How to Get a Breakthrough in Ukraine
The Case Against Incrementalism
IT IS no easy matter for a distant observer to understand the circumstances of the formation of the Hungarian state and the place which in the course of subsequent history Hungary came to take in Europe. It was in 895 A.D. that the Magyars reached the basin of the Danube, entering the country formerly known as the Roman province of Pannonia; and a hundred years later, when Constantine, Emperor of Byzantium, wrote his famous work on the Magyars, our ancestors were already in full possession of the territory which in the days prior to the Great War was known as Hungary. Their dominion stretched westward as far as the River Emms and extended even to the district lying between the Danube and the Save; in the south the frontier of their country was the Danube; the eastern frontier was the Carpathians--up to the Moldavia and Bukovina of today; and on the northern frontier lay Galicia and the old Kingdom of Bohemia. These frontiers remained intact for over a thousand years, right down to 1918; and even a temporary occupation by the armies of a foreign power failed to change them. The masses of Magyars who first occupied the country had been driven from their original home by the ever-active inner forces that make history; the same forces assisted the Magyars to establish in their new country a state possessing a uniform language and a uniform culture, and within that state to set up a national Christian kingship.
Torn into three parts during the period of Turkish occupation, the Hungarian nation lived a threefold life. Having lost its political unity, its spiritual unity too often became disorganized; Magyar frequently came into conflict with Magyar--at times showing a far more bitter hatred than when fighting against a foreign foe. And in the meantime the Turks were ravaging and "Balkanizing" the country. The vitality that could survive such a terrible crisis without withering and wasting away must indeed have been marvelous. When--after a subjection of a century and a half--the Hungarians at last succeeded, with the assistance of the Hapsburgs and the Western Powers, in driving the Turks from Hungarian soil, it appeared as if there were nothing to prevent Hapsburg rule from being definitively established.
But though the Hapsburgs rarely showed respect for the Hungarian Constitution, the independence and liberty of the Hungarian state never ceased to exist either de jure or de facto,--certainly never in any manner analogous to that of Poland, for instance. Even in the midst of the greatest trials there were always to be found Hungarian statesmen who preserved intact the jealously guarded treasure of national independence, who succeeded in giving expression to its reality--if unable to do so elsewhere--in the terms of the coronation oath.
At the outset, the economic and legal situation between Hungary and Austria was regulated--somewhat one-sidedly indeed --by an agreement of the nature of a state treaty. The constitutional form of the relation of the two countries was preserved by the fact that, subsequently to the reign of Ferdinand I, Hungary had invariably elected and crowned as king the Austrian ruler. But it was not until 1687 that this connection acquired a legal substance. In that year the Hungarian legislature promulgated and incorporated in law the right of succession of the male line of the ruling dynasty. By this Act of Parliament, and still more by the Pragmatic Sanction passed at a later date, expression was given to the fact that there existed between Hungary and the Austrian hereditary provinces, by virtue of the possession of a common ruler, the legal relation of a state union. Acts I and II of 1723--the Pragmatic Sanction--further declared as fundamental state law that the female line of the House of Hapsburg was also entitled to the right of hereditary succession to the Hungarian throne; while at the same time they established the obligation of mutual defense and the principle that the Hungarian Kingdom was inseparable from the other hereditary provinces under the rule of the House of Hapsburg.
The history of America divides naturally into two great periods --pre-Washington and post-Washington. In the history of Hungary, too, we find a similar mighty historical watershed demarcating two distinct worlds in the life of a people. The point of division was 1848. The Hungary prior to 1848 was still the Hungary of the Estates, with its special privileges for the nobility, its feudal serfs, and a by no means numerous and completely isolated class of burghers (who nevertheless were careful to preserve their acquired rights). Since 1848 has existed the democratic Hungarian state, desirous of living in accordance with the principles of modern parliamentarism and based on an absolute equality of rights (though it must be confessed that, to begin with, there was a lack, strictly speaking, of any bourgeois consciousness).
During the early part of the nineteenth century there was a splendid re-awakening of the national spirit. A new and intense interest and activity was displayed in everything relating to the culture of the country, a movement indissolubly linked with the glorious name of Stephen Széchenyi. When the historical personality of Louis Kossuth appeared in the arena of public life the political consequences of the outburst began to manifest themselves. As early as 1839 the Parliament of the privileged Estates accepted the principle of definitive redemption, which was the first serious step of a decisive character towards enabling the agricultural laborers (who previously had not possessed the right of changing their domicile at will and who had at their disposal no opportunities of rising in the social scale) at last to acquire human rights and to cease being mere slaves and the objects of extortion. This fact also contributed in no small measure towards enhancing the expansive political force of the nation. On March 15, 1848, the will of the people proved victorious in the streets of Budapest. It was indeed the triumph of the people generally, for a short time before, without any pressure from without, the Hungarian Estates had spontaneously declared for the complete abolition of the entire system of entailment and of the institution of socage service. This action involved the entrance into history of the Hungary of civil equality.
The events of March impelled the resignation of Metternich, the omnipotent Austrian Chancellor; whereupon, on April 11, 1848, the well-meaning but weak monarch, Ferdinand V, once more reinstated the Hungarian Constitution into full possession of its rights and restored the ancient liberty of Hungary. Unfortunately, however, this situation did not last long. The overthrow of the revolutions throughout Europe once more put power into the hands of the absolutists; the Austrian Imperial Court, too, thought the time had come to settle accounts once for all with the Constitution and independence of Hungary. On December 2, 1848, they made Ferdinand V abdicate as Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, and thus pave the way for the accession of Francis Joseph I, a young man who for the moment was entirely dependent on the influence of bad advisers. Now these bad advisers were all alike enemies of Hungary. When the conflict with the Imperial House became inevitable the Hungarian nation took up arms in defense of its rights. The titanic struggle lasted a year and a half, and it resulted in the overthrow of the better cause and of justice. The King enlisted the aid of the absolute Tsar of Russia, Nicholas I, in defense of his absolutism. Hungary was trampled under foot by Cossack horses and brought to her knees by Russian bayonets.
For more than fourteen years--until 1866--Hungary was subjected to a rule of violence of the most malicious and at the same time a most ingenious character. But Francis Joseph, who possessed capacities as a ruler far superior to those of his immediate predecessors, had years before come to understand that the treatment meted out to Hungary was a mistake and that sooner or later the matter would have to be settled on a proper basis. The Austrian defeat at Koniggratz, in the Austro-Prussian War, gave a final and decisive impetus to the development of affairs. On October 20, 1866, appeared the so called "October Letters Patent," which in substance restored the Constitution of Hungary and in any case afforded a sound basis for the initiation by Francis Deák--the "Sage of Hungary"--of negotiations with the ruling dynasty and with Austria for the conclusion of the so called Compromise, or Ausgleich. Act XII of 1867 completely restored legal continuity, continuing the erection of the constitutional edifice which had been left unfinished in 1723, 1790 and 1848, respectively, and established the whole inner substance and form of the state union existing between Austria and Hungary. Its terms now emphasized--in a manner precluding any possibility of doubt--the independence and sovereignty of Hungary and at the same time set fast the fact that the "common" institutions established by the two states to ensure efficient mutual defense were on a footing of strict parity.
This state union came to an end in November, 1918, with the collapse of the Monarchy that followed the end of the Great War. As the events that then took place not only rendered impossible any possession in common of the states which previously formed parts of the Hapsburg Monarchy, but also precluded the dynasty from continuing on the throne, the Hungarian National Assembly had to make provision to ensure that the new historical situation should find expression in a proper legal form. This provision is contained in Act I of 1920.
The National Assembly as the exclusive legal representative of the sovereignty of the nation established the fact that the exercise of the kingly power ceased on the thirteenth day of November, 1918. It declared further that, as a result of the events that had taken place, the indivisible common possession of Hungary and her dependencies and of the kingdoms and countries represented in the former Austrian Imperial Parliament had also ceased. And then--to quote the text of the Act--"until such time as it shall definitively settle the manner of the exercise of the power of the Head of State, and shall in consequence actually take over the office of Head of the State, the National Assembly shall by secret ballot elect from among the citizens of Hungary a Regent to perform temporarily the functions of the Head of the State." Hungary is therefore in law a kingdom; but at the present moment the power of the Head of the State is being exercised by the elected Regent.
At this point the question might well be asked, why is Hungary spoken of as a kingdom if it has no king?
May I be permitted here--setting aside all other arguments--to point simply to the importance of the rôle played in the public law and constitutional life of Hungary by the Holy Crown and the political dogma relating thereto based on a certain mystic tradition. Time, and long and bitter struggles for liberty, have imprinted deep in the minds of the Hungarian people the ancient law that the nation can regard as lawful king and legal possessor of the kingly power only that person whose anointed brow has been touched by the Holy Crown presented to King St. Stephen in 1000 A.D. by Pope Sylvester II. This conception first obtained a precise legal form at the opening of the sixteenth century in the "Tripartitum" of Stephen Verböczy, Lord Chief Justice of Hungary, in a declaration to the effect that, by the act of coronation with the Holy Crown, the right of reigning and ruling was conferred by the nation of its own free will on the king elected voluntarily by that nation. In other words, the political nation, being the source of power and law, by the crown conferred these supreme moral and political rights on the sovereign. Hereby the crown became a profound historical symbol, which in the mind of the Hungarian people personified the kingship even in the absence of a living and actually reigning king. This is the psychological explanation of the present situation of Hungary. The Hungarian state is at the present moment genuinely a kingdom--though for the moment without a king--by virtue of the political and symbolical power of the Holy Crown. The Entente itself has tacitly recognized this to be the actual legal position; for whereas in its first draft of the Conditions of Peace it spoke everywhere of a Hungarian Republic, the Treaty of the Trianon contains no such definition but speaks of our country throughout, without any designation of the form of government, simply as "Hungary."
Unfortunately, during the last half century of Hungary's association with the rest of the Hapsburg Monarchy, though its position and independence permitted it to be regarded as completely and definitively settled from the legal point of view, yet the institutions of a common army and a common foreign affairs service obscured the fact of the historical separation of Hungary and hid it from the public opinion of foreign countries. But the misunderstanding was not confined to the so-called general public; even diplomats and statesmen found themselves in a rather awkward dilemma when they were called upon to speak of the political position of Hungary. I have had sad experiences in this respect, particularly when we were engaged at Neuilly in elaborating the material for the Peace Conference, on which occasion we were dumfounded to learn that powerful statesmen exercising a decisive influence in the affairs of the world knew of Hungary only as an "Austrian province." And naturally we were treated accordingly. This erroneous and general belief was undoubtedly one of the most catastrophic factors governing the drafting of the Treaty of the Trianon, for the vast majority of the treaty makers took Hungary to be, not an independent state which had been in existence for a thousand years, but an entirely new historical creation which had practically been brought into being by the Great War, and the independence of which had been a direct gift and sign of goodwill on the part of the great powers. This supposition seems to be proved by Article 78 of the Treaty of the Trianon, which runs as follows: "The independence of Hungary is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently Hungary undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another power." This passage of the Treaty, while on the one hand ensuring the international recognition of the independence of the Hungarian State, at the same time places that independence under international control. The position has indeed been considerably improved in this respect by the admission of Hungary to membership in the League of Nations; but there are certain restrictions still in force--restrictions which, in my opinion, even if they had not been omitted altogether would undoubtedly have been substantially modified had the consciousness of the national independence of Hungary definitely taken root in the public opinion of Europe prior to the outbreak of the Great War.
Aside from the Great War itself, the five months' régime of the Bolsheviks was without doubt of paramount importance in determining the political, social and indeed even the economic situation of post-war Hungary. The answer to the question as to how Hungary could have fallen a victim to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is today fairly evident to the historical observer. Hungary was plunged into a tragic decadence as a result of the backward development of her middle class, by the want of an organized society and, naturally, also by the anarchy ensuing as the result of the defeat in the war. After the liberation of the serfs in 1848, it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that a certain process of intermingling was effected in the three grades of society--this resulting in the formation of a new middle class, which however consisted largely of immigrants and was unable before the outbreak of the Great War to strike deep root in the national soil. The industrialization of the country did not begin until after the period following the Compromise of 1867; and its effect made itself apparent at first only in the big towns, not spreading to any extent until later. This process of distribution was a very slow one and involved as its consequence that, while the development of the capital city of Budapest assumed gigantic dimensions and rose with genuine American rapidity to a position as one of the big cities of the world and as an industrial center, the country itself --the country districts--remained behindhand in the process and in certain respects even showed an alienation in spiritual aspects from the capital. In the latter, meantime, new classes were in the making,--first and foremost the industrial proletariat, which even prior to the war embarked on exhausting struggles for the achievement of its political rights, and then the constantly growing civil servant and clerk class, which in time absorbed the impoverished scions of the older landed families. This was the society which, as a result of its inner explosive forces of unrest, was just preparing to resort to the safety valve of constitutional reforms at the very moment when the Great War broke out. The new situation naturally resulted in the taking of new decisions; but it did not substantially change the frame of mind in which Hungarian society had been living during the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the Great War. The bewildering fact of military defeat threw the older and established classes of Hungary, together with the bourgeoisie, into a state of torpid lethargy. The moment was regarded by the destructive elements which are present in all societies, and by the Bolshevik agents who were constantly making their way into the country from Russia, as a suitable one for them to play their own particular part as factors in Hungarian politics and in the management of the affairs of Hungary. First came the Károlyi Revolution with its own particular défaitism, which infected the whole living organism of the nation and reduced its power of resistance to a minimum; and this preparatory artillery attack was followed on March 21, 1919, by its logical consequence--the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Hungary lay prostrate and helpless at the mercy of her enemies; and--a fact that made her situation still more tragic--the country was in the hands of a band of desperate ruffians who were engaged in tearing to shreds even the last remnants of her national past and her national pride.
The fundamental principles of communist government seem to harmonize in a striking manner with the system which--however unconsciously it may have worked--was nevertheless most instrumental in hastening the fall of the great Roman Empire. The political massacres en masse and, later on, in the days of the emperors, the extinction of the so-called "best," resulted in removing from the life of the nation just those individuals who possessed a personality and creative power of their own. This was the convenient, if not exactly humane method adopted by the Roman Caesars to remove the opposition; but we must adduce as an extenuating circumstance on their behalf the fact that they probably did not know what they were doing. The Bolsheviks, however, both in Russia and in Hungary, had before them the Roman precedent; and they acted with a thoroughly Marxian consciousness in doing what Caligula and Nero had done from a mere savage instinct. In Russia the extinction of the best pillars of the state and of society has already reached a very advanced stage, even if it is not yet absolutely complete; and there is no doubt that the same would have been done in Hungary too, where the great "work of purification" was actually begun, had not this atrocious rule of a kind of contagious delirium collapsed suddenly on August 1, 1919. Even as it was, the victims done to death by the Bolshevik demagogues in the interest of social progress amounted to many hundreds.
I do not wish in this place to indulge in a detailed characterization of the Bolshevik reign of terror. There is already a considerable literature devoted to the treatment of this question. I would confine myself to stating that when the bourgeois society returned to power it found only ruins--political, social, economic, and moral--in the place of what had been the state. There was no country to be found anywhere; it had to be rebuilt.
In 1821 Goethe, speaking of Hungary, said: "It is a country richly endowed with blessings; only it is a pity that it cannot progress." Where is now the Hungary to which the great German genius referred? It has gone--not merely geographically and politically speaking, as the result of the action of the Treaty of Peace in taking away two-thirds of the territory and population of the country, but also in respect to its aims and its soul. Before the close of the last century Hungary had already belied Goethe's reproach; and today there is no need of any proof that she is both able and willing to progress.
The Hungary of the nineteenth century created in its territory mighty reservoirs of culture and civilization. Whenever the sky cleared and the weather became propitious to intellectual life--even if the improvement was only a slight one--there immediately appeared a Hungarian musical genius such as Francis Liszt or Francis Erkel, or a Munkácsy in the field of art, or in the fields of literature and scholarship a Jókai, a Pulszky, a Joseph Eötvös,--men who immediately followed the first great generation in the period subsequent to 1848, the generation of Széchenyi, Kossuth, Petöfi, Arany, and the others. I have no intention of dealing with the latest achievements of Hungarian literature, art and music, it will suffice for me to refer to their international success, of which I believe everybody must have heard.
However, the right of the Hungarian people to live is not vindicated merely by such successes as these, or by their conscious work in the interests of European culture in the basin of the Danube and the Tisza, in the highlands of Upper Hungary and in Transylvania, or by geographical and natural causes, but by the historical mission that has devolved on the Magyars in the course of centuries, the mission of acting as the intellectual, political and economic link between East and West.
Taking this rõle of the Magyars into consideration, I may now sum up the chief agenda on the program facing Hungary in the immediate future--the Hungary which, as I have described, has suffered the vicissitudes of the Great War and a series of revolutions, and which now is confined within the narrow frontiers unjustly imposed on her by the Treaty of the Trianon. The program falls under three principal heads, as follows:
1. Economic and financial reconstruction.
2. A democratic reorganization on the basis of the principle of a gradual and sound evolution.
3. The organic linking up of Hungary and all Hungarians with Western culture; and in connection herewith a settlement of the minority question.
As far as the first of these agenda is concerned, I feel a certain satisfaction in pointing out that the economic reconstruction of Hungary and the rebuilding of her financial system has made gratifying progress since the floating of the League of Nations loan. The seven reports already published by your distinguished compatriot, Mr. Jeremiah Smith, offer a thorough and objective description and give full information as to what has been going on in Hungary since the work of reconstruction began, and as to how state and society are coöperating for the attainment of the common object. The taxpayers are doing their duty faithfully; the revenue of the state shows a tendency to increase; and if the work of rebuilding the private economy of the country were able to be started with the energy and with the financial assistance from foreign countries such as has accompanied the efforts to reconstruct the state, there can be no doubt that in a few years Hungary would recover from the grave economic shock caused by the reparation stipulations of the Treaty of Peace. Naturally there are other conditions which are essential if the forces of Hungarian economic vitality are to assert themselves to the full; but these are for the moment so remote that it is scarcely to be hoped that they will be within the reach of those responsible for carrying out the work of reconstruction.
But I cannot sufficiently emphasize to my foreign readers the fact that even in her present form and structure Hungary offers the most favorable field conceivable for the investment of foreign capital. The industrial, commercial and agricultural possibilities open here to foreign capital and foreign enterprise are practically unlimited; all that is required is for them to be energetically seized and transformed. I am convinced that the financial world of America, which as a result alike of its initiative and its shrewdness has at all times been able to find the way to the exploitation of such possibilities, will on this occasion too discover that Hungary--which to a certain extent is perhaps still a terra incognita for American business men--is worthy of interest and study. Once this first step has been taken, there will ensue an active participation and a direct connection.
During journeys of mine in foreign countries, as recently as one or two years ago, eminent financiers declared to me that, though they admitted that Hungary was still an unexploited mine both economically and financially, they could not see the necessary guarantee for investments in view of political and social conditions. To these objections I replied by repeatedly pointing out that while on the one hand Hungary desired peace and wished to attain success exclusively by peaceful development, on the other hand Hungary and the Hungarian Government did stand for the principle of democratic progress. This naturally does not mean that the country should transplant to its soil, blindly and uncritically, every institution which, while it may have stood the test in other countries, might not be at all practicable or advantageous in Hungary, the development and present situation of which are entirely different from those of other states. Just as there are no two absolutely similar men anywhere in the world, so there are not two absolutely similar nations. This does not mean that Hungary has not accommodated herself to the requirements of the modern fellow-feeling between peoples. On the contrary, she has always done so in the past and will continue to do so in the future. For a thousand years Hungary has possessed a constitutional life, and since 1848 a parliamentary form of government. There can be no doubt that parliamentarism is the child of democracy. The mutual relation of these two things, however, is not always or in all countries the same. It is different in Hungary from what it is in Great Britain, and more particularly from what it is in the United States. Parliament, as the manifestation of the will of the nation, is undoubtedly an organ which is suited to satisfying the claims and wishes of the general masses, and no more suitable organ has yet been invented by the human mind. In Hungary everyone regards Parliament as a necessary institution and suitable for the purpose--naturally, on a moral, legal and social basis most closely conforming with the national and historical individuality of the country. Hungary, which during the whole course of her history has always been an enthusiastic admirer of the great ideas of liberty, has at all times remained in essence a state with conservative inclinations. This is the result of her whole historical life, of her racial characteristics and her qualities of temperament. According to the modern Hungarian interpretation, however, which I myself accept, conservatism does not mean, and in this country has never meant, reaction or backwardness, but sober reflection, a sieve of ideas through which mass movements pass and are as it were sterilized before becoming incorporated in the national code of law or public institutions. Democracy and conservatism are in my opinion very easily reconcilable and compatible ideas; and I have all the more reason to say so, seeing that I profess and affirm that democracy is not an object in itself, but a means to attain and achieve, by a peaceful development, the highest degree of human welfare and the greatest measure of human contentment.
As is but natural, democracy is interpreted by everyone according to the party principles which he avows. To mention only one instance in illustration, there are people who are unable to distinguish democracy from the idea of a republic; and I may refer--in contrast with this attitude--to Great Britain, where democracy reached the height of its development during and as a consequence of the rule of Conservative governments. I admit that the political system of Hungary, judged by the standard which we may apply to the great democracies of the West, cannot yet be called perfect or complete. However, every effort is being made to render Hungarian society and the Hungarian people--by economic and cultural advancement--fitted to possess the purest form of democratic constitution and one which shall be translated into terms of actual life in the most thorough manner. However, for the attainment of this grand object we require--apart from time--an enhancement of general culture, as well as a successful issue to the great work of economic and financial reconstruction which has been begun under such favorable auspices.
Unfortunately, when speaking of this question today I cannot speak in the name of all the Hungarians living in Europe. Almost four millions--or one-third of all the Hungarians living today in the whole world--is the number of those Hungarians who are now beyond the present frontiers of the country and are cut off from their fatherland, not only politically and economically, but also intellectually and from the viewpoint of culture. The definitive stabilization of this situation without any complete acknowledgment of minority rights on the part of the countries to the rule of which these Hungarians have been subjected, cannot prove of advantage either to international peace or to European consolidation. The so-called minority question in its whole tragic reality is still awaiting solution; and thus far practically no serious attempt has been made to eliminate this problem--at least in respect of its most distressing points--from the life of Central Europe. The Treaties of Saint Germain and the Trianon, as also the minority treaties concluded in this connection between the Great Powers and the Succession States, do indeed provide for the protection of the rights of the minorities; but today these provisions possess absolutely no practical value, for they are dependent on the League of Nations to imbue them with any life or substance. So far, however, the League of Nations has failed to do its duty in this field, so that I venture to say that the state of things in force today in respect of the rights of minorities in Eastern Europe is an outrage on culture which can only be explained by presuming that the peoples of the world are not yet sufficiently informed about it, seeing that they are occupied in liquidating the other troubles arising out of the Great War.
Hungary, which has probably been more immediately and seriously affected by this question than any other country, has spontaneously made the most loyal provisions for the comfort of the small sprinkling of non-Magyar nationalities left within her new frontiers; she has seen to it that they shall enjoy full satisfaction in the use of their mother tongues and in their religious and social life; she has provided that they shall be enabled, not only in the field of the administration of justice but also of state administration, to assert all those rights which are their human due. The Government ordinances recently issued regarding this matter bear eloquent witness to the far-reaching observance of human liberties by the Hungarian Government and of that Government's genuine democratic feeling.
I could not close these remarks in a manner more in harmony with my profound respect for the public opinion of America than by expressing the sincere desire of the whole Hungarian nation for peace. Hungary never wanted war. Written documents are now available to prove that Count Stephen Tisza, who in 1914 was Prime Minister of Hungary, and who was murdered by the agents of the Károlyi Revolution in 1918, at the decisive Crown Council held in Vienna protested against the declaration of war. The situation was then quite clear. All the vital interests of the country demanded that there should be no war. Hungary had nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by a war. This fact was as well known to every thinking Hungarian as it was to Stephen Tisza. However, the subordination of Hungary in the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy proved a decisive factor; we had to go with those to whom our history had bound us hand and foot.
The policy now being pursued by Hungary is a decided and deliberate endeavor to maintain peace. The favorable effects of this effort are seen, not only in the effectual support being afforded us by the League of Nations, but also in the considerable diminishment in the charged atmosphere of hostility by which we were surrounded in the beginning and by the opening of commercial negotiations with all the neighboring states. Certain agreements have already been made with Jugoslavia, and negotiations with Czechoslovakia are proceeding. The concrete results so far attained offer a reassuring promise that at no very distant date a fresh and healthy circulation will be set going through the still rather anaemic economic organism of the Succession States. The Geneva Conventions afford us an opportunity for making commercial treaties and for bringing into being such economic agreements as shall best conform with our own interests. And we are anxious to avail ourselves of the opportunity--not only in order to increase our inner forces, but also to help place the great edifice of world peace on foundations of the most solid and extensive character.
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