CUBA'S propinquity and its highly strategic position in the Caribbean have inevitably produced an unusually intimate connection with the United States. It is the nature of this connection, subsequently confirmed by formal arrangements and strengthened by economic penetration from the north, which the Cubans now find irksome and which they would alter so as to obtain greater freedom of movement. In addition to the fortuitous circumstance of geographical proximity -- the brief ninety miles that separate the two countries -- three outstanding factors affect the relations between Cuba and the United States. These are the Platt Amendment, the Reciprocity Treaty of 1903, and the large American investments in the Island.

The Platt Amendment, which was originally passed as a "rider" to an army appropriation bill in the American Congress, was incorporated into the Cuban Constitution against the bitter opposition of most of the higher political class in Cuba. The circumstance that the Island was still under the military government of the United States made its acceptance obligatory in the Cuban Constitutional Convention. Four of the provisions of the Amendment seemed to the Cubans to limit the national sovereignty of their nascent republic. The first forbade the making of treaties with third powers which might compromise the independence of the nation. The second limited the debt contracting powers of the government to obligations within the scope of the ordinary revenues. The third provided for intervention by the United States to maintain orderly government and all its accessories. The fourth required the cession to the United States of sites for coaling or naval stations.

The treaty of commercial reciprocity between Cuba and the United States was signed December 11, 1902, and has governed the trade relations between the two countries ever since. The special concessions embodied in the treaty were specifically confirmed by the United States Tariff Act of 1917, at which time the reciprocity arrangement with Brazil was discontinued in accordance with the new tariff policy of this country. The reciprocity treaty admitted Cuban goods into the United States at a reduction of 20 percent from the regular tariff rates. Thus Cuban sugar of 96 degrees polarization, the standard in the crude sugar market, pays a duty of 1.7648 cents per pound, as against 2.206 for sugar of other countries. On the other hand, American goods imported into Cuba, with the exception of tobacco products, were granted reductions of from 20 to 40 percent from the Cuban schedules, the preferential rate being graduated according to the four classes into which American products are grouped for the purpose. The treaty also provided that "no sugar, the product of any other foreign country, shall be admitted by treaty or convention into the United States, while this convention is in force, at a lower rate of duty than that provided by the Tariff Act of the United States approved July 24, 1897."

Investments of American capital in Cuba have reached an aggregate of some $1,500,000,000, our largest holdings in any foreign country except Canada. The largest single item is, of course, sugar, which accounts for over half the total. Approximately two-thirds of the entire output of sugar is produced by American-owned mills. American interests include the great Cuba Cane Sugar Company, the Cuban American, the Punta Alegre, the Cuban Dominican, and the Cuba Company. The Cuba Cane places the value of its properties at over $86,000,000. The National City Bank, through a holding company, known as the General Sugar Company, operates a number of important centrals. The American Sugar Refining Company owns the two fine mills, Cunagua and Jaronú. The United Fruit Company operates two huge centrals on the North Coast of Oriente Province, which it feeds with cane from the vast hinterland of its own territory. The Hershey Chocolate interests own three centrals in Matanzas Province. Besides these there are a number of lesser companies in the field. The Americans have an overwhelming control of the industry in the two eastern provinces of Camaguey and Oriente, where in the crop year 1926-27 American-owned centrals accounted for 15,049,087 bags as against 3,470,270 bags for the Cuban-owned mills. American companies also control the situation in Matanzas Province. Only in the important Province of Santa Clara and in the western provinces of Habana and Pinar del Rio, where the industry is on the decline, do the Cubans hold the balance. Each of the larger American companies owns or controls by long-time leases, from 100,000 to 660,000 acres of lands. The aggregate of such holdings is well over 5,000,000 acres. Thousands of miles of private broad-gauge railway lines also serve the American sugar properties.

Other investments comprise government securities, railways, public utilities, banks, hotels, mineral deposits, manufacturing industries and general agricultural lands. The foreign debt of Cuba, amounting to a total of about $89,000,000, is all held in the United States. The railway system of the eastern provinces, unified under the Cuba Company and operated as the Consolidated Railways, is American-controlled. In the field of public utilities, the American Foreign Power Company owns the light and power business in nearly all the important towns of the Island, including the Havana Electric Company. The Cuba Telephone Company, with its wires all over the republic, is a subsidiary of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company. The Havana Dock Company is another American-owned utility. Among banks, the National City Bank of New York is a powerful factor in the financial life of the Island, and has over twenty branches scattered throughout the Republic. The First National Bank of Boston and the Chase National Bank of New York also operate directly in Cuba. A number of the largest hotels in Havana are owned in the United States, and the Bowman interests of New York are now investing more millions in a large amusement development as a further stimulus to the growing tourist trade between the United States and Cuba. The Bethlehem Steel Corporation and other interests hold large iron and manganese ore deposits in the Province of Oriente. The American Portland Cement Company controls the cement manufacturing plant at Mariel, and a number of industrial establishments in and near Havana, including substantial investments in the tobacco manufacturing industry, are American-owned. American interests are also a prominent factor in the tobacco growing industry of Pinar del Rio, and many American farmers are engaged in the production of fruits and vegetables for export, especially in the Isle of Pines, and in the country closely tributary to the city of Havana. In fact, most of the vegetables shipped to American markets are grown by Americans.

It will be seen from this summary how completely American capital and enterprise dominate the whole economic life of the country. The only important exceptions are the growing of sugar cane in which Cubans still predominate, and the general mercantile business of the island, which is largely in the hands of Spaniards. The economic structure of few other independent countries is controlled to such an extent by a foreign people.

It is in order at this point to review briefly the developments in Cuban-American relations as affected by the two fundamental acts which govern these relations. Under the operation of the Platt Amendment, there has been but one instance of formal intervention in Cuban affairs. In 1906 intervention was precipitated by the inability of the Estrada Palma administration to put down a serious revolt against the government. At the invitation of the Cuban President, Secretary of War Taft was sent to Cuba by President Roosevelt, where he took over the direction of Cuban affairs, supplanting the constituted authorities of the Republic. After a short period as Provisional Governor, Taft was succeeded by Charles Edward Magoon, who was in charge of the intervention until its termination in 1909. The mission of General Crowder, who was sent to Cuba in 1921 as special representative of President Harding, partook of much of the character of a forced intervention, but did not involve the suspension of the native government. The sending of General Crowder was prompted by the necessity of exercising a certain measure of control over the acts of the shifty Zayas government. As such it was a mission of considerable delicacy, since General Crowder was dependent on the support which his actions would receive from the Government at Washington, and not upon the high powers conferred under a régime of intervention. However, he was able to exercise strong pressure on the Zayas government for the acceptance of his recommendations for improving the administration of public affairs, so that his position as obligatory mentor to a particularly exasperating government had some very substantial results. It is well to remember that both under the formal intervention of 1906-9 and under the Crowder mission, as well as during the life of the American military government (1898-1902), every solicitude was shown by those in charge of American affairs in the Island for the rights and feelings of the native Cubans. In spite of the possibilities of the situation, a minimum of friction was engendered. On the other hand, incalculable benefits of a very positive nature were conferred on a young and yet undisciplined nation, which was gravely in need of disinterested guidance. It is safe to say that, except for the efforts of the noble Estrada Palma to start his people on the right road, none of Cuba's own national leaders before President Machado deserves so much gratitude from the nation as did General Wood and General Crowder. Wood occupies a very high place in Cuban popular esteem, probably as much for his participation in the war of 1898 as for his constructive accomplishments as Military Governor of the Island. The very solid work of Crowder, who only retired during this year as Ambassador to Cuba, has yet to receive the recognition which it deserves. Beyond the regulation official farewells, his departure from Havana attracted much less attention than the sailing of any Cuban cabinet officer for a vacation in Europe.

The United States has had no occasion to exercise the right conferred on it by the Platt Amendment to prevent the curtailment of Cuban independence by a third power, and any voluntary relinquishment of national sovereignty by treaty, provided against in the Amendment is, of course, highly unlikely; neither has control of governmental expenditures in the interests of national solvency been the object of intervention, though much of the work of General Crowder lay in that field.

In accordance with the authority derived from the Amendment, the United States Government selected Guantánamo Bay on the coast of Oriente Province as the site for a naval base. This location was admirably chosen, not only because of its commanding strategic position long ago emphasized by Captain Mahan, but also because its isolated location minimizes the possibility of friction with the native element in the country. The Isle of Pines had previously been rejected for this purpose. Moreover, the American claims to this large island, the determination of whose ownership was left by the Platt Amendment to future negotiations, has been definitely abandoned, to the great satisfaction of Cuban nationalists.

Under the Reciprocity Treaty, trade between Cuba and the United States has reached such proportions that Cuba now ranks among the major factors in the foreign commerce of the United States. In both exports and imports she is ahead of every other Latin American country. In 1926 the United States exported to Cuba goods to the value of $160,500,000 and imported from Cuba sugar and other products valued at $250,600,000. In 1925 the respective figures for exports and imports were $198,700,000 and $261,700,000. In the former year, Cuba ranked seventh among American export markets and fifth as a source of American imports. Cuba is our first market for many important lines, including boots and shoes, and is our second market for flour and cotton cloth. In the first 21½ years in which the Reciprocity Treaty was in effect, Cuba exported to the United States merchandise to the value of $4,666,167,044, or virtually 80 percent of her total exports. During the same period she imported from the United States goods to the value of $2,902,359,002, or slightly over 67 percent of all her imports. The Reciprocity Treaty has had little effect on the course of Cuban export trade, the percentage destined for the United States in the fiscal year 1902-3 being 80.6, or substantially the same as for the whole period in question. However, the proportion of Cuban sugar exported to the United States has decreased considerably since 1911, up to which time we took practically the entire Cuban output. The increase of Cuban sugar production beyond the needs of the United States, and the development of large domestic sources of supply by the United States have been responsible for this decline in the relative proportions of Cuban sugars taken by this country. On the other hand, the tariff advantages granted to American goods have resulted in raising the percentage of Cuban imports from the United States from 41.1 percent of the total (1902-3) to 61.4 percent in 1926, which is, however, 14 percent less than in 1919, the peak year of American trade with Cuba. It is noteworthy that the latter is the lowest figure since pre-war days, and as such represents the strong tendency of the trade to return to its earlier channels. This is largely explainable by the predominance of the Spanish mercantile element in the business of the Island.

Reduced to the simplest terms, Cuba's foreign policy must be a matter of finding markets for her sugar, and, very secondarily, for her tobacco. Everything else is but the frills and fireworks of diplomacy -- the assertion of her national amour propre as a sovereign state. She believes that the first and substantial object is no longer properly served by the Reciprocity Treaty. The second and sentimental phase of her international policy she declares grievously prejudiced by the Platt Amendment. Therefore she would modify the one and abrogate the other.

Agitation against the Platt Amendment is perennial in Cuba. Though much of this outcry against the act which limits the country's sovereignty is only for political effect at home, discontent with the Amendment is undeniably very real. It is difficult to say how much of this opposition is, in turn, the result of persistent agitation and how much spontaneous popular feeling. A fervid organization, known as the "League Against the Platt Amendment," does not allow public concern over the problem to flag, and the press keeps alive the issue in its columns. President Machado is a declared opponent of the Amendment, and his declaration at Barocoa in September to the effect that "Cuba will make whatever treaties she pleases" is indicative of this attitude.

The present political régime in Cuba is essentially nationalistic. It resents the economic dependence on the United States into which Cuba has fallen through one circumstance or another. It refuses to recognize the fact that the advanced American economic penetration of the Republic is only the natural result of the attraction of a field that promised good returns on the investment of capital. That Cubans were unable or unwilling to supply the capital and enterprise necessary for this development of their country does not affect this essential fact. They only see their sugar industry dominated by Americans, their banking system controlled from the United States and vast areas of the national territory held in "latifundias" by the foreigners. They believe that the advantages of the Reciprocity Treaty are no longer reciprocal, and that the original convention should be altered to meet the changed condition of the present, so that the balance of favors contemplated by the Treaty may be restored. Even Luis Marino Perez, probably the clearest economic mind in Cuba, is convinced of the antiquated nature of the Reciprocity arrangement. Cubans contend that the present American duty on sugar is inordinately high, approximately 80 percent when reduced to an ad valorem basis, and that it bears no relation to relative costs of producing sugar in Cuba and the United States. The reduction of this duty is the great desideratum of Cuban foreign policy. It is regarded as the only certain guarantee for the future prosperity of their too exuberant sugar industry. They recognize the political power of the beet sugar industry in the United States as the principal obstacle to the attainment of their wishes, and view with alarm the increasing sugar production of our overseas possessions. But for the latter, Cuba could market her entire output in the United States. In 1926 the United States consumed 5,671,000 tons of sugar. Of this, Cuba supplied 3,291,000 tons, or 58.03 percent of the total. Our domestic beet sugar industry supplied 873,000 tons, or 15.39 percent and the cane industry of Louisiana only 70,000 tons. We consumed 618,000 tons of Hawaiian sugar, 460,000 tons of Porto Rican, and 313,000 tons of Philippine sugar, or a total of 1,391,000 tons.

Cuba resents particularly the free admission of Philippine sugar into the United States, which she contends is in violation of the clause of the Reciprocity Treaty quoted above. However, the legal basis of her claim, whereby she protests that the Philippines are foreign territory, is a weak one, since the United States Supreme Court has declared the international status of the Philippines to be that of American soil. The Cubans assert with considerable justice that, in view of the far greater magnitude of American investments in the Cuban sugar industry, that industry is deserving of relatively more consideration in the American Tariff than is the case at present.

In default of an early prospect of improving the status of her sugar under the Reciprocity Treaty, the Cuban government has embarked on a policy of artificial regulation of her sugar business, in the hope of raising the price level of her great staple to a satisfactory position. During the past three years many bills have been introduced into the Cuban Congress with the object of promoting the interests of the national sugar industry, but very little legislation to that effect has actually been enacted. Finally, to avert the danger of overproduction, a law was signed by President Machado on May 3, 1926, empowering the President to regulate the next two sugar crops and to fix the time for the commencement of the grinding season. In accordance with this authorization, the President on September 21st decreed that the 1926-7 crop should start as of January 1, 1927. On December 10th, he signed a decree limiting the crop to 4,500,000 tons. A special commission was appointed to apportion this total among the six provinces, and, when representatives of the sugar interests in each province found it impossible to fix a satisfactory quota for each mill, the National Commission was forced to make the necessary apportionment. Vast quantities of cane were left in the fields at the end of the crop, occasioning considerable dissatisfaction among planters, especially in Camaguey and Oriente. Nor did the restriction have the anticipated effect on the price of sugar. For a time, the c. f. price of raws rose above 3 cents a pound -- according to Cuban opinion the borderline between profit and loss -- but fell again, depressing business throughout the Island.

Discussion of the sugar problem continued active throughout last summer. The famous Cortina plan for the protection of the sugar industry was finally shelved in Congress, and interest transferred to a new project originated by Col. J. M. Tarafa, one of the most prominent capitalists in the Island. This scheme had the support of the President, and as an administration measure was forced through the Congress. The law received the signature of President Machado on October 4. It provides for the creation of a commission of five members with vast powers over the national sugar industry. The Commission, which is headed by Col. Tarafa, is to study the world market, with the object of securing a more scientific regulation of production and distribution in Cuba. On the basis of these findings the President shall determine the limit to be placed on the next crop and its distribution among the leading markets of the world. A certain quota of the crop will first be assigned to the United States, and the sale of the surplus above this amount will be left to a special entity created by the law, to be known as the "Cuban Sugar Export Corporation." This body is capitalized at $250,000 by means of an obligatory subscription of the producers, apportioned according to the production of their mills.

It is unlikely that this radical departure of the Cuban Government will result in a higher price level for sugar. It is also highly improbable that the plan for an international agreement between Cuba and other prominent sugar producing countries, like Java and Czechoslovakia, for a concerted restriction of production will succeed. It appears that Cuba will have to wage a lone fight in the sugar world. She is definitely embarked on a policy of artificial restriction, and must face the probability of increased production in other nations that may offset the advantages of her program. Conflicting opinions have greeted the new sugar law in the United States. The refiners, of course, are outspoken in their denunciation of it. On the other hand, the Cubans are counting on the support of their arch-enemies, the American beet sugar interests, in the belief that the latter group will welcome any measure calculated to raise the price of sugar, whatever its origin.

The Cuban Government is making a determined effort to increase the international prestige of the country and to create a position in the society of nations independent of her peculiar status with relation to the United States. The atmosphere of the Cuban Foreign Office is pro-European. Martinez Ortiz, the Secretary of State, though impregnated with the current nationalism of the administration, is a continental gentleman, by preference at home in the suave society of European capitals or negotiating at close range and in the stately fashion of ages with the chancelleries of the Old World. He would strengthen Cuba's position by a series of commercial treaties that would open wider markets to her products. The bargaining provisions in the new tariff were calculated to aid in this movement, as declared by President Machado himself in an address delivered on December 4, 1926.

Cuba's recent election to a place in the Council of the League of Nations by a vote of forty out of fifty-nine delegations occasioned an outburst of national enthusiasm on the Island. Her President called it "the foremost triumph in Cuban diplomatic history."

One of the most interesting phases of present developments in Cuban foreign policy is the growing rapprochement with Spain, which was lately confirmed by a commercial treaty between the two countries. Though the terms of the pact represent some very skilful negotiating on the part of the Cubans, the treaty was celebrated with much more enthusiasm in Cuba than was justified by its potential advantages to the smaller nation. Much of this closer binding of ties between Cuba and Spain is sentimental. The old bitterness against Spain engendered in the Wars for Independence have disappeared with surprising rapidity and completeness. Spaniards now join Cubans in paying the annual tribute to the memory of Marti and Maceo. Cuba has been brought within the scope of the Spanish reconquista movement -- the attempt by Spain at a spiritual and intellectual recovery of her lost colonies. Some of the republics, like Mexico, have been obdurate to the call of the mother country; others have been very receptive to the allurements of kinship and a common language. Also, the Spanish community in Cuba is large and influential. Conservative, solid and industrious, the peninsular element dominates the internal trade of a country whose people, true to the habits of their Latin American cousins, are disposed to leave the business of buying and selling to foreigners. The dignified Diario de la Marina, the best newspaper in Cuba, is its special press organ. One of its wealthiest and most prominent leaders, Falla Gutierrez, is a power to be reckoned with in the country.

Cuba has also increasingly affiliated herself with the cause of Hispano-Americanism, the racial phase of the more comprehensive Pan-Americanism. There are possibilities for her embarrassment in the fact that the objects of the two movements may not always be consistent, particularly where the Latin American policy of the United States becomes an issue. The outspoken "Yankeephobes" in the other Latin American republics are trying to win over Cuban public opinion to their campaign against the "imperialism" of the great bugaboo of the north. The intransigent element in Nicaragua, the Panamanians who resent their country's "dependence" on the United States, the irreconcilable nationalists of Santo Domingo and Haiti, irked by our intervention in their countries' affairs, have all appealed for the sympathy of the Cubans. An attempt was recently made to organize a society in Cuba to promote the cause of Porto Rican independence. Mexico, in her assiduous and skilled efforts to build up a solid bloc of Latin American support in the event of an open break with the United States, has not neglected Cuba. In this connection, it is significant that the diplomatic representations of each country in the other have been raised to the rank of embassies, with much attendant talk of consanguinity and its obligations. Yet one of the most clear-headed of Cubans once remarked to me, "Though we should not rejoice at the difficulties of others, the troubles of Mexico have been to the great advantage of Cuba." For a Mexico peaceful and orderly, and unharassed by radicalism, would be a very formidable competitor of Cuba, if her cheap and plentiful labor were given full rein to develop her great possibilities as a producer of the staples of the tropics.

The Pan American Congress to be held in Havana in January offers an unequalled opportunity for Cuba to assert her international personality. How far she will go in proclaiming the fullness of her sovereignty, now restricted by the Platt Amendment, will depend on the moderation and wisdom of her own delegates and the support which they might count on in public opinion. Her delegation, headed by the able Sanchez de Bustamente, contains some of the outstanding figures in Cuban national affairs, and, in spite of the temptation to give the fullest expression to national aspirations, before a sympathetic audience, it is doubtful if the unpopular American control will be openly challenged. However, the Cubans might well be placed in an awkward position if delegates of the other republics should air their opinions of the United States too unceremoniously. The incident with Uruguay which led to a short-lived suspension of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and which was precipitated by the Uruguayan representative at Geneva casting doubts on the complete independence of Cuba, still rankles in the national pride. After all, the call of the blood is very strong among all these republics of Hispanic ancestry, and those who have full liberty of action to do as they please are the envy of those who may not. There are many in Cuba who resent the fact that the dream of her revolutionary patriots has not reached complete fruition and that Cuba is not as libre as she might be.

What are the alternative solutions for Cuba's international problem? In the first place, any rapprochement with the general body of other nations, as with the rest of Latin America, in particular, can give her little more than an unsubstantial and sentimental satisfaction. Furthermore, additional commercial arrangements with other countries can profit her little. Practically all these countries have sugar industries of their own to foster, and due to the conditions of the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States, Cuba's ability to barter tariff favors with other nations is limited.

The time for the radical remedy of annexation to the United States has passed. Such a course might have been practicable during the period of military government, or even at the time of the intervention of 1906-09. More responsible Cubans then favored joining the United States than gave open utterance to their wishes. Today, no Cuban would dare suggest annexation. Annexation is now out of the question, unless a long succession of lean years for the island would weaken the nationalistic spirit of the country to the point where it would be willing to pay the hard price for free sugar and economic salvation. Even then the strongest opposition to annexation would probably come from the north.

Many developments of the last twenty-five years would militate against such a drastic solution. This is aside from the growth of a strong national consciousness among the Cubans and the creation of an official class which would lose by the abolition of national independence. In the first place, the potential menace of free Cuban sugar to the large beet sugar industry of the west and the cane sugar industry of Louisiana, not to mention the cane sugar industries of Hawaii, Porto Rico and the Philippines, would insure the opposition of powerful political interests in Congress. Much less important, but nevertheless to be considered, would be the fruit and vegetable growers of Florida and other sections, whose business would be seriously threatened if Cuban products were allowed free entry.

If annexed to the United States, Cuba could well expect early statehood. She could scarcely be treated so cavalierly in this respect as Porto Rico has been. She would almost certainly be a democratic state, out of sympathy with democratic low tariff policies and from mere propinquity with the "solid south." In view of this prospect the Republican Party would probably not welcome Cuba into the Union.

Finally, the effect of annexation on the rest of Latin America would have to be considered, even if it was a voluntary surrender of national sovereignty. The passing of Cuba as an independent power would only seem to confirm the warnings of the most violent Demosthenes of those countries against the menace from the north. Clearly, in view of all these circumstances, annexation is not within the realm of practical politics.

The second alternative is the removal of the present limitations on complete sovereignty by the annulment of the Platt Amendment through the necessary agreement with the United States. The Cuban Government is openly committed to the attainment of this end. Its leaders affirm that the Cuban people have attained their political majority and are no longer in need of the tutelage and control implied in the offensive Amendment. Moreover, they contend that substantially the same objects could be assured through different arrangements of such a nature as not to offend the national sensibilities of the Cubans. Though very considerable progress towards political stability has been made under the Machado régime, no assurance exists that those higher standards will be perpetuated beyond the life of the present administration. The disgraceful Zayas era is still too close for us to be certain that the evils of those years can never recur to threaten order and stability within the country as well as the integrity of the whole political order. It is against this possibility that the Platt Amendment still holds the warning of intervention. Many Cubans are willing in their frank moments to acknowledge that this guarantee of public order is to the benefit of their own country as well as to that of the heavy American investments in the Island. These same Cubans recognize the salutary value of the financial control implied in the clause of the Amendment which limits the power of the Government to contract debts.

The Cuban contention that the Reciprocity Treaty no longer serves its original purpose and should be modified to restore the balance of tariff favors contemplated in the pact of 1903 has much to commend it. For Cuba, this would involve a substantial reduction in the American import duty on sugar, which is the crux of the whole question. However, this would result in a corresponding reduction in the revenues of the United States Government and would meet the powerful opposition of the beet sugar states in Congress. On her side, Cuba has proposed no definite and satisfactory formula for the difficult purpose of bargaining to this end. The further concession which she would be required to make to American products in her import schedules would, of course, curtail her customs revenues and create additional financial problems for her Government.

Cuban officialdom should recognize that, after all, her foremost interest is in strengthening her commercial relations with the United States. Those who talk lightly of denouncing the Reciprocity Treaty and of turning their country adrift in a world of free competition can have little sense of the realities of the situation. The nation can do much by balancing its internal economy, now dangerously threatened by its unique dependence on sugar. Beyond that, its path lies in cultivating its great natural market to the north. Europe and the rest of the world can do little for her. As for the Platt Amendment, time and the political maturity of the Republic will automatically dispose of its limitations on the national sovereignty.

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