The Russian Military’s People Problem
It’s Hard for Moscow to Win While Mistreating Its Soldiers
I REMEMBER standing once in a West African forest where thin, silver trees loomed straight and smooth in the air. There were two men with me. One was a black man, Solomon Hood, United States Minister to Liberia; a man of utter devotion, whose solicitude for the welfare of Liberia was like a sharp pain driving him on. And he thought he had found the solution. The solution was the white man beside us. He was a rubber expert sent by the Firestone Corporation of the United States to see if rubber could be grown in Liberia.
Those were rather ticklish times in the rubber situation. England was attempting to corner the world's production and prices were shooting up. Henry Ford flew south to seek plantations. Edison experimented with new plants. Firestone sent his representative to Liberia.
Most people cannot easily visualize the peculiarly helpless position of a small outland in the modern world of industry. It seems that a rich country like Liberia ought easily to be self-supporting and to secure machinery, experts and modern luxuries in return for its raw material. But this is much more easily said than done. In the first place, it must raise the raw materials which the world at the moment demands, and it often finds that the price of its product is so manipulated that absolutely no dependence can be put on it. In fact, between changing and disappearing markets, freight-carrying monopolies, high cost of machinery, and absence of expert knowledge, Liberia, like many other small, isolated countries, has been in continual financial difficulties. She needs expert advice; but expert advice from white men, accompanied by invested capital, means loss of political power. And Liberia is jealous of her independence -- jealous and proud. Indeed, the record of peace, efficiency and ability made by this little poverty-stricken settlement of the rejected and despised, sitting on the edge of Africa and fighting the world in order to be let alone, is, despite querulous criticism, one of the most heartening efforts in human history.
Five times Liberia has been tempted to seek salvation in loans of foreign capital. In 1870 a loan of $500,000 was placed in London, but actually she received less than $75,000, for which she eventually paid nearly $500,000 with interest. For a long time Liberia did not again consider borrowing money. Meanwhile she was held up to criticism and ridicule as an undeveloped country. European Powers, which were partitioning Africa, began to press in upon her. France sliced off territory on one side and England on the other. Both cut off her hinterland, which ought to have extended back to Lake Chad. Then, Sir Harry Johnston, representing English interests, came in 1906. He formed the Liberian Development Company, which was to invest £100,000, and Liberia was to guarantee the bonds. All that came of this investment, except increased debt for Liberia, was proof, through the planting of this little forest where I stood, that a good rubber tree would grow in Liberia; and this was the report of the Firestone expert in 1923.
Just before the World War industrial aggression began again. The Sunlight Soap interests in Great Britain tried to get a concession which would monopolize the palm oil. When Liberia resisted, England began to press for payment of Liberian debts which had been defaulted. Sedition spread among the frontier force, and it looked as though France or England was on the point of seizing the country. Liberia moved swiftly. She sent a delegation to America, which appealed to Booker T. Washington. Mr. Washington appealed to Theodore Roosevelt. Theodore Roosevelt needed the Negro vote, and he appointed a Liberian commission. The commission went out and made negotiations for a refunding of the Liberian debt. A new loan of $2,000,000 was raised at 5 percent. It looked as though at last Liberia had got a start, because, while a Financial Adviser with large powers was the string attached to this new loan, nevertheless there was no American disposition to interfere with Liberian independence.
Then suddenly came the World War and smashed all these dreams. Liberia, despite her large German trade, was forced to declare in favor of the Allies. One inducement was a loan promised her by the United States Government. Before this went through, however, the war was over and Congress refused to confirm the loan. Again Liberia was on the rocks. She sent another delegation over to the United States, headed by President King, but little was accomplished.
For five or six years Liberia staggered on during the reaction from the World War, but finally began to make progress between 1922 and 1925. "The economic and financial future of the country looked brighter than for many years." [i] But she was handicapped. She needed roads, machinery, local industry. She still feared foreign capital, but she needed it.
Then came Solomon Porter Hood, as United States Minister. He knew Firestone slightly. He corresponded with him. The rubber situation developed. King was reëlected President, and at his inauguration, as a gesture of good will, I was designated by cable to act as Special Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary. The appointment was purely ornamental, but I did all I could to coöperate with Hood and Africa and Liberia and tell them of the tremendous interest which American colored people had in them.
Firestone determined to enter into contract with Liberia to start rubber plantations, and began negotiations. On my return to the United States I wrote to him. I know what modern capital does to poor and colored peoples. I know what European imperialism has done to Asia and Africa; but, nevertheless, I had not then lost faith in the capitalistic system, and I believed that it was possible for a great corporation, headed by a man of vision, to go into a country with something more than the mere ideal of profit. I tried to state this to Mr. Firestone. I intimated that the one thing above all which he must avoid was taking capital into a small country and putting it under the control of officials who despised the natives and organized ruthless exploitation. I tried to point out that by using trained American Negroes he might avoid this situation in Liberia, and have a more normal development by putting in the hands of people of the same race, local and immigrant, such power over the invested capital as would divert it, at least to some extent, toward ends of social welfare as well as towards profit. I had no reply to my letter. Perhaps it never got by the assistant secretary. When I heard of the terms which Firestone demanded in Liberia my heart began to fall. The Liberians resisted, and if the leading officials had had their way, the contract would never have been signed.
Firestone presented a contract which gave his company the right to select wherever he wished in Liberia one million acres of land at a nominal rental of only 6 cents an acre, and he insisted that because of certain public improvements Liberia must have more money; particularly, a modern harbor must be built, so that passengers and freight would not have to take that gloriously exciting but dangerous and costly ride in the surf boats over the bar. This insistence upon a loan increased the opposition in Liberia, but the Firestone Company refused to come on any other terms. Moreover, Liberia recognized that her only protection against the territorial and economic aggression of France and England lay in the attitude of America, and she was certain that if an American loan were made the United States would protect Liberia in order to safeguard the loan. In spite, therefore, of bitter opposition on the part of many high officials, and without the knowledge of even some of the cabinet officers, the Firestone contract was signed in September 1926. Raymond L. Buell says: "In response to the question why they agreed to this loan in the face of early opposition and manifestly unfavorable terms, all of them gave the same reply: The State Department of the United States told us to accept this loan." [ii]
The only concession that Liberia apparently obtained was that the loan should be made not by the Firestone Corporation but by some other American corporation. That was easily adjusted. In came the National City Bank. And when the mists cleared away, the "Finance Corporation," which made the loan, the Firestone Rubber Company, and the new local bank, known as the "United States Trading Company," all in reality represented one and the same investment of capital by Firestone. Liberia was to receive a 7 percent loan of $2,500,000, with the right to increase this eventually to $5,000,000. The first instalment was marketed at 90, giving $2,027,700 in actual receipts.
This sum was expended to repay $1,146,715 in outstanding 5 percent bonds, $175,000 in internal bonds, mostly at 3 percent, and to meet various other debts. Of the balance, $11,730 was spent for health and sanitation and $156,439 for public works. There is still today available from this loan a balance of $367,466, which the Firestone interests have not yet advanced. In addition to this, a corps of financial experts was to be engaged consisting of a Financial Adviser at $12,500 and five assistants at a total annual salary of $32,000. These salaries were to be paid by the Liberian Government.
The local Firestone bank was to act as financial agent. The loan charges, including interest on the bonds, amortization expenses, and salaries of fiscal officers, in 1928 absorbed 20 percent of the total revenue of Liberia; in 1929, 26 percent; in 1930, 32 percent; in 1931, 54.9 percent; and for 1932, according to an official statement, "nearly the whole revenue intake of the government." A member of the American Legation in Liberia has estimated that Liberia is really paying 17 percent for the loan; and a high official of the State Department in the United States was so alarmed when he understood the details of the contract that he held up a somewhat similar engineering contract in Abyssinia, and said: "There's not going to be another such contract as the Liberian one while I am here." [iii]
The sudden influx of cash to Liberia in 1926 started a boom. The country was stirred as never before by a vision of prosperity. Mr. Buell, who was there then, wrote: "Business has begun to 'hum.' More hard money is in circulation than ever before. While most of this goes to private interests, the government has already also secured a few thousand dollars a year additional revenue. Many American missionaries and educators are en-heartened; they now believe that Liberia will survive." [iv]
The American financial experts allowed and encouraged expansion. Salaries were raised, including that of the Financial Adviser, who under the arrangements for the debt service before the advent of the Firestones had been getting $5,000; that was now raised to $12,500. The salaries of Liberian officials were increased. "The total government budget in 1925-26 was $859,464; in 1927-28, $1,529,840; in 1928-29, $1,654,869. In other words, there came a period of inflation and boom." [v] Moreover, other expenditures allowed by the financial experts were not wise. "The distressing thing is that the above mentioned amount of $156,000 [for public works] has been squandered as a result of the deplorable advice given to the Liberian Republic by the Financial Adviser at that time in office." [vi] This expert was subsequently transferred to Haiti by the United States Government to take care of that country's American debt.
Hardly had apparent prosperity come to Liberia than the shadow of the Great Depression began to move across the world. The British rubber monopoly broke. The price of rubber fell from 72 cents to 5 cents. Far from needing a million acres, Firestone took only 50,000 and cut wages of his laborers in half, from a shilling to 6 pence a day; he did practically nothing about the promised $300,000 harbor. As the commercial and industrial situation began to tighten, opposition began to seethe in Liberia. The former opponents of the loan became vocal. It was pointed out by the opposition that President King was getting rich, not simply by his connection with the Firestone project, but by other transactions; and high government officials were implicated with him. Spanish and French interests appeared in Monrovia and were said to have large sums in cash to buy labor for French Gabun and Spanish Fernando Po.
Now labor supply for modern industry in Africa always tends to approximate slavery because it is bound up with the clan organization of the tribes. In the African tribe there is no free labor capable of entering into an individual labor contract. Only the tribal chief can assign members of the tribe to work, and this brings widespread misapprehension and contradiction. Black Senegalese troops "volunteered" for the French Army during the World War; that means that chiefs were induced to designate black soldiers for use in the World War, but it does not mean that these individuals necessarily wanted to go. They obeyed -- had to obey -- the tribal mandate. Thus, the Liberian Labor Bureau established in 1912, but not operative until 1926, supplied labor for the Firestone Company; and for this labor fees were paid the chiefs. As Mr. Buell says: "Under this system, which is similar to that which has produced wholesale compulsory labor in other parts of Africa, the Firestone Plantations Company is making it financially worth while for the government and for the chiefs to keep the plantations supplied." [vii]
But Liberia has a comparatively small population, and when France and Spain began to bid for labor the Firestone Corporation saw its labor supply threatened with diminution and its business costs rising. It therefore, to put it mildly, offered no objection to the accusations heard in Liberia against government officials in connection with slave-trading. These accusations became so sharp that finally Liberia was compelled to take notice, especially when the United States drew her attention to these charges in June 1929; and in September of that year she offered to allow an International Commission of Inquiry, under the League of Nations, to investigate conditions.
The League of Nations appointed a committee, headed by Dr. Cuthbert Christy, an Englishman. A colored American, Dr. Charles S. Johnson, appointed by President Hoover, and the grand old man, the Honorable Arthur Barclay, one of the finest products of Liberia, were the other two members. This Commission made its report in 1930.[viii] On the whole it was thorough and frank. The Commission made a careful investigation and proved that domestic slavery existed among the more primitive Liberian tribes; that there was pawning of children; and especially that laborers were recruited among the tribes and sent out of the country to the French colony of Gabun and to the Spanish colony of Fernando Po. Military force had been used, and President King, Vice-President Yancy and some other officials were involved in the accusations of profit-sharing from the proceeds of this slave-trade. Members of the frontier force were used in obtaining this labor, and also in extortion and illegal taxation.
The Report of the International Commission of Enquiry was filed at Monrovia on September 8, 1930. The legislature met the second Monday of October, and President King gave his annual message October 30. After the report and various petitions had been received, a select committee of the House of Representatives reported December 2, and on adoption of that report President King, Vice-President Yancy and other officials were retired from office. Edwin Barclay, Secretary of State, nephew of Arthur Barclay, one of the Commission, was selected to fill out the unexpired term, and took the oath on December 3.
President Barclay had not been involved in the charges concerning slave-trading, although he was a member of President King's cabinet. The only mention made of him in the report was as protesting against some of the slave-trading activities. He seemed the best man for the position. Considering the power of President King and his friends, Liberia acted as quickly as could be expected. But the United States was singularly impatient. Before President King was retired, the Secretary of State on November 17 sent a protest urging action. President King presented this protest to the legislature. Thereupon the Legislature passed acts prohibiting the export of contract labor overseas; providing for the reorganization of the hinterland; forbidding pawning; establishing a public health and sanitary service; and permitting unrestricted trade with the interior.
Despite this, the United States refused to recognize President Barclay and united with the British and German legations on January 21, 1931, to present notes to the Government of Liberia demanding that it ask the Council of the League of Nations to appoint an International Governing Commission to take over Liberia and administer the affairs of the country. President Barclay replied that he could not do this without violating his oath of office, but that he would ask the League of Nations to nominate capable persons to help in reorganizing the country. The League thereupon appointed a special committee of the Council, on which a representative of the United States Government, Mr. Samuel Reber, was to sit.
Meantime, the full force of the depression had struck Liberia. Prices fell. The value of Liberian exports dropped from $1,497,214 in 1927 to $856,759 in 1930. Salaries of Liberian officials were reduced on three occasions (in one case more than 50 percent), and the Liberian Secretary of State said in 1932 that "most salaries had not been paid at all during the last seventeen months." At the same time, the debt service was absorbing larger and larger proportions of the whole income of the country.
Liberia had asked that experts be appointed who were not from countries which had colonies. She wanted people with open minds. But the League ignored that request, and March 3, 1931, appointed M. R. Brunot, a Frenchman, an expert in general administration; M. Th. Ligthart, a Dutchman, a financial expert; and Dr. M. D. Mackenzie, an Englishman, an expert in medical and public health questions. This committee of experts studied documents during March and April. They reached Liberia June 13 and left July 26, 1931, working "throughout in close contact with the Liberian Government," which "endeavored to assist us and supplied us with such information as it possessed." [ix] Their report consisted of a short, general description of the land and people and the form of government. It is notable that of the 50 pages of report and appendices, only one-third of a page is devoted to the question of slavery, practically the whole report being on economic conditions and the Firestone contract. With regard to the abolition of slavery and forced labor it was written: ". . . the experts on their arrival in Monrovia found that the Liberian Government had already passed laws forbidding slavery and forced labor, and actually the experts found that the exportation of forced labor had been suppressed." [x]
The United States, in the meantime, had complained that native witnesses against the Liberian Government had been intimidated and punished, but the League of Nations and the English Government both investigated this charge and Lord Cecil said on May 17: "Neither of the two reports contained evidence of such allegations." [xi] There was trouble, serious trouble, with the Krus; but it was historical and administrative and connected with the present only in so far as the Krus thought the Liberian Government had been superseded by foreign control. The Liberian Government reported also that it had taken action to try to meet every recommendation made by the Christy Commission.
The report of the experts in presenting their plan of relief repeatedly emphasized and dwelt upon the difficulties presented by the Firestone contract and its one-sided character: "Reckoning that an area of 50,000 acres will shortly have been planted, it will take about five years for the whole plantation to reach its full output. If the crop is estimated at 400 pounds per acre, the exports will amount to about 9,000 tons. The price of rubber at New York is at present about 5½ cents per pound. But even assuming a price of 20 cents per pound -- which in present circumstances seems impossible to attain in five years -- the crop would fetch $4,032,000, of which the Liberian Republic would receive 1 percent, or $40,320. In addition, Firestone pays a rental of 6 cents per acre, which gives $3,000. The Republic of Liberia thus receives from Firestone $43,320, an amount which is not sufficient even to pay the officials responsible for the service of the loan, $53,650. If the contributions to be paid by Firestone are reckoned on the basis of the present price of 5½ cents per pound for rubber, the amount is only $13,188 instead of $43,320." [xii]
The Committee recommended an elaborate plan of rehabilitation based on arrangements to secure the second half of the Firestone loan of $2,500,000. They would then reduce the expenses of the Liberian Government by $100,000 and employ twenty-one foreign experts, at a total cost, with expenses and geographical and mineralogical surveys, public health, and roads and bridges, of $398,000 a year. Nothing was allowed for education in the initial years of the plan, although "education alone, of course, will enable the Liberian Republic to attain its ideal and its aim, that of a free and united Negro nation." [xiii] This would make an annual budget of $950,000, of which $624,350 would go for foreign experts and loan charges.
Liberia objected: "Such a solution would not only not solve the problem, but would rather render the same more acute. . . . A survey of the situation has convinced the Liberian Government that the adoption of the suggestions of the Brunot Commission would powerfully contribute to the financial ruin of the republic, since no one can presently foresee how soon the world economic depression, which has largely been responsible for the present situation, will end." [xiv]
The Committee of the Council of the League of Nations began to consider the experts' report on January 25, 1932, and continued until May 21. Some members immediately put their finger on the Firestone contract and loan as the crucial point: "Was it reasonable," said M. de Madariaga, of Spain, on January 28, "to urge forward reforms in Liberia before they attacked the root of the evil? Would it not be better before considering whether they should or should not introduce reforms, should or should not borrow money, to decide whether the Firestone Company would remain in Liberia or not?" [xv]
The American representative was told by Lord Cecil, who presided over the Committee, that "everyone admitted that some modification of these terms was both necessary and possible." "It was a pity that the Committee could not get in direct touch" with the Firestones. Mr. Reber, while he disclaimed representing the Firestones, "felt in a position to state" that in January he had had "the impression that this Company would modify conditions, but that such modification would depend upon the reforms and the nature of the powers granted to the foreign specialists." He added that it was "essential to submit an idea of these to the Finance Corporation." [xvi] Here the American State Department, the Finance Company and the Firestone Company stand revealed as representing one and the same policy, with the same spokesman.
On May 19 the Committee of the Council finally adopted a curtailed program for Liberia in place of the first plan of the experts. This plan as published May 21 provided a Chief Adviser and eight foreign experts, together with the present Financial Adviser and his aides, at a cost, including roads and surveys, of $188,000. This was based on a radical revision of the Firestone contract; a moratorium on payments; an increase in land rentals, from 6 cents to 50 cents an acre; reduction in the amount of land to be granted; and a reduction of the interest paid on the debt. Labor contracts for the Firestone plantations were to be modified so as to be in accord with the International Slavery Agreements of the League, and decisions of the Chief Adviser could be appealed to the League Council. The total cost of this service was to be about $500,000. The actual income of Liberia for 1931 was $481,429, and to this sum was to be added the unpaid residue of the first Firestone loan. The proposal for an additional loan was dropped.
At the next meeting, which did not take place until September 19, 1932, it was reported that the Liberian Government had accepted the plan in principle, subject to certain reservations, but that the United States still expressed doubt as to the adequacy of the authority which it was proposed to confer upon the Chief Adviser. The amendments suggested by the Liberian Government were not important, being chiefly in the line of cutting down the initial expense, and making it possible for Liberians to act as Deputy Provincial Commissioners.
The Committee was disposed to agree with most of these suggestions. Then suddenly at the meeting of September 20, 1932, the United States proposed to lay aside the whole plan and make instead "a preliminary agreement," based "on the establishment in Liberia of an agency of the League of Nations headed by a Chief Adviser." This Chief Adviser was "to prepare a progressive and practical program of administration and reform to become effective upon the deposit of the text with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations." To this official Liberia was to grant "ample and adequate authority," and in case of a difference of opinion, "the opinion of the Chief Adviser shall rule except that Liberia shall always have the right to appeal to the Council of the League of Nations or to an agency thereof in Geneva for final decision." [xvii]
The Committee was taken aback. Lord Cecil asked how the United States Government proposed to have the Chief Adviser chosen. Mr. Reber explained that his government "would be glad to have an opportunity of expressing its views with regard to the appointment." The Chairman replied that under the ordinary procedure of the League, the United States would be consulted, as would also Liberia; but he wished further enlightenment: "What, for instance, pending an appeal to the Council, would be the fate of a decision reached by the Chief Adviser?" Mr. Reber answered: "The advice of the Adviser would continue to be acted upon until the Council had given its final decision." [xviii]
This brought matters to a standstill, because it meant that when the Council was not in session months might pass before any matter in dispute could be brought up, and that the Chief Adviser would be in effect the real ruler of Liberia. Mr. Grimes, Secretary of State, who was representing Liberia, asked time to consider this totally unexpected amendment. M. Panafieu of France remarked that the American proposal involved a radical change in the procedure adopted by the Council on May 20, and made the Council face a dilemma: "No reforms without money, and no money without reforms." He added that "the Council had presented to Liberia and Firestone interests what seemed to them a fair compromise." "The only reason," he said, "it had asked the Liberian Government first of all to accept in principle the broad outlines of the scheme of assistance had been on account of the reservations made at the time by the Americn representative, and now, at the very moment when the Government of Monrovia had signified its acceptance in principle . . . the Committee was asked to follow a different procedure." [xix] Thereupon the meeting adjourned in order that the delegates might present the matter to their governments. At the meeting on September 23, the Liberian delegation said that the United States Government "contemplates not only the rehabilitation but also the reorganization of Liberia. And that the power proposed was not in accordance with the Liberian constitution. Should the committee then adopt the proposals contained in the said statements, what would become of the Liberian Government?" [xx]
The Committee then made and Liberia accepted a modified statement of the power of the Chief Adviser, by which the Council of the League could suspend a decision pending adjustment by the International Court; also the Committee tried again to get in touch with the Firestone interests, but could not; and were finally told on October 12 that the Firestones could not begin negotiations until November. Lord Cecil, the Chairman, declared at the meeting of October 12 that the Committee found itself in a difficult position. They had essayed to assist Liberia with the full approval of the United States Government. Last May they had reached an agreement and had hoped that the Finance Corporation would send a representative to Geneva to consult with them. It now appeared that although the United States Government had endorsed the general principles of the plan of assistance, the Finance Corporation was not satisfied. "This was a strange attitude for a commercial body to assume towards the League of Nations, and he thought that the Committee of the Council was surely entitled to more courteous treatment." [xxi]
It was at this time that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People heard of the impasse and appealed to the Secretary of State not to insist on a dictator in Liberia at the behest of the Firestone interests. Mr. Stimson made this astonishing reply: "The Firestone interests have no immediate connection with the present problem. Their conduct in Liberia has not been made the subject of criticism by any investigating body. The present problem is not one of business interest, but of order and humanity."
A striking rejoinder to this is the statement made by a member of the Committee at the 66th Session of the Council: "Whenever a powerful commercial concern interfered in a country which was particularly weak economically and politically, there occurred between the economic entity and the political entity a symbiosis which clearly was a very bad thing, not only for the political welfare of the country in question, but also for the general welfare of the world, all countries being interdependent." [xxii]
This, then, is the situation. And because of the impossible position into which the Liberian Government has been forced by the refusal of the United States to recognize it, by the consequent inaction of the League, and by the attitude of the Firestone interests, the Liberian Legislature on December 23, 1932, passed a joint resolution to give notice to the Finance Corporation "that the Government of Liberia can no longer continue the payment of the expenses incident to the service of the loan, and that from June 30, 1932, the payment of interest and amortization is suspended until such time as the revenues of the Government for two consecutive years shall have amounted to six hundred and fifty thousand dollars annually."
The Financial Adviser protested, saying that Liberia's financial plight was not due mainly to the depression but to failure to follow his advice. He advised against "such unfriendly and unreasonable legislation." As a result, and as a dying gesture of the Hoover Administration (assented to, we are told, by President Roosevelt), the United States rushed a Major-General to Liberia, together with an expert from the State Department, to replace the colored Minister, Charles E. Mitchell, who had never been allowed to present his credentials or have any official relations with President Barclay. The official reason for this action was as follows: "The recent violation by Liberia of the loan agreements to which she is a party and her virtual repudiation of this obligation and the security on which large sums have been advanced to her by American interests are the culmination of some years of disagreement."
Liberia is not faultless. She lacks training, experience and thrift. But her chief crime is to be black and poor in a rich, white world; and in precisely that portion of the world where color is ruthlessly exploited as a foundation for American and European wealth. The success of Liberia as a Negro republic would be a blow to the whole colonial slave labor system. Are we starting the United States Army toward Liberia to guarantee the Firestone Company's profits in a falling rubber market or smash another Haiti in the attempt?
[i] R. L. Buell, "The Native Problem in Africa," Vol. II, p. 836.
[ii] Buell, op. cit., p. 845.
[iii] Manuscript Report of Miss Anna Graves. I am deeply indebted to Miss Graves for the privilege of examining her collection of League documents regarding Liberia.
[iv] Buell, op. cit., p. 836.
[v] League of Nations. "Request for Assistance submitted by the Liberian Government." (1932. VII. 7, p. 33. Official No. C. 469. M. 238, 1932, VII.) Referred to hereafter as League of Nations Report.
[vi] Ditto, p. 30-31.
[vii] Buell, op. cit., p. 834.
[viii] League of Nations: International Commission of Enquiry in Liberia. "Communication by the Government of Liberia, dated December 15, 1930, transmitting the Commission's Report." (1930. VI. B. 6. Official No. C. 658. M. 272. 1930. VI.) Referred to hereafter as the Christy Report.
[ix] League of Nations Report, p. 9.
[x] Sixty-Sixth Session of the Council (League of Nations). Minutes of 9th meeting, Feb. 6, 1932 (Official Journal, March 1932, Part II, p. 525).
[xi] Minutes, May 17, page 14. From mimeographed copies of the "Minutes of the Committee of the Council appointed to examine the problem raised by the Liberian Government's request for assistance." Issued by the League of Nations and dated from the 6th meeting, January 25, 1932, to the 25th meeting, October 12, 1932. Referred to hereafter as Minutes, with date of meeting.
[xii] League of Nations Report, p. 32. (The italics are in the Report.)
[xiii] League of Nations Report, pp. 25 and 26.
[xiv] League of Nations Report, p. 60.
[xv] Minutes, January 28, p. 9.
[xvi] Minutes, May 6, p. 22.
[xvii] Minutes, September 22, pp. 3 and 4.
[xviii] Minutes, September 22, p. 5.
[xix] Minutes, September 22, p. 6.
[xx] Minutes, September 23, p. 5-8.
[xxi] Minutes, Oct. 12, p. 5.
[xxii] Official Journal, March 1932 (Part II, p. 526).