Xi’s Costly Obsession With Security
How a Quest for Control Threatens China’s Economic Growth
TO EVALUATE the military strength of a country one examines its military system in time of peace and takes account of the potential power which it can command in time of war. In looking at Germany today, however, I shall confine myself to the purely military factors, while admitting the importance of two elements which really cannot be overlooked -- the demographic factor and industrial power.
It is not my intention to reopen the charge that Germany has not executed the Versailles Treaty. But in order to make the subject clear I shall have to point out: first, the legal situation created by the Treaty, and the modifications adopted by the Allies; and, second, the actual situation in Germany, which is very different today from that legally prescribed, even in its emended form. The difference between the de jure and the de facto positions will show how remarkably the offensive power of Germany has increased, and that consequently any argument founded simply on the Versailles statute is sapped at its base. Finally, by comparing the German claims with the ideas of General von Seeckt, the spiritual chief of the German Army, I shall try to draw objective conclusions and offer a reasoned judgment upon the present military power of Germany and its orientation.
I. MILITARY PROVISIONS OF THE VERSAILLES TREATY
The military statute of the Versailles Treaty (which contained no time limit) was intended to reduce the possibility of German aggression, to facilitate the eventual application of the sanctions which were provided for in order to compel Germany to observe the Treaty, and to render possible the preparation of a general limitation of armaments by all nations. Its aims were not punitive, but merely to stabilize Europe as it was in 1919. And it marked the first step of a desired evolution in the direction of disarmament.
Let us in the first place see what the Treaty of Versailles prescribes. It gives Germany a professional army and limits its effectives and matériel both in number and by categories. It forbids her to make ready for mobilization and establishes a demilitarized zone in the Rhineland. The German Army, which is reduced to 100,000 men (officers included), must be "exclusively reserved for the maintenance of order in the country and the policing of its frontiers." Compulsory military service is suppressed. The army is to be composed of twelve-year volunteers; the term of service for the officers is twenty-five consecutive years.
The composition and armament of the seven divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry which are authorized are settled in detail. None of the organs charged with planning and preparing for war are to be allowed. The former General Staff and the war academies are suppressed and cannot be revived "in any form whatsoever." The army shall have no aviation, no tanks, no heavy artillery. All mobilization measures are prohibited. Materials of war exceeding the statutory amounts shall be surrendered to the Allies to be destroyed. The manufacture, import or export of war materials is forbidden. Matériel authorized for the army and navy shall be supplied by factories designated by name. The manufacture of gas for war purposes, and the use of it, are prohibited. Organizations and educational establishments are forbidden to concern themselves with military questions. Further, in order to obviate future aggression, a zone of German territory between the western frontier of Germany and a line drawn fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine is "demilitarized."
Lastly, independently of the control exercised in Germany by the Inter-Allied Commission, the Allied and Associated Powers decided to occupy the left bank of the Rhine and to evacuate it by degrees, the last zone to be freed in 1935, or later if necessary. It will be recalled that France accepted this progressive evacuation in exchange for a pledge that England and the United States would come to her side in the event of further aggression by Germany.
Thus the Allied and Associated Governments were unanimous in recognizing that, in the face of Germany's demographic and industrial superiority, the security of France demanded (once the left bank of the Rhine had been evacuated) that she should have an army superior in effectives to the German Army in order to be in a position to await the promised intervention of England and the United States. As we know, the guarantee was not signed; the United States did not ratify the Peace Treaty. Yet one fact remains, and that is that in 1919 the maintenance of peace in Europe was founded by the Allies, not on "parity" of armaments but on the contrary on the inequality of the military forces of France and Germany, in favor of the former.
II. THE MODIFICATIONS AGREED TO BY THE ALLIES
Far from taking a narrow legal point of view, the Allied Governments, represented by the Conference of Ambassadors, interpreted the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in a liberal and conciliatory fashion, in an effort to show Germany that they had confidence in her. A few specific illustrations will suffice to indicate this:
At Spa, for example, the Allies agreed that doctors and veterinary surgeons should be counted separately, which resulted in an increase of 500 officers, and that civilians employed in the army might be increased from 901 to 1,936, more than twice as many. The Inter-Allied Commission of Control observed that the distribution of commissioned officers violated the statute; the Allies, in a spirit of conciliation, allowed the effectives to be reckoned as a total. Again, despite the prohibition against the reconstitution of the Berlin and Munich military academies in any form, the Ambassadors' Conference admitted special arrangements for the training of General Staff officers, and this now proceeds according to pre-war principles.
In the category of armaments, also, there were important concessions, permitting among other things an increase in the number of machine guns; a reserve of 50,000 rifles and 20 million cartridges more than the number provided; the possession of 52,000 revolvers, 166,000 bayonets, 18,000 lances, 30,000 sabres; a supplementary supply of infantry and artillery munitions equal to the requirements of an army; permission to study protective devices against "forbidden" weapons (with the proviso that models cannot be transformed into real weapons). In practice, Germany is learning the use of forbidden weapons. Certain cannon, for example, have real carriages and sights; the tube is of wood, but it can easily be replaced by a real one.
One of the most important concessions was permission to transform the state police into an armed force, with military training and equipment. In 1913 Germany had 80,000 police (30,000 state police and 50,000 local), charged with maintaining order as a separate service. This force did not differ from the police of other countries. Now the Allied Governments have allowed the German police force to be raised to 140,000 men, of whom 105,000 are state police and 35,000 local. The former are a military organization. Like the Reichswehr, they are recruited by voluntary enlistment for twelve years. Members are cadets for two years (a total of 5,000 men), and afterwards are attached to active units which correspond to infantry companies, cavalry squadrons or technical units. The radio system of the state police is the most important in Germany, and their automobile equipment is far superior to that of the army and can transport more than 20,000 men. Their arms are no longer restricted, as in 1913, to a revolver and a sword, but consist of rifles or carbines. They have 150 armored motor cars, each fitted with 2 machine guns, sub-machine guns and hand grenades. The railway police have been given authorization to be armed (8,000 rifles and pistols), and have armored trains at their disposal. It will be seen how greatly the state police have changed in character. Living in barracks, organized in units, armed and equipped like a military force, they are an important addition to the Reichswehr.
Further concessions were made with regard to war factories. All factories which had manufactured or studied how to manufacture war material, other than those authorized by the Treaty, were required to disappear. But the Conference of Ambassadors decided to suppress only those factories which were built exclusively for the manufacture of war material. With regard to war material in excess of the amount authorized, the Ambassadors' Conference allowed material to be preserved which was not for "combat purposes." The Conference also limited the prohibition on the manufacture, importation and exportation of war material solely to material obviously destined for "war purposes" -- a very difficult thing to define. Again, the Conference allowed surplus barracks to stand, provided they were rendered unfit for military purposes.
The Conference permitted improvements to be made in the fortifications on the eastern, southern and northern frontiers, though they were contrary to the Treaty, as well as certain constructions at Könisberg, Cüstrin and Glogau. The armaments of coast towns were increased, e.g. the Conference granted 119 supplementary cannon and agreed that the 22 cannon at Könisberg, which were to have fixed carriages, could be placed on movable carriages, on condition that they were not to be removed from that place -- a condition which has not been respected.
In the field of aëronautics there were a number of concessions. The Paris agreements of May 1926 restored to Germany the right to build machines of all types, provided they are not armored, nor armed, nor capable of being turned into military machines -- a restriction which it is impossible to enforce. In addition, 36 members of the Reichswehr and the state police were separately authorized to become pilots. A Bureau of Aviation was allowed to the Ministry of the Reichswehr "for the study of foreign military aëronautics and the aërial defense of the Reich."
Germany was authorized to send military bands into the demilitarized zone, as well as 9,000 state police. Military railways in those areas were to have been suppressed; an agreement on August 4, 1929, considerably modified the 1922 program. Similarly, Germany was authorized to install underground telephonic cables in the demilitarized zone, to maintain 4 airports, 16 landing fields and artillery establishments (subject to certain observations). She even obtained permission not to destroy completely certain fortifications.
The facts which I have enumerated are sufficient to destroy the legend about the harshness with which the Allies are supposed to have insisted upon the execution of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty. They did not merely make concessions of detail; they granted Germany the right to revamp her entire military system. As a result, the present legal situation is far different from that stipulated at Versailles.
Now what is the actual situation, in contrast to the hypothetical legal situation which I have outlined?
III. EVOLUTION OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM SINCE 1920
Since 1920 Germany has aimed at the execution of a definite program: to create and preserve the essential foundations of a powerful military machine modelled after that of pre-war days. The elements include: (a) A Supreme Command, a General Staff and commissioned officers. (b) Military instruction with a view to offensive warfare. (c) The organization of units which increase the mobility and offensive strength of the army. (d) Matériel. (e) Trained effectives. An examination of the results obtained in 1932 in these categories reveals the military power of Germany.
(a) Commanders and Commissioned Officers. At the head of the army is a single commander, known as the "Chief of the Army Command," who combines all the prerogatives formerly exercised by the Emperor, the General Staff, the Ministry of War and the army inspectors. About him are grouped the 250 officers and numerous officials, most of them retired officers, who constitute the Army Command. It is as powerful an organism as all the pre-war central organizations together used to be. Amongst the four major services of the Army Command, the Truppenamt (Troups Bureau) constitutes the present General Staff, properly speaking, and is at all points analogous to the old General Staff. The recruitment of General Staff officers is provided for as formerly. Only the titles have changed.
The lower ranks are also very numerous -- one non-commissioned officer to four men -- and their training is advanced to a point at which they are capable of fulfilling functions far superior to their assigned rank.
It is on this solid structure, out of all proportion to the number of effectives actually authorized, that the present German Army rests.
(b) Training. So far from accepting the position defined for the German Army by the Treaty, its organizer, General von Seeckt, has sought to make it the framework of a nation in arms. As early as September 1921, in his preface to the new Army Regulations, General von Seeckt took as his basis "the men, armament and equipment of the army of a great, modern, military Power, and not merely the German Army of 100,000 men created in accordance with the terms of the Peace Treaty." And, speaking of the modern weapons of combat which are forbidden in Germany -- aviation, tanks, heavy artillery -- the General suggested that "their absence must not make us afraid to attack."
The Reichswehr, an army of the first quality, of exalted patriotism, and convinced that it will one day be the nucleus of a nation in arms, preserves "the old military ideals of the former army" and the "warlike spirit" which its successive chiefs have always flattered themselves that they have maintained and nourished. It is being trained and organized for offensive warfare.
(c) Increase in the offensive power of the army. Germany has not merely maintained the framework of its former military establishment, it has modified the army's internal organization so as to increase its mobility and power on the offensive. Taken singly, these changes are sometimes of only relative importance. But taken together they are seen to be part of a general plan methodically executed.
In the Infantry, the mobility and marksmanship of the units are being constantly improved. The number of machine guns, both light and heavy, is greater; a new type of machine gun has been adopted; the mine thrower has been improved; canons d'accompagnement and anti-tank guns are being studied and tried out.
In the Cavalry, each division now has a communications squadron (instead of a squadron of recruits), caterpillar squadrons, and armored cars.
All the cavalry squadrons are furnished with six light machine guns (whereas they legally should have none), and the high command is now arranging to have the number raised to nine. The number of machine guns in excess of what is allowed may be estimated at about two thousand. The machine gun armament of both infantry and cavalry is twice the amount provided in the Treaty.
In the Artillery, a supply squadron has been created for each division, and observation units have been formed, as defined by modern army regulations. In 1931 further artillery material was put into service. Motorized batteries appeared in the 1932 manœuvres.
In the Engineers, the battalions are increasing the number of their units and becoming partly motorized. The supply units are being grouped, and equipped with motors and modern material of every kind.
The high command has also arranged to use arms forbidden by the Treaty. With regard to heavy artillery, it has adapted coast defense matériel to mechanical transportation and is now training crews at Könisberg. As for tanks, it has created companies of "imitation" tanks, which are used at manœuvres. In the field of chemical warfare, it has created "fog sections," in part motorized, and capable of using poison gas machinery. The use of gas bombs is taken for granted in all training classes and at the General Staff.
In the field of aviation, machines for reconnaissance, observation, fighting and bombing have been constructed by various firms, officers go through training as pilots and observers, both in Germany and abroad, and in the course of manœuvres contact exercises between the land and air forces take place. The recent condemnation of a German publicist who had alluded in the Weltbuhne to collusion between the Reichswehr Ministry and the Lufthansa Gesellschaft is confirmation of this fact.
(d) Matériel. In addition to authorized matériel, Germany possesses stocks of arms which were concealed from the Control Commission, and these, in the words of the Commission, constitute a "not negligible" supply. The police are constantly discovering rifle and machine gun dépôts. At Leipsig in February 1930 the Communists found more than 200 machine guns in military buildings. This fact was confirmed in the Reichstag by Deputy Kippenberger, who added that he had proof that in one garrison in the eastern part of the country more than 2,000 machine guns were stocked in seven different dépôts.
Further, the manufacture of arms has been resumed in many factories, both authorized and otherwise. The trade in arms is proof of it. In 1928 Germany exported arms to the value of 150 million pounds sterling, and in 1930, according to the "League of Nations Annual," she exported arms to the value of 1,765,000 pounds sterling. The Düsseldorf firm of "Rheinmetall," which is authorized only to make cannon, also makes light and heavy machine guns, anti-tank guns, sub-machine guns, and antiaircraft guns. The firm of Mauser, which is prohibited from manufacturing arms, is making rifles and automatic rifles of a new model. Similar activity is observable in making other sorts of war material. The firm of Zeiss is exporting field-glasses. The firm of Siemens is selling wireless equipment and instruments for finding bearings by sound. Since the beginning of 1932 there has been a great increase in the number of other factories which manufacture war materials of divers kinds. Export requirements (export of these materials is in itself prohibited) are not sufficient to justify this increased activity, so that one is left wondering whether part of the manufactures in question are not at the disposal of the Reichswehr.
The German chemical industry is interested in chemical warfare and is preparing for it. The German Army regulations anticipate it. Certain firms, such as Stolzenberg and Minimax, manufacture and openly sell flame-throwers and machines for releasing gas. The firm of Stolzenberg manufactures and exports poisonous gases. It offers them in its catalogs and sells sample boxes.
German aviation firms, despite the prohibition on building, possessing or importing airships fitted up for military purposes, make in Germany the prototypes of reconnoitering and pursuit machines. "H. D. 38," "H. D. 47" and "H. D. 43," built by the firm of Hinkel, are classified in a British handbook on aërial fleets as pursuit machines. Moreover, the foreign branches of the firms of Junkers and Dornier build military aëroplanes which are simply adapted from certain types of civilian planes built and used in Germany.[i] The giant Junkers "G. 38" is a magnificent bombing-plane, according to the announcement made by Junkers after her trip to Madrid. Certain foreign affiliates of the German aëronautical industry, like the "Flyindustrie" of Malmo, sell military machines which are merely converted commercial planes.
All this activity is directed and coördinated by the bureau of the Army Command which is charged with looking after armament and matériel -- the Waffenamt. All the large firms are unofficially represented in the bureau, which in its turn has delegates on all the chief economic committees in Germany. A census is regularly taken of factories which would be concerned in industrial mobilization. By the accumulation of stocks of material, by making ready for a mobilization of industries, by the construction of model machines, Germany is assured of supplies of war material far in excess of those provided for in the Treaty or in subsequent agreements.
Since the Treaty did not limit military credits, the Reich has been able to increase its expenditures for these purposes at will. In 1913, for an army of 800,000 men, with 4,000 machine guns and 8,000 modern cannon, the army estimates amounted to 67 million marks, of which 3.1 millions were for the upkeep of arms in use. In 1930, for an army of 100,000 men, with theoretically only 2,336 machine guns and 316 cannon, the same estimates amount to 78.9 million marks, of which 21.3 millions are for the upkeep of arms in use. That is seven times as much money for the upkeep of one-eighth the number of men and about one-half the number of machine guns and one-twenty-fourth the number of cannon.[ii]
It should be mentioned at this point that certain expenditures of a military character (historical and topographical services, upkeep of the state police, etc.) figure in the budgets of other Ministries, as well as in state and municipal budgets, and even in the budget of the State Railways. Notorious trials, such as that of Captain Lohmann in 1928, the Weltbuhne case, and the condemnation at Leipsig of Kreiser and Ossietzky for revealing the air service estimates and the collusion between the civilian air service and the Reichswehr, have proved the existence of what amounts to a subsidiary budget for military purposes. Finally, the Reich allocates under heads other than the budget of the Reichswehr a long list of subventions to certain factories which are not authorized to produce war material. For example, we find in the secret accounts, referring to the estimates of 1925 to 1930 inclusive, the subventions as follows, all entered under the heading of the Ministry of Finance: Schichau Werke, 12,227,000 marks; Deutsche Werke, 28,753,000 marks; a total of 40,980,000 marks.
The German budget, then,-- a vague document which gives no justification for the expenditures entered under general headings, quite apart from the non-budget resources used for military purposes -- allows for the manufacture of new war materials, for preparations for mobilization, and, as we shall see later, for the allocation of large sums for the "athletic" training of youth.
(e) Effectives. Now let us see what are the resources in men, apart from the Reichswehr, which are at the disposal of Germany in time of peace.
In the first place, and thanks to the concessions of the Allies, the Reich has been able to build up an armed force in the state police. The decidedly military character of an important part of this force is evident from its manœuvres. Thus, the German press [iii] published photographs of the manœuvres of the Mecklenburg state police, with the following caption: "In order to emphasize the character of the Schutzpolizei, whose duty it is to maintain public order, as an army trained for war, the National-Socialist Minister, von Granzow, has put the police through real manœuvres modelled after those of the Reichswehr."
At the present time the masculine population of Germany which could be mobilized amounts to about 11,000,000 men between 17 and 45 years of age. Of this total we may estimate that 4½ millions have received complete military training, to wit: 1,000,000 trained men under 32; 1,700,000 trained men 33-38 years of age; 1,800,000 trained men 38-45 years of age.
The number of trained men under 32 has been decreasing, and the problem of how to maintain the supply of trained soldiers has arisen. Germany first attempted to solve it by trying the system of "time volunteers," based on that of 1806-1813; by making premature releases from the Reichswehr (the number of these authorized by the Treaty has frequently been exceeded); and by giving groups of young men, mostly students, periods of training with the Reichswehr lasting several weeks. But these remedies did not provide for the training of the great mass of the young men capable of bearing arms. The Reich authorities then decided to entrust private organizations with the duty of giving premilitary training and perfecting the technique of men already trained.
The Stahlhelm, the Hitler organizations, the Kyfhaüserbund, the rifle clubs, the riding clubs, and many others, give individual and collective military training. Their "youth sections" start off with the young men from 17 to 20 and give them route marching with packs, rifle practice, etc.; their "active sections" keep the trained men up to the mark.
In particular, the Stahlhelm and Hitler's army each has a territorial and military organization corresponding to that of the regular army. Impressive gatherings at Coblenz in 1930, in Silesia, in Breslau in 1931, in Berlin in 1932, show the power of these associations. On each occasion 100,000 men were assembled. These men were fully organized, had full military equipment, and were transported by rail and motor under conditions like those of a real military concentration. In other words, they are troops ready for war.
Amongst the other associations which give military instruction the Kyfhaüserbund, the Wehrwolf, the Reichsbanner and the Reitervereine are all of them important, besides the small-calibre rifle clubs and, to give certain sorts of specialized training, the Technische Nothilfe, which receives a governmental subvention. In all we may estimate at more than a million men -- between seven and eight thousand of whom are young -- the number of members of these associations which give more or less complete military training and are capable of reinforcing the Reichswehr.
The German youth also receive military training, both theoretical and practical, in the universities in the winter, in the sports camps in the summer. The aim of the sports clubs is training in Wehrsport, that is, in sports of direct military use, the natural step towards what the Germans call Wehrhaftigkeit, that is "aptitude for war," according to the definition given by General Rheinhardt, Minister of War in 1919.
In 1930 a bill establishing compulsory labor was abandoned, it being thought preferable first to try a voluntary system. On July 19, 1931, therefore, by a decree of the Reichstag, the "voluntary work service" was created. Its military advantages are obvious. The army supplies material to the working units and personnel to supervise its use.
Further, carrying out the project laid before the Reichstag in April 1932 by General Groener, Reichswehr Minister, of grouping the entire youth of Germany in one athletic association, the German Government (decree of September 14, 1932) created an organization called the Kuratorium, a sort of central bureau whose task it is to unite members of associations, without distinction of party, "in a common and methodical task." The Kuratorium, which is attached to the Ministry of the Interior, is under the chairmanship of General von Stulpnagel, former Commander of the Fourth Division. It has considerable financial resources, and twenty camps, distributed over the entire country, will be placed at its disposal for the Wehrsport training of the German youth. On September 21 the German press announced the adhesion of the following associations: Reichsbanner, 220,000 men; Stahlhelm, 100,000; Jungdeutscher Orden, 100,000; Wehrwolf, 440,000. The National-Socialist shock-troops also joined the Kuratorium on October 1, 1932, bringing in an additional 200,000 to 400,000 young men. It is only necessary to refer to the statements of Deputy Kasper, on March 10, 1931, in the Prussian Landtag -- statements not contradicted by any Minister -- in order to understand that all this "sport" is simply intensive military preparation for war.
IV. THE GERMAN DEMANDS; THE SYSTEM RECOMMENDED BY GENERAL VON SEECKT
It is in this factual setting that the present German demands must be studied. They are the same as those put forward in 1930 in a book called "Modern Principles of National Defense," by General von Seeckt, organizer of the Reichswehr and the uncontested spiritual chief of the German army today. A striking similarity between the organization which he recommends and the present demands of the Government is revealed by setting the principal factors in the two systems beside each other.
|GENERAL VON SEECKT'S SYSTEM||GERMAN PROGRAM AND DEMANDS|
|(a). A professional army, recruited on the||(a). Reduction of the length of service in the|
|voluntary system for an average term of six||professional army to six years; graduation of|
|years, recruiting to take place continuously.||the term of active service.|
|Equipment, armament and munitions in sufficient|
|quantity for immediate use.|
|(b). The systematic location of training units,||(b). A slight increase in the man-power of the|
|whose business will be to prepare for the general||Reichswehr (3,000 officers and men).|
|mobilization of the nation and train the levees.|
|(c). Preparation for general mobilization which||(c). Training in associations and clubs; organization|
|will guarantee the defense of the national territory||of voluntary work service; organization|
|while the mobile army, that is the permanent||of the Kuratorium to train the youth.|
|army, seeks a rapid decision before the||The right to train a compulsory militia of|
|necessarily slow mobilization of foreign conscripted||40,000 men for terms of 3 months each, that|
|armies can take place.||is to say, to turn out 160,000 trained men per|
|To this end, preparation of the mass of the||annum.|
|people; moral and physical instruction in the|
|schools; genuine military instruction for three|
|months. Everyone to take part in military training|
|in order to develop a national "will to resist"|
|and establish national discipline.|
|(d). In the army thus outlined, shock formations||(d). (The present existence of the Grenzschutz|
|to be constituted in fortified regions;||was confirmed by Deputy Kasper in the Prussian|
|equipment, material and munitions for these to||Landtag and by the statements made at|
|be stocked in advance.||Elbing, September 6, 1932, by General von|
|(e). For the other units in the national army,||(e). The furnishing to Germany of "samples"|
|the types of matériel to be decided upon in advance.||of all the matériel now prohibited and which|
|The acquisition of stocks of raw materials||will not be prohibited by the general agreement|
|and the preparation and transformation||to be made. (This demand coincides with reports|
|of factories to ensure necessary production.||in German "Left" papers, beginning last|
|March, of activity in the factories making war|
|materials, particularly in the Ruhr Basin.)|
The parallel is evident. But General von Seeckt does not confine himself to drawing up an organization. He also enunciates a doctrine of war, and this consists in the principle that at the first outbreak of hostilities there must be a sudden attack led by the 200,000 men (including Reichswehr reserves) who are at the disposal of the present commanders of the Germany Army.
It is superfluous for me to emphasize the menace which a scheme of war like this holds for an organization which is based on principles of defense and slow of motion, particularly if the sudden offensive is undertaken by an army which, if it assumed the form and extent desired by General von Seeckt, would be more efficient than the German Army of 1914.
The account which I have given of the German military system as it exists at the end of 1932 proves that the present de facto situation has nothing in common with the de jure situation, even as largely ameliorated by concessions made subsequently to the signing of the Treaty of Peace. Germany has restored the essential foundations of her pre-war strength, and continues to increase that strength for aggressive warfare.
The Reichswehr has a more centralized command than had the Imperial Army. The General Staff, the organ of war preparation, has been restored. It is an army of chiefs of staff, officers and instructors, ready to serve as the framework about which will group "the nation in arms."
The theory of training, directed towards offensive operations, has no longer any connection with the "maintenance of order in the interior and the policing of frontiers."
The army's modernized armament and equipment are considerably in excess of the authorized amounts. Appropriations have made it possible to accumulate large stocks. Thus though the Reichswehr has been given new armament in recent years (e. g. the new rifle "Einheitsgewehr," a new light machine gun, a new mine thrower, new cannon, a new howitzer, etc.) the old equipment has not been destroyed. These yearly credits have also made it possible to give subventions to the war factories (authorized and otherwise) to perfect their machinery.
It is not reasonable to suppose, then, that the troops for reinforcing the Reichswehr would not now have the necessary arms. These troops are trained; the militarized police have been trained with the greatest care; the general reserves, independent of those released from the Reichswehr, have been trained by the various associations. The training will now be developed, in accordance with one inclusive program, in the camps of the Kuratorium.
The trained reserves at the present time total about 800,000 young men. With these must be counted one million trained ex-combatants, aged less than 32 years.
The number of existing barracks and other military buildings in excess of the requirements of the Reichswehr would easily house the same number of troops as were stationed in 1914 in the same territories.
Under cover of commercial aviation, the nuclei of military and naval aviation have been established.
Forbidden arms are being studied, and sometimes are tried out or actually put into service. Motorization of all branches is increasing.
Military mobilization, in the full technical sense of the term, and industrial mobilization -- both have been fully prepared.
How different is this situation from that generally depicted by Germany when she declares that she has only 100,000 men, and those poorly armed, compared with neighbors armed to the teeth! The real fact is that Germany at this moment could put in the field an army totally unlike that provided for in the Treaty, and with effectives comparable to those which she had on the French front in 1914. And I have moreover shown, I think, that the present demands of Germany seek sanction for organizations which hitherto have been unofficial, in order to mould the military system into one homogeneous whole on the pattern laid down by General von Seeckt.
[i] The following are examples: the Dornier Wal and the Dornier Superwal, hydroplane for sea use; the "R. 35," a scouting two-seater, modelled on the civilian machine; the "R. 47," a pursuit two-seater, modelled on the Junkers "J. 48;" the "K. 37," a fighting three-seater, modelled on the civilian Junkers "S. 35."
[ii] The increase applies to the total army estimates. These grew continuously from 1924-25 to 1929, but were slightly reduced in 1930-31 and 1931-32 because of the German financial crisis. The 1932-33 Reichswehr estimates total 674 million reichmarks, or a decrease of 15 millions compared with 1931-32. But the cost of living has fallen considerably since 1931, so that the estimates do not reflect Germany's financial difficulties.
[iii] See the Hamburger Fremdenblatt, September 29, 1932, and the Ruhr Echo, September 20, 1932.