Europe’s Monetary (Dis)Union
Europe's Progress Toward Economic Integration
New Opportunities and New Challenges
Euro Fantasies: Common Currency as Panacea
The Case for EMU: More than Money
EMU and International Conflict
The Dollar and the Euro
The Degeneration of EMU
The Future of the Euro
Why the Greek Crisis Will Not Ruin Europe’s Monetary Union
The Failure of the Euro
The Little Currency That Couldn’t
The Crisis of Europe
How the Union Came Together and Why It’s Falling Apart
Can Europe’s Divided House Stand?
Separating Fiscal and Monetary Union
Saving the Euro Will Mean Worse Trouble for Europe
Charting the Disastrous Choices Ahead
Can the Eurozone Be Saved?
Yes, but the EU Summit Was Too Little, Too Late
How to Save the Euro -- and the EU
Reading Keynes in Brussels
Why Only Germany Can Fix the Euro
Reading Kindleberger in Berlin
The Myth of German Hegemony
Why Berlin Can't Save Europe Alone
Europe's Optional Catastrophe
The Fate of the Monetary Union Lies in Germany’s Hands
Why the Euro Will Survive
Completing the Continent’s Half-Built House
Avoiding the Next Eurozone Crisis
How to Build an EU that Works
Europe After the Crisis
How to Sustain a Common Currency
Europe's New Normal
It's Here, It's Unclear, Get Used to It
So Long, Austerity?
Syriza's Victory and the Future of the Eurozone
Austerity vs. Democracy in Greece
Europe Crosses the Rubicon
Why Greece Will Cave—and How
Alexis Tsipras and the Debt Negotiations
Why Greece and Europe Will Still Stay Attached
How to Contain Athens' Economic Problems
A Pain in the Athens
Why Greece Isn't to Blame for the Crisis
The Agreekment That Could Break Europe
Euroskeptics, Eurocritics, and Life After the Bailout
As doom and gloom about the euro abound, an increasing number of commentators and economists question whether the common currency can survive. The world economy, they allege, is teetering on the edge of an even deeper crisis than today's.
To be sure, the eurozone faces serious economic and financial problems. The area is in the midst of multiple overlapping and mutually reinforcing crises. The first is a fiscal crisis, which has taken its biggest toll in Greece but pervades the southern part of the eurozone and Ireland. The second is a competitiveness crisis, long evident in the large current account deficits along the eurozone's periphery and the even larger current account imbalances between eurozone countries. The third is a banking crisis, which first unfolded in Ireland and has become particularly acute in Spain.
Yet for all the turmoil, fears of countries' repeatedly defaulting on their debts or the total collapse of the euro are vastly overblown. The eurozone countries have demonstrated that they can and will resolve each successive stage of the crisis by cooperating and sharing decision-making powers. They have created a host of new continent-wide institutions, built a substantial financial firewall to prevent debt problems from spreading, and are now well on their way to creating a banking union and a partial fiscal union. When the dust settles, the common currency, and indeed the entire project of European integration, is likely not only to survive but to emerge even stronger.
WATCH WHAT THEY DO, NOT WHAT THEY SAY
The European crisis is rooted in a failure of institutional design. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that Europe adopted in the 1990s comprised an extensive, if incomplete, monetary union, anchored by the euro and the European Central Bank (ECB). But it included virtually no economic union: no fiscal union, no banking union, no shared economic governance institutions, and no meaningful coordination of structural economic policies.
The EMU's architects assumed that economic union would inexorably follow monetary union. But European countries
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