On June 30, 2012, Mohamed Morsi, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated Freedom and Justice Party, was sworn in as Egypt’s president. On the first anniversary of his inauguration, Morsi faced millions of protesters demanding his resignation. When the president proved unable to resolve the crisis, the military forced him out of office and placed him and other senior Muslim Brotherhood leaders under house arrest.
The Morsi presidency’s abrupt and ignominious end was due to several factors.Although Morsi had promised to serve as a president for all Egyptians, his actions over the past year reinforced the impression -- among key figures in both the state establishment and the secular opposition -- that he was using the powers of his office for partisan gain. For example, he gave Islamists control of key government ministries, including those of education and information. And after he ousted 17 provincial governors, Morsi replaced seven of them with Muslim Brotherhood members and one with a member of an ex-militant Islamist group, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyaa. He also appointed Muslim Brotherhood loyalists to strategic positions in the state prosecutor’s office and in the media.
Morsi and his supporters justified such moves by saying that they needed to cleanse the state of figures associated with the old regime. One could argue, moreover, that rewarding one’s own party members is normal behavior in democratic politics. But in Egypt, relations among leading political and civil-society actors are so warped by long-standing mutual suspicion and distrust that such appointments
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