UNTRAVELED air routes and undeveloped resources in the Arctic are now being thought of as valuable for the future, even the near future. For this, Mr. Stefansson is perhaps more responsible than any other one individual. That the French, in 1763, gave up Canada rather than Guadaloupe to the British, who accepted the former instead of the latter with hesitating reluctance, and that the judgment of Seward regarding Alaska had to wait a generation or so for its vindication, have been some of the effective historical arguments of the practical explorer, who is so often deemed merely a prejudiced dreamer.

The area of the earth's surface north of the Arctic Circle (66° 30′, as usually drawn; strictly it is 66° 31 ⅔′) comprises over eight million square miles. What States have sovereignty over this vast region? To what countries are we to assign the known and the unknown?

Let us think of the Arctic as in part known land, in part known sea and in part unexplored, and thus let us look at it on the accompanying map. This map, like most maps of the Arctic, looks "queer." It seems different from maps of regions with which we are more familiar. The reason is at once simple and perplexing. It is common learning that every ordinary map of any considerable portion of the earth is necessarily at best only an approximation of correctness, because it is a flat picture of the convex surface of an oblate spheroid; and an accurate flat picture of a convex surface is impossible. Then, too, on the usual map of the United States, for example, we draw parallels of latitude. We know that these imaginary lines of latitude run around the world; but on such a map they are drawn as straight, or perhaps as slightly curved lines, going from one side of the sheet to the other. But on the Polar map these same straight or slightly curved lines of latitude become circles around a central north; and it is this change that gives us to pause and to wonder.

Most of us, I am sure, think of "North" as being something like "up." North is almost always toward the top of the page. Are not North and South opposites? So a straight line of longitude on a Polar map which runs north and then, going straight on, runs south, is very bewildering. In early days, we were taught that "if I face east, the north is at my left hand"; so while, when we stop to think about it, we admit that the shortest air route from London to Tokio goes near the Pole--still it does seem like going out of one's way, doesn't it? Not unnaturally, a New York journalist recently wrote of Alaska as being southwest of the North Pole--it certainly seems as if it should be, since it is northwest of "here."

If we look at our map, opposite page 54, we see that the countries now having important possessions north of the Arctic Circle are Canada, the United States, Russia, Denmark, and Norway.[i]

Denmark's Arctic possession is the Island of Greenland, with its enormous area of over 800,000 square miles, though part of this is south of the Arctic Circle, the Island extending south to latitude 60°. There are some settlements at various points along the coasts of Greenland. But the interior is uninhabited, partly unexplored, and the island has been crossed from one side to the other only six or seven times by explorers such as Nansen and Peary, and more recently by Rasmussen and Koch. With an area thrice the size of Texas, the population is not more than fifteen thousand, mostly Eskimo. The island is under Danish administration and the title of Denmark, in part at least, is ancient and is now unquestioned. (Norwegian rights on portions of the east coast were adjusted by the Treaty of 1924.) The world generally, and the United States in particular, recognize that Greenland is a Danish land. In 1916 our Government formally declared, in connection with the treaty for the cession of the Virgin Islands, that it "will not object to the Danish Government extending their political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland."

Spitsbergen (including Bear Island), with its valuable coal and other mineral deposits, is Norwegian. The history of this archipelago is instructive. Discovered as far back as 1596, the subject of many conflicting claims and much diplomatic correspondence in the seventeenth century, it came to be recognized as terra nullius and was formally so described in the Protocol of 1912 drawn up by representatives of Norway, Sweden and Russia. Still more formally, Norwegian sovereignty was recognized by the Treaty of 1920, a Treaty which the United States ratified in 1924. While Russia is not yet a party to that Treaty, the Norwegian Government is in effective occupation of the region, and there can be almost no doubt that her title is perfect to "all the lands situationed between 10° and 35° longitude east of Greenwich and between 74° and 81° latitude north." It is reported that Norway, in a note to Canada, has made some claim to Axel Heiberg Land (and perhaps one or two other islands) based on the discoveries of Sverdrup. Now Axel Heiberg, while unoccupied by any one, is within the region claimed by Canada. Its northern tip, Cape Thomas Hubbard, was chosen for the airplane base of the MacMillan Expedition. The possibility of Norwegian title to land in this region becoming a reality is highly remote.

Future territorial expansion in the Arctic seems to be open only to the Canadians, the Russians and ourselves. All three Governments at this time are showing active interest in the situation.

The Government of Canada in recent years, particularly since 1919, has been devoting much attention to its northern lands and to the possibilities that lie still farther north. The Canadian Budget item for the "Government of the North West Territories" was less than $4,000 in 1920; it was over $300,000 in 1924; and it doubtless is still larger this year. In 1920 there were elaborate official investigations conducted by the so-called Reindeer and Musk-ox Commission. In 1922, a Canadian expedition on the ship Arctic established a police post, post-office and customs house at Craig Harbor on Ellesmere Island, with a personnel of seven men headed by an inspector of police. This post, in latitude 76° 10′ north and longitude 81° 20′ west, is one of the most northerly official stations in the world, being less than a thousand miles from the Pole. It is interesting to note that the 1922 expedition selected near the post "a site sufficiently level and smooth for an aerodrome."

Indeed, Canada has now established a periodic ship patrol of Ellesmere Island and neighboring lands. In the summer of 1924 a building was erected on the west shore of Rice Strait, near Kane Basin, north of Craig Harbor, in latitude 78° 46′. The intention is that the police at Craig Harbor shall make a patrol to Kane Basin during the winter. A second permanent post was opened on Devon Island and there is also one at Ponds Inlet on the north coast of Baffin Island, where the Hudson's Bay Company has a station. This year the annual voyage of the ship Arctic commenced about July 1 as usual, and still other posts are to be established in this region. Melville and Bathurst Islands are mentioned as possibilities. A glance at the map will show that Ellesmere Island and Devon Island, with Baffin Island and Bylot Island to the south, form the eastern fringe of the Arctic Islands of Canada.

The Canadian Government has also been careful to preserve its rights in the matter of explorations, both positively and negatively. The Stefansson Expedition of 1913 received instructions to re-affirm any British rights at points which the Expedition might touch. Both Rasmussen and the Danish Government were formally notified by Canada in 1921 that any discovery of Rasmussen would not affect Canadian claims.

No relevant diplomatic correspondence between the United States Government and the Canadian Government has been published. However, the Prime Minister of Canada said in the House of Commons on May 11, when asked for the papers about Wrangel Island, that some of the correspondence might be regarded as confidential by the Government of the United States, indicating that on that question at least there had been some correspondence; and on June 10, in speaking of the Canadian claims in the Arctic generally, Mr. Stewart, Minister of the Interior, said: "A dispatch dealing with the subject was sent to Washington, to which we have had no reply."

The Canadian claims in the Arctic deserve special attention. They have very recently been definitely and officially stated by Mr. Stewart,[ii] and are outlined on a map laid on the table of the Canadian House of Commons. They include everything, known and unknown, west of Davis Strait and longitude 60°, east of the meridian which divides Alaska from Canada (141°), and north of the Canadian mainland up to the Pole.

What is to be said as to the Canadian title to the islands now on the map within these lines, islands having an area of say 500,000 square miles? There is of course no doubt of the perfect jurisdiction of Canada over these lands under Canadian law. Statutes and Orders in Council include within the Dominion all of these territories; the national act and the national assumption of jurisdiction are complete; but we are thinking of their status internationally.

Baffin Island, the largest of all, with 200,000 square miles, is as certainly Canadian as is Ontario; and we may take for granted Canadian ownership of the other islands directly adjacent to the mainland. As Halleck says: "The ownership and occupation of the mainland includes the adjacent islands, even though no positive acts of ownership may have been exercised over them."

As to the rest, there are various shades of doubt--the doubt increasing generally with the latitude. We have seen that Ellesmere Island and Devon Island have each at least one officially established and maintained police post; that is actual, even if it is to be deemed only partial, possession. The other islands north of 74° are unoccupied, are generally uninhabited, and indeed have rarely--and some of them never--been seen or visited except by explorers of various nationalities. The very existence of the more remote of them was unknown a generation ago.

On the other hand, whereas Canada makes a precise and definite claim of sovereignty, no other country (aside from the rather shadowy "discovery" rights of Norway to one or two islands) has announced any claim whatever. Furthermore, the appearance of these islands on the map as a seeming northern extension of the Canadian mainland is a visible sign of an important reality--namely, that many of them are quite inaccessible except from or over some Canadian base. With her claim of sovereignty before the world, Canada is gradually extending her actual rule and occupation over the entire area in question.

It has been suggested that the Monroe Doctrine has a bearing upon lands in the Arctic. Speaking very generally, this is no doubt true. Historically, the Monroe Doctrine at its original enunciation was aimed in part against the extension of territorial claims by Russia in the north. It is well to remember, however, that the geographical extent of the Monroe Doctrine has never been precisely delimited. Monroe spoke of "the American Continents" or, in other words, North and South America. Does this wholly exclude Antarctica, and if not, what part of that region is included? Further, and more material here, what are the precise northern boundaries of the Continent of North America?

It is also frequently said that the Monroe Doctrine applies to "the Western Hemisphere." Now whatever this expression means in this connection it certainly does not mean half the sphere. It must rather mean something roughly equivalent to "the American Continents." Geographically, the Western Hemisphere is usually mapped as commencing at about 20° longitude west of Greenwich and extending to 160° east. This corresponds to the idea of a "western" half, because if the Western Hemisphere commenced any farther east it would take in part of Africa. But this western half of the globe, as any one may see by looking at an atlas, includes not only the Cape Verde Islands and the Azores and Iceland on the east, but on the west includes all of New Zealand and a considerable expanse of the Pacific beyond the Fiji Islands. Of course what all this means is that the word "hemisphere" is frequently used very loosely, as meaning not the western "half" but a large western "portion" of the globe, and it is in this sense only that it is to be connected with the Monroe Doctrine.

Assuming, however, that the Monroe Doctrine may be invoked in relation to Arctic islands, may it, or should it, be invoked as against Canadian claims east of 141° west longitude?

In answering this question we should think of realities. The Monroe Doctrine is a national policy established primarily for the benefit of the United States. It doubtless will remain unlimited by any precise geographical formula and undefined by any particular form of words. In more than one sense, Ottawa is very near to Washington. The international frontier between the two countries means more a tariff than it does anything else. To interpret the Monroe Doctrine as meaning that Canada could not extend her domains to the north would be to say that acquisition by Mexico of Axel Heiberg Land would be regarded by the United States with complaisance and Canadian sovereignty thereover with opposition. The absurdity of the conclusion demonstrates the falsity of the premises.

As to the islands now known and lying north of the Canadian mainland, the average American would have no objection to the Canadian title. Certainly we would prefer Canadian ownership to any other ownership. We do not regard Canada as a "European Power" despite her membership in the British Empire,--a much looser tie to London than it was even a generation ago. The only other possibilities would be something in the nature of terra nullius, an unsatisfactory sort of ownership by everybody, or else ownership by the United States. No public sentiment here would favor either, as against Canada.

So while it cannot be asserted that Canada's title to all these islands is legally perfect under international law, we may say that as to almost all of them it is not now questioned and that it seems in a fair way to become complete and admitted.

The undiscovered lands are another story. We can make up our minds about them when we know what they are.

Russian claims in the Arctic have not been so precisely set forth. However, in 1916 Russia notified the Governments of Great Britain and the United States and doubtless other countries that it considered various islands near the Arctic coast of the Empire as forming an integral part thereof. These included the Henrietta Islands, Jeanette, Bennett, the islands of New Siberia and also, of particular interest in view of recent history, Wrangel Island and Herald Island. It is clear that the British Government now makes no objection to any of these claims. The attempt by Mr. Stefansson to make Wrangel Island British did not receive official support in London; the British have obviously decided to claim no Arctic lands west of 141°. The Russians took active steps to end the most recent occupation of Wrangel Island, and it is now unoccupied.

Wrangel Island lies about 80 miles from the Siberian coast and is perhaps of some value and habitable. Its early history is summed up by a leading authority as follows: "A Russian heard of it in 1824 but never saw it; an Englishman saw it in 1849 but never landed on it; an American landed on it in 1881 and claimed it for the United States." Except for Herald Island, which is a few square miles of barren rock, Wrangel Island is much nearer Alaska than any other island in the Russian Arctic. Possibly the United States may be interested in the future of Wrangel Island; but probably no country is concerned with the other Russian claims north of the mainland of Russia, so far as they have been disclosed; they are to be thought of chiefly in their bearing on future air routes.

The only known land in the Arctic which is not now the subject of a positive claim by some government seems to be Franz Josef Land,[iii] a group of islands--uninhabited and of unknown value--lying just north of 80° and, generally speaking, east of Spitsbergen and north of Nova Zembla. From their location we must assume that they will be claimed by Russia, for they are in about the same latitude as the Russian claims some 300 miles to the east.

Recent dispatches indicate that the present Russian Government is pursuing its rights. It seems that the Soviet Government is making plans for a Polar expedition by air to explore the areas directly north of Russian territory, in accordance with a program drafted by Dr. Nansen; and also that an expedition is to be sent to the region that has been known as Nicholas Land, but now to be called Vladimir Lenin Land, on the 80th parallel and at about 100° east longitude.

We cannot say that the sovereignty of all the known lands in the Arctic is definitely settled internationally. We can say, however, that the sovereignty of substantially all of these territories is now either definitely known or definitely claimed. The next few years will bring some sort of occupation of most lands hitherto unvisited except by occasional explorers. And the probability is that few of the claims thus far made to lands hitherto discovered will be questioned.

More doubtful, of course, is the status of the unknown.

The United States has never officially made any claim to any known Arctic lands outside of our well recognized territory. The sole declaration we have made regarding Arctic regions is the renunciation of any possible rights based on discovery or otherwise in Greenland. As to the unknown territories, there likewise is no official statement; but there is significant action.

The MacMillan expedition must be regarded as in effect an official expedition of our Government. True, it was largely financed by the National Geographic Society; but it was mostly composed of Navy personnel, it was supplied with Navy airplanes and with Navy wireless, and it was as indubitably governed by instructions from the Secretary of Navy as it was formally bidden Godspeed by his representative. Nothing was lacking to give the party official character, national duties and international rights.

The announced purpose of the MacMillan expedition was to explore the unknown area of the Arctic, the "white spot" on the map; and there can be no doubt that behind all this preparation and action will be found a national policy, to be announced publicly in due course. This great unexplored region of the Arctic lies, generally speaking, north, northwest and northeast of Alaska. The area of this "white spot" on the map is something

more than 1,000,000 square miles--more than the area of Greenland.

This is another way of saying that the Arctic Continent, long believed in and long sought, does not exist. Even if all this unknown area were land, it would not be a continent; at the utmost it would be a large island, one-fourth to one-third the size of Australia. But though unexplored, it would be going too far to say that this area is totally unknown; and inferences regarding it, based on known facts, almost forbid the idea that it is all land. The Pole and its immediate surroundings are water and not land; and soundings made in that vicinity show that the water is very deep water, suggesting that no great land area is adjacent. On the other hand, data from observations of the currents, the tides and the ice lead some scientists to think it unlikely that there is no land in this region. It may well be that the "white spot" contains more or less land in the form of islands.

If the methods of exploration previously used were the only ones available, it would perhaps be some generations before such a vast surface could be even approximately charted; but with the airplane or the dirigible (and perhaps the submarine) the possibility is quite otherwise. The question is now more one of expense than anything else. With proper preparation and airplane bases, the difficulties involved in obtaining the necessary information--and these difficulties are still great--could be overcome in the course of a few years.

If the political situation in the unknown Arctic finally results in agreement among the British Empire (Canada), Russia and the United States, the legal aspects of the problem will become unimportant. In the meantime, however, they are very interesting and in some of their features novel.

In early days, the discovery of unknown lands was regarded as the primary source of national title. But the impossibility that discovery, without anything more, should constitute a continuing basis of sovereignty soon became obvious and "effective occupation" or "settlement" became a requisite. In recent years, a third element of title has come to be thought of internationally as almost necessary, and that is what Lord Stowell called "notification of the fact," usually by an express communication to other Powers.

Of course, no formula or statement yet devised has solved or can solve all the difficulties connected with sovereignty over newly discovered lands. If effective occupation or settlement is to be deemed the real test, certainly "settlement" in Arctic regions can hardly be regarded as precisely synonymous with settlement elsewhere. Greenland is admittedly Danish, but I do not suppose that any one would say that the whole of Greenland is settled at this time. But clearly (if sufficient money is available) there may be effective occupation of an enormous Arctic area by the establishment of a few posts, here and there, with airplane and radio communications, without there being much "settlement" in the ordinary sense of that word.

In speaking of "the occupation which is sufficient to give a State title to territory" Mr. Olney, as Secretary of State, wrote in 1896: "The only possession required is such as is reasonable under all the circumstances--in view of the extent of the territory claimed, its nature and the uses to which it is adapted and is put while mere constructive occupation is kept within bounds by the doctrine of contiguity." While these words were not written about the Arctic, they seem very applicable to that region, where--doubtless for some time to come--no possession will be more than "reasonable" and occupation will be very largely "constructive."

In thinking of these three elements of title we are apt to conceive that their order in time is naturally, first, discovery, then occupation or settlement, and finally notice. Obviously, occupation cannot precede discovery by some one; and it seems generally to have been considered, as by the Institute of International Law, that the international notice required was a notice of possession. But the official Canadian claim, so far as it relates to the unknown, is in the nature of a notice before discovery and before occupation. What Canada says is that if Arctic lands be found--found by any one--east of 141° and west of 60° (west longitude) and Davis Strait, they are Canadian or will be.

It cannot be said, however, that such a claim as this is wholly without foundation or precedent. It bears some analogy to the "back country" or "hinterland" theory regarding territory stretching away from the coast. More accurately, it may be said to rest partly on the notion of "territorial propinquity" which the United States on one famous occasion recognized as creating "special relations between countries." Claims to unoccupied territory on the ground of contiguity are not unknown, although it cannot be said that there is any well defined or clearly settled principle to support them.

Very naturally, Canada thinks of the islands now on the map north of her mainland as contiguous territory, natural geographical extensions of the country. Discovered, to a great extent (not wholly) by British explorers, separated from the more southern area and from each other by comparatively narrow straits, though largely unoccupied in any sense, these lands seem to the Canadians a geographical entity and clearly parts of one domain, their own. To project this sentiment still farther north, perhaps across a considerable extent of Arctic sea or ice, is less logical but seems equally natural.

However, assuming as we must, that the Canadian claim even to the unknown rests partly on the principle of contiguity, there is another feature of the Arctic map, as Canada would draw it, which is of peculiar interest to us. A definite western line to the Pole is fixed, so far as Canada can fix it, and that line is the 141st west meridian. Of course, to claim up to that meridian is to renounce anything beyond it. In other words, the British now say that they now admit the rights of the United States to all unknown lands north of Alaska. This proposed line of division certainly does not rest entirely on any principle of contiguity; however that principle may be described or limited, it does not favor any one point of the compass as against any other; northwest or northeast may be as well "contiguous" as north. Nor does the line rest on any agreement between Ottawa and Washington, or we would know of it. It may accordingly be supposed that the suggestion of this line has as its foundation some legal theory, and that it is not merely an arbitrary continuation of the Alaskan boundary north from Demarcation Point to the Pole.

It appears probable that the Canadian theory of the line of the 141st meridian up to the Pole is based somewhat on the history and the provisions of former treaties. Going back a century, to about 1820, the various territorial pretensions of Russia, Great Britain and the United States in the vast northwest were not accurately defined and to some extent were overlapping. In 1821 a famous Ukase was issued by Russia. This asserted sovereign rights over the waters of Bering's Sea and a large portion of the North Pacific and also claimed land on the west coast as far south as 51°. Protests against the terms of this Ukase were promptly made by both Great Britain and the United States.

Following these protests the United States and Russia signed a treaty, in 1824, by which Russia substantially abandoned any claim to sovereignty over "any part of the Great Ocean" (although this was by no means the last heard of such a claim). The two countries reciprocally agreed that their citizens should not form "any establishment" to the north and south of 54° 40′, Russia renouncing to the south and the United States to the north of that subsequently famous line. It may be said that the effect of this was to leave territorial questions north of 54° 40′ to Russia and Great Britain, and south thereof to Great Britain and the United States.

The Treaty of 1825 between Great Britain and Russia followed. We now know that the British cared comparatively little about the boundary; they were thinking of navigation and fishing and trade in the Pacific. The frontier clauses were the excuse and the mask for the rest of the treaty. Indeed, the British, if pressed, would have conceded 135° west longitude as the eastern boundary of Russian America, a concession which, if made, would have left all the Canadian Klondike within the United States some generations later. But the 141st meridian was agreed to, and in describing the boundary between the possessions of the two countries, "sur la côte du Continent et les Iles de l'Amérique Nord-Ouest," the provisions of the treaty here material, in its original text, read thus: "La même ligne méridienne du 141me degré formera, dans son prolongement jusqu'à la Mer Glaciale, la limite entre les Possessions Russes et Britanniques sur le Continent de l'Amérique Nord-Ouest."

It is to be remembered not only that in 1825, when this treaty was written, the northern part (at least) of the boundary fixed was a matter of little concern to the parties or to any one else, but also that the two countries were dealing to some extent with the unknown. A considerable length of the northern mainland coast, both east and west of what is now Demarcation Point, was unexplored in 1825 and was put down on the maps of that time by guess. Bering's Strait and its vicinity had been charted for half a century; but Point Barrow was not reached till 1826.

In 1867, by our treaty with Russia, we purchased Alaska for $7,200,000 and succeeded to the rights of Russia under the Treaty of 1825. The expression above quoted from the Treaty of 1825 was incorporated in the French text of our Treaty of 1867; and in the English text it is imperfectly translated as "the said meridian line of the 141st degree, in its prolongation as far as the Frozen Ocean.

How far is "as far as the Frozen Ocean," or "la Mer Glaciale" of the Treaty of 1825? That the "Frozen Ocean" meant what came to be called the "Arctic Ocean" may be assumed; in the negotiations the words "Polar Sea" were used at least once; but this does not answer our question as to the extent of the line. What lands, if any, lay between the northern coast and the North Pole was not known in 1825, for it is not known now. Certainly if there had been islands adjacent to that coast they too, although then unknown, would have been subject to the same line. We now know that there are no such adjacent islands; there may be islands to the north, but if so they are some hundreds of miles toward the Pole. Indeed, the expression "as far as the Frozen Ocean" is vague enough (taking into account the previous Treaty of 1824) to make it at least arguable that the line runs as far as the 141st meridian itself runs, and that means to the North Pole (for the continuation of that line beyond the Pole is not the 141st but the 39th meridian).

It is also of interest here to notice what the Russian Treaty of 1867 says about our boundary to the west. The treaty ceded "all the territory and dominion now possessed by his said Majesty (the Emperor of All the Russias) on the Continent of America and in the adjacent islands, the same being contained within the geographical limits herein set forth"; and the western limit subsequently set forth in the text runs from a point in Bering's Strait on the meridian (approximately 169°) which passes midway between certain named islands "and proceeds north without limitation, into the same Frozen Ocean." (The Treaty French of this phrase is also worth quoting--"et remonte en ligne directe, sans limitation, vers le Nord, jusqu'à ce qu'elle se perde dans la Mer Glaciale.") These words "without limitation" are pretty strong words. They come very near to fixing the territorial rights of Russia and the United States, so far as those two countries could then fix them, up to the Pole.

So I think we may say that the Canadian theory is, in part at least, based on the history of these treaties. It comes to this: the areas round the North Pole, whatever they may be, form three or four great cone-shaped sectors--the Canadian sector from 60° west to 141° west; the American sector from 141° west to 169° west; and the great Russian sector running from 169° west to some undefined line in the neighborhood of 30° or 40° east longitude. The remainder of the circle, from say 40° east to 60° west, would, so far as this theory goes, be unassigned, but, very fittingly, that remainder seems to contain no land at all north of Spitsbergen and Greenland. Possibly a few islands close to the north Greenland coast are exceptions to this statement.

Whatever may be said by way of argument against this Canadian theory, it is certainly a highly convenient one. All unknown territory in the Arctic is appropriated by three Great Powers and divided among them on the basis of the more southerly status quo. Certainly if these three Powers are satisfied with such a partition, the rest of the world will have to be.

Looking at the matter from another point of view, the Canadian theory would give the United States (if we wanted it) a very large portion of the present unknown area. What this would mean in terms of territory we cannot now say; perhaps nothing; perhaps a frozen empire. We shall know more about it very soon.

[i] Sweden and Finland are partly within the Arctic Circle. Iceland lies just south of the line.

[ii] They were foreshadowed almost in their present terms in the Canadian Senate in 1907.

[iii] Before the World War, because of "discovery," it would have been necessary to think of Austria-Hungary as a possible sovereign, but hardly now.

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  • DAVID HUNTER MILLER, of the New York Bar, technical adviser to the American Commission at the Paris Peace Conference
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