Manchuli in Heilungkiang and Fushun in Liaoning. Figures such as three billion barrels are quoted, but a more reasonable estimate for the only fields so far productive, those in Liaoning, would probably be upward of 200,000,000 barrels under economical conditions of production. By 1939 Japanese installations in this region had an annual yield of about 360,000 metric tons of crude oil, largely for ultimate export to Japan.


This brief survey of China's mineral resources leads back to the original question. It may be concluded that China is potentially an important and reasonably self-sufficient industrial nation. The national reserves of coal are immense, and those of iron fair. The supplies of copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, manganese and other subsidiary metals seem limited, but they are also insufficiently explored. Of this group of minerals, China seems to be best supplied with copper. She is rich in tin, tungsten and antimony and can expect to ship these metals abroad. Her supplies of mercury, gold and silver are considerable, though not exceptional. She will have export surpluses of three industrial minerals -- magnesite, talc and China clay -- and she appears to have enough reserves of most other common industrial minerals and structural materials to meet the increased domestic requirements which would accompany rising living standards. Petroleum will probably not be of great importance as a Chinese mineral product for some time to come, although continued exploration in western China may yield much greater reserves.

In concluding this survey, certain comments may be ventured as to actions which need to be taken by China and by other nations to expedite China's industrialization. The achievement of victory and then of political stability are of course the great prerequisites for China's economic development. On the large subject of political stability we are able to note here only that the condition of the Chinese masses is not favorable to industrial development, and that reform of various kinds is needed. As stated, the Chinese diet is poorly balanced and undernourishment is the rule among the Chinese. The Chinese people depend too much upon plant foods, especially cereals, and obtain too little dairy and meat foods; the implications of this fact no doubt go deep into the structure of Chinese society, but they cannot be analyzed here. The individual Chinese is quick to learn industrial techniques, by all accounts, but the "cheap" labor of China may need a generation of education and readjustment before it can approach the efficiency of western workmen. And a better nutritional level is certainly a prerequisite to the arduous physical labor needed to run machines efficiently, despite the most advanced mechanization.[xix] "Cheap" labor may be inexpensive in terms of cost per hour of work, but it is frequently very expensive in terms of cost per task accomplished, as has been demonstrated in many industries in various countries.

Extensive comment on the present policies of the Chinese Government toward the country's mineral resources are scarcely warranted; internal development has of course been hamstrung by the recurring emergencies of the last 20 years of warfare. The creation of an active federal geological survey three decades ago was intended to be the first of a series of measures designed to put China's mineral resources to use. The Chungking Administration has recently taken several highly constructive steps; we may note in particular the work of the National Resources Commission since 1938 in searching for petroleum, and the studies of lead and zinc smelting, antimony and tin production, and tungsten marketing fostered by the Chinese Ministry of Economics. The promising program of railroad building planned in 1920 has largely gone by the board in the period of civil and foreign wars,[xx] but the Chinese Government seems aware of the crucial need for the development of communications in China, especially the need for a railway net in western China which has been emphasized in this paper.

What can the Great Powers do to help China forward on the road to industrialization? Only a few aspects of this broad question can be considered here. A philanthropic approach toward China's financial needs is sometimes recommended for the United States, and perhaps for the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom. But a "big brother" role is politically feasible only to a moderate degree. American and British citizens, with their own pyramided war debts, will not favor foreign loans which have the appearance of gifts -- despite the example of the excellent intangible profits yielded by the generous attitude of the United States in the case of the Boxer indemnities. Although China asks for understanding, she will not ask for charity. The American Government, or, more wisely, private capital, may justifiably undertake moderate-interest, long-term loans for development in China. Loans to further the rehabilitation and extension of the Chinese railways in western and southwestern China would be especially helpful. The question of collateral for such loans is a delicate one; loans with large collateral are always open to the charge of imperialism, however farsighted and fair the terms may be. The recent revision of certain laws governing foreign capital in China will, at any rate, simplify this problem. In the past foreign capital has been discouraged from investing in exploratory mining ventures in China by laws so framed that all mining corporations were controlled by Chinese capital and directors. It is understandable that the Chinese Republic felt the need of such measures -- after all, China was freed from the limitations of extraterritoriality only a year ago. But the revision of the laws was a wise and constructive action.[xxi]

Export of antimony, tungsten and tin will be an important source of foreign exchange for China after the war, and "cartels"-- or some type of producers' associations -- to stabilize these industries and reduce sources of international conflict would be useful. Whether such organizations would act to help hundreds of small mine operators and their numerous employees and would regulate prices in the interest of consumers, or would merely raise and maintain artificial price levels, is of course a relevant question. The problem can perhaps be solved only by the creation of an international board of mineral control, functioning as part of a larger international organization.

The United States and the British Commonwealth could usefully expedite the development of Chinese mineral resources by making technical advice and services available to the Chinese. Government engineers, geologists and economists could be loaned to the Chinese, much as the United States now exchanges them with the Latin American countries. The younger Americans, Canadians, Australians and Europeans who served in such capacities would gain valuable experience while rendering aid to China. Perhaps educational and philanthropic foundations in the United States will send competent and understanding young Americans with special scientific training to China, extending the help which has been given to China in the field of medicine. If such engineering fellowships are arranged, however, we must take care to see that the arrangements are not one-sided. The form is as important as the substance if good feeling is to be fostered.

Finally, we must revert to the truism that world policies which make international trade easy are basically necessary for China's industrial development and hence for peace and stability in the Far East. It was noted above, for example, that the iron ore of India and the Philippines supplements the coal of China; the welfare of this whole vast area will be forwarded by governmental actions which make such a natural union of economic resources possible. China is conspicuously dependent upon foreign exchange in the development of a modern industrial plant. She must trade with the United States, with Great Britain and probably with Japan. Trade with the U.S.S.R. may contribute to Chinese exchange in Russia, although at present the exportable surpluses of Russia and China are similar rather than supplementary: coal is the chief surplus raw material of both eastern Russia and China and both are short of iron ore and, of course, of consumers goods.

The United States can look forward to fruitful and mutually beneficial trade relationships with an industrialized China. We need her tin, tungsten and antimony. We can use her talc, clay, possibly her magnesite and certainly her crude oil, if it is found in sufficient quantities. And though Chinese bunker coal does not actually enter this country, its use by American ships in Chinese ports is valuable to American commerce.

China has in the past received 15 to 20 percent of her imports from the United States, mostly in the form of fabricated goods, but also including petroleum and petroleum products, pig iron, steel billets, and copper bars and ingots. Shipments of these products would doubtless decline if China measurably increased domestic mineral production and fabrication. But the industrialization of China would not mean that her total imports from the United States would decrease. The primary result of the development of a modern economy in China would be a rise in the Chinese standard of living and a great increase in the demand for consumers goods. The development of Chinese resources, the growth of Chinese industry, the rising purchasing power and living standards of the Chinese citizenry will be immensely helpful to the foreign trade and basic economy of the nations of Europe, Asia and the New World.

[i] See T. T. Read, "Economic-Geographic Aspects of China's Iron Industry," Geographical Review, v. 33, p. 42-55, for details concerning iron and coal deposits and an excellent description of recent developments.

[ii] H. Foster Bain, "Ores and Industry in the Far East." New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1933. W. H. Wong, "The China Year Book, 1935." Shanghai: North-China Daily News and Herald, Ltd.

[iii] M. R. Campbell, "The Coal Fields of the United States." Washington: U. S. Geological Survey, 1919.

[iv] D. B. Dowling, "Coal Fields and Coal Resources of Canada." Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1915.

[v] A. Strahan, "The Coal Resources of Great Britain," in 12th International Geological Congress, "Coal Resources of the World." Toronto: Morang and Co., Ltd., 1913, v. II.

[vi] H. M. Mikami, map of world iron ore. Economic Geology, v. 39, 1944, p. 14, 22. Charles Hart, "Known Iron Ore Reserves of the World and Their Significance," Iron and Steel Engineer, May 1939, p. 18.

[vii] H. M. Mikami, op. cit., p. 22.

[viii] F. R. Tegengren, "The Iron Ores and Iron Industry of China." Peking: Geological Survey of China, Memoirs, Series A, No. 2, 1921-24, p. 457.

[ix] "China Handbook, 1937-1943." New York: Macmillan, 1943, p. 488.

[x] H. Foster Bain, op. cit.

[xi] Ching-chao Wu, "Minerals in the Industrialization of China," Contemporary China, May 15, 1944, p. 3.

[xii] "The Mineral Industry Covering 1940." New York: McGraw-Hill, 1941, v. XLIX, p. 610.

[xiii] A. S. Wheeler, "Antimony Production in Hunan Province, China," Transactions of American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers, v. 25, 1915-1916, p. 366-389.

[xiv] For further details on the non-ferrous mineral resources of China see an article by Kung-Ping Wang in the October 1944 issue of the Geographical Review entitled "Mineral Resources of China, with Special Reference to the Non-Ferrous Metals."

[xv] S. H. Dolbear, "China as a Field for Industrial Minerals," 1944 (unpublished report, courteously made available to the present authors).

[xvi] Kunitaro Niionomy, "The Magnesite Deposits of Manchuria," Economic Geology, v. 20, 1925, p. 25-53, especially p. 52.

[xvii] M. L. Fuller and F. G. Clapp, "Oil Prospects in Northeastern China," Bulletin of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists, v. 20, 1926, p. 1073-1117. W. B. Heroy, "Petroleum" in H. Foster Bain, op. cit., p. 123-133.

[xviii] "China Handbook, 1937-1943." New York: Macmillan, 1943, p. 483-484.

[xix] See especially the excellent discussion by H. Foster Bain, op. cit., p. 237-242.

[xx] Cf. Chang Kia-ngau, "China's Struggle for Railroad Development." New York: John Day, 1943.

[xxi] Cf. "The Prospect of Foreign Investment in China," Contemporary China, February 7, 1944.

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