FOR a generation past, Australia has regarded Japan with suspicion and at times with alarm. Australian public men, with few exceptions, have viewed her growing strength with apprehension, and more than one important step of Australian policy has resulted from their fears. In an Australian weekly of wide circulation Japan has constantly been the subject of articles and cartoons which have depicted her as the future invader of Australia. Other papers given to sensational methods have found it easy to work up a Japanese scare. The general public, it is safe to assert, has usually been prone to nervousness of Japan.

Before the war of 1914-1915, Australia's attitude to Japan was influenced mainly by the determination to exclude Japanese workmen and settlers, and by the belief that Japan was engaged in spying on our defenses and natural resources. Australians have been accustomed to suppose that she needed an oversea outlet for her population, and that our exclusion of Japanese immigrants excited great indignation in Japan. Accordingly it has been believed that she planned a forcible occupation of Australia or of the less populated parts of it, and the presence of supposed Japanese spies seemed to confirm this fear. After the outbreak of the World War, the occupation by Japan of the island groups in the Pacific north of the equator, and the Japanese proposals at international conferences for the recognition of racial equality, as well as her maintenance of armaments which seemed too large for use in home defense, kept these suspicions active. In short, Australians have come to think that Australia had a leading place in the plans for future territorial expansion which it has been the fashion to attribute to Japan. It is the object of this article to trace how this attitude has arisen, and to discuss what justification there is for it.

Australia took little interest in Japan or the Japanese until about thirty years ago. We had been concerned with the Chinese since the days of the gold diggings in the middle of the nineteenth century. The immigration of Chinese had excited much opposition, and between 1880 and 1890 Acts restricting it were passed by the Parliaments of all the Australian colonies. But it was not till nearly the end of the century that there was any anxiety about the Japanese or any action against them. Indeed, in earlier years there were official efforts to bring them to Australia. In 1876 the Government of South Australia approved a scheme for bringing Japanese farmers to the Northern Territory, and sent an agent to Tokyo to negotiate with the Japanese Government. The good fortune of some Japanese divers who drew the winning horse in Tattersall's sweep on the Melbourne Cup of 1891 and received a prize of £22,000 is said to have attracted much attention in Japan to Australia. At the census of that year only about 400 Japanese were recorded, but during the 'nineties, with the approval of the Government of Queensland, large numbers were brought to the pearl fisheries of Torres Straits. By 1900 the Japanese population of Australia reached its peak -- between 4000 and 5000. A few years earlier Japan had given China a severe defeat, and Australians, who hitherto, except for a short-lived Russian scare in 1885, had thought of their country as far removed from any danger of war, were beginning to turn their thoughts to the new power in the north.

By this time, also, there was general concern throughout Australia at the political and social dangers of the continued immigration of colored peoples, and the maintenance of "White Australia" had already emerged as the cardinal principle of our external policy. At a conference of Premiers of the Australian colonies in 1896 it was decided that the colonies should not adhere to the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1894, as adherence would give the right of entry to Japanese; but that on the contrary bills should be presented to the Colonial Parliaments for extending to all Asiatics the restrictions already placed on Chinese. The Government of Queensland, however, did not carry out these decisions. It adhered to the Treaty, but subject to a supplementary agreement which recognized the right of Queensland to regulate the immigration of Japanese laborers and artisans. To ensure that laborers and artisans should not come, a "Gentlemen's Agreement" was made between the two Governments.

This agreement is of interest as being the forerunner of similar "Gentlemen's Agreements" afterwards made by Japan with the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and with Canada and the United States. By it Japan undertook to issue passports only to Japanese of the classes Queensland was willing to admit, and Queensland undertook to admit without question Japanese holding passports issued by their Government. In the course of the negotiations with Queensland the Japanese Government made a declaration of its attitude to the foreign control of Japanese immigration. It is worth quoting, as this attitude has been maintained ever since. "The Japanese Government," wrote the Japanese Foreign Office, "entertains no objection to the wish of the Queensland Government with regard to the issue of passports to Japanese travellers proceeding to that Colony, with the object of restricting the entrance of Japanese laborers and artisans, if the restriction in question is to be applied to all foreigners. But if the intention of the Queensland Government is to make a distinction as regards Japanese subjects only, and subject them alone to this restrictive treatment, the Japanese Government must hesitate to further the wishes of that Government." It is in the distinction here made between restriction on equal terms of immigrants of all races -- to which Japan has not objected -- and restriction of Japanese only, that the key to Japanese policy regarding immigration for the past thirty years is to be found.

Several of the Colonies passed bills to exclude colored immigrants. These bills did not receive the Royal assent, and at the Colonial Conference in London in 1897 the British Government stated its objections to an absolute prohibition of colored immigration, but proposed that a language test applicable to immigrants of any race should be used to exclude undesirable persons.

The difficulties surrounding the control of immigration, and the need for common action regarding it, were among the causes that led in 1901 to the federation of the Australian Colonies to form the Commonwealth of Australia, and one of the earliest measures announced by the Commonwealth Government was the Immigration Restriction Bill. In May, 1901, before the Bill was introduced, the Japanese Government expressed the view to the Commonwealth Government that a mutual agreement was preferable to legislation, and it offered to discuss any proposals to that end. It urged that legislation should not involve unfair racial discrimination, and that Japanese should be treated as Europeans. It stated also that it "had no desire to send the working man to Australia." About the same time the Japanese Consul in Australia wrote to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth that, "My Government recognizes distinctly the right of the Government of Australia to limit in any way it thinks fit the number of those persons who may be allowed to land and settle in Australia, and also to draw distinction between persons who may or may not be admitted. As Japan is under no necessity to find an outlet for her population, my Government would readily consent to any arrangement by which all that Australia seeks, so far as the Japanese are concerned, would be at once conceded."

The Immigration Restriction Bill, however, was introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament and the Prime Minister did not hesitate to say that it was aimed specially at the danger from Japan. The Bill authorized the putting to any person desiring to enter Australia of a dictation test in a European language. The Japanese Government protested both to the Australian and the British Governments, but the bill became law. It was administered tactfully, however, and in 1905 it was possible to arrange a sort of "Gentlemen's Agreement" with Japan, similar to that which had been made by Queensland. Under this arrangement, which has worked smoothly ever since, Japan issues passports for Australia to none but merchants, students and tourists, or Japanese of other occupations (such as those employed in pearling) who have obtained prior permission from the Commonwealth Government, and Australia admits Japanese holding passports without the dictation test being put to them. In the same year the Immigration Restriction Act was amended so as to allow of the test being given in any language, and not only in a European language. There is thus no appearance of discrimination on the face of the law, and as the actual arrangements for carrying it out in regard to Japanese subjects were made in an agreement into which the Japanese Government entered voluntarily, it can be said that the "face" of that Government has been "saved." [i]

There is no ground for thinking that the existing law and its administration are unsatisfactory to the Japanese Government. If it has found any reason for dissatisfaction in the knowledge that, while the entrance of Japanese is subject to control, persons of white race have been admitted without passports and without inquiry as to whether or not they were merchants, students or tourists, that dissatisfaction must have been diminished by the restrictions lately imposed by the Commonwealth Government on the entry of Maltese (who are British subjects) and other peoples of southern Europe.

In no country did the success of Japan against Russia in 1905 produce a greater impression than in Australia. That war revealed to us a power with vast and efficient armaments on land and sea, distant only 2000 to 3000 miles from our northern coast, its population of unexampled patriotism, ten times as numerous as ours and already as large as its resources seemed able to support. Only four years before, we had adopted a policy with which Japan had recorded her "high dissatisfaction." Australian opinion was poorly informed of Japan's history and economic position, and it seemed natural to suppose that she might desire an outlet to the south, and that our policy of restricting immigration would give her a pretext for fastening a quarrel on us. In this state of mind Australians began to hear rumors of Japanese espionage in two areas of great importance for our defense against an invader from the Pacific -- the coast to the north of Sydney in New South Wales, and the Great Barrier Reef which stretches for over a thousand miles along the coast of Queensland. Doubtless the rumors grew in the telling, but there seems no reason to doubt that between 1905 and 1910 a number of Japanese did busy themselves in these localities in collecting information useful to the naval and military staffs of a foreign power. If it be taken for granted that these men were in the pay of their country, we assume no more than it is well known Japan did in many countries. It was an era of espionage, by Great Britain and Germany, to name no others, as well as by Japan. All over the world nations were engaged in collecting naval and military information regarding other states, no matter how remote might be the likelihood of any quarrel between them. Indeed the practice was so general that the presence of one country's spies in another country was of very slight value as evidence of any hostile intention. Australians, however, had had little previous experience of being spied upon, and were not disposed to qualify their impressions by any general reflections on the significance of espionage in general. It was taken for granted that Japanese had been sent by their Government to spy on Australia, and that this was a preliminary to the making of plans and to a subsequent attack. So the habit became fixed of regarding Japan as our future enemy. This attitude toward Japan led in 1909 to the adoption of compulsory training of all youths for military service (it is still the principal obstacle to the generally desired abolition of compulsory training) and was responsible in large part for the formation in 1910 of an Australian navy separate from that of Great Britain.

Quick as was the response of Japan in 1914 to Great Britain's call to her to join in the war in fulfillment of her obligations under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and useful as was the help given by the Japanese navy, the events of the war period increased rather than diminished Australia's suspicion of Japan. In part this was due to Japan's actions in China, particularly to the twenty-one demands of 1915, and in part to the anti-British campaign in the Japanese press in 1915 and 1916. But it was due also to events more directly affecting the relations of the two countries. Of these the most important were connected with the immigration question. During the war there arose in Australia a belief that Japan had demanded free admission for her subjects, or that she would make this demand after the war. That such a belief was possible was due partly to the Commonwealth Government having withheld from the public information that might well have been published, and partly to the suspicions which were fostered through the prevention of discussion under the war censorship. The facts have not yet been published by the Commonwealth Government, but from Japanese sources it is possible to tell the story of what occurred.

In 1911, about the time when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed for the last time, Great Britain and Japan had entered into a new commercial treaty, in place of that of 1894. The new treaty was primarily only a treaty conferring rights on British subjects in Japan and on Japanese subjects in the United Kingdom; and, like all commercial treaties into which Great Britain had entered since 1880, it conferred no rights within the self governing Dominions. There was provision for its extension to any of them, if a Dominion so desired. It also contained an agreement as to custom tariffs on imports from the United Kingdom to Japan, and from Japan to Great Britain, and this also could be extended to any Dominion which adhered to the Treaty.

Australia had for several years followed the policy of declining to adhere to any new commercial treaties made by the British Government, as well as of obtaining release from any old commercial treaties still binding on her. In pursuance of this policy, the Commonwealth Government decided not to adhere to the treaty between Great Britain and Japan. This decision was of course accepted by the Japanese Government, but after the outbreak of war in 1914 Japanese trade with Australia grew rapidly, and the Government of Japan became desirous of obtaining the benefits as to Customs tariff and other matters which adhesion by Australia would have entailed. What passed between the Australian and Japanese Governments has never been published by the Australian Government, and references to it were discouraged by the censorship during the war. But in Japan statements on the subject were made by Ministers in the Diet and were freely discussed in the press. From these sources, whose accuracy there is no reason to doubt, it appears that through the Consul General in Australia, and through its Ambassador in London, who saw the Commonwealth Prime Minister, Mr. W. M. Hughes, during his visit to England in 1916, the Japanese Government proposed that Australia should adhere to the treaty. But at the same time it stated that it recognized that the Commonwealth might be reluctant to do so owing to its anxiety about the immigration of Japanese. Accordingly the Japanese Government gave an assurance that it had no intention to depart from its long established policy of not sending any emigrants to Australia, and it offered, if Australia adhered to the treaty, to enter into an agreement like those already made in similar circumstances with the United States and Canada. If this proposal had been carried out, the actual arrangements for the admission of Japanese would have remained unaffected, although their basis would have been different. Instead of there being a law under which Australia had means of excluding all Japanese, modified by an agreement that laborers, artisans and the like were to be excluded, there would have been a treaty giving all Japanese the right of entry, but modified by an agreement that laborers, artisans and the like were not to have the benefit of it. Under either arrangement, only Japanese of the classes not objected to by Australia would have been admitted.

This is the account of the matter that is to be derived from Japanese sources, and there is no reason to think it is not accurate. But a very different story of what had occurred became current in Australia. The Prime Minister, Mr. Hughes, came back from London in August, 1916, impressed with the gravity of the struggle that was before the Allies, and determined that Australia should pull her full weight in the war. To this end he advocated conscription; but it became understood that in doing so he had in mind not only the war in Europe but some question with Japan. Shortly after his return, Mr. Hughes addressed a meeting of members of both Houses of Parliament. The proceedings were not published, but it was currently reported and widely believed that an authoritative statement had been made to the meeting that Japan would challenge the White Australia policy after the war, that Australia would then need the help of the rest of the Empire, and that if she wished to be sure of getting it she must now throw her full strength into the war in Europe. Rumors of this statement doubtless exaggerated in the telling, were current in the community, but the censorship made any discussion of the facts impossible.

Another question which alarmed Australia was the occupation by Japan of the Marshall, Caroline and other groups of islands, former German possessions in the Pacific north of the equator. These, with other German possessions south of the equator, were surrendered to an Australian force in September, 1914, but were not then occupied. In October, in the course of naval operations against German ships, the Japanese navy occupied them. It was understood in Australia that the Japanese had gone into occupation only until Australia could assume control, and an expedition was sent from Australia to take over the islands; but it was stopped before it reached the equator. In Japan it was assumed from the first that the islands had passed into the permanent keeping of that country; while in Australia it was taken for granted that, in virtue of the surrender to Australia, the islands belonged to us. So the continued occupation of the Japanese, as well as the obstacles which Japanese officials placed in the way of Australian firms who for many years had traded with the islands, caused much irritation. But early in 1917, unknown to the Australian public, the Commonwealth Government assented to an arrangement for the future disposal of the islands. The Allies, hard pressed by the German submarines, had asked Japan for additional warships, and Japan had taken the opportunity to ask for assurances of Allied support in keeping the German leases in Shantung and the German islands north of the equator. The Allies, including Great Britain, gave the assurances asked for, and so the question was settled; but nothing of this was known to the Australian public.

During the war, Japanese warships gave some assistance in escorting Australian troop-ships across the Indian Ocean and in patrolling in Australian waters, although the Japanese Admirals were unable to give much help at the time it was most needed, when German raiders were near our coast. The extent of the help given by Japan had necessarily to be kept from the public, and of course nothing was known as to the degree of its efficiency. Nevertheless, the presence of Japanese warships was regarded with great uneasiness. In turn, the lack of cordiality on the part of Australia became known in Japan and caused some comment in the Japanese press.

The Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Hughes, left Australia early in 1918 for Europe, in readiness for the anticipated Peace Conference. On his way he delivered a speech in New York in which he said that, "if Australia is to continue a free Commonwealth she must have guarantees against a future aggression. This involves the Australian Monroe Doctrine in the South Pacific. . . . We seek America's steadfast coöperation, and we are committed by inexorable circumstances to the doctrine 'Hands off the Pacific.'" Later in London he repeated this phrase and said that, "against all predatory nations we shall strive to give this doctrine effect to the last ounce of effort at our disposal." The Japanese press did not fail to perceive that Japan was the aggressor whom Mr. Hughes had in mind, and much indignant comment was published. At the Peace Conference itself Mr. Hughes by his speeches and interviews reinforced the impression he had already given, and for a time he and the country he represented were treated in the Japanese papers as the chief opponents of the legitimate claims of Japan.

The part which Japan took at the Conference was far from reassuring to Australia. First, there was Japan's advocacy of a declaration of racial equality, which few in Australia had expected. President Wilson's plans for a better world after the war were of course as widely read in Japan as elsewhere, and the Japanese saw that now was an opportunity to bring before the world the grievance which they suffered through their unequal treatment in various foreign countries, especially in the United States. A movement to right these grievances by a declaration of racial equality might not only soften the affront which California had given to their dignity but might also assist Japan to that hegemony of the Asiatic peoples to which many Japanese aspired. Accordingly the racial equality movement swept the country. This movement sought a declaration by the Peace Conference of the equality of the peoples of all countries; and there is little doubt that in the popular view in Japan it was intended to involve also the abolition of all restrictions on the entry of Japanese into foreign countries.

A general declaration of racial equality was consonant with the long declared policy of the Japanese Government. All through the reign of the Emperor Meiji the Government had devoted itself to internal reforms and to the strengthening of the national power so as to secure recognition as an equal of other countries. Japan had now obtained a place as one of the great powers, and a formal declaration of the equality of the peoples of all races would crown its achievement. Accordingly the Japanese delegates to the Peace Conference received authority to propose such a declaration in general terms. But the Japanese Government could not go further and claim the abolition of all restrictions on the immigration of Japanese into foreign countries, for it practiced and intended to continue such restrictions against Chinese and other foreign laborers who might wish to settle in Japan. It seems, then, that the proposed declaration was not intended as a challenge to the right of any country to control immigration.

In February, 1919, the Japanese delegates who were taking part in the discussion of the draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations proposed that the Covenant should include a clause binding all nations to accord "equal and just treatment in every respect" to the nationals of other countries. In this form the proposal did not meet with support, being thought too wide. Later the Japanese proposed to insert in the preamble of the Covenant a reference to "the indorsement of the principle of the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals." This proposal was supported by the delegates of a majority of the countries. But Mr. W. M. Hughes, scenting danger to the White Australia policy, opposed it vigorously, and his speeches and interviews gained him great notoriety in Japan. At one stage of the discussion it was suggested to the Japanese that immigration should be excluded by express words from the scope of the amendment; but to this the Japanese would not agree, although they stated privately that immigration was a matter for domestic legislation free from the control of the League. Ultimately the proposed amendment was withdrawn. But the refusal of the Japanese to declare expressly that the control of immigration must be decided by each country for itself has been thought to be evidence of an intention to maintain the contrary if opportunity offered. A little knowledge of Japanese affairs might have dispelled this suspicion. In reality the refusal of the Japanese delegates was probably due to the cicrumstances of home politics. Although Japan is far from being a country in which the rulers are swayed by popular agitation, the delegates were not indifferent to the excited state of public opinion in Japan. They knew that the racial equality movement was supported by a society of patriots which had committed more than one political murder; and it seems probable that their refusal to exclude immigration from their amendment was due in part to fears for their own safety.

In Australia, however, it was taken for granted that the Japanese had planned to bring about control by the League of legislation restricting immigration; and the subsequent declaration in favor of racial equality made by Japan at the First Assembly of the League, and the amendments in regard to matters of domestic jurisdiction proposed in the draft Protocol at the Fifth Assembly, have confirmed this popular suspicion.

During the Peace Conference the disposal of the German islands north of the equator also came up, and the Australian public, ignorant of the arrangements of 1917, learned with dismay that the islands were to remain under the permanent control of Japan. Australia, it was true, was to have similar control over the neighboring islands south of the equator. Each country was to exercise jurisdiction as mandatory from the League of Nations -- a plan which Mr. Hughes, an implacable foe of many of President Wilson's proposals, opposed bitterly, not realizing that so long as Japan held her islands under a mandate that forbade fortifications, Australia had much more security against an attack than if she had been able herself to fortify the islands south of the equator. Although the allocation of the mandates was settled in May 1919, it was not till the end of 1920 that the terms were defined. During the first two or three years of the Australian occupation of the German islands, the Australian administration had treated the Japanese on terms of equality and indeed money assistance was given in a time of commercial stress to the principal Japanese trader in the islands. But after 1917 the fears which influenced the Hughes Government were reflected in the attitude of the island administration. Exports from the islands to Japan were restricted, Japanese ships were not permitted to carry cargo between the islands and Australia, and restrictions were placed on the entry of Japanese. Little was published about these matters in Australia, but there was frequent reference to them in the Japanese press, and they led the Japanese Government to oppose the issuance of a mandate in the form contemplated by the Peace Treaty, which did not ensure the open door and equality of rights in regard to residence and trade. Ultimately Japan withdrew her opposition, but made a declaration that she did not acquiesce in the discriminating treatment of Japanese, and that she did not abandon her claim that the rights and interests enjoyed by Japanese subjects in the past should be fully respected. A few months after the issuance of the mandate a new administration was set up in the islands and the Immigration Restriction Act was put in force.

There was no question of any importance in dispute between the Australian and Japanese Governments after the end of 1920, and during 1921 Mr. Hughes, who was still Prime Minister, made speeches which atoned for what he had said in previous years. During the discussion of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at the Imperial Conference held in London in that year he took a friendly attitude towards Japan. The treaties into which Japan entered at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, in which she undertook to respect the rights of the British Empire in relation to Australia and New Zealand and to submit to a conference of the parties to the treaty controversies not involving matters of domestic jurisdiction that affected such rights and in which she joined in defining a non-fortification area in the Pacific, were entirely satisfactory to Australia, and it seemed that all further fears about Japan could be put aside. The Commonwealth Government kept its expenditure on defense at a low level, and compulsory military training was not resumed on the pre-war scale.

But there were those in Australia who were ready to revive the old fears and they found support in the press, particularly in those evening papers of the large cities which are always ready to create a scare. Japan continued to build warships within the limits allowed by the Washington Treaty, and articles soon appeared suggesting that these might be used against Australia. The Labor Party, which has been in opposition in the Commonwealth Parliament since 1916, and which until a few years ago was foremost in supporting preparations against an attack by Japan, now took the view that there was no danger from that quarter. But the present Prime Minister, Mr. Bruce, who succeeded Mr. Hughes in 1923, seemed to accept the view of his naval and military advisers who desired that Australian armaments should be maintained at the pre-war scale. Although he has not made any public comments on the attitude of Japan to Australia, Mr. Bruce has strongly supported the proposal of the British Government to form a first class naval base at Singapore -- a work which can serve no purpose if there is not any danger from Japan, and which seems likely to lead Japan into the further building of warships.

Perhaps enough has now been written to show that there is little or nothing in the past conduct of Japan to support the view which many Australians hold that she will challenge the White Australia policy and that she envisages the future domination of Australia. It seems safe to conclude that we are of so little importance to her that we scarcely enter into her policy. But there is still the question whether we may become of more importance to her in the future. The answer to this question seems to depend on her economic situation and this in turn depends on her future population. Without entering a discussion foreign to the main purpose of this article, it can be said that most of Japan's economic needs are supplied by the neighboring mainland of Asia. There is only one commodity of importance, namely wool of the finer qualities, which she need get from Australia. And Australia is of small consequence to her as a market. Her economic needs may lead her into a policy threatening to China and other neighboring countries, but they seem quite unlikely to affect her relations with Australia. There remains the problem of population and food. If the historians can be trusted, this problem was as grave 300 years ago, when Japan had only a quarter of her present population, as it is now with nearly 60 million people in her main islands. Even now imports and exports of food almost balance one another. An increase of the cultivated area is still taking place, and the use of chemical manures would add to the crops. If the food resources of south Manchuria and of the waters off the Siberian coast be included with her own, it will be seen that Japan is very far from a shortage of food. Moreover, it should not be taken for granted that her population will continue to increase at its recent rate. For a century and a half before America compelled her in 1853 to resume intercourse with foreign nations, her population was almost stationary. The increased prosperity that has accompanied the industrialization of Japan brought about a rapid increase, as did the similar economic change in Europe. But it may be doubted whether the increase will continue at so rapid a rate. In Europe the industrial situation seems now to have led to a much slower rate of increase, and it may be expected that in Japan also increasing economic stress will slow down the birth rate. If it does not, or if political or other difficulties shut Japan out from the markets of China, we may expect that her people, who at present show little inclination to leave their country, will seek an outlet overseas. But that outlet need not be in Australia; for South America is open to them, and those who have gone there are very prosperous. In general, then, the danger to Australia from an increase of population in Japan seems remote, and should not affect Australia's attitude toward her.

In conclusion, it may be pointed out that this survey has interest even for those not concerned with the relations of the two countries. For, like the relations between more important countries, this small section of international life has been influenced by lack of knowledge and understanding. Australian public men who have dealt with the questions that have arisen between Australia and Japan have had little opportunity to understand Japanese policy. Living far removed from the centre of international intercourse, and unaccustomed to deal with external questions, they have been ready to suppose that Australia was of great importance to Japan, and ready to treat her every act with suspicion. The press -- particularly those evening papers which are in unscrupulous hands -- has been ready to inflame the public. The people have been as unqualified as have their public representatives to form a calm judgment; and they have been hindered rather than helped by the failure of the Government to give out adequate information, and especially by its attempt during the war to suppress publication both of facts and comment. But, here as elsewhere in the world, it may be hoped that an increase in knowledge will enable us to avoid some at least of the causes that produce quarrels between nations.

[i]The following figures of the number of non-whites and half-castes (other than aborigines of Australia) recorded at the last four censuses show that the Immigration Restriction Act has achieved its purpose:

1891 1901 1911 1921
Chinese 38,100 33,600 25,800 20,800
Japanese 400 3,600 3,600 2,900
Others 3,700 14,800 12,900 13,300
------ ------ ------ ------
Total 42,200 52,000 42,300 37,000

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  • E. L. PIESSE, for some time Director of the Pacific Branch in the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Department; member of the Australian staff at the Washington Conference
  • More By E. L. Piesse