WHAT shall we do to secure lasting peace in the Far East after the United Nations have won the war and the Japanese have been driven out of China and the other countries which they have invaded? This raises the complicated question as to what are the essential conditions for a permanent order in the Pacific. It is so urgent that we must begin to give it serious consideration even while the fighting is still going on.

In his radio address on December 9, 1941, two days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt enumerated a series of acts of aggression committed during the past ten years by Japan and her Axis partners, beginning with Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931. The significance of this enumeration was apparent. It was Japan which actually started the Second World War ten years ago; and it was the failure of the League of Nations -- and, to a lesser extent, of the United States -- to curb Japanese aggression in the Far East which encouraged the European aggressors to go ahead with their audacious design for world domination.

Farsighted persons, both in government and out, are now planning seriously for a better world order after the war. In doing this we must recognize that no lasting peace is possible without achieving a permanent order in the Pacific. The reason is clear. Peace, like war, is indivisible. The problem of peace in the Pacific is complicated by special political, economic, racial and national issues which the war has either raised or aggravated. Settlement of these issues in a manner to promote the interests of the Pacific region as a whole will probably require a regional understanding; and one must consider the relationship of this regional arrangement to the world order. Moreover, from the viewpoint of political strategy, the fact that the United Nations were laying plans for a permanent order for the Pacific area once victory is won would serve to counteract Japanese propaganda for a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and rally the natives of the region to fight the common battle for freedom.

It is my belief that four essential requirements must be met before a permanent order can be built in the Far East. First, Japan must be beaten and completely disarmed. Second, there must be a fundamental adjustment in the relationship of China with foreign Powers. Third, the racial and national problems of the region must be solved equitably. Fourth, a regional organization must be formed to establish security and maintain peace.


It almost goes without saying that Japan, the age-long aggressor in the Pacific region, should be disarmed after her military defeat. The principle of the disarmament of aggressor nations has already been proclaimed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in the Atlantic Charter, whose eighth point states that, pending the establishment of a permanent system of general security, such disarmament is essential. In a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in New York on December 31, 1941, Dr. Hu Shih, Chinese Ambassador in the United States, applied this principle specifically to the Far East by stating that his Government would give full support to the disarming of Japan as one of the necessary factors in the maintenance of peace in the Pacific area. The way in which the Far Eastern crisis has developed during the past ten years should have convinced the world that Japan's aggressive policy is a constant menace to the security of neighboring countries. Her military caste is so powerful that it exercises full control over national policy, and its spirit is so extremely nationalistic and chauvinistic that national policy, in turn, is bound to take the form of aggressive territorial expansion. If Japan retains her military superiority there will be little possibility of lasting peace in the Pacific region.

The only effective way to hold Japanese militarism in check is to disarm the country completely. Japan's air and naval forces should be liquidated except for a limited number of small warships which she might be allowed to retain for use by her police and customs services. Naval shipbuilding works and munitions factories should either be closed down altogether or reduced in number and size to the point at which they will be just sufficient to fulfill ordinary peacetime purposes. Her land forces should be strictly limited to the number necessary to maintain internal order. Details of the extent and process of Japanese disarmament must be left for experts to work out when the armistice comes. What is essential is that it should be thorough and effective and that any limited armament allowed Japan should be closely supervised by a permanent international commission.

To prevent Japan from rearming, such an international commission should, at least temporarily, set up agencies to inspect and investigate Japanese armaments continuously on the spot. Naval and air bases in Japan which are apparently designed for offense should be demolished forthwith. At least until a general plan of world disarmament is adopted, the importation of arms and ammunition, including military planes, should be completely banned. Severe penalties should be set for the violation of any of the disarmament clauses prescribed by the United Nations as a condition of armistice. During the armistice period, or for as long as is necessary to insure Japan's strict observance, the United Nations or whatever world association may be established by them should police Japan by stationing a strong international force at a few strategic points in the Japanese homeland. Prolonged and strict observance of the disarmament clauses by Japan should be a basic condition for her admission into a regional or world association of nations.

It may be contended that the Japanese are a proud and patriotic people who will never bear national humiliation or submit to harsh terms imposed by foreign powers without proportionately increasing their chauvinism and their hostility towards foreigners; and it may be argued as a result that it would be unwise and impolitic for the United Nations to impose disarmament on a defeated Japan, to set up an international commission in Japan to supervise her armaments or to assign an international force to police the country. It might be argued that, on the contrary, a policy of moderation and generosity would help to pacify the Japanese and reconcile them with their former enemies. In my opinion, this viewpoint is erroneous and dangerous.

Events have fully demonstrated the futility of an appeasement policy such as the United States followed towards Japan up to the outbreak of war. The Japanese, although capable of extreme fanaticism in individual actions, are complete realists in their point of view in international relations. A big stick counts with them more than lofty principles, good faith and soft words. It is a mistake to think that one could make the Japanese quiet, reasonable or peace-loving by treating them generously after the war. Their long series of military successes, their great territorial conquests and the consequent rapid growth of their national power in the past fifty years have developed among them a legend of invincibility. This forms the psychological background of their extreme militarism and ruthlessness. Only thorough-going disarmament after a crushing military defeat can smash that false legend and so help to loosen the traditional grip of the military caste upon the Japanese people.

Ever since the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Western democracies have hoped that a rise of liberal elements in Japanese politics might effect a change in Japanese foreign policy. The hope has not been realized. If it still is cherished after the war, then there should be a clear understanding that only by means of complete disarmament under vigilant supervision can the military clique be removed from control over the country and its liberal leaders, if any, given the power to guide its national policy in the direction of peaceful development and coöperation with neighboring states. No doubt there would be many difficulties in disarming so chauvinistic a nation as Japan. Those difficulties simply must be faced in view of what is at stake for the world at large as well as for the Pacific region in particular.

Great changes will also have to be made in the territorial limits of Japan. This will be as important as disarmament in reducing Japan's capacity for aggression. In deciding on her new territorial limits, we shall have to take into account both the legitimate claims of interested parties and the offensive value of the territories in question in Japanese hands.

It goes without saying that Japan must withdraw completely from Manchuria, which would automatically return to Chinese sovereignty. Japan should also be made to relinquish all the territories, both on the continent and scattered across the sea, which she has acquired since 1894 -- the year in which her career of conquest started. It does not matter whether such territories shall have been seized during the present war or previously. She should be permitted to retain only those which she had before 1894.[i] The most important of the territories acquired between that date and the outbreak of the Second World War are Korea, Formosa and the Pacific Mandated Islands. The case of Korea will be discussed below. Formosa, a former Chinese province with an almost purely Chinese population, which Japan extorted from China as a condition of peace in 1895, should be restored to China unconditionally. The Mandated Islands, the offensive value of which in Japanese hands has been fully demonstrated, should be placed either under a new mandatory power or under international administration. It goes without saying, too, that Japan should also be required to give up all the territory which she has seized since the outbreak of the present war -- parts of mainland China, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Hainan, the Dutch East Indies, Indo-China, Malaya, Burma and other areas.


The second problem to be solved as a prerequisite to a Pacific settlement is that of China's relations with foreign Powers. The abrogation of unequal treaties has been one of the outstanding diplomatic issues between China and the Great Powers ever since the Chinese nationalist revolution began. By means of these treaties as well as through political influence the foreign Powers acquired extraterritorial rights and special privileges of various kinds which have been seriously detrimental to China's sovereignty and national welfare. If such an anomalous state of affairs were allowed to continue after the war it would be a constant cause of international friction and a disturbing factor to any order that might be set up in the Far East. It is no exaggeration to say that in agitating for the abolition of the unequal treaties China has been seeking to achieve international harmony and justice as well as national freedom. Many farsighted westerners have recognized the desirability of a fundamental change in their countries' treaty relations with China. Unfortunately, the foreign Powers have been slow to relinquish the privileged positions which they enjoy.

The Second World War has simplified this problem. Not even the staunchest die-hards expect to see the old order restored in China's foreign relations, no matter what the outcome of the war. Indeed, responsible leaders of Great Britain and the United States have already announced or pledged in principle the eventual relinquishment of their extraterritorial rights in China. It goes without saying that the special rights or interests claimed by Japan or imposed upon China by that country should be the first to be wiped out. In the postwar relations between China and foreign Powers, the principles of equality and reciprocity should be followed in concluding treaties as well as in all other transactions. All extraterritorial rights should be abolished. There should be no more foreign consular jurisdictions and no more foreign concessions or settlements in China. All the leased territories should be returned unconditionally to Chinese jurisdiction. Foreign nations should no longer be permitted to station troops or gunboats within Chinese territory.

Only by such a fundamental readjustment of her relations with foreign Powers could China really be freed from foreign domination and set firmly on the course of political and economic progress. At the same time the development of a normal, free relationship between China and the nations of the West would help create a more friendly atmosphere for international coöperation. The Western democracies need not fear that China will ever become too strong. The Chinese are essentially a peaceloving people who would never seek territorial expansion or political dominance. On the contrary, a free, strong, prosperous and democratic China would be the greatest stabilizing factor of a new order in the Pacific region.


Not less important -- though certainly more delicate -- are the issues raised by the great variety of races and nations which exist in the Pacific region. Most of them are related to the problem of the future status of colonies or possessions heretofore ruled by the Great Powers. It is of paramount concern to the Pacific countries that these issues should be settled in a just and practicable manner.

The Japanese slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics" is no doubt pure political propaganda and will be dismissed as such by most intelligent Asiatics. Many and various racial and national problems do exist, nevertheless, and the hope of building up a lasting peace in the Pacific depends to a large extent on their correct solution. Almost all the subject peoples in this region have age-old grievances against their rulers. Those of them who are politically mature cherish aspirations for political or national freedom and have actually been striving for its realization. Since the United Nations are committed to an all-out fight for world freedom, it would be both illogical and impolitic, from either the long-term or the short-term view, for them not to help realize such legitimate aspirations.

The case of Korea is perhaps the simplest. Korea was forcibly and fraudulently annexed by Japan, and the Korean people have never ceased to show their opposition to Japanese rule. Increasing numbers of Koreans have been fighting or working in China against the common enemy. There is no reason why this once independent kingdom, with a population of 22 million and a civilization even more ancient than that of the Japanese, should not be given political freedom after the defeat of Japan. It is fitting that a representative of China, Dr. Hu-shih, should have been the first man in public life to remind the world of Korea's claim for freedom by saying (in the paper referred to above) that at the coming peace conference "the wishes of the 22 million people in Korea should be given a fair hearing and just consideration and steps should be taken to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to these people." President Roosevelt has also specifically mentioned "the people of Korea" as one of those whose future freedom depends upon a victory of the United Nations.

The most urgent case is that of India. Her population of 389 million is the second largest in the world, and she has all the characteristics of a distinct civilization. Today she has become one of the most important factors in world politics. In the right circumstances, the people of India could play a major rôle both in the present fight for world freedom and in the shaping of a postwar order in the Pacific. For the sake of freedom and peace, farsighted and fair-minded persons everywhere want to see India's national aspirations fully realized after the war. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was simply voicing the general sentiment of the free world when, after a series of conferences with Indian leaders, he urged the British to give India real political power, declaring: "I sincerely hope and confidently believe that Britain, without waiting for any demand on the part of the people of India, will, as speedily as possible, give them real political power so that they may be in a position to further develop their spiritual and material strength, and thus realize that their participation in the war is not merely aid to the anti-aggression nations for victory, but also the turning point in their struggle for India's freedom."

Lord Cranborne, who had then been recently appointed British Colonial Secretary, stated on February 24, 1942, that the British Government was "in favor of India's political freedom," although he qualified this by adding that "if the Indian leaders would get together and devise some scheme which would be satisfactory to all, the Indian problem would be satisfactorily solved." Prime Minister Churchill's announcement of a definite British offer of dominion status and Sir Stafford Cripps' subsequent mission raised hopes of an early realization of Indian aspiration. Although the Cripps mission failed to achieve its immediate objective, due to the rejection of the British proposals by Indian leaders, this was a real turning point in Indian affairs.

The postwar fate of Indo-China cannot be settled yet. But one thing should be made clear: the conditions which existed in that country under French rule should not be restored after the Japanese have withdrawn. Good government, at least, should be guaranteed to the native people, and they should be given a fair chance to prepare themselves for self-government. Other subject peoples in the Pacific area, such as those of Malaya and the Netherlands Indies, come in a different category. But their interests should be given fair consideration in the postwar reconstruction, with the realization by stages of progressive self-government as the goal.

A few guiding ideas for the solution of these colonial problems may be submitted. The ultimate status of most of the large colonies or dependencies might be either complete political independence or full self-government in the form of dominion status or home rule. At the same time, one must admit that, with the exception of India, hardly any of them has reached a stage of political maturity which would ensure a successful exercise of immediate freedom. It is pretty well agreed that the subject peoples of the Pacific region should not be returned to the position they occupied before the war. Yet it would be premature and even dangerous to leave them to themselves immediately after the war in a region where international relations as well as racial problems are so complicated. To do this might create chaos instead of order.

There should be a period of tutelage, then, during which the native peoples would have an opportunity to prepare themselves for self-government. The best way to promote this would be to give the natives more education, to hasten their economic emancipation, and to allow them to acquire political training by participating more and more in local administration. In the meantime, each colonial government, whether in charge of an international commission or under a colonial or mandatory Power, should adjust its educational, financial and administrative systems to serve the best interests of the natives. The policy which was so successfully pursued by the United States in the Philippines should be widely followed as a model for colonial administration in the whole Pacific area.

It is impossible to stipulate a uniform system of administration for all the colonies and dependencies in question. Different regimes would have to be used in different circumstances. Some writers have advocated a federation called the Indonesian Union, to be composed of British Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, the Philippines, Burma, and, later on, Thailand and Indo-China. The idea of binding such heterogeneous human groups and geographical units into a federation must be ruled out as impracticable. The people of these countries do not have enough common interests and mutual understanding to support a federal union, nor do they have sufficient political experience to operate one. The scheme is called a federation, but in practice it would be government through an international commission exercising its rule over a vast area. Such an international régime would hardly work, in view of the serious conflicts of interests and policies which might arise among the Powers forming it.

As a matter of fact, responsibility for the administration of the large colonies and dependencies will probably be resumed after the war by the original ruling Powers, except perhaps in the case of Indo-China, whose relationship to France will depend upon the outcome of the war and the standing of that country at the end of hostilities. The Power should, of course, discharge that responsibility under adequate international supervision and control. Actually, it is of no material importance whether a ruling power administers a colonial government in its own right or under an international mandate; the essential thing is that the administration be conducted in the spirit of trusteeship. The exceptional case of Indo-China requires, as said above, special consideration. If the Vichy régime continues its policy of collaboration with the Axis, and yet manages to survive the war, then Indo-China is likely to be taken from France entirely and put under an international administration or a mandatory régime. In case a mandatory system is adopted, China, for obvious reasons, would have a good claim to the mandate.

Administration by an international commission under the authority of a regional or world organization would be the proper program for other territories in the region, such as the Japanese Mandated Islands. Their importance is strategic rather than economic or political, and they have no possible chance of ever standing by themselves because of their small size, the sparseness of their population and a variety of other circumstances.

Finally, if it should appear that the Korean people, after liberation from the Japanese yoke, still needed friendly advice and assistance in the initial stages of their political freedom, the United States would be in the best position to assume this responsibility. This is true not only because of American disinterestedness and the traditional friendship which exists between the United States and Korea, but also because American financial resources would be needed to help the newly freed country in its effort to rebuild a national life.

Another racial problem may be mentioned. There are millions of Chinese living in various parts of the Pacific region, particularly in the South Seas, where for years they have engaged in trade and other peaceful activities. But in spite of the important contributions which they have made to the economic development and prosperity of the countries where they reside, they have not acquired political rights. In many cases they suffer from harsh and discriminatory measures imposed by local legislative or administrative authorities. The worst situation is in Thailand, where about three million Chinese residents, constituting almost one-fifth of the whole population, are being oppressed in various ways by the Thai Government.[ii] A number of anti-Chinese measures have been taken in the fields of immigration, industry, education and politics. It was to prevent the Chinese community from seeking diplomatic protection against oppression by the local government that Thailand for many years has followed a policy of non-intercourse with the Chinese Government.

The continued existence of such a state of affairs cannot be tolerated by China after a war in which Thailand chose to be on the side of the enemy. Would it not be in conformity with justice and peace to give these Chinese at least such political and civil rights as were usually guaranteed to national and racial groups under the prewar minorities treaties?

All these long-standing racial grievances, national aspirations and other political issues concerning subject peoples or national minorities in the Pacific region must be settled fairly in the postwar political reconstruction. If this is not done, the presence of large discontented groups constantly threatening revolt will make it difficult to build up a permanent order for the region. Meanwhile, it would be well, perhaps, if the United Nations were to make an early announcement of a general policy or principle which would be applied to the postwar government of colonies and the treatment of subject peoples and national minorities. As stated, the object would be to promote self-government and establish greater freedom. This would help to increase the enthusiasm and effort of the native peoples for the great common cause of freedom and democracy and would nullify the malicious political propaganda of the Japanese, with its specious promises of the "liberation of the Asiatic peoples from the white man's yoke." In the words of Paul van Zeeland at the 1941 conference of the International Labor Organization in New York, "In so far as we express clearly what we shall do with our victory, we are helping to win that victory."

There have been signs of late that the political winds are beginning to blow in this direction. In his address to the nation on February 23, 1942, President Roosevelt seemed indirectly to promise postwar freedom to all the conquered and subject peoples of the Pacific region by saying that "the people of Asia know that if there is to be an honorable and decent future for any of them or for us, that future depends on victory by the United Nations over the forces of Axis enslavement." He also declared that "the Atlantic Charter applies not only to the parts of the world that border the Atlantic, but to the whole world." The farsighted leaders of the United Nations should start planning how to put such promises and declared principles into effect in the postwar period of reconstruction, and should say now that they are doing it.


Three basic problems, at least, must be given consideration in any planning for a regional organization of the Pacific area. First, what countries should be members of such an organization? Second, what functions should it have? Third, what agencies should be set up to carry out those functions?

The first problem is simple. The membership of the organization, which might be called the Pacific Association of Nations, should include China, Soviet Russia, India, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Japan and Thailand. Japan and Thailand, however, should not be admitted to membership until after peace has been concluded and until the other member nations have satisfied themselves that their former enemies are able and willing to fulfill their duties. Should Korea succeed in recovering her national freedom, as she will do unless the United Nations betray their common cause, she would certainly be entitled to membership. New members should be admitted by agreement of two-thirds of the original member nations.

The proper functions of the Pacific Association may be grouped in two distinct but related categories.

Since its main object would be to assure peace and security in the region, its chief functions naturally should be to avert war by exercising joint influence or taking joint preventive measures, and, in case war does occur, to help the victim and to enforce sanctions against the aggressor.

First of all, the member nations of the Association should bind themselves by a pact of non-aggression, arbitration and mutual assistance. Disputes between them should be submitted to arbitration, judicial decision or conciliation. Any act of war by one member against another should be met immediately by collective economic or military sanctions. A permanent international military force should be formed and placed under the control of the organization. Each member nation should contribute a definite quota to this force, which should be stationed permanently in strategic posts and be held in readiness to move anywhere within the region in case of emergency. Economic and military sanctions of the regional organization might be reinforced by the coöperation and support of a wider world organization, should one come into being. After a regional system of general security is established, the regional organization, taking account of the world armament situation, should adopt a regional plan for the reduction and limitation of armaments.

The Association should also perform certain positive functions, for peace can be lasting only if it is constructive. The Association therefore should promote such progressive measures as the common interests of the region require. In economic and social matters, member nations should be obligated to coöperate through international agencies. Problems related to trade opportunities, raw materials and immigration, which are peculiarly complicated in this region, should be solved in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity, due consideration, of course, being given to the national interests of others as well as to the legitimate needs of the countries concerned. Both in the interests of the natives and for the sake of peace, the Association should supervise and control the administration of colonies and dependencies in the region. Member nations should have the right to present any proposal or grievance to the Association for discussion and investigation.

To carry out its various functions the Pacific Association should be provided with the following agencies:

1. A General Conference, composed of representatives of the member nations, meeting regularly once a year and, if necessary, in extraordinary session. It should have power to discuss and decide upon policies and problems of general interest to the region as well as controversial issues between member nations.

2. A Pacific Council, composed of five members elected at the annual General Conference for a term of one year. It should have the duty of seeing that the decisions and resolutions of the General Conference are carried out by the appropriate agencies. It should also take any action that might be deemed wise and effectual to meet an emergency or crisis during the recess of the General Conference.

3. A Pacific Court, composed of from five to seven judges elected by the General Conference for a term of five years from a list of jurists recommended in equal number by each of the member nations. This court should have compulsory jurisdiction over all justiciable disputes. It should also be competent to deal with any other matter referred to it by the parties concerned or by the General Conference or the Pacific Council. The Pacific Court might be dispensed with should a World Court be established.

4. An International Military Staff, appointed by the General Conference. It should command an international force and should, if necessary, formulate and execute military sanctions under the authority of the General Conference or of the Pacific Council during the recess of the Conference.

5. A Permanent Secretariat, appointed by the Council with the approval of the General Conference and acting under the general direction of both these bodies. It should serve as an information and research center on the economic, social and other problems of the region.

Member nations should not be represented equally in the General Conference. The relative sizes of the delegations might be fixed according to the areas and populations of the respective countries, their economic resources and other political or cultural factors.

A unanimous vote should not be required to make a decision of the Conference or the Council valid. In both cases a two-thirds majority should suffice. The necessity of unanimity would seriously handicap the organization in taking effective action in a crisis; on the other hand, decision by a simple majority would be too risky, in view of the gravity and importance of the issues which might be involved.

The General Conference should meet in extraordinary session at the request of a majority of the member nations or on the initiative of the Council. The Council should be required to submit regular reports to the meetings of the General Conference and should be responsible to the Conference for the discharge of its duties.

Each member nation should be entitled to put forward a candidate for election to the Council by the General Conference, but not more than one person of the same nationality should be eligible for membership on the Council or the Pacific Court at the same time. This would prevent any single nation from dominating either of these basic institutions of the Association. The organization of the International Military Staff and the Permanent Secretariat would present more delicate problems and would probably require more elaborate planning. But the basic principle to be followed can be stated simply: these executive agencies should be so organized as to insure professional competence and efficiency as well as loyalty to the Association.

The seat of the Pacific Association should be at an internationalized place where the Secretariat, the Pacific Court and the International Military Staff could be located permanently. Meetings of the General Conference and the Council should be held at this place or at such other places as might be selected on occasion. A rational solution of the problem of financing the organization would be to divide its cost among the member nations in proportion to the number of representatives allotted to each in the General Conference.

The regional organization in the Pacific should be started immediately at the end of the war, regardless of whether there is a long period of armistice or whether a world organization is set up simultaneously. If a wider world organization does come into existence, the Pacific Association, like other regional organizations, should be subordinated to the more inclusive body. At the same time, the world organization could coördinate the related activities of the regional organizations and extend to them any aid which might be necessary. Thus the Pacific Association would in the long run gain moral and material strength from the world organization.

No hard and fast rules can be laid down regarding the exact relationship between the regional organization and the world organization; much would depend upon the character and scope of the latter. Observance of one simple principle might, however, avert serious conflicts of jurisdiction and ensure better coördination of the common efforts of the two organizations. Matters of purely local concern should be left entirely in the hands of the regional organization except for such special advice and assistance as it might formally request. Regarding matters which by their nature tend to affect the interests of the world as a whole, such as access to key raw materials, problems of national or racial freedom, and sanctions against aggressors, the world organization should have the last word. Before taking any decisive action on such questions, therefore, the Pacific Association should, except for necessary precautionary measures, seek the approval and coöperation of the world organization.


What specific part would a victorious and fully restored China, freed from all juridical and extraterritorial restrictions and from foreign economic and political dominance, be able and willing to play in the new Pacific order outlined above?

In the first place, China could lead the way to democracy in Asia. After she has won the war in close association with the Western democracies China seems most likely to direct her political reconstruction towards the goal of constitutional democracy. The successful inauguration of political democracy in a country of 450 million people and possessing an ancient and distinguished civilization could not fail to have a tremendous effect on the political trends of other Asiatic countries.

Secondly, China could use her growing influence, moral as well as political, to help build up a better order in the Pacific. No one can deny that a free China, with growing power and yet maintaining its old traditions of peace, would be a great moral force for peace and justice throughout the whole region. Especially would this be true if China were able to coöperate with a free India, whose people have manifested a striking confidence in the Chinese people as well as warm friendship for them. Further, China could help to assure a progressive and orderly development of political life in the Pacific region by exercising a moderating influence on the postwar relationship between the Western colonial nations and Asiatic peoples which aspire to be free from foreign rule.

Thirdly, from the military point of view, China could make an important contribution to the enforcement of peace. Victorious China must be made militarily strong for defense. Because of her great resources in man power, as well as because of her geographic position, a strong China would be able to share with other Great Powers the responsibility of policing the Pacific region and enforcing sanctions against would-be aggressors. In fact, China would be one of the few Great Powers which could play an effective military rôle in the region. Thus in all respects the permanent order in the Pacific will depend considerably upon the part which China is enabled to play after the war has been won by the United Nations.

[i] An exception to the above procedures should be made of the Luchu Islands. Although Japan annexed them before 1894, they earlier had been tributary to China for 500 years. That, and the fact of the strategic importance of the islands, makes the problem of their disposal a matter for special consideration. At the least the native people of the islands should be given an opportunity to exercise the right of self-determination.

[ii] The number of Chinese residing in Thailand has been variously estimated between 524,062 according to the 1937 Thai census, and 3,000,000, the figure given by the "Chinese Year Book" for 1938-1939. A moderate estimate by the latest authority is 2,500,000. For details, see K. P. Landon, "The Chinese in Thailand" (New York: Oxford, 1941), p. 21-23; and Virginia Thompson, "Thailand: The New Siam" (New York: Macmillan, 1941), p. 321-322.

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  • S. R. CHOW, Professor of International Law and International Relations and Chairman of the Department of Political Science successively at National Peking University, National Central University, and National Wu-Han University; member of the People's Political Council; author of "Le Contrôle parlementaire de la Politique étrangère"
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