THE war power of a nation is the product of both mental and material forces. In measuring Japan's capacity to sustain war we must take account of both categories of forces -- what the Japanese people believe and will to do, and what they have to do it with. We should also remember that war power and industrial power, while closely related, are not identical. It may happen that a nation poorly endowed with resources but possessed of an ironbound will may accumulate enough materials in advance to enable it to prevail in war, at least for a time, over a nation richer in materials but suffering at the start from a weaker will or a less united purpose.
These considerations apply to the relative situation of Japan and the United States today. To make any reasonable guess as to the probable length of the present struggle we must ask two questions: Can the will of the Japanese be broken or bent while we maintain ours? Can Japan develop the raw materials in the areas occupied by her forces, in sufficient quantity and at a sufficiently rapid rate, to replenish her prewar stocks before they are exhausted?
A complete analysis of all the factors which will determine the answer to either question is beyond the scope of an article. Regarding the first, it will be sufficient to say here that the war would not have begun, at least when it did, if the Japanese had not been misled by appearances into believing that we had neither the interest in the Far East nor the unity of purpose necessary to sustain a long and bitter war there. The Japanese generals constantly preached the necessity of spiritual mobilization. They believed we were incapable of developing this in sufficient degree and quickly enough to affect the result of the war. Our implacable determination to crush Japanese militarism is now clear. It will have a strong psychological effect on the Japanese. But whether people or
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