Europe’s Monetary (Dis)Union
Europe's Progress Toward Economic Integration
New Opportunities and New Challenges
Euro Fantasies: Common Currency as Panacea
The Case for EMU: More than Money
EMU and International Conflict
The Dollar and the Euro
The Degeneration of EMU
The Future of the Euro
Why the Greek Crisis Will Not Ruin Europe’s Monetary Union
The Failure of the Euro
The Little Currency That Couldn’t
The Crisis of Europe
How the Union Came Together and Why It’s Falling Apart
Can Europe’s Divided House Stand?
Separating Fiscal and Monetary Union
Saving the Euro Will Mean Worse Trouble for Europe
Charting the Disastrous Choices Ahead
Can the Eurozone Be Saved?
Yes, but the EU Summit Was Too Little, Too Late
How to Save the Euro -- and the EU
Reading Keynes in Brussels
Why Only Germany Can Fix the Euro
Reading Kindleberger in Berlin
The Myth of German Hegemony
Why Berlin Can't Save Europe Alone
Europe's Optional Catastrophe
The Fate of the Monetary Union Lies in Germany’s Hands
Why the Euro Will Survive
Completing the Continent’s Half-Built House
Avoiding the Next Eurozone Crisis
How to Build an EU that Works
Europe After the Crisis
How to Sustain a Common Currency
Europe's New Normal
It's Here, It's Unclear, Get Used to It
So Long, Austerity?
Syriza's Victory and the Future of the Eurozone
Austerity vs. Democracy in Greece
Europe Crosses the Rubicon
Why Greece Will Cave—and How
Alexis Tsipras and the Debt Negotiations
Why Greece and Europe Will Still Stay Attached
How to Contain Athens' Economic Problems
A Pain in the Athens
Why Greece Isn't to Blame for the Crisis
The Agreekment That Could Break Europe
Euroskeptics, Eurocritics, and Life After the Bailout
The past-including my past-is over. The prophet Isaiah wrote: "Forget the former things. Do not dwell on the past. See, I am doing a new thing. Now it springs up. Do you not perceive it?" At every moment of life, at every moment of activity, one should mostly envisage the future, and that is the reason for the title of these lectures.
In my comments on the world economic situation, I will cover three points. The first will be the conditions for a lasting economic recovery; the second, my view on the phased march toward a new Bretton Woods; and the third, a joint assessment of the structural aspects of the crisis.
The Williamsburg Summit provided an opportunity to mark the end of the world economic crisis we have lived through since 1973. Mutual undertakings should have carried a clear signal to all actors on the economic scene. The opportunity was not seized.
I do not want to minimize the results of the Williamsburg Summit. For instance, the joint statement on arms control and security, in the present context of relations between the Soviet Union and the West, was a significant collective step, with three major components:
-the confirmation by the three European countries concerned that they will proceed with the deployment of Euromissiles starting at the end of this year unless a now improbable agreement on current INF negotiations takes place before; the electoral results since then in the United Kingdom and Italy have given additional weight to this commitment;
-the explicit exclusion of the French and British nuclear forces from INF negotiations, which was necessary since some imprudent steps had led the Soviet Union to insist on their inclusion and cast some doubts on the attitude of Western countries; to be sure, the proposal by the U.S.S.R. after the Williamsburg Summit to impose a freeze on existing nuclear forces, including European ones, shows that this fundamental question, which is addressed in my third Lecture of this
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