FOREIGN policy is influenced by persons in government, and may be influenced by persons outside government, but only in a superficial sense is it "made" by them. It is the product of geographical, political, racial, religious and economic forces, some of which may change but most of which are constant, and which play upon a people until they take an attitude toward the rest of the world. That attitude may be aggressive or submissive or coöperative. It may be "right" or "wrong." It may lead to success or failure. Political leaders do not create it so much as stimulate and direct it. Hitler did not make the Germans aggressive; Churchill was not the architect of British steadiness; nor did Roosevelt make the Americans economically powerful, mercurial, warm-hearted -- I leave it to our friends or our enemies to supply the characterizing adjective. Each successful political leader knows instinctively what his people are, or what they want; and, for better or worse, leads them in the direction that the vast majority of them want to go.

Is there any area of foreign policy today in which such considerations are so relevant as in our policy toward China? China is in process of profound political and economic change, but change there comes tortuously and slowly. In Chinese-American relations, then, it is particularly necessary to provide for the long haul. Many persons say that we have no settled policy toward China, and they are forever calling on the State Department to "make up its mind." But they confuse policy with the day-to-day conduct of affairs. Press dispatches, even official communications, sometimes obscure the pattern. One does nevertheless exist, despite temporary variations, and it goes back 150 years. The American policy toward China was well conceived originally, I believe, because it accorded with the fundamental attitudes of the American people; and it is precisely because the present situation in China is so unsettled and perplexing that this is the very time for us to emphasize its validity and use it as the yardstick for measuring all our day-to-day decisions. The basis of that traditional policy is, of course, the Open Door. What have those familiar words stood for and what do they signify today?


The policy was essentially commercial in origin. Intercourse between China and the United States began in the early days of the Republic -- the clipper ship era. The possibilities of the "China trade" caught the imagination of New Englanders long before the industrial revolution. At first it was the desire for tea and silk and chinaware that led our ship captains to undertake the arduous voyage around the Cape of Good Hope and across the Indian Ocean to Canton. For exchange they took to China furs and cotton, lead and ginseng. From small beginnings the trade grew steadily, but never as fast as China's vast population and need for goods seemed to warrant. In the development of this trade there were three courses open to the United States. We could have sought exclusive arrangements, concessions and bilateral deals; we could have avoided official action and have left our traders to secure what business they could by their own efforts; or we could have demanded "most-favored-nation treatment" for our businessmen -- i.e., trade on a basis of equality and reciprocity, whereby privileges extended to any nation are extended to all. This was the system which was the most favorable for us, and the one which we championed, here as elsewhere. Of China's total foreign trade, the proportion which went to the United States grew constantly, until in 1937, before hostilities between Japan and China began in earnest, the United States led all other nations, taking 27.59 percent of China's exports and furnishing her with 19.75 percent of her imports.

Thus, in the Treaty of Wanghia, concluded by Caleb Cushing in 1844, equal trading rights for the United States were secured. But our policy was not clearly defined until the latter years of the century. Due to the weakness of China and the encroachments of European countries which were carving out for themselves special spheres of influence, it seemed clear that freedom of trade over wide areas would be denied not only to the United States but to other countries as well. It was then that Secretary of State John Hay successfully elaborated and carried through what came to be known as the "policy of the Open Door."

Let us recall the state of affairs at that time. China had been defeated by Japan in the war of 1894-5, Russia had occupied Port Arthur in Manchuria, Germany had obtained a foothold in Shantung, England had secured Wei-hai-wei and was strong in the Yangtse Valley, France was in control of Kwang-chow-wan in South China, and Italy was endeavoring to gain a position on the Chinese coast. Each of these areas was the center of a "sphere of influence" or "interest" which seemed likely to be made the exclusive province of the traders of one nation.

Secretary Hay's purpose was to safeguard the most-favored-nation trading rights which the United States had secured by treaty with China in Chinese territory wherein foreign nations claimed special interest or influence. He, therefore, on September 6, 1899, sent notes to Great Britain, Germany and Russia, and subsequently to Japan, Italy and France. The note to Britain contained the following passages:

The present moment seems a particularly opportune one for informing Her Britannic Majesty's Government of the desire of the United States to see it make a formal declaration and to lend its support in obtaining similar declarations from the various Powers claiming "spheres of influence" in China, to the effect that each in its respective spheres of interest or influence --

First. Will in no wise interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called "sphere of interest" or leased territory it may have in China.

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said "sphere of interest" (unless they be "free ports"), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such "sphere" than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its "sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such "sphere" than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances.

Considering the temper of the time, when many European Powers were intent on "slicing the Chinese melon," it seemed unlikely that Secretary Hay's bold move would be successful. But the fact that the provisions of the agreement applied to all nations gave each an interest in checking the growth of monopoly privileges. Consent from the other Powers finally came. The arrangement designed to guard the rights and increase the opportunity of American traders was a strong factor in checking further encroachments on the territory of China by other states.

Along with the problem of expanding trade with China, there was the problem of protecting the lives, property and interests of Americans there. It was not an easy one. In the early part of the nineteenth century China was a hermit nation. She had scarcely any intercourse with other peoples and desired none. Foreigners who sought to trade were segregated in Canton and had no association with the Chinese except for business. Foreign women were not allowed in China, even in the area set aside for foreign residence.

The British were more forceful than the Americans in breaking down Chinese aloofness (though Caleb Cushing in 1844 was escorted to China by four naval vessels). In the late 1700's and the early 1800's the British sent emissaries to the Imperial Court in Peking. They were treated as tribute bearers, and the Son of Heaven refused to recognize Great Britain or any other foreign nation. It was not until 1842, following the "opium war" with Great Britain, that Canton, Amoy, Ningpo, Foochow and Shanghai were formally opened to British trade. Although the United States did not engage in the war, she demanded and gained in 1844 equal standing with the British in respect to the treatment to be accorded her citizens. Americans were permitted to establish homes in the five treaty ports, to open consulates there, and even to establish churches and hospitals. The American-Chinese Treaty of Wanghia went further than the Anglo-Chinese treaty by stipulating that Americans who committed any crime in China would be subject to trial only by the American consul -- a provision made essential by the difference in legal concepts between China and the west. Thus was established the beginning of extraterritoriality in China -- a system to which the Chinese did not object at the time but which, when shared later by almost all other countries, they found increasingly irksome. Extraterritoriality was finally abolished by treaty in 1943.

The application of the Open Door policy led to a conscious effort by the United States to help China become a free, strong and united nation. In that endeavor our effort has been sincere and persistent. We have helped whenever an outsider might do so with propriety and effectiveness. While the Open Door policy in China assured to Americans equal commercial privileges even in the areas where the other Great Powers had spheres of influence, it had long been felt by the United States that even better conditions for trade would result if foreign nations had no spheres of influence at all, and if the Chinese Government were to administer all the territory over which it had at least nominal suzerainty. As early as 1853, Humphrey Marshall, the American Commissioner, had said: "The highest interests of the United States are involved in sustaining China . . . rather than to see China become the theatre of wide-spread anarchy and ultimately the prey of European ambition." This was the inception of the idea that the United States should not only respect Chinese sovereignty but should actively help China in setting her house in order. This basic concept has constantly guided our relations with China and with the other Powers which have had interests there. But it was not until the Washington Conference of 1922 that international acceptance of this elaboration of the Open Door doctrine was secured. Article I of the Nine-Power Treaty, signed by Belgium, China, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United States, provided:

The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree: 1, To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; 2, To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; 3, To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; 4, To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

Other clauses in the Agreement pledged the signatory Powers to respect the principle of equal opportunity of trade.

In the years since 1922 the Nine-Power Treaty has twice been broken -- by Japan when she attacked China in 1931, by the United States and Great Britain when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Yalta agreed that Russia should resume her special sphere in Manchuria as the price of her entry into the war against Japan. (Incidentally, Russia's earlier occupation of Port Arthur had been a strong factor in prompting John Hay to act nearly 50 years ago.)

The closest we ever came to war with China was during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, when American troops were sent to Peking along with those of other Powers for the relief of the Legations which were besieged by the Chinese. Since the citizens of several of the western Powers were also the object of the Chinese attack, there was danger that the policy of the Open Door might be set aside. Secretary Hay strove to prevent the emergency from being made the excuse for war or for new demands upon China. In a note sent in the name of President McKinley to the other Powers, he said that the purpose of the United States was to limit its intervention to the restoration of order and the protection of American rights, to "bring about permanent peace and safety to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

The Boxer settlement in 1901 provided that the Powers should henceforth be permitted to maintain troops in Peking and Tientsin, and to keep the railway open from the capital to the sea; and the United States maintained garrisons there until the outbreak of World War II. American troops have also on occasion been sent to Shanghai for police purposes and the Navy has maintained a patrol of gunboats on the Yangtse River for similar reasons. Thus the lives and property of American citizens have been assiduously protected in China, but never have disorders there been used by the United States as a basis for war or for exactions which were a threat to China's independence or well-being.

As is well known, the balance of the United States' share of the Boxer indemnity, after private claims had been paid, was returned to China to finance scholarships for Chinese students in American universities.

In a word, then, the keynote of the American policy has been friendship. Friendship between China and the United States has been mutual and, despite periods of temporary distrust such as that occasioned by the passage of the exclusion act, genuine. It has been possible because of an identity of basic aims. Both China and the United States have wanted peace, neither has had aggressive designs against the other, both have wanted trade.

The Open Door policy has not been carried out in a vacuum. It has been a practical response to a concrete situation. But it has had behind it the weight of interest of both nations, and has been in keeping with the general attitude of Americans toward the Chinese people. It won for us the friendship of the Chinese and it played a major part in helping to bring to birth the new China.


No nation can solve the internal problems of another, and the traditional American policy in China, beginning with insistence upon the Open Door for trade and developing to include assistance for China's effort to become free, strong and united, by no means resolved Chinese domestic difficulties. No one supposed that it would. But by casting our weight on the side of China's freedom over a considerable period of time we unquestionably have helped China advance toward that goal. The Chinese Republic came out of the Second World War in a greatly strengthened external political position. With the abolition of extraterritoriality, China regained her unqualified sovereignty for the first time in more than a hundred years. With the exception of Outer Mongolia, to which China was forced to grant independence, and the much more important provinces of Manchuria, where she has been compelled to give the U.S.S.R. a special status, all territory of China is now controlled and administered by the Chinese. (It may be argued that the special status of Manchuria legally does not violate Chinese sovereignty, but in effect it obviously does.) China's inclusion among the Big Five, with a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations (which the United States warmly supported), was the hallmark of this political triumph.

It is proper to note, moreover, that in the field of domestic affairs China seemed to be making heartening progress in the years before the Japanese attack in 1937. Despite Japan's conquest of Manchuria and her infiltration in north China and along the coast, and despite the inability of the National Government to conclude the struggle with the dissident Communist faction, the area administered by the established Government of China was larger than it had been at any time since the revolution. The financial and economic position of the Government was becoming stronger and showed prospects of further improvement. That, of course, is why Japan dared not postpone any longer the execution of her plans of conquest.

The Second World War lasted eight years for China, and at the end of it China was shattered. It is not fashionable at the moment to recount her miseries. Perhaps it is natural also that there should be a reaction from the extremes of admiration and gratitude which were expressed for Chiang Kai-shek in the war years, and for the Chinese people whose strength of will and powers of endurance he marshalled. In any event, not only were China's financial and political arrangements unable to withstand the explosive and destructive effects of eight years of conquest and resistance, but China's morale was also greatly impaired. The civil war which seemed to be only flickering towards the end of the thirties is now flaring. The Communist régime displays the attributes of Communist régimes everywhere -- conscienceless propaganda against its opponents, fifth-column activities in areas which it aims to acquire. The Nanking Government has retaliated with terror on its own account. We are told constantly that it is inefficient and corrupt and it obviously does not have the strength to tackle the reform measures which must precede the establishment of economic and political health.

This being the case, what is the American interest in China today, and what policy seems most likely to secure it?

Economically, our immediate and discernible stake in China is not great. The standard of living of the Chinese people has been so low that, despite her enormous population, China's foreign trade has been relatively small, and conditions in the country have been so unsettled that it has not offered a good field for American investment.

In 1933 Professor C. E. Remer listed our investments at less than $240, 000,000 -- business investments $155,000,000; American holdings of Chinese securities and obligations of the Chinese Government $41,000,000; and missionary and philanthropic properties $43,000,000. During the war years, and since, American funds have been poured into China at an unprecedented rate and to a total of nearly three and a half billion dollars. The financial help since V-J Day breaks down as follows:[i]


Lend-Lease as of December 31, 1946 a $747,000,000
Export-Import reconstruction credits authorized 49,800,000
Export-Import cotton credits 33,000,000
UNRRA 481,000,000
FLC surplus property credits 35,000,000
Maritime Commission ship's sales credits 16,500,000
Surplus property at original procurement cost b 824,000,000
a Shipments subsequent to this date are of minor importance.
b Sold for $175,000,000.

Little of this large sum is on a returnable basis, however, and our financial stake -- if we think in terms of a possibility of profit -- has not been greatly increased by this wartime assistance. In addition to the sums above named, a credit of $500,000,000 was earmarked by the Export-Import Bank in April 1946. After General Marshall returned from China some months later it was stated that this proffered credit would lapse on June 30, 1947, unless satisfactory constructive plans were developed before that time. The earmarking expired on June 30, 1947. However, on June 27 the Bank stated that it would consider the extension of credit to the Chinese National Government for specific projects, notwithstanding the expiration of the earmarking.

Americans have always been fascinated by the prospect of doing business with China's 400,000,000 customers -- three times the number in our own domestic market. Perhaps some of this enthusiasm has been handed down from early days when the possibilities did seem more bright. In the year 1820, for example, our trade with China represented more than a tenth of our total foreign trade, the Chinese buying 11.8 percent of all we sold abroad and we purchasing from them 10.9 percent of our imports. But this promise was not fulfilled. During the ten-year period before the recent war, for example, only 2.8 percent of our total imports came from China, and we sold her only 2.4 percent of our exports. Industrialization of China might pave the way, of course, for a realization of some of the promises of a century and a half ago. The Open Door for development of trade is one of our considered principles which we shall surely not relinquish. But tangible financial profits in China in any sizeable amount are a future, not a present possibility.

Strategically, our interest in a free, strong and united China is great. The experience of World War II proved that China was more important to our safety than we thought. Since our acquisition of the Philippines at the turn of the century, it has been clear that we would defend the Islands if they were invaded and that if we lost them we would at all costs endeavor to take them back. Although we have given the Philippines their independence, we are continuing to assume the obligation for their defense. As we learned to our sorrow, the possession of the southeast coast of Asia by an expanding and unfriendly Power constitutes a threat to the Philippines and consequently a threat to the United States. With the growth of air warfare the Islands are completely vulnerable to attack from China. When Japan started the war against us her continental position in China both facilitated her conquest of the Islands and made our task of regaining them and of defeating Japan very much greater.

In Manchuria, the situation is similar to that which existed before the start of the war, with the exception that Russia has succeeded Japan as the dominant Power in that region. Our decision at Yalta apparently was based on the assumption that this would not constitute a serious threat to the United States -- or else it was inadvertent. Manchuria has been a sphere of special interest for Russia or Japan, or both, for many years, and this has not affected our military interests, even though Russia and Japan fought a war over their rivalry there. But if that special position were to lead Russia, as it did Japan, to expand into China south of the Great Wall, then the strategic situation would plainly be changed.

Whether Russia will be tempted to resume the interest in China proper which she showed in the 1920's, and which ended so unsatisfactorily for her, and whether if so she could succeed in conquering or controlling China, where Japan failed, and could harness China's resources and manpower for a venture in world conquest -- all this is a matter of conjecture. It can be stated confidently, however, that a strong, independent and united China in complete control of the east coast of Asia offers the best hope for peace and prosperity in that part of the world; and thus it is of importance for American security. Perhaps no other American interest in the field of foreign affairs is more readily perceived and supported by the State Department than this one.

The American interest in the political future of China is no less great, though not quite so easily described. Perhaps the course of development taken by the 400,000,000 Chinese will influence the political shape of the world 50 years from now -- and hence the conditions of life in the United States -- more than anything that is likely to happen in Europe. We want China to move in the direction of democracy -- to evolve a government representing the interests of all her people and not a dictatorship of any class or group. But it is wise not to scatter the word "democracy" too freely through discussions of affairs in China. For though China has produced individuals who represent the finest democratic ideals of reason and tolerance, and though her peasantry is in many ways among the most democratic of peoples, she has still to develop a truly democratic régime. China is -- China. We shall have to wait and see what new institutions her own genius produces to suit her temperament and her new needs.

In 1943, when the Allies were deliberately giving the requirements of the western theater of war priority over those in the eastern theater, it came naturally to so great and objective a student of politics as Sir Halford J. Mackinder to write: "Wisely the conquering of Japan waits for a while. In due course China will receive capital on a generous scale as a debt of honor, to help in her romantic adventure of building for a quarter of humanity a new civilization, neither quite Eastern nor quite Western." [ii] That perhaps describes the terms of the political pledge as well as it can be put. There is no doubt, I think, that the Chinese understood that that pledge was made; and that they believe it is in our interest as well as theirs that it be redeemed.

But the hard question, of course, is not to define our long-range interests, but to determine how to secure them in the present circumstances. What to do today to help China become a free, strong and united nation, friendly to the United States and to our ideals of democracy?


Since a choice must be made, we can, I think, reduce the alternatives to three.

The first and most obvious course of action to further our commercial, strategic and political interests would be to back the present friendly Government of China to the hilt, financially and in every way we could devise --just as, for example, we try to help the present Government of Great Britain to overcome its difficulties. That is the course which most Americans expected the United States Government to take in China after Japan was conquered; it would have been correct by every canon of international law, consistent with our traditional China policy, and in keeping with our obligations. It was not followed, and cannot now be followed, for the reason that it would in practice be ineffective. As noted above, China is exhausted from eight years of war. The Government is beset by a breakdown of the national economy on the one hand and open rebellion of the Communists on the other. Great sums of money and quantities of goods will not solve her problems.

The second course is the exact opposite of the first: to reverse our traditional policy of the Open Door and make plain that we will not support the Government of China in any way. Though I cannot imagine any man in a position of actual responsibility choosing to risk such a course, and though I think it is most probable that were it taken the American people would demand a reversal of the new policy as soon as they understood its implications, this alternative is now being championed by a number of writers in American newspapers and periodicals. It is in accordance with the world-wide Communist Party line; but an ardent sympathy for the people of China and a fierce indignation with the Government of China for not alleviating their plight are not found exclusively among Communists. The intensity of China's misery seems to suggest the need for a correspondingly dramatic stroke of policy on the part of China's friends. We should do something! And that "something" should be keyed to the pitch of the crisis -- something showing dramatically how strongly we disapprove of present conditions in China. This suggestion represents, of course, a characteristic American approach -- characteristic of our way of expressing our feelings, if not our mature judgment. However this may be, one finds it easier to sympathize with the motives of some who advocate this course than to follow their reasoning.

The argument in favor of transferring American support from the National Government to the Chinese Communists seems to have yielded to the realities of the international situation and is now seldom expressed. On occasion, however, it takes the form of a truly romantic hope that if the Chinese Communists (whose leaders are avowed Marxists, many of them schooled in Moscow) were to succeed to power in the Chinese Government, China would thereby in some strange manner be drawn away from the Soviet Union. Since, fortunately, this theory has not been tested in China, we have to look to the behavior of Marxist leaders in, say, Hungary, Rumania or Jugoslavia for evidence of its invalidity. Most Americans find the evidence conclusive.

A related argument is that our present policy is "making Communists," since we are supporting an unpopular government. The question of its validity would seem to turn upon the degree of force which the United States is using to impose the Nanking régime upon the Chinese people. The number of American troops in China is so small, the troops are so scattered, and their pre-occupation with the legitimate affairs of the United States is so strict, that the Chinese peasantry are subtle indeed in their reasoning if the presence of the American soldiery is linked in their minds to defects in the Chinese Government.

Similarly the charge is made that our "intervention" risks provoking the intervention of the U.S.S.R. in China, and thus increases the risk of war. It is reasoned that if we "clear out of China," and Russia comes in, then we can return with a clear conscience and fight the war. The fact that Soviet power flows into every vacuum on the Soviet border is the one firm link in such a chain of reasoning (for all that it is usually the unstated one). Much confusion stems, I think, from the misuse of the term "intervention." We are not now "intervening" in China. It is not intervention to sell military equipment to a friendly Power or to dispatch a military mission to it at the request of its government.

There are at present United States military personnel in China in three categories, Army, Navy and Marines. The first is composed of members of the Army Advisory Group to China, grave registration personnel, and supply personnel for these; the second of members of the Naval Advisory Group to China; the third of guards for protection of the remaining United States installations in China. The total is less than 10,000 men. To withdraw these troops suddenly (we are in fact withdrawing them gradually) would be taken in China as symbolizing a reversal of United States policy. But those who advocate such a course do not say, or perhaps do not perceive, what the full implications of it would be. It would be taken to mean not that we were ceasing to exert influence upon Chinese affairs, but that we had decided to try to bring down the present Chinese Government.

The third course seems the logical one. It is, quite simply, to reëmphasize our tested China policy -- and to wait. After all, we are dealing with China; and we delude ourselves if we believe that there is any dramatic stroke of action which will rapidly improve the situation there. This is indeed a time for patience. As friends of the Chinese people we want them to carry through the fundamental changes which they have undertaken. We want the Chinese revolution to be completed. Our experience with Japan, which adopted western institutions without making fundamental changes in her feudal system, was costly and tragic. We believe that a strong, free, democratic and united China will be a powerful factor for peace in Asia and in the world. It may not be expedient to give large practical help to the Chinese Government at this moment. But there is a sane middle course between giving aid without stint that would be wasteful and ineffective, and withdrawing the possibility of any assistance whatever. Unless we are of the opinion that the Communists are preferable to Chiang, and that Chiang's Government should be overthrown, there is no rational ground for abandoning our established policy.

Some twenty years ago when I was living in China, I recall asking Admiral Tsai Ting-kan, one of the first Chinese to have been educated in the United States, and a very wise old gentleman, how long he thought it would be before China "settled down." "Not long," he said. "How long?" I pressed him. "Five years?" "No," he replied, "perhaps a hundred years. Chinese history teaches us that it usually takes a hundred years after a dynasty falls before a new government is firmly established." That leaves China about 65 more years in which to hammer out a new régime, dating from the revolution of 1911. I thought then that Admiral Tsai was too pessimistic. Now, in 1947, I am still willing to hope that the job can be done sooner, but I also see the wisdom of taking the long view.

This long view is evident in the last important statement of our China policy, made by President Truman on December 18, 1946. In the course of it he said: "China is a sovereign nation. We recognize that fact and we recognize the National Government of China. . . . We are pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of China. . . . We will persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and economic recovery in their country. . . . When conditions in China improve, we are prepared to consider aid in carrying out other projects, unrelated to civil strife, which would encourage economic reconstruction and reform. . . ."

Conditions have not improved since last December, and no aid has been considered a practical possibility. General Wedemeyer's mission may find ways to give assistance in the future. The long-term policy of the Government, which dictated the sending of the mission, is sound. Action taken in harmony with this policy is likely to prove fruitful. Departures from this policy are likely to be regretted.

[i] We are here discussing China policy, not the wisdom or unwisdom of measures taken to win the Second World War. For example, the State Department has been criticized because Lend-Lease military help was given to Chiang Kai-shek and not to the Chinese Communists. Many of the critics were pleased when similar help was extended to Tito, in another theater of operations. Later events would indicate that the Lend-Lease policy left no greater problems in China than it did, say, in the Balkans. But one's view of that will depend upon which side of the iron curtain one's sympathies lie. The important point to be noted is that Lend-Lease policy is quite distinct from China policy; and that its purpose was to defeat the Axis, not to strengthen either Chiang or Tito.

[ii] "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1943.

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  • WALTER H. MALLORY, Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations; author of "China: Land of Famine"
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