Israel Banks on a Fence
The Future of Palestine
Israel's New Strategy
Can Hamas Be Tamed?
The Hamas Conundrum
The Untamed Shrew, Four Years On
Letter From Gaza: Hamas the Opportunist
Hamas’ Tunnel Diplomacy
How to Handle Hamas
The Perils of Ignoring Gaza's Leadership
The Palestinian Spring?
Hamas and Fatah Have Unified, but not Yet Reconciled
Israel's Gamble in Gaza
The Perils of Operation Pillar of Defense
Why The Group Thought It Could Get Away With Striking Israel
Where Hamas Goes From Here
Time To Regroup or Rupture
Hamas' Not-So-Secret Weapon
Meet Salah al-Arouri, the Man Behind the Group's Kidnapping Strategy
Why Cairo Can't Broker a Ceasefire Between Israel and Hamas
The Near Enemy
Why the Real Threat to Israel Isn't in Gaza
Bibi's First War
Why Benjamin Netanyahu Has Never Liked Military Conflict
How Hamas Won
Israel's Tactical Success and Strategic Failure
Gaza's Bottle Rockets
Why Hamas' Arsenal Wasn't Worth a War
Notes From the Underground
The Long History of Tunnel Warfare
Why Withdrawing From the West Bank Would Make Israel Safer
Why Israel Should Stop Pushing Hamas to Give Up Its Weapons
Is Trusteeship for Palestine the Answer?
In the wake of Hamas's coup in the Gaza Strip and the appointment of an emergency government by Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process faces its greatest crisis in years. A three-state solution cannot lead to a resolution of the conflict. Yet without a responsible Palestinian partner capable of living up to its commitments to peace, there will be no possibility of putting the peace process back on track. Given the collapse of the Palestinian security apparatus, the call is again heard for international intervention.
When I proposed an international trusteeship for Palestine in the May/June 2003 issue of Foreign Affairs, it was in the context of the forthcoming war in Iraq. At the time, President George W. Bush had claimed that a positive ripple effect would wash across the region. On the eve of the war, Bush had endorsed a road map for creating an independent Palestinian state. I believed that it was essential for Bush to take advantage of the opportunity that his war-making in Iraq would generate for peacemaking on the Israeli-Palestinian front.
But, having served as President Bill Clinton's and Bush's ambassador to Israel at the beginning of the Palestinian intifada, I had become convinced that nothing would come of any renewed U.S. effort unless an antidote was found to the fundamental weakness of Palestinian governing institutions. Without a responsible Palestinian partner and a capable and disciplined Palestinian security apparatus, no progress could be made on any peace plan.
Despairing that Palestinians could not on their own overcome the dysfunctional governing structure that Yasser Arafat had built, and knowing that Arafat was no longer a reliable partner for peace, I proposed a full-scale U.S.-led and U.N.-endorsed international intervention to take away control of most of the West Bank and all of Gaza from Arafat and the Israeli army. Those territories were to be held in trust for the Palestinians while the trustees worked with responsible Palestinian partners to create the
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